JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Appellate Committee on 22.05.1997 (Annexure-2) whereby the representation of the petitioner seeking his classification as Assistant Administrative Officer instead of Development Staff has been rejected. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Office Assistant in the erstwhile General Assurance Society Ltd. on 01.01.1964. He was promoted to the post of Officer In-charge in sub-Branch, Bhilwara in the pay-scale of Rs. 200-20-400-25-600. He was confirmed on that post on 09.02.1966. In the meantime, the General Insurance Business (Nationalization) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act') came into being. 3. The General Assurance Society was taken over, various insurance companies were merged and formed into four different companies. The National Insurance Company Limited, which is arrayed as respondent No. 4, was formed on 01.01.1975, wherein the General Assurance Society was also merged. 4. In exercise of the power conferred by clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the General Insurance Business (Nationalization) Act 1972, the Central Government formulated the General Insurance (Rationalization of pay scale and other conditions of service of officers) Scheme, 1975. This scheme was notified by the Government on 17.09.1975 to come into force on 01.10.1975. The petitioner was however, categorized as Inspector Grade-I in terms of General Insurance (Rationalization of Pay Scale and Other Conditions of Service of Development Staff) Scheme, 1976. The petitioner was not satisfied with his categorisation as Development Staff and instead sought to be categorized as Assistant Administrative Officer in terms of the 1975 Scheme. The petitioner represented against his categorisation as Development Staff and was informed that the Appellate Committee has been appointed to go into the question of categorization. 5. Consequently, the petitioner preferred an appeal which was rejected by the Appellate Committee on 23.06.1978. The petitioner then preferred writ petition titled as S.B.C.W.P. No. 1000/1979 before this Court which was dismissed vide order dated 30.10.1984. He filed an appeal against this order and the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.09.1996 directed the respondents to constitute an Appellate Committee and decide the representation of the petitioner within a period of three months. The Appellate Committee in its meeting dated 20.03.1997 rejected the representation of the petitioner. He filed an appeal against this order and the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.09.1996 directed the respondents to constitute an Appellate Committee and decide the representation of the petitioner within a period of three months. The Appellate Committee in its meeting dated 20.03.1997 rejected the representation of the petitioner. The decision of the Appellate Committee was conveyed to the petitioner by the General Manager, National Insurance Company vide communication dated 22.05.1997 (Annexure-2), which has been impugned in the instant petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner had been discharging the functions of an officer and hence he should have been categorized as an officer instead of Development Staff. In support of his submissions he referred to the order whereby he has been functioning as Branch In-charge. He further stated that similarly situated employees namely Shri P.P. Gupta and Shri G.L. Jain, have been categorized as Administrative Officers and hence categorisation of the petitioner as Development Staff is arbitrary and discriminatory. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner did not have any administrative or supervisory experience and hence his categorisation as Development Staff cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the record. 9. There is no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was discharging administrative and supervisory functions. The mere fact that he had worked as Branch In-charge cannot be construed that the petitioner performed administrative duties. The respondents have stated in the reply that even though the petitioner was given designation of Branch Secretary, he continued to work on the development side for procuring insurance business. Though he was working as Branch Secretary, he was in-charge of only a Sub-Branch and he did not have any supporting staff working under him. The representation of the petitioner had been duly considered by the Appellate Authority and rejected while giving proper reasons. The relevant extract of the decision of the Appellate Authority is reproduced hereunder:- "The aggrieved Development Officer should have responsibility of controlling staff which could be Inspector or Clerical or Subordinate Staff and should have controlled minimum premium of Rs. 30,000/- in the year 1972. The relevant extract of the decision of the Appellate Authority is reproduced hereunder:- "The aggrieved Development Officer should have responsibility of controlling staff which could be Inspector or Clerical or Subordinate Staff and should have controlled minimum premium of Rs. 30,000/- in the year 1972. Further the candidate should have minimum period of two years in the Officer category as on 1st January, 1973. The Appellate Committee after carefully going through the relevant service records took note of the fact that you were the Officer-in-Charge of a Sub-Branch i.e. Bhilwara Branch at the material time and you had no supervisory control over Clerical and/or Development Staff and you were essentially discharging the function of a Development Officer. The Committee's decision was further corroborated by the Judgment of Learned Single Judge wherein he has given the clear finding that as no administrative duties were discharged by you and your salary was linked with the cost ratio which was done only in the case of Development Officer, therefore, the then Appellate Committee rightly and appropriately rejected your demand for categorisation as AAO w.e.f. 1st January, 1973." 10. There is also no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was discharging functions similar to Shri P.P. Gupta and Shri G.L. Jain who have been categorised as Administrative Officers. It is clearly borne out from the reply of the respondents that these two officers were holding the post of Branch Manager while the petitioner worked as Branch Secretary which is inferior to Branch Manager. Two persons from Development Staff and two persons of Subordinate Staff were working under G.L. Jain. The salary of Shri G.L. Jain was also more than that of the petitioner. Shri P.P. Gupta was a Graduate while the petitioner was only Intermediate in Arts. Shri P.P. Gupta was also holding the designation of Branch Manager of Ajmer Branch while the petitioner was In-charge of only a Sub-Branch. Two members of Subordinate Staff were also working under him while there was none under the petitioner. His salary was also higher, Rs. 945/-, in comparison to the salary of petitioner, which was Rs. 625/-. 11. The onus was on the petitioner to prove that he is discharging functions which are administrative in nature and he is entitled to be categorized as Assistant Administrative Officer. The petitioner has not been able to discharge this burden. His salary was also higher, Rs. 945/-, in comparison to the salary of petitioner, which was Rs. 625/-. 11. The onus was on the petitioner to prove that he is discharging functions which are administrative in nature and he is entitled to be categorized as Assistant Administrative Officer. The petitioner has not been able to discharge this burden. The scanty material produced by the petitioner before this Court is not sufficient to hold that the categorisation of the petitioner as Development Staff is arbitrary, irrational or discriminatory. 12. It is settled law that Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits reasonable classification based on distinct qualities of persons grouped together, as against those who are left out. Even though various persons may be doing the same work, their quality of work may differ. Merely designating the petitioner as Branch Secretary is not enough to arrive at the conclusion that he was doing the same work as those who have been classified on the administrative side. The quality of work may be different as also the nature and level of responsibility. 13. Even otherwise, evaluation of duties and responsibilities for determination of cadre based on quality of work & nature of responsibility, are complex matters which are to be decided by expert bodies. The Appellate Committee is well equipped to deal with such administrative function and unless & until its order is per se arbitrary or discriminatory, it would not call for any interference by this Court. 14. Further, the constitution of committee for categorisation of employees in pursuance to the nationalisation of Insurance companies had come up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. K.S. Vishwanathan and Ors. reported as, 1985 (3) SCC 686 , wherein the categorisation made on the basis of actual work performed by the officers was upheld. The judgment of the High Court, holding that the committee for categorisation was improperly constituted, was set aside. 15. Therefore, it cannot in any manner be said that the action of the respondents in categorizing the petitioner as Development Staff is arbitrary, discriminatory or illegal, warranting any interference by this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. 15. Therefore, it cannot in any manner be said that the action of the respondents in categorizing the petitioner as Development Staff is arbitrary, discriminatory or illegal, warranting any interference by this Court in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. In view of the above, there is no merit in the instant petition and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******