JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J.—Heard Shri Vijay Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs: “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 7.4.2011, 18.6.2011 and 20.7.2013 passed by the respondent Nos. 5, 4, and 3 enclosed as Annexure-1, 2 and 3 to the writ petition. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to reinstate the services of the petitioner and to pay the regular salary of the petitioner month by month, when it falls become due. (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate the services of the petitioner on the post of Constable, treating the petitioner continuous in service with all consequential benefits.” 3. It appears from record that the petitioner was appointed as Constable in the year 1995 in U.P. Police. In the year 2009 the petitioner was posted at Reserve Police Lines, Pratapgarh. On 30.7.2009 he was transferred to Police Station Udaipur. While he was preparing to proceed to Police Station Udaipur, suddenly severe pain started in the back and leg of the petitioner and he became unconscious. Thereafter, his family members took him from Police Lines to Allahabad and admitted at T.B. Sapru Hospital Allahabad, where his treatment was going on from 31.7.2009 to 19.1.2010. After getting fitness on 19.1.2010 he reported his Amad at Police Lines but his Amad was reported in the GD on 23.1.2010. The petitioner has informed the authority concerned about his illness through UPC well within time. 4. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was conducted in which he was found guilty of unauthorized absence. An enquiry under Rule 14 (1) of the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 was conducted in which the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty for unauthorised absence from 30.7.2009 to 23.1.2010 (total 178 days) and submitted his finding on 18.2.2011. The enquiry officer recommended for not paying any salary of absent period and further recommended for dismissal from service. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued on 24.2.2011. The enquiry officer recommended for not paying any salary of absent period and further recommended for dismissal from service. Thereafter, a show-cause notice was issued on 24.2.2011. The petitioner replied the aforesaid show-cause notice on 31.3.2011 narrating the entire facts and requested to consider the factual aspect in sympathetic manner as he was actually sufferring from acute illness. Thereafter, the Superintendent of Police without considering the reply of the petitioner passed the impugned order dated 7.4.2011 dismissing the services of the petitioner and passed orders for not paying any salary for the period from 30.7.2009 to 23.1.2010. Against the said order the petitioner filed appeal, which was dismissed vide order dated 18.6.2011. 5. Against the dismissal order and appellate order, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 48697 of 2011, which was dismissed on 25.8.2011 on the ground of alternative remedy. In pursuance thereof the petitioner filed revision. As the revision was not decided for a considerable long time, the petitioner was compelled to file Writ Petition No. 3033 of 2013, which was disposed of with direction to the revisional authority to decide the revision of the petitioner within three months. Thereafter, the revision of the petitioner was dismissed on 20.7.2013. Against the aforesaid dismissal, appellate and revisional orders the present writ petition has been preferred. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that while passing the impugned order the opportunity of hearing was not given to the petitioner. The enquiry proceedings were also not conducted in proper manner. The petitioner was undergoing treatment for the period of absence and for which he has also annexed the certificate of Government Hospital which reveals that he was on medical treatment and was advised bed rest for the period of absent. But the respondents had not considered the same and passed the impugned order ex parte without giving opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner has also informed the authority concerned regarding his illness well within time through UPC. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further makes statement that if the petitioner is reinstated in service, he will not claim any salary for the period in which he has not worked. 8. On the other hand learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the petitioner belongs to disciplined force and there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders impugned. Learned counsel for the petitioner further makes statement that if the petitioner is reinstated in service, he will not claim any salary for the period in which he has not worked. 8. On the other hand learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the petitioner belongs to disciplined force and there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders impugned. Time to time notices had been served to the petitioner and full opportunity had been afforded to him and as such there is no violation of principle of natural justice in the matter. Even the petitioner has not filed reply to the show-cause notice inpsite of several indulgence and therefore the impugned punishment order has been passed. The petitioner was absent from duty for a long period of time unauthorisedly and therefore the order impugned has rightly been passed. 9. Heard rival submissions and perused the record. 10. It appears from the record that earlier to the present impugned order, the petitioner was never punished nor any disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the petitioner. So far as the present impugned order dated 7.4.2011 dismissing the petitioner from service is concerned, the same has been passed due to his unauthorised absence from 30.7.2009 to 23.1.2010 (total 178 days). 11. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Tiwari v. D.I.G., P.A.C. and another, 2001 (4) AWC 2630 , 2002 Lab IC 259, has, while reiterating the view of the Supreme Court, held that the High Court normally does not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. 12. As already noticed above, since the charges on which the punishment has been imposed are to be taken as correct, what is now left to be considered and examined is as to whether the punishment imposed was commensurate with the said charges or not. 13. In Mithilesh. Singh v. Union of India and others, 2003 (1) UPLBEC 911, the Apex Court held that absence from duty without proper Intimation and permission amounted to grave offence warranting removal from service. 13. In Mithilesh. Singh v. Union of India and others, 2003 (1) UPLBEC 911, the Apex Court held that absence from duty without proper Intimation and permission amounted to grave offence warranting removal from service. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ramakant Yadav, 2003 (1) AWC 84 (SC); 2002 (3) UPLBEC 2799, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court whereby the punishment had been reduced to reinstatement in service on payment of 50% of back wages with a warning to the delinquent, and held that the High Court ought not to have Interfered with the quantum of punishment in the facts of that case. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh, AIR 1996 SC 736 , held that where the employee had absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, the High Court was not correct in holding that his absence from duty would not amount to such a great charge so as to impose the penalty of dismissal from service. 14. On the contrary the Apex Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , has held that “the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the Jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Marital, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.” 15. In the case of Union of India and others v. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215 , the Apex Court held that over-staying of leave subsequent to the order of rejection of application for extension of leave could not be considered to be a sever enough charge to warrant punishment of dismissal from service and the same was held to be harsh and disproportionate. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Harpal Singh v. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and others, 2000 (2) AWC 1075 : 2000 (86) FLR 334 , held that where it was on account of negligence of the constable of the G.R.P. that one passenger was misbehaved with and was murdered, the same could not be a case of serious misconduct and held that the punishment of dismissal from service was totally disproportionate to the offence and thus directed reinstatement of the employee in service, with half back wages and also ordered that he be given a severe warning. Further, in the case of Alexandar Pal Singh v. Divisional Operating Superintendent, 1987 (2) ATC 922 (SC), the Supreme Court held that ordinarily the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion of the punishing authority in imposing particular penalty but this rule has an exception. If the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate with the misconduct committed, then the Court can interfere. The railway employee on being charged with negligence in not reporting to the railway hospital for treatment was removed from service. The Supreme Court found it fit to interfere with the punishment of removal from service and modified it to withholding of two Increments. 16. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Tiwari v. D.I.G., P.A.C. and another, 2001 (4) AWC 2630 , 2002 Lab IC 259, has, while reiterating the view of the Supreme Court, held that the High Court normally does not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. 17. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court, in my view the broad principle which emerges is that normally, it is the disciplinary authority which should be best left with the duty of imposing the punishment after considering the facts and circumstances of the case. However, it is well-settled that in case, if on the admitted facts, the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offence, which shocks the conscience of the Court, the Court has the power and jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed. 18. In view of above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the orders impugned cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed. 18. In view of above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the orders impugned cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. The writ petition is allowed. The petitioner is also entitled to be reinstated and all other consequential benefits forthwith. However, on the basis of no work no pay the petitioner is not entitled for any salary for the period in which he had not worked and the same has also been accepted by learned counsel for the petitioner.