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2015 DIGILAW 307 (RAJ)

ASHISH SHARMA v. PRABHU DAYAL

2015-02-03

PRAKASH GUPTA, SUNIL AMBWANI

body2015
Judgment : 1. Application(I.A. No.29617/2014), seeking leave to file the present Special Appeal is allowed. The parties agree that the points and issues raised in this Special Appeal, are covered by the judgment of this Court dated 27.11.2014, in D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No.1536/2014-Hari Kishan Ojha Vs. Prabhu Dayal & Others, and in which, following the judgment in Union of India & Another Vs. Khurshid Ahmed & Ors., dated 05.09.2012 in Special Leave to Appeal(Civil) No.19135-19138 of 2012, the Special Appeal was dismissed. 2. In Khurshid Ahmed's case(supra), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:- “Apart from that, we find that when letter of intents had been issued; bid had been accepted; amount of Rs.30 lacs had been received; interim order had been vacated by the Apex Court; High Court has also vacated the interim order; even Railway Board has issued communication to hand over the possession to successful bidders so as to avoid legal complications, Clause 26.1.2 of the Catering Policy, 2010 cannot come in the way to hand over the possession of the stalls to the petitioner-respondent no.1, highest bidder as there was no fault on his part in completing the contract and in-fact, initially he was deprived of possession of stalls due to the Court's order and once it has been vacated, possession of stalls ought to have been given to him. It is shocking that some incumbents whose licenses stood expired before the bids were invited, are still enjoying possession of stalls at Jaipur Junction, whereas the person, who has made the highest bid, has been kept out and deprived of possession inspite of the fact that his offer has been accepted and letter of intents has been issued. We find no rational behind Catering Policy, 2010, which has been pressed into service by the appellants so as to get rid of the contract entered between the parties under the Catering Policy of 2005. When Clause 26.1.1 saves those contracts which have been operationalized, there was no rhyme or reason so as to differentiate the contracts entered between the parties, which have not been operationlised because of no fault on the part of the incumbent, whose bid has been accepted. When Clause 26.1.1 saves those contracts which have been operationalized, there was no rhyme or reason so as to differentiate the contracts entered between the parties, which have not been operationlised because of no fault on the part of the incumbent, whose bid has been accepted. The classification, which has been made in the Catering Policy, 2010, cannot be said to be reasonable one and in fact, it is intended to defeat the rights which had accrued in favour of the petitioner-respondent no.1, highest bidder to operate contracts, which could not have been dealt with arbitrarily and as a result of operation of new Catering Policy, 2010, it is surprising that without any fresh bid having been invited, incumbents whose licenses stood expired before bids were invited, are continuing to operate uninterruptedly. This is nothing but arbitrary action on the part of the appellants-Railway and IRCTC. What has surprised us is that even though the learned Single Judge had vacated the interim order as early as in 2009, the concerned officers did not take steps to take possession of the stalls from the erstwhile vendors. Although, it is not possible to record a firm finding that their actions and omissions were actuated by malice, we are convinced that the concerned authorities had acted arbitrarily and deprived respondent No.1 of his legitimate right to do catering business at Jaipur Railway Station and the High Court did not commit any error by issuing a mandamus for handing over possession of the stalls. With the above observations, the special leave petitions are dismissed. The petitioners and all the concerned officers are directed to implement the order/.judgment of the High Court within a period of 30 days from today. This would necessarily mean that they shall take possession of the stalls being operated by the erstwhile contractor and handover the same to respondent No.1 within 30 days. It is also made clear that tenure of the licence of respondent No.1 will commence from the date of actual handing over possession of the stalls.” 3. There are no distinguishing facts or grounds, to take a different view. 4. The Special Appeal is dismissed.