Judgment B.R. Sarangi, J. The petitioner, who was working as a Conductor under the Orissa State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the O.S.R.T.C.”) a Government of Orissa undertaking has filed this application seeking for following reliefs:- i) quash the order dated 9.10.2000 relating to denial of back wages and consequential benefits including increment; ii) direct the opposite parties to pay the back wages of the petitioner from 5.5.1995 till the date of reinstatement; iii) direct the opposite parties to treat the suspension period as on duty; iv) direct the opposite parties to count the suspension period and the period from dated 5.5.1995 to 1.10.2000 of the petitioner towards his qualifying service; v) direct the opposite parties to give all the consequential benefits including the incremental benefits during the period from 5.5.1995 till dated 1.10.2000 vi) direct the opposite parties to pay the rest “V.R.S.” retrial dues with interest within a stipulated period; vii) and may pass such other order/orders as deemed just and proper. 2. The short fact of the case in hand is that the petitioner was appointed as a Conductor in OSRTC Limited in the year 1971 and discharged his duty assigned to him. An F.I.R. was lodged in the year 1986 by the then District Traffic Manager, Puri at Sea-Beach Police Station, Puri that while the petitioner was serving as conductor misappropriated an amount of Rs.3859.30 in the year 1984-85. On the basis of the F.I.R. lodged, investigation was undertaken and on completion of investigation, charge-sheet under Sections 467/471/409, IPC was submitted by the police which was registered as G.R. Case No. 1015 of 1986. During pendency of the criminal case, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 13.01.1986. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service on 8.10.1986. The petitioner faced the trial in G.R. Case No. 1015 of 1986 and he having been found guilty was convicted by judgment and order dated 9.8.1994 under Sections 467/471/409, IPC. Against the said order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned C.J.M., Puri, the petitioner preferred criminal appeal No. 130 of 1994 before the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge, Puri, which was dismissed by judgment dated 19.04.1995. While such criminal appeal was pending for consideration, the petitioner was issued with notice of show cause on 25.11.1994, which was assailed by the petitioner before this Court in OJC No. 8257 of 1994. Sessions Judge, Puri, which was dismissed by judgment dated 19.04.1995. While such criminal appeal was pending for consideration, the petitioner was issued with notice of show cause on 25.11.1994, which was assailed by the petitioner before this Court in OJC No. 8257 of 1994. This Court disposed of the said writ application on 20.12.1994 directing the petitioner to file reply to the notice of show cause and further directed that no final order shall be passed in the said proceeding till disposal of the criminal appeal by the appropriate forum. Since the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge, Puri dismissed the criminal appeal No. 130 of 1994 preferred by the petitioner against the order of conviction dated 19.4.1995, he was dismissed from service on 5.5.1995. Further, against the order of such conviction by the appellate authority, petitioner preferred Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1995 before this Court and this Court vide order dated 18.1.2000 allowed the said revision. Consequently, the petitioner made representation before the authority to reinstate him in service and give all consequential benefits. On consideration of such representation, the petitioner was reinstated in service w.e.f. 1.10.2000, but he was denied back wages and consequential benefits pursuant to order dated 9.10.2000 vide Annexure-3. Hence, this application. 3. Mr. Tanmay Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Manoj Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that refusal to grant back wages and consequential benefits in view of reinstatement in service by the authority is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the settled position of law laid down by the apex Court as well as this Court. In order to substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment in Union of India and others v. Jaipal Singh, 2003 (7) Supreme 676 and Bishunu Charan Sahu v. Branch Manager, United Commercial Bank and another, 2004 (I) OLR 127 . 4. Mr. A.K. Mohanty-A, learned counsel for the opposite party-Corporation strenuously urged that the petitioner has retired from service on 31.07.2002. The claim made by the petitioner that he is entitled to back wages is not permissible under law and as such the period from 5.5.1995 to 1.10.2000 will not be counted towards qualifying service and also he is not entitled to any continuity for suspension from 13.1.1988 to 8.10.1986 and 24.1.1990 to 14.5.1990. The claim made by the petitioner that he is entitled to back wages is not permissible under law and as such the period from 5.5.1995 to 1.10.2000 will not be counted towards qualifying service and also he is not entitled to any continuity for suspension from 13.1.1988 to 8.10.1986 and 24.1.1990 to 14.5.1990. He supported the reasons assigned by the authority rejecting the claim of the petitioner vide impugned order under Annexure-3. In order to substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State of Maharastra and others, AIR 1997 SC 1434 , Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155 . 5. On the basis of the facts pleaded above, the admitted fact is that the petitioner was continuing as a conductor of the OSRTC and on allegation of misappropriation of Rs.3859.30, the then District Traffic Manager, Puri of the Corporation lodged an F.I.R. basing upon which G.R. Case was instituted and the petitioner faced the trial. Consequentially he was convicted under Sections 467/471/409, IPC and assailing such order of conviction and sentence, the petitioner preferred criminal appeal. The said appeal was dismissed confirming the order of punishment imposed by the learned court below. Against such order of conviction, the petitioner preferred revision before this Court, but this Court set aside the order of conviction and imposition of sentence done by both the trial court as well as the appellate court. Consequence thereof, the petitioner made a grievance before the authority for reinstatement in service and on consideration of such grievance by way of representation, the petitioner was reinstated in service. But he claims that he should be allowed continuity in service for the purpose of financial benefits admissible to him and also back wages for the period he was placed under suspension and out of employment because of conviction made by the competent criminal court. Therefore, it is to be adjudicated whether: i. The petitioner is entitled to get full back wages for the period he was out of employment for the reasons that he has been convicted by the appropriate criminal court and also continuity in service as claim by him ; ii. if so, what relief? 6. Therefore, it is to be adjudicated whether: i. The petitioner is entitled to get full back wages for the period he was out of employment for the reasons that he has been convicted by the appropriate criminal court and also continuity in service as claim by him ; ii. if so, what relief? 6. Following criminal proceeding since the petitioner was found guilty by the trial court as well as the appellate court, criminal charges were levelled against him, in that case, no fault can be found with the authority in dismissing of the petitioner from service in accordance with law. But the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal charges, therefore he cannot be kept out of service. Therefore, he made a representation before the authority and that representation was considered and consequentially, the petitioner was reinstated in service w.e.f. 1.10.2000. Such action of the authority is in conformity with the provisions of law decided by the apex Court in Union of India and others (supra). In the said judgment the apex Court held that if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal, subsequently the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Therefore, the action taken by the authority after conviction of the petitioner in keeping him out of service cannot be faulted. But after acquittal on the basis of representation filed, the petitioner has already been reinstated in service w.e.f. 1.10.2000, till he retired from service on 31.07.2002. 7. So far as release of back wages is concerned, for the period from 5.5.1995 to 1.10.2000, the period during which the petitioner was kept out of service because of conviction order passed by the appropriate criminal court, he is not entitled to get such benefit as no fault can be attributable to an employer so that the employee can claim the back wages. Because of involvement in a criminal case and conviction therein since law requires that employee should be kept out of service and he has not discharged any duties during the said period, no back wages can be granted to him. 8. Mr. Because of involvement in a criminal case and conviction therein since law requires that employee should be kept out of service and he has not discharged any duties during the said period, no back wages can be granted to him. 8. Mr. Tanmay Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner states that he has abandoned the claim of the petitioner with regard to payment of back wages for the period from 5.5.1995 till 18.1.2000, the date he got acquitted from the criminal charges but from 18.1.2000 till he was reinstated on 1.10.2000, the petitioner is entitled to get the back wages because after the acquittal there is no justifiable reasons on the part of the employer not to reinstate him in service forthwith. Therefore, for this period, since the employer had not reinstated the petitioner, he is entitled to get back wages from 18.1.2000 to 1.10.2000 in view of the judgment passed by the apex Court in Union of India and others (supra). 9. So far as applicability of the judgment referred by learned counsel for the opposite party-corporation is concerned, in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar (supra) it appears from the fact of the said case that the appellant was working as Compositor in Government of India Printing Press and was charged with offence punishable under Section 409, IPC and pending trial he was kept under suspension and was paid subsistence allowance. After his acquittal, the appellant was reinstated but he was not granted consequential benefits. Therefore, he approached the Administrative Tribunal, which dismissed the claim of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant approached the apex Court. In that case the question which came up for consideration was when a Govt. Servant is prosecuted for commission of defalcation of public funds and fabrication of records, can he be entitled to reinstatement with grant of consequential benefits along with back wages etc. Considering the facts of the said case, the apex Court held that if the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution, though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence, he can not be made entitled to reinstatement with grant of all consequential benefits with all back wages etc. as a matter of course. 10. Considering the facts of the said case, the apex Court held that if the conduct alleged is the foundation for prosecution, though it may end in acquittal on appreciation or lack of sufficient evidence, he can not be made entitled to reinstatement with grant of all consequential benefits with all back wages etc. as a matter of course. 10. Similarly, in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (supra), the apex Court held that even if the employee is acquitted of the charges in the criminal trial for lack of evidence or otherwise, it is for the competent authority to form its opinion whether the suspension of the employee was wholly unjustified and so long as such opinion of the competent authority was a possible view in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the materials before its, such opinion of the competent authority would not be interfered with by the Tribunal or the Court. Therefore, grant of consequential benefits have been left open to the employer as claimed by the employee while he was kept out of service because of his involvement in criminal case. 11. As it appears, the ratio decided in Union of India and others (supra) has not been taken into consideration by the apex Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar (supra) and Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (supra). In Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar (supra), the apex Court has taken into consideration Rule 72 (3) of the Maharastra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Services and Payment during Suspension, Dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1991. Similarly, in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (supra), the apex Court has taken into consideration Rule 54-B (3) of Andhra Pradesh Fundamental Rules. While considering both the provisions of law, the apex Court has come to the aforesaid conclusion. 12. Mr. A.K. Mohanty-A, learned counsel for the opposite party-Corporation has not brought to the notice of the Court any such similar provision governing the field, which has got application to the employee of the Corporation. Therefore, in absence of any such provision governing the field, the judgment referred by him is distinguishable and as such the ratio decided in Union of India and others (supra) is applicable to the present case which was also referred by this Court in Bishnu Charan Sahu (supra). 13. Therefore, in absence of any such provision governing the field, the judgment referred by him is distinguishable and as such the ratio decided in Union of India and others (supra) is applicable to the present case which was also referred by this Court in Bishnu Charan Sahu (supra). 13. Therefore, keeping in view the ratio decided in Union of India and others (supra), after the acquittal, the petitioner should be considered as if he is continuing in service. In that view of the mater, the petitioner is entitled to the back wages for the period from 18.1.2000 to 1.10.2000. Therefore, the impugned order so far as it denies back wages from 5.5.2000 to 1.10.2000 is modified to the extent that the petitioner is entitled to back wages from 18.1.2000 the date he was acquitted till he was reinstated in service i.e. 1.10.2000 as if he is continuing in service. The said view has also been taken into consideration by this Court in Bishnu Charan Sahu (supra). So far as continuity in service is concerned, it is well within the domain of the employer to consider the same while granting benefit of back wages to the petitioner for the period from 18.1.2000 till 1.10.2000. It is left open to the employer to grant continuity in service to the petitioner to discharge his duty in accordance with law. 14. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition stands disposed of.