1. This appeal under section 21 of the National Investigating Agency Act 2008 (‘the Act of 2008’) is directed against the order dated 15.5.2014, passed by Special Judge, NIA, Guwahati in NIA Case No. 01/2009 whereby and where-under the bail application filed by present appellant was rejected. 2. Heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. S. Jahan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. D.K. Das, learned Standing counsel, NIA. 3. The case projected by the appellant in this appeal, in short, is that he was arrested on 31.5.2009 in connection with Basistha P.S. Case No. 170 / 2009 under section 120B/121/121A, IPC read with section 25(1)(d) of the Arms Act. During the course of investigation of Basistha P.S. Case No. 170/2009, same was ordered to be investigated by National Investigating Agency ('the NIA') and such order was passed by Central Government on 1.6.2009 in exercising its power conferred under section 6(5) read with section 8 of the Act of 2008. Thereafter, NIA Case No. 01/2009 was came to be registered. 4. The NIA being so entrusted with case aforesaid, examined the witnesses seized documents having bearing on the allegations in the aforesaid case, did other needful and on the conclusion of investigation, the National Investigation Agency submitted charge sheet under various provisions of law including the offences specified in chapter IV and VI of the Act of 1997 against the appellant and several others and forwarded them to the court to stand their trial. 5. After taking cognizance of offences in aforesaid case, in course of time, learned Special Judge, NIA, secure the attendance of all the accused persons and on hearing the learned counsel for the parties, was pleased to frame charge under section 120B/121/121A, IPC read with section 25(1)(b) of the Arms Act as well as section 17/18 of the unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967 ('the Act of 1967'). Charges, so framed, on being read over and explained to the accused persons including appellant herein, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. After the framing of charges under the aforesaid provisions of law, the prosecution has examined as many as 37 witnesses out of 366 numbers of listed witnesses till the time of filing of the present appeal. 6. After the framing of charges under the aforesaid provisions of law, the prosecution has examined as many as 37 witnesses out of 366 numbers of listed witnesses till the time of filing of the present appeal. Since the appellant has been in custody w.e.f. 31.5.2009 and since there was no possibility of the aforesaid case being brought to its logical conclusion in near future and since no material has been collected so far against the present appellant requiring the court to detain the appellant for further period, the appellant had preferred present appeal seeking bail in connection with aforementioned case. 7. On the receipt of the application, the Special Judge, NIA, Guwahati has allowed the respondent therein to file objection if any, against such prayer seeking bail. The respondent, same being NIA, on being so required, submitted in writing that the appellant could not be granted absolute bail but it is not averse to allowing him to be released on interim bail. On hearing both the parties, learned Special Judge NIA did not give accused the benefit of bail taking into account various factors including the materials already on record. 8. In that connection, it may be stated that one of the grounds on which learned Special Judge, NIA was pleased to reject the bail prayer of the petitioner was that in granting or rejecting bail application of a person accused of offences prescribed in Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the Act of 1967, the material on record needs to be considered in the light of law holding the field. The objection or no objection from NIA cannot alone be a guiding factor in granting bail in such a case. The relevant part of the order is reproduced below: “It reveals from the aforementioned reply petitions that the NIA has strongly objected granting of absolute bail to the accused persons and they have expresses their no objection for releasing the accused persons only on interim bail with conditions. But the NIA either in their reply petitions or during the course of hearing has not cited or raised any purpose/reason for which interim bail is required to be granted. The defence side also has not cited any special reason for which release of the accused persons for a particular period on interim bail can be allowed. But the NIA either in their reply petitions or during the course of hearing has not cited or raised any purpose/reason for which interim bail is required to be granted. The defence side also has not cited any special reason for which release of the accused persons for a particular period on interim bail can be allowed. On the other hand, according to me, 'Objection' or 'No Objecting' by any Prosecution Agency cannot be the sole criteria for rejecting or granting bail and moreover if that is supported with no basis." 9. He further held that if the accused aforementioned is released on bail, there is every possibility of his influencing witnesses who are supposed to render evidence in connection with aforementioned case. The relevant part of his order is reproduced below: "Hence it will not be an exaggeration to say that the nature of the case is very serious. Trial has been going on against the accused persons under different sections of IPC, Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Arms Act where punishment extends to imprisonment for life. That apart, according to me, while dealing with the bail matter another important thing to be considered is that whether there is possibility of influencing the prosecution witness adopting any unlawful means by the accused thereby adversely affecting the trial, if released on bail. In the present case this possibility cannot be brushed aside. Again though in some of the bail petitions it has been mentioned that the evidence of the witnesses examined so far do not disclose sufficient incriminating materials but, according to me, this fact cannot be considered at this stage since some more witnesses are left to be examined in the case by the prosecution. The learned Spl. PP, NIA has also raised objection against the evaluation of evidence at this stage." 10. The bail application was rejected also on legal ground. Learned Special Judge, NIA, referring to the decision of this court in the case of NIA v. R.H. Khan, 2010 (3) GLT 302 held that once the Special Judge, NIA framed charge(s) involving the offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the Act of 1967 against an accused person, he can no longer exercise power under the law to enlarge such person on bail. 11. Being aggrieved, the appellant has approached this court seeking quashment of aforesaid order. 12. 11. Being aggrieved, the appellant has approached this court seeking quashment of aforesaid order. 12. Refuting the aforesaid order, passed by learned Special Judge NIA Guwahati in NIA Case No. 01/2009, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned senior counsel has contended that such an order cannot be sustained on grounds more than one. In that connection, it has been submitted that till the lime of preferring of present appeal, only 37 numbers of witnesses have been examined from the side of prosecution from a list of 366 witnesses but none of them could any way implicate the appellant with the charges, leveled against him. On this count alone, according to learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, his client needs to be granted the benefit of bail. 13. The further case of the appellant was that there is absolutely no material on record to conclude that in the event of bestowing the appellant with the benefit of bail in connection with aforementioned case, he would misuse the liberty granted to him by influencing the witnesses likely to be examined from the side of prosecution. Therefore, merely on assumption and presumption that the appellant may misuse the liberty if he is ordered to be released on bail, his prayer for bail cannot be rejected. 14. Regarding the conclusion of the Special Judge, NIA that objection or no objection from NIA cannot be the criterion in granting or refusing bail in respect of person accused of offence, defined in Chapters IV and VI of the Act of 1967, it has been contended that such conclusion is also not based on law since the NIA is duty bound under law to do justice according to law meaning thereby that the NIA cannot be oblivious to the facts on record which strongly suggest the innocence of appellant. 15. The further case of the appellant was that one similarly situated person, namely, Jayanta Ghosh, was already granted bail by Apex Court of the country vide order dated 12.12.2014 in Crl. Appeal Nos. 2577/2014 arising out of SPl. (Crl.) No(s). 751/2013. Since a very similarly situated accused person had already been granted benefit of bail, the bail of the present appellant cannot be rejected on application of the principle -that equally situated person cannot be treated differently. 16. Appeal Nos. 2577/2014 arising out of SPl. (Crl.) No(s). 751/2013. Since a very similarly situated accused person had already been granted benefit of bail, the bail of the present appellant cannot be rejected on application of the principle -that equally situated person cannot be treated differently. 16. In support of such contention, our attention has been drawn to the various charges, framed against the appellant herein as well as the charges, so framed against the aforesaid Jayanta Ghosh in NIA Case No. 01/2009 to contend that charges, so framed against both the appellant herein are totally similar with charges, framed against Sri Ghosh, both of whom along with some other accused persons are facing trail in NIA Case No. 01/2009 on the allegations, so specified in the aforesaid charges. 17. Since the charges, framed against the appellant herein as well as the charges framed against Sri Ghosh are totally similar and since Sri Ghosh had already been given the benefit of bail in connection with NIA Case No. 01/2009 where the present appellant too has also been detained since 2009, the appellant needs to be given the benefit of bail. 18. We have also heard Mr. D. Das, learned standing counsel for NIA who advanced submissions similar to the submission made before the trial court. 19. Before proceeding further, we need to know what a coordinated Bench of this court had stated in its decision in the case of NIA v. R.H. Khan (supra) via-a-vis bail, preferred by a person who stood charged of the offences including the offences, punishable under Chapter IV and VI of the Act of 1967. The relevant part is reproduced below: “Thus, if the Special Court, on perusal of the case diary, forms an opinion that there are reasonable ground for believing that the accusation, against an accused person, of the commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI is prima facie true, it will not remain within the powers of the court to grant bail in such a case. This position is further made clear by subsection (6) of section 43D, which lays down the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions tinder the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grating of bail. This position is further made clear by subsection (6) of section 43D, which lays down the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions tinder the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grating of bail. The logical conclusion would, therefore, be that in a case, investigated by the agency, if the Special Court formed an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the Special Court would have no jurisdiction to grant bail to such an accused except as may be provided by law.” 20. The decision in NIA v. R.H. Khan, 2010 (3) GLT 302, (2010) 5 GLR 704, therefore, clearly shows that once a Special Judge, on perusal of the materials, placed before it, prima facie comes to a conclusion that there are materials to frame charge/charges against a person accused of offence or offences, punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act of 1967, it no longer remains within his power to grant bail to such a person. 21. Further, in the case of Oinam Moniton Singha v. National Investigating Agency, 2013 (2) GLT 980, this court held that the ban which operates against the Special Judge, NIA dealing with a bail application of a person already charged with having committed of fence/of fences, punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act of 1967 would also operate against the Appellate Court dealing with bail application filed by such a person. The relevant part is reproduced below: "(77) The proviso to section 43d (5) imposes a limitation in addition to the imitations, which clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, impose on the court's power to release an accused on bail. This, the proviso to section 43d (5) is an additional restriction on the court's power to grant bail. (78) We must also point out that when a case is registered and investigated, under the NIA Act, for commission of Scheduled offences, the Special Court would be competent to deal with not only the Scheduled offences, but also other offences under any law for the time being in force. Such a law would obviously include offences under the Indian Penal Code. Such a law would obviously include offences under the Indian Penal Code. We have also settled that the power of the Special Court, constituted under the NIA Act, to grant bail is covered by, and shall remain confined within, the ambits of section 437 of the Code and, as an appellate court, the High Court’s power, under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be co-extensive with the powers of the Special Court. We have further settled that the ban, imposed on the power of the court to release an accused, if a case falls within the proviso to section 43d(5), is, as already mentioned above, in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same as magisterial Courts) by clauses (i) and (ii) of section 437(1). (79) Our above conclusion that this court's power, while considering an appeal under section 21(4) of the NIA Act, would be co-extensive with the power of the Special Court and that the ban imposed on the power of the Special Court to release an accused on bail, which appears in the proviso to section 43d(5), if a case falls within the proviso to section 43d(5), is in addition to the limitations imposed on the powers of Special Court (same being magisterial courts) by clauses (i) and (ii)of section 437 (1), stand upheld by the Supreme Court in its order, dated 25.8.2011, passed, in SLP (Criminal) No. S5063/2010), wherein, while allowing the appellant, Redaul Hussain Khan, to withdraw his appeal and giving him liberty to apply for bail to the Special Court afresh if there are any change in the circumstances or if fresh facts are place before the court, the Supreme Court made it, however, clear, thus;" 22. We respectfully agree with the ratio laid down by this court on the law points aforesaid in the cases aforementioned. 22(a). We respectfully agree with the ratio laid down by this court on the law points aforesaid in the cases aforementioned. 22(a). Corning back to our case, we have found that the learned Special Judge, NIA had already framed against the appellant the charges of offences under section 120B read with section 17/18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, since with the framing of charges involving offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act of 1967, the Special Judge, NIA can no longer grant bail to such a person and since the Appellate Court, exercising power under section 21(1) of Act, 2008 in relation to person, charged with offences punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the Act of 1967, are subject to limitations similar to that of the Special Judge, NIA, in our opinion, in view of law, laid down in R.H. Khan (supra), neither the Special Judge, NIA nor this court exercising jurisdictions under section 21(1) of Act, 2008 can grant benefit of bail to the appellant herein. 23. It may be stated here that the learned Sr. counsel for appellant has laid enormous stress on the fact that the words, used in framing charges against the appellant were very similar to the words used in framing charges against the accused Jayanta Ghosh in NIA Case No. 01/2009. Relying on such similarity, Mr. D.K. Mishra contends that since Sri Ghosh, charged with similar offences, had already been granted bail, in connection with case aforesaid, the present appellant too cannot be detained in custody any longer in NIA Case No. 01/2009 on the application of the principle of equality before law. 24. We have considered such submissions in the light of materials on record and found that though the words, used in framing charges against the aforesaid accused persons are very similar in all respects, yet, the degree of involvement of those accused persons, are not similar. Being so, the principle that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly finds no application to the present case. 25. In the result, we have found no infirmity in the order under challenge and consequently, present appeal stands dismissed for the reasons aforementioned. 26. Being so, the principle that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly finds no application to the present case. 25. In the result, we have found no infirmity in the order under challenge and consequently, present appeal stands dismissed for the reasons aforementioned. 26. We have found that till date the prosecution has examined only 37 witnesses out of a list of 366 witnesses though the prosecution is expected to examine as many as 92 witnesses out of such list to prove the charges against the appellant. We have also found that there is only one Special Judge, NIA in the State of Assam. 27. We are also aware of the fact that till date, the appellant has already spent more than 5 and a half years in jail although the minimum punishment for the offence under Chapter IV and VI of the Act of 1967 is 5 years which may, however, be extended to life imprisonment. 28. Considering all these while rejecting the bail application of the present appellant, we call upon the NIA to do everything possible to ensure that the trial against the aforesaid appellant and others similarly situated accused persons is brought to its logical conclusion as early as possible. ..