JUDGMENT : S. N. Prasad, J. The petitioners in both the writ petitions being aggrieved with the order dated 22.1.2005 passed by the Managing Director, Orissa State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Bhubaneswar(hereinafter referred to as „the Corporation) by which order of regularization passed in favour of the petitioners dated 20.5.1997 has been recalled with a direction to make recovery from the salary of the petitioners w.e.f. from 21.5.1997, have approached this Court. 2. Brief facts of the case which has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners have been appointed as daily wage kantawalla vide office order dated 20.5.1997 and working since 25.10.1991 and 21.1.1992 respectively. 3. After rendering service without any complaint from any quarter, the District Manager of the Corporation in exercise of power conferred upon him under Rule 21(5) of Orissa State Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Service Rule, 1993 has regularized services of the petitioners with immediate effect vide order No.30 dated 20.5.1997 and thereafter both the petitioners have discharged their duties without any complaint from any quarter. 4. The Managing Director of the Corporation has issued an order as contained in order dated 22.1.2005 by which order of regularization of the petitioners vide order dated 20.5.1997(Annexure-2), has been recalled on the ground that the same has been done without prior approval of the appropriate authority as provided under Rule 21(5) of Orissa State Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Service Rule,1993 with a direction to recovery excess amount paid to the petitioner with effect from 21.5.1997. 5. 5. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 22.1.2005 on the following grounds: (i) The petitioners since been engaged as daily rated employees with effect from 25.10.1991 and 21.1.1992 respectively and thereafter in exercise of power conferred under Rule 21(5) of the Orissa Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Service Rule,1993, the District Manager of the Corporation has taken decision vide office order dated 20.5.1997, being appointing authority for regularization of services of the petitioners, there is no need of prior approval of the Managing Director of the Corporation, hence ground taken in the order is absolutely non-est ground; (ii) The impugned order was passed on 22.1.2005 without giving any show cause notice to the petitioner which is in violation of principles of natural justice due to the reasons that the petitioners were regularized in service vide order dated 20.5.1997 and after about seven years the impugned order has been passed, hence the petitioners were required to be heard. 6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that if the petitioners would have been provided with opportunity of being heard, they could have brought to the notice of the concerned authority regarding legal proposition of law to the effect that the petitioners since been engaged in full-fledged, as such the District Manager of the Corporation is the competent authority; there is no requirement of approval by the Managing Director of the Corporation, since they have not been provided opportunity of being heard, this fact has not been brought to the notice of the Managing Director of the Corporation, the petitioners have rightly been prejudiced. 7. Order of recovery made in the impugned order has also not sustainable in view of the fact that there is no misrepresentation of fact on the part of the petitioners since the petitioners are working on daily rated capacity since the year 1991-1992 against sanctioned posts, as such they were regularized in service in view of power conferred upon the District Manager of the Corporation of the concerned district. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the petitioners since were engaged as daily rated capacity, without following the procedure as laid down under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, as such petitioners have no right to continue in service in the permanent establishment by regularization of their services. 9. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the petitioners since were engaged as daily rated capacity, without following the procedure as laid down under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, as such petitioners have no right to continue in service in the permanent establishment by regularization of their services. 9. Further submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties is that under Rule,1993 the Managing Director of the Corporation is the competent authority to accord approval of decision of regularization which has been taken in favour of the petitioners by the District Manager of the concerned District, since Managing Director has not approved the decision of the District Manager regarding regularization of services of the petitioners cannot be said to be order of regular one. 10. However, in reply to the fact that adequate opportunity has not been provided to the petitioners learned counsel for the opposite parties has fairly accepted this. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 12. Admitted position in this case is that the petitioners have been engaged on daily rated capacity with effect from 1991 and 1992 respectively and since they were discharging their duties in daily rated capacity. 13. District Manager of the Corporation of the concerned district has regularized services of the petitioners vide order dated 20.5.1997, the impugned order of recalling the order of regularization has been passed on 22.1.2005 on the ground that the same has been done in contravention of Rule 21)5) of Orissa State Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Service Rule,1993 which provides that order of regularization is to be approved by the Managing Director of the Corporation, since has not been approved by the Managing Director of the Corporation, hence order of regularization cannot be said to be regular one. 14. To determine the issue it is relevant to see the provisions as contained under Rule 21(5) of the Orissa State Civil Supplies Corporation Employees Service Rule,1993 which is quoted below: “In respect of the Grade-IV employees of the Corporation the following functionaries shall be deemed to be the appointing authority. Category of Grade-IV employees Appointing authority. i) Those functioning in the Headquarters office of the Corporation. The Administrative officer. Category of Grade-IV employees Appointing authority. i) Those functioning in the Headquarters office of the Corporation. The Administrative officer. From perusal of sub-rule (5) of Rule 21 District Manager of the Corporation of the district has been vested with power of appointing authority of Class-IV employees working under the district office. 15. The ground which has been taken in the impugned order dated 22.1.2005 that there is contravention of Rule 21(5) of the Rules and there is no prior approval of the concerned authority, the only adverse grounds that order of regularization dated 20.5.1997 has been recalled. From perusal of sub-rule(5) of Rules,1993 there is no reference that for regularization of any employee prior approval of the Managing Director to be obtained but from where the authority has found the point has not at all been discussed in the impugned order. 16. Further the petitioners since been regularized in service with effect from May,1997 and the impugned order has been passed on 22.1.2005, the petitioners at least should have been given opportunity of being heard, so that they would have provided with an opportunity to satisfy the authority regarding the ground of cancellation of order of regularization, but since the petitioners had not been provided opportunity which has not been discussed by the Managing Director of the Corporation in the impugned order, order of regularization has been cancelled after lapse of more than 7 years, as such the same is in violation of cardinal principles of natural justice which is the minimum requirement of law on the basis of principle that, if any, civil right has been accrued to any of the aggrieved party, he/they are entitled to get opportunity of hearing before taking adverse decision. 17. In the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1978 S.C. 597 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 57 and 58 part of which is being quoted herein below: “57. Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram parten rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. Now, it is true that there is no express provision in the Passports Act, 1967 which requires that the audi alteram parten rule should be followed before impounding a passport, but that is not conclusive of the question, if the statute makes itself clear on this point, then no more question arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law may in a given case make an implication and apply the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works. (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180: "A long course of decisions, beginning with Dr. Bentley's case (1723) 1 Str 557 and ending with some very recent cases,establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature". The principle of audi alteram partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard,is part of the rules of natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in which the rules of natural justice are manifested, namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram partem. We are not concerned here with the former since there is no case of bias urged here. The question is only in regard to the right of hearing, which involves the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in the procedure for impounding a passport? 58. "that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. This view was reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent decision of this Court in D. F. O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh: (1971) 3 SCC 864 : ( AIR 1973 SC 205 ). The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.” 18. In the case of Biecco Lawrie Limited and another Vs State of West Bengal and another, reported in (2009)10 SCC 32 at para-18 it has been held as follows: “Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action. In the case of Biecco Lawrie Limited and another Vs State of West Bengal and another, reported in (2009)10 SCC 32 at para-18 it has been held as follows: “Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a civil consequence or a prejudice is caused to him by an administrative action. In other words principle of natural justice is attracted where there is some right which is likely to be affected by any act of the administration including a legitimate expectation. (See : Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., [ (2007) 2 SCC 640 ] The procedure to be followed is not a matter of secondary importance and in the broadest sense natural justice simply indicates the sense of what is right and wrong (Voinet v. Barrett (1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its technical sense it is now often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it comprises of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that- a man may not be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's defence must always be fairly heard. 19. Regarding the averment of learned counsel for the opposite parties is failure of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, but this fact has not been discussed at all in the impugned order. It is settled position that ground which has not been stated in the impugned order, the same cannot be developed by making affidavit or by making oral evidence. In this connection, reliance has been placed in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others reported in (1978)1 SCC 405 where it has been held at para-8: “The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought, out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought, out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji. "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in Ms mind, or what he intended to, do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to effect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 20. In the case of East Coast Railway and another Vs Mahadev Appa Rao and others, reported in (2010)7 SCC 678 it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court at para-9 as follows: “There is no quarrel with the well-settled proposition of law that an order passed by a public authority exercising administrative/executive or statutory powers must be judged by the reasons stated in the order or any record or file contemporaneously maintained. It follows that the infirmity arising out of the absence of reasons cannot be cured by the authority passing the order stating such reasons in an affidavit filed before the Court where the validity of any such order is under challenge. The legal position in this regard is settled by the decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) wherein this Court observed: “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. ” 21. In view of the proposition of law laid down as indicated above, the contention of the opposite party cannot be accepted. 22. ” 21. In view of the proposition of law laid down as indicated above, the contention of the opposite party cannot be accepted. 22. Thus from perusal of the impugned order it is apparent that the same has been passed without providing an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner by stating 10 many grounds which is knot referred in the order. 23. In view of the facts stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 22.1.2005 suffers from infirmity and as such the same is hereby quashed. 24. The matter is remitted before the Managing Director of the Corporation to pass fresh order after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioners within a reasonable period, preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of.