JUDGMENT : Subrata Talukdar, J. 1. In this application under Article 226 of Constitution of India the petitioners challenge the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal dated 3rd August, 2011 as well as the order dated 31st July, 2009 passed by the Ld. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Office, Kolkata, West Bengal and the Inspection Report connected thereto. 2. The petitioners are all partners of M/s K.C. Paul and Sons, Kolkata running their business under the name and style of M/s K.C. Paul and Sons, Purusottam Roy Street, Kolkata 700007. In this writ petition the petitioners are represented by Sri Dipak Kumar Ghosh with Sri Ranjay De, Ld. Counsel. 3. The Respondent-Provident Fund Authority is represented by Sri S.C. Prasad, Ld. Counsel. 4. Arguing the writ petition Sri Ghosh at the very outset submits that the impugned order of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner dated 31st July, 2009 shows non-application of mind inasmuch as the Ld. Commissioner has failed to disclose sufficient reasons of his own in accepting the contention of the departmental representative appearing before him. Referring to the relevant concluding portion of the order dated 31st July, 2009 Sri Ghosh points out that the same speaks of a perfunctory disposal by simply adopting in toto the arguments of the departmental representative with an equally perfunctory reference to “relevant facts” and the records. The conclusion referred to above reads as follows:- “I have considered all the relevant facts and also perused the records and I accept the contention of the Departmental Representative and his findings to the effect that the employer in relation to the said establishment has not remitted the Provident Fund, Pension Fund and Insurance Fund contributions and Administrative Charges towards Provident Fund & Insurance Fund for the period from 4/06 to 12/07. It is also to be pertinent to mention here that in the contentions filed by the establishment, I am also not able to find any material points through which the assessment of dues may be less and/or waived as sought for in their submission dated 27.3.2009. Hence. In exercise of the powers vested to me u/s. 7A of the Employees’ Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. I proceed to assess the dues against the establishment as per squad report dated 19/12/2008. Now, therefore, I, Sri Ramanand, Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Office.” 5. Sri Ghosh further points out that the Ld. Hence. In exercise of the powers vested to me u/s. 7A of the Employees’ Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. I proceed to assess the dues against the establishment as per squad report dated 19/12/2008. Now, therefore, I, Sri Ramanand, Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Regional Office.” 5. Sri Ghosh further points out that the Ld. Commissioner ought to have also applied his mind to the Inspection Report and the anomalies arising therefrom. Sri Ghosh further argues that from a bare reading of the relevant grounds taken before the Ld. Appellate Tribunal it would be apparent that certain important parameters were not considered by the Ld. Commissioner. The said grounds are as follows:- “(i) For that the impugned Order dated 31.07.2009 is bad in law since the power given to the Commissioner under the Act is not to decide abstract question of law but to draw conclusion by identifying the workmen which has not been done in the instant case. (ii) For that the impugned Order dated 31.07.2009 is bad in law since Personal Allowance has been excluded from the purview of basic wages as per Circular dated 18.8.55. (iii) For that the impugned Order dated 31.07.2009 is bad in law since nothing has been shown as to how the Ministry’s Circular dated 16.5.64 would not have any manner of applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. (iv) For that the impugned Order dated 31.07.2009 is bad in law inasmuch as the Compensatory Allowance is totally misconceived and it has not been shown as to how the Ministry’s Circular dated 16.5.1964 would not have any manner of applicability which are excluded compensatory allowance from the definition of wages. (v) For that the impugned Order dated 31.7.2009 is bad in law since the same suffers from the infirmity of non-application of mind as no business activity is carried on at 13, Raja Rajendra Nath Sil Lane, Kolkata-6. (vi) For that the impugned Order dated 31.7.2009 is bad in law since the same suffers from basic error and infirmity of non-application of mind, since beside the aspect of non-applicability the calculation of liability pertaining to personal allowance cannot be more than Rs. 86,626.50 which has not been considered by the Respondent Authority.” 6. Ld. Counsel submits that the above noted grounds were not considered by the Ld. 86,626.50 which has not been considered by the Respondent Authority.” 6. Ld. Counsel submits that the above noted grounds were not considered by the Ld. Commissioner and even failed to find their reflection in the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal dated 3rd August, 2011. From the conspectus of the grounds (supra) the essential challenge of Sri Ghosh to the order of the Provident Fund Authority can be summarised as follows:- (a) Failure to exclude compensatory allowance from the definition of wages; (b) Failure to correctly appreciate the Ministry Circular dated 16th May, 1964 to the facts of the case and assessment of compensatory allowance; (c) Failure to identify workmen who were in the nature of regular workmen attached to the partnership entitled to benefits under the Provident Fund Act; (d) Failure to exclude personal allowance from the purview of basic wages applying the circular dated 18th August, 1955. (e) Failure to consider that no business activity is carried on at 13, Raja Rajendra Nath Sil Lane, Kolkata 6; (f) Failure to assess the quantum of personal allowance liability which could not be more than Rs. 86,626.50 paise. 7. Ld. Counsel further argues that nowhere from the order of the Ld. Commissioner dated 31st July, 2009 under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Fund Act 1952 (for short the 1952 Act), the issues required to be addressed on behalf of the petitioners were at all addressed by the Ld. Commissioner. 8. Applying the same reasoning to the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal Sri Ghosh submits that the said impugned order dated 3rd August, 2011 cannot be sustained in law. 9. Per contra, Sri S.C. Prasad, Ld. Counsel appeared for the Provident Fund Authority submits that the petitioners have been running their business on the basis of an internal arrangement and paying Provident Fund on the basis of wages whereas the Provident Fund Authority treated the allowances as the basic wage and assessed the dues. Supporting the Inspection Report, the order of the Ld. Commissioner dated 31st July, 2009 and the order of the Ld. Tribunal dated 3rd August, 2011, Ld. Counsel submits that by seeking to employ seasonal workers compensatory allowance is being paid to them in the name of basic wages to avoid Provident Fund liability. Ld. Supporting the Inspection Report, the order of the Ld. Commissioner dated 31st July, 2009 and the order of the Ld. Tribunal dated 3rd August, 2011, Ld. Counsel submits that by seeking to employ seasonal workers compensatory allowance is being paid to them in the name of basic wages to avoid Provident Fund liability. Ld. Counsel points out that there cannot be any dispute with regard to the application of the Ministry Circular dated 16th May, 1964 which holds the field and applies to the facts of this case. 10. Sri Ghosh relies upon paragraph 8 of the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal in support of his submissions. Paragraph 8 reads as follows:- “It is true that the assessment is to be made with regard to the identifiable employees only as held in the case of M/s H.P. State Forest Corporation Ltd. v. Regional PF Commissioner and in the case of M/s Food Corporation of India v. Union of India. However, as per Para 36a it is the duty of the appellant to prepare the list of employees engaged by him and if the employer fails to perform his duty he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own latches. In the case of M/s Harison Malayam Pvt. Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 1133/90, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “it was the duty of the respondent company to get the necessary identity of the workers employed through the contractor at the commencement of the contract. Since the primary responsibility of appellant of contributing is on the principal employer. On the admitted fact the respondent company had engaged the contractor to execute the work and it was also the duty of the respondent company to get the temporary identity certificate issued to the workmen and to pay the contribution. Since, the company failed it cannot be held to say that the workers are un-identifiable.” In this case the appellant has failed to prepare and submit the list of employees engaged by him so at this stage he cannot be permitted to contend that the employees for whom assessment has been made are not identifiable”. 11. Ld. Counsel also takes this Court to the definition of employee as appearing at clause 2F of the 1952 Act. Sri Prasad submits that the definition is wide and covers each type of worker in the employment of the petitioner. 12. 11. Ld. Counsel also takes this Court to the definition of employee as appearing at clause 2F of the 1952 Act. Sri Prasad submits that the definition is wide and covers each type of worker in the employment of the petitioner. 12. Sri Prasad also disputes the argument of Sri Ghosh that the judgment in Bata India reported in 2014 Labour Law Reporter 866 is not applicable to the facts of this case. Sri Prasad argues that paragraph 6 of Bata India (supra) applies and reads as follows:- “6. There cannot be any two opinion that if ultimately on examination of facts it is found that the so-called associates are in reality the contractors and an artificial device has been created to circumvent the provisions of the Act, the Provident Fund Authorities are within their right to claim such amount towards provident fund dues from the writ petitioner, but the fact remains that there has to be a proper adjudication of the issue. The observations made by the Provident Fund Commissioner with regard to associates in the impugned order can apply only provided a definite finding is arrived at as to the true identity of these G3 associates as in reality contractors. The doctrine of identification is applicable in any final order could be passed. The petitioner cannot be fastened with liability on the basis of a report of which no opportunity is given to the petitioner to contradict the same and it was only on this ground that I am inclined to give opportunity to the petitioner only to deal with the squad report dated 20th June, 2007 and the authority concerned shall adjudicate the issue upon furnishing a copy of the said squad report to the petitioner and decide the matter in accordance with law.” 13. It is also the contention of Ld. Counsel that the ratio of the decision in M/s Harison Malayam Private Limited (Civil Appeal No. 1133/90) applies to the facts of this case and has been reproduced in the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal at paragraph 8 (supra). 14. For the above reasons Sri Prasad submits that the 1952 Act being in the nature of a beneficial law must be construed purposively in the interest of the employees. 15. Having heard the parties and considering the materials on record this Court finds that the Ld. Appellate Tribunal at paragraph 8 (supra). 14. For the above reasons Sri Prasad submits that the 1952 Act being in the nature of a beneficial law must be construed purposively in the interest of the employees. 15. Having heard the parties and considering the materials on record this Court finds that the Ld. Commissioner by his order dated 31st July, 2009 mechanically adopted the submissions of the departmental representative. Although there is reference to consideration of relevant facts it does not appear that the particular issues raised by the petitioner as included in his grounds of appeal (supra) were considered individually in contradistinction to the materials advanced on behalf of the authority. 16. Similarly, this Court finds from the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal that there is heavy reliance on several judicial authorities and the portions of the judgment found to be applicable by the Ld. Appellate Tribunal have been applied to the case of the petitioners. 17. In the above view of the matter this Court finds that there is a failure on the part of both the Ld. Commissioner and the Ld. Appellate Tribunal to adduce particular reasons for holding against the petitioner on the facts of the present case. Having regard to the above discussion while on the one hand this Court finds the order of the Ld. Commissioner to be perfunctory and routine in its reasoning, on the other hand the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal, albeit better articulated is lacking in adequate examination of the particular grievances raised by the petitioner before the Ld. Commissioner. 18. The duty to adduce reasons with sufficient clarity is well-known to law and such duty is closely tied with the principle of exercise of natural justice. The principle of a speaking order has been explained by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Gopinath Raha v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 2011 (1) WBLR (Cal) 184. At Paragraph 3 it was observed as follows:- “3. On a bare reading of the said order it appears that it is a gross breach of principle of speaking order which is nothing but a facet of natural justice. Every order must be a “speaking order” only for the reason that the litigant should know what actually played in the mind of the Court to pass the judgment. The reasoning is the soul of a judgment. Every order must be a “speaking order” only for the reason that the litigant should know what actually played in the mind of the Court to pass the judgment. The reasoning is the soul of a judgment. This point has already been settled by the Apex Court by several judgments which are discussed below.” 19. However, this Court finds that the factual exercise conducted by the authority in the nature of the Inspection Report cannot be faulted and shall continue to be treated as the basis of future adjudication. 20. With the above observations the order of the Ld. Appellate Tribunal dated 3rd August, 2011 and the order dated 31st July, 2009 as well is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Ld. Commissioner for consideration afresh taking particular notice of the grounds taken by the petitioner in the appeal and observed earlier in this judgment. The petitioner would be afforded an opportunity of persuading his case through an opportunity of hearing as legally predicated. 21. W.P. 2739(W) of 2012 stands disposed of as above. 22. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.