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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 312 (HP)

Sonu v. State of H. P.

2015-04-08

P.S.RANA, SANJAY KAROL

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JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Appellant-convict Sonu, hereinafter referred to as the accused, has assailed the judgment dated 24.3.2009, passed by Special Judge (II) (Additional Sessions Judge-I), Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, in Sessions Trial No.9-I/2008, titled as State v. Sonu, whereby he stands convicted of the offence punishable under the provisions of Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and pay fine of `1,00,000/-, and in default of payment thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 4.3.2008, ASI Ajit Kumar (PW-17) received secret information that accused, who was running a Tudi (fodder) shop near Hanuman Temple Mohtali, Himachal Pradesh, was dealing with and had concealed the contraband substance (opium) in his shop. Information of such fact was sent by ASI Ajit Kumar, through Constable Joginder Singh (PW-10), to the Superintendent of Police, Kangra. Ajit Kumar also associated Excise Inspector Narinder Singh (PW-4) and Rasal Singh (PW-1), Pradhan of the concerned Gram Panchayat, for carrying out search and seizure operations. Thereafter, Ajit Kumar formed a raiding party. Also, Dy.S.P. Kishan Chand (PW-3) was requested to remain present on the spot. On reaching the spot, raiding party apprised the accused of his statutory right. He offered to be searched by the police officials vide Memo (Ex. PW-1/A). During the search, hidden inside the Tudi, police recovered a scooter tyre (Ex. P-1), in which two packets (Ex. P-2 & P-3), containing opium, were kept. Weights and scales were brought from the shop of Tilak Raj (PW-8) and the contraband substance weighed. Weight of one packet (Ex. P-1) was found to be 1.6 kgs and another packet (Ex. P-3) was found to be 1.2 kgs. Two samples, each weighing 25 grams, from each of the packets, were drawn and sealed with two seals of seal impression ‘M’. Photographs (Ex.PW- 2/A to 2/E) (negatives are Ex.PW2/A1 to 2/E1) of recovery were taken on the spot. NCB form (Ex.PW-17/B) was filled up. Ruka (Ex.PW-17/A) was sent through Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-12), on the basis of which FIR No.47/08, dated 4.3.2008 (Ex.PW-6/A), under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, was registered at Police Station, Indora. Accused was also arrested on the spot. NCB form (Ex.PW-17/B) was filled up. Ruka (Ex.PW-17/A) was sent through Constable Ashok Kumar (PW-12), on the basis of which FIR No.47/08, dated 4.3.2008 (Ex.PW-6/A), under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, was registered at Police Station, Indora. Accused was also arrested on the spot. NCB form and the case property was produced before SHO Shakti Prashad (PW-16), who resealed the same with his own seal of impression ‘T’ and deposited it in the Malkhana. MHC Rajinder Singh (PW- 6) handed over the sealed samples to Dev Raj (PW-13), who deposited the same at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Junga. Report (Ex.PW-16/D), which confirmed the sample to be opium, was obtained and taken on record. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses and statement of the accused under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took the following defence: “I am innocent and have been falsely implicated in the present case. I was not in occupation of any shop of Mohtli ramp. I was not doing any work of selling fodder. No opium was recovered from my possessing or from any shop in my occupation. The entire story of the police raid and recovery of opium from a shop in my possession is false. I was taken by the police from my home at village Saili Kulian, Tehsil Pathankot on 5.3.2008 and a false case was planted on me and the police officials took the photographs under their pressure and duress. I am just a auto-rickshaw driver.” Accused chose not to lead any evidence in defence. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal by the accused. 6. I am just a auto-rickshaw driver.” Accused chose not to lead any evidence in defence. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal by the accused. 6. While relying upon the decisions rendered in Om Prakash alias Baba v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 632 ; Avtar Singh and others v. State of Punjab, (2002) 7 SCC 419 ; Ismailkhan Aiyubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 10 SCC 257 ; Mohd. Aslam Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau and another, (1996) 9 SCC 462 ; Inder Sain v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 372 ; and State v. Raju @ Mohammad and others, Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 913, learned counsel for the accused-appellant, contends that prosecution failed to establish recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. The principles of law stand misinterpreted and mis-appreciated. Only argument being that there is nothing on record to establish relationship of landlord and tenant between witness Sunita (PW-9) or that accused was in the exclusive possession of the shop in question. 7. Learned Additional Advocate General has supported the judgment of the trial Court, for the reasons assigned therein. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out. Trial Court has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence on record. There is no error in either appreciation or application of law. The accused led no evidence to probablize his defence. Even from his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, it remains improbablized. Prosecution has been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & another vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 has held that:- “6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspectives in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary contest of escalating crime and escape. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary contest of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles of golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breaks down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned author [ Glanville Williams in ‘Proof of Guilt’] has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted ‘persons’ and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “ a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent … …” In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these times long ago.” [Emphasis supplied] 10. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these times long ago.” [Emphasis supplied] 10. In the instant case, we find that not only the police officials but also independent witnesses to have supported the prosecution case, on the issue of with regard to recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. 11. ASI Ajit Kumar categorically states that on 4.3.2008, when he was on patrol duty at Ranchi Mor Damtal, alongwith police officials HC Raj Kumar, HHC Surjit Singh, Constables Purshotam, Kamlesh, Ashok Kumar and Jatinder Singh, at 4 p.m., he received a secret information that one Sonu alias Nitu son of Bahadur Chand, resident of Selly Pulian Pathankot, who was running a Tudi shop near Hanuman Temple, Mohtli, was dealing in psychotropic/narcotic substance. The information was definite to the effect that if premises were raided, opium would be detected and recovered. Accordingly, he telephonically informed the Deputy Superintendent of Police and requested him to reach the spot. Ruka (Ex. PW- 17/A) was also sent though Constable Ashok Kumar for registration of the FIR. In compliance of provisions of Section 42 of the Act, he also sent information through Constable Joginder Singh to the superior officer. From the testimony of Dy.S.P. Kishan Chand (PW-3), Joginder Singh (PW-10) and Praveen Kumar (PW-15), we find such fact to have been duly corroborated. Praveen Kumar, who was posted in the Office of Superintendent of Police, Kangra at Dharamshala, has produced extract of the Register (Ex.PW- 15/A), evidencing the fact of receipt of such information. Thus, in our considered view, there is total compliance of provisions of Section 42 of the Act. 12. It is true that no search warrant or authorization was obtained before conducting the search and seizure operations, but then it remains explained that secret information was authentic. ASI Ajit Singh did involve Dy.S.P., a Superior and gazetted Officer, for carrying out the search and seizure operations. 13. Where the Gazetted Officer himself, after acting under Section 41 of the Act, has conducted search and seizure operations, it is not mandatory requirement of law to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. ASI Ajit Singh did involve Dy.S.P., a Superior and gazetted Officer, for carrying out the search and seizure operations. 13. Where the Gazetted Officer himself, after acting under Section 41 of the Act, has conducted search and seizure operations, it is not mandatory requirement of law to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. (See: Yasihey Yobin and another v. Department of Customs, Shillong, (2014) 13 SCC 344 ; State of Haryana v. Jarnail Singh and others, (2004) 5 SCC 188 ; and M. Prabhulal v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2003) 8 SCC 449 ). 14. ASI Ajit Kumar states that he formed a raiding party, comprising of the police officials and other independent witnesses, and upon reaching the spot, in the presence of Dy.S.P. Kishan Chand, as also the raiding party, informed the accused of his statutory rights. Accused offered to be searched by the police party, vide Memo (Ex.PW-1/A). Prior to the search being conducted, accused, who was present on the spot, also searched the members of the raiding party, vide Memo (Ex.PW-1/D). Witness states that accused was running a shop of Tudi. From the Tudi, so kept in the shop, a scooter tyre (Ex. P-1), which contained two polythene packets, was recovered. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-5) was sent to fetch weights and scales and also call a photographer. The packets (Ex. P-2 & P-3) contained opium, which when weighed were found to be 1.6 kgs and 1.2 kgs, respectively. Two samples (Ex. P-4 & P-5), each weighing 25 grams, were drawn from each of the packets and sealed with seal impression ‘M’. Specimen impression of the seal was taken on a piece of cloth (Ex. PW-1/D). NCB form (Ex. PW-17/B), in triplicate, was filled up on the spot. Also, entire proceedings were got photographed. Accused, who was arrested, desired information of his arrest be furnished to Sunita (PW-9), which was so done accordingly, vide memo (Ex. PW-17/D). Both, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and Superintendent of Police, Kangra, were informed, through wireless message (Ex.PW-17/E), of recovery of opium, effected from the conscious possession of the accused. With the completion of proceedings on the spot, police party returned to the Police Station and handed over the case property to Inspector Shakti Prashad, who resealed the sealed parcels with his separate seal. 15. With the completion of proceedings on the spot, police party returned to the Police Station and handed over the case property to Inspector Shakti Prashad, who resealed the sealed parcels with his separate seal. 15. In cross-examination, we find the testimony of this witness not to have been impeached in any manner. His deposition is clear and unambiguous. Significantly, accused has not cross-examined the witness on material points. Grievance made out is only with regard to nonassociation of independent witnesses present on the spot or the owner of the building to establish the factum of tenancy. 16. Independent witnesses of credence were associated and the question of tenancy we shall discuss hereinafter. 17. We find testimony ASI Ajit Kumar to have been materially corroborated not only by Dy. S.P. Kishan Chand but also by independent witnesses. Kishan Chand categorically states that upon receiving telephonic information, he reached the spot and in his presence, premises occupied by the accused were searched and from the tyre found in the Tudi, contraband substance was recovered. There are no contradictions, embellishments, improvements in his testimony. His testimony is absolutely inspiring in confidence. 18. We find that police party had also associated independent witnesses of credence and credibility. Rasal Singh is the Pradhan of the area and Narinder Kumar is an Excise Inspector. Both have proved their presence on the spot and recovery of the contraband substance from the conscious possession of the accused. No contradiction, material in nature, could be pointed out from their testimonies. 19. It is true that Rasal Singh had earlier witnessed such like operations, but then it has not come on record that Rasal Singh is not a witness of credence, is a stock witness, or that he was trying to shield the real culprit or had any animosity with the accused. They fully corroborate the version of other two police officials. 20. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-5) does state that on the asking of Ajit Kumar, he brought the scales/weights and also requested the photographer to come to the spot. 21. Tilak Raj does state that on the date of occurrence of the incident, police Constable took weights and scales from his shop. Though the witness was declared hostile, but when examined by the Public Prosecutor, admitted himself to be one of the persons standing on the spot, in the photograph (Ex. PW-2/B). 21. Tilak Raj does state that on the date of occurrence of the incident, police Constable took weights and scales from his shop. Though the witness was declared hostile, but when examined by the Public Prosecutor, admitted himself to be one of the persons standing on the spot, in the photograph (Ex. PW-2/B). In fact, weighment was done in his presence, as he clarifies by stating that he went to the spot lateron. We find defence of the accused not to have been probablized at all, even from his testimony. 22. Sandeep (PW-2) has proved photographs (Ex. PW-2/A to PW-2/E) and negatives (Ex. PW-2/A1 to Ex. PW- 2/E1). The witness categorically states that the shop belonged to accused, who was carrying on business of fodder/ Tudi. 23. We find Ajit Kumar to have materially complied with the provisions of the statute. Joginder Singh, as is evident from his testimony, took the Special Report (Ex. PW-12/A) and delivered it in the Office of Superintendent of Police, Kangra at Dharamshala, which fact also stands corroborated by Ashok Kumar (PW-12), who was posted as Reader of the Superintendent of Police. Not only that Constable Sugreev (PW-11) promptly took copy of the FIR to the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nurpur; SDPO, Nurpur; and SSP, Kangra. 24. We find that even by way of link evidence, prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Shakti Prashad (PW-16), who was, at the relevant time, posted as the SHO of the concerned Police Station, does state that on 4.3.2008, Ajit Singh produced before him parcels bearing seal impression ‘M’, which he resealed with his seal of impression ‘T’ and handed it to the MHC. 25. MHC Rajinder Singh (PW-6) states that Inspector Shakti Prashad handed over the case property to him, which he deposited in the Malkhana. Entry (Ex.PW-6/D) was made in the Register. Two sealed parcels alongwith Road Certificate; NCB forms, were entrusted to Dev Raj (PW-13) for being deposited at the Forensic Science Laboratory. Dev Raj does corroborate such fact. From the conjoint reading of testimonies of these witness, it is apparent that so long as the parcels remained with them, they were kept in save custody and not tampered with. 26. Prosecution witnesses do state that the building having the shop in question, is owned by Sunita Devi (PW- 9). Dev Raj does corroborate such fact. From the conjoint reading of testimonies of these witness, it is apparent that so long as the parcels remained with them, they were kept in save custody and not tampered with. 26. Prosecution witnesses do state that the building having the shop in question, is owned by Sunita Devi (PW- 9). It is also true that prosecution has not led any evidence to establish relationship between the accused and Sunita Devi. Whether accused was a tenant or not, remains unestablished on record. But then, would this fact render the prosecution case to be fatal? In our considered view - No. This we say for the reason that relationship of landlord and tenant or existence of tenancy is not an issue in the present case. All that the prosecution was required to establish was exclusive possession of the accused and his presence in the shop, where Tudi was kept, wherefrom contraband substance was recovered. Corroborative in nature, photographs clearly establish accused to be present on the spot. Primarily independent witnesses have deposed that when raid was conducted for carrying out search and seizure operations, accused alone was present in the shop. When the contraband substance was recovered, neither did he raise any hue and cry nor protest about someone else being owner of the goods. His presence on the spot had to be explained. After all a senior level Police Officer was present on the spot. His defence that he was picked up from his residence at Pathankot (Punjab-a neighbouring State), cannot be said to have been probablized. Neither he nor his family raised any protest at any point in time, with regard to alleged kidnapping or false implication, both by the police officials or any other individual. Also none of the police officials harboured any animosity against the accused. Evidently, accused himself had desired information of his arrest be supplied to Sunita. Thus, he was familiar with her, who undisputedly owned the premises in question. No doubt, Sunita has her residence immediately behind the shop in question, but it is not her case that she is in possession of the shop in question or owner of Tudi, but she does admit of having let out the shops to third parties. Thus, he was familiar with her, who undisputedly owned the premises in question. No doubt, Sunita has her residence immediately behind the shop in question, but it is not her case that she is in possession of the shop in question or owner of Tudi, but she does admit of having let out the shops to third parties. Certainly she does not state that the shop in question was let out to the accused, but then the shop being in exclusive possession of the accused stands duly established on record, through the testimonies of the members of the raiding party. 27. Trial Court, in para-16 of the judgment, has dealt with the testimonies of the tenants of the adjoining shops. We affirm the reasoning. Police had neither any intimation nor information of relationship of the accused with Sunita Devi. But definite information was of the accused carrying business of Tudi from the premises in question, where she had hidden the contraband substance. The capacity in which the accused was occupying the shop is immaterial and irrelevant to the fact in issue. “Possession” has different shades of meaning and it is quite elastic in its connotation. Possession and ownership need not always go together. What is required is custody or control. 28. In Inder Sain (supra), the Court, while dealing with the expression “possession”, held as under: “11. ……..So, in the context it is permissible to look into the object of the legislature and find out whether, as a matter of fact, the legislature intended anything to be proved except the possession of the article as constituting the element of the offence. Even if it be assumed that the offence is absolute, the word 'possess' in Section 9 connotes some sort of knowledge about the thing possessed. So we have to determine what is meant by the word 'possess' in the section. The question is whether the possessor of a parcel is necessarily in possession of everything found in it. The word 'possess' is not crystal clear. There is no clear rule as to the mental element required. ……………………. 14. We think that the only question for consideration here is whether the appellant was in possession of opium. The question is whether the possessor of a parcel is necessarily in possession of everything found in it. The word 'possess' is not crystal clear. There is no clear rule as to the mental element required. ……………………. 14. We think that the only question for consideration here is whether the appellant was in possession of opium. It was held in a number of rulings of the various High Courts that if possession of an article is made an offence, then there must be proof that the accused was knowingly in possession of the article. See the decisions in Emperor v. Santa Singh, AIR 1944 Lah339; Sabendra Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Pat 222, Abdul Ali v. The State, AIR 1950 Assam 152, Pritam Singh v The State, 68 Pun LR 200=(AIR 1961 Punj 50) and Sub-Divisional Officer and Collector, Shivasagar v. Gopal Chandra Khaund, AIR 1971 SC 1190 . 15. It is true that prosecution has not adduced any evidence to show that the appellant was knowingly in possession of opium The appellant took the endorsement of the Railway Receipt from the consignee, and presented it before the parcel clerk and obtained the parcel. There is, strictly speaking, no evidence that the appellant was aware that the parcel contained any contraband substance, much less opium. 16. But it is said on behalf of the prosecution that in most cases of unauthorised possession of opium the prosecution will never be able to prove that the accused was knowingly in possession of the article and that the burden to prove that he was not in conscious possession is upon the accused by virtue of Section 10 of the Act. That section seems to proceed on the assumption, if it Is proved that the accused had something to do with opium, then the burden of proof that he has not committed an offence will be upon the accused. In other words, when once it is proved in a prosecution under Section 9 of the Act that the accused was in physical custody of opium, it is for the accused to prove satisfactorily that he has not committed an offence by showing that he was not knowingly in possession of opium. It would, therefore, appear that the prosecution need only show that the accused was directly concerned in dealing with opium. It would, therefore, appear that the prosecution need only show that the accused was directly concerned in dealing with opium. If the prosecution shows that the accused had physical custody of opium, then, unless the accused proves by preponderance of probability that he was not in conscious possession of the article the presumption under S. 10 would arise. We do not think that the language of S. 10 would warrant the proposition that for the presumption mentioned in the section to arise it is necessary for the prosecution to establish conscious possession. 17. In our opinion S. 10 would become otiose if it were held that prosecution must prove conscious possession before it can resort to the presumption envisaged in the section As we said Section 10 proceeds on the assumption that a person who is in any way concerned with opium or has dealt with it in any manner, must be presumed to have committed an offence under S. 9 of the Act, unless the person can satisfactorily prove by preponderance of probability either at he was not knowingly in possession or other circumstances which will exonerate him. The burden to account will arise only when the accused is in some manner found to be concerned with opium or has otherwise dealt with it. 18. In State v. Sham Singh, ILR (1971) 1 Punj & Har 130, Gurdev Singh, J. speaking about S. 10 observed: "Section 10 of the Opium Act, in my opinion, implies that a person who is in any way concerned with opium that forms the subject matter of prosecution or has otherwise dealt with it in any manner so as to render him accountable for it will be presumed to have committed an offence under S. 9 of the Opium Act unless he can 'account satisfactorily' for it." In Sheo Raj Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Oudh 297, it was held: "Section 10 expressly throws upon the accused the burden to account for opium in respect of which he is alleged to have committed an offence". Practically the same view was taken in Syed Meheboob Ali v. State, 1967 Cri LJ 1727 (Orissa). 19. In the last analysis, therefore, it is only necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accused has some direct relationship with the article or has otherwise dealt with it. Practically the same view was taken in Syed Meheboob Ali v. State, 1967 Cri LJ 1727 (Orissa). 19. In the last analysis, therefore, it is only necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accused has some direct relationship with the article or has otherwise dealt with it. If the prosecution proves detention of the article or physical custody of it, then the burden of proving that the accused was not knowingly in possession of the article is upon him. The practical difficulty of the prosecution to prove something within the exclusive knowledge of the accused must have made the legislature think that if the onus is placed on the prosecution, the object of the Act would be frustrated. 20. It does not follow from this that the word 'possess' in S. 9 does not connote conscious possession. Knowledge is an essential ingredient of the offence as the word 'possess' connotes, in the context of S. 9, possession with knowledge. The legislature could not have intended to make mere physical custody without knowledge an offence. A conviction under S. 9 (a) would involve some stigma and it is only proper then to presume that the legislature intended that possession must be conscious possession. 21. But it is a different thing to say that the prosecution should prove that the accused was knowingly in possession. It seems to us that by virtue of S. 10, the onus of proof is placed on the accused when the prosecution has shown by evidence that the accused has dealt with the article or has physical custody of the same, or is directly concerned with it, to prove by preponderance of probability that he did not knowingly possess the article. 22. In his statement under Section 342, the appellant totally denied having anything to do with the parcel. He had no case that to his knowledge the parcel contained anything other than apples. He never put forward the case that he bona fide believed that the parcel contained only apples. He was in physical custody of opium. He had no plea that he did not know about it.” (Emphasis 29. In Om Prakash alias Baba (supra), the Court was dealing with the case where there was positive evidence to the effect that the premises in question belonged to a third party, where several persons, other than the accused, were residing. Hence, decision is inapplicable. 30. He had no plea that he did not know about it.” (Emphasis 29. In Om Prakash alias Baba (supra), the Court was dealing with the case where there was positive evidence to the effect that the premises in question belonged to a third party, where several persons, other than the accused, were residing. Hence, decision is inapplicable. 30. In Avtar Singh (supra), the Court was dealing with a case where the alleged contraband substance was being transported and it had come on record that persons other than the accused were also found travelling in the vehicle at the relevant time. Hence, decision is inapplicable. 31. In Ismailkhan Aiyubkhan Pathan (supra), the Court was dealing with a case where the prosecution could not establish exclusive, actual or constructive possession of the room. 32. In Mohd. Aslam Khan (supra), Court was dealing with a case where the accused was not found to be in the premises and police had to break upon the lock, for carrying out the search and seizure operations. In the absence of proof of ownership or exclusive possession of the premises, the Court acquitted the accused, which is not the case in hand. 33. In Raju @ Mohammad (supra), the Court was dealing with the case where, in the given facts and circumstances, Court found the accused not to be in exclusive possession of the premises, from where the contraband substance was recovered. 34. It is a settled position of law that where prosecution has been able to establish the accused to be in conscious possession of the contraband substance, Court can presume his mental culpable state and the onus to rebut the presumption is on the accused. (See: Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 ; State of Punjab v. Lakhwinder Singh and another, (2010) 4 SCC 402 ; P.K. Arjunan v. State of Kerala, (2007) 8 SCC 516; and Gopaldas Udhavdas Ahuja and another v. Union of India and others, (2004) 7 SCC 33 . 35. In the instant case, even remotely, accused has not rebutted such presumption. 36. In our considered view, prosecution has been able to establish guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence. 37. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. 36. In our considered view, prosecution has been able to establish guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence. 37. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and/or in complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any.