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2015 DIGILAW 319 (HP)

Nasib Chand v. State of H. P.

2015-04-09

P.S.RANA, SANJAY KAROL

body2015
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In this appeal filed under Section 374 Cr.P.C., convict Nasib Chand has assailed judgment dated 29.12.2008, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una, H.P., in Sessions Case No.9 of 2008/Sessions trial No.17 of 2008, titled as State of H.P. Versus Nasib Chand, whereby he stands convicted for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to serve rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- and in default thereof, further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that in the night intervening 12-13.11.2007, accused murdered his wife Smt. Popla Devi, but misled others making them believe that on account of stomach pain deceased committed suicide. Based on the complaint, made by Paramjit Singh (PW.11), uncle of the deceased, Inspector Mehar Chand (PW.18) after reaching the house of accused, carried out necessary investigation. He recorded statement of Ravinder Kumar (PW.10), brother of the deceased, on the basis of which FIR No.218/07, dated 13.11.2007 (Ex.PW.8/A) was registered, under the provisions of Section 302 IPC at Police Station, Amb, Tehsil Amb, District Una, H.P., against the accused. Investigating Officer got the spot photographed and prepared the spot map (Ex.PW.18/F). He also prepared the inquest reports (Ex.PW.18/G and Ex.PW.18/H) and sent the dead body for postmortem to the Regional Hospital, Una. Dr. Harmeet Singh (PW.6) conducted the postmortem and issued report (Ex.PW.6/C). On the spot, Investigating Officer completed the proceedings, including recording of statements of the relevant witnesses. With the receipt of the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex.PW.6/B), doctor opined the deceased to have died on account of strangulation. Certainly it was not a case of natural death or suicide. With the completion of investigation, which prima facie revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, Challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as eighteen witnesses. 3. The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as eighteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took the following defence:- “My wife was suffering from T.B. and she committed suicide by hanging.” 5. Trial Court based on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, found the prosecution to have established its case, beyond reasonable doubt. Trial Court, found the accused to have first killed his wife and then created an alibi of the deceased committing suicide on account of serious ailment. 6. We have heard Mr. Vinay Thakur, learned counsel, on behalf of the appellant as also M/s Ashok Chaudhary and V.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. AGs., and J.S. Guleria, learned Asstt. AG.,, on behalf of the State. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find the findings returned by the trial Court to be based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. Prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Fact that deceased was married to the accused is not in dispute. Such marriage was solemnized 15-20 years prior to the date of incident. From the wedlock two sons and two daughters were born is also not disputed. The dead body of the deceased was recovered from the house of the accused is also not disputed. In any event, it stands proved by the Investigating Officer (PW.18). That dead body was sent for postmortem is also not in dispute. 8. From the testimony of Dr. Harmeet Singh (PW.6), it is evident that a Board of Doctors was constituted for conducting the postmortem. In any event, it stands proved by the Investigating Officer (PW.18). That dead body was sent for postmortem is also not in dispute. 8. From the testimony of Dr. Harmeet Singh (PW.6), it is evident that a Board of Doctors was constituted for conducting the postmortem. At this juncture, it would be beneficial to reproduce the relevant portion of testimony of the doctor: “External Appearance: Body of well built female of length 5’ 5” wearing light yellow print Salwar, Kamij and light pink Bra. Body was in Rigor mortis with flexion of both upper limbs at the elbow joint. There was a black nylon thread with multiple knots at regular intervals worn in the neck. There was a big knot on the left side corresponding to mark on the skin. The nylon cord/thread was strong enough to support the weight of head and neck to cause compression of neck. There was a ligature mark on the neck above the thyroid cartilage transverse measuring 20 cm starting from the angle of the mandible on the right to the nape of neck on the left side. Mark of ligature was corresponding to the thickness of the nylon cord. “ [Emphasis supplied] 9. Evidently, ligature marks were found on the neck, above the thyroid cartilage of the deceased. Mark of ligature, corresponding to the thickness of the nylon cord, was found on the body of the deceased. According to the doctor, death could have been caused with this nylon cord (Ex.P-1). At the time of postmortem it was on the body of deceased and removed by the doctors. Also froth was coming from the right nostril. By cross-examining the witnesses an endeavour was made by the accused in establishing that symptoms found on the dead body, were in fact similar to suicide by hanging and not strangulation. In our considered view accused remained unsuccessful in such an attempt. Modi and Parekh do not say with certainty, as a matter of rule, that under all circumstances, in a case of strangulation, the tracheal cartilage, hyoid bone and the thyroid cartilage, must be broken or fractured. 10. It is not in dispute that there is no eye witness to the incident. Modi and Parekh do not say with certainty, as a matter of rule, that under all circumstances, in a case of strangulation, the tracheal cartilage, hyoid bone and the thyroid cartilage, must be broken or fractured. 10. It is not in dispute that there is no eye witness to the incident. Prosecution case primarily rests on circumstantial evidence and they being (i) recovery of dead body of the deceased from the house of the accused; (ii) incordial relationship between the accused and the deceased; (iii) accused being last seen in the company of the deceased; (iv) the postmortem report recording death to have been caused by strangulation; (v) accused having orally confessed his guilt with Tara Chand (PW.1); (vi) conduct of the accused and (vii) falsification of defence, so taken by the accused. 11. That death has taken by strangulation stands proved and discussed by us. 12. Law with regard to circumstantial evidence is now well settled. It is a settled proposition of law that when there is no direct evidence of crime, the guilt of the accused can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but then the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature, to fully connect the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of circumstances must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the proved circumstances should be consistent, only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, being totally inconsistent with his innocence. While appreciating the circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and great caution must be taken to evaluate the circumstantial evidence. [See: Pudhu Raja and another Versus State Represented by Inspector of Police, (2012) 11 SCC 196 ; Madhu Versus State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399 ; Dilip Singh Moti Singh versus State of Gujarat, (2010) 15 SCC 622, Mulakh Raj and others Versus Satish Kumar and others, (1992) 3 SCC 43 ; and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Versus State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 .]. 13. 13. Also, apex Court in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, Court held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, following tests must be satisfied “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” (Also see: Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172 ; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259; and Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 436 ). 14. Each case has to be considered on its own merit. Court cannot presume suspicion to be a legal proof. In the absence of an important link in the chain, or the chain of circumstances getting snapped, guilt of the accused cannot be assumed, based on mere conjectures. 15. The apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) 2 SCC 286, while cautioning the Courts in evaluating circumstantial evidence, held that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is reasonable, capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. This of course must precede the factum of prosecution having proved its case, leading to the guilty of the accused. 16. To establish the remaining circumstances, prosecution relies upon the testimonies of Tara Chand (PW.1), Smt. Banta Devi (PW.4), Tari (PW.5), Rahual (PW.7), Ravinder Kumar (PW.10), Paramjit Singh (PW.11), Viney Kumar (PW.12), Ms. Kanchan Devi (PW.13), Mohinder Pal (PW.16) and Papu Sharma (PW.17). 17. At the threshold, it be only observed that neither from the suggestion put by the accused nor from any evidence led by him, it can be inferred, even remotely, that deceased was suffering from Tuberculosis. Kanchan Devi (PW.13), Mohinder Pal (PW.16) and Papu Sharma (PW.17). 17. At the threshold, it be only observed that neither from the suggestion put by the accused nor from any evidence led by him, it can be inferred, even remotely, that deceased was suffering from Tuberculosis. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 enjoining duty on the accused to have placed on record some material/evidence to this effect. 18. The doctor has ruled out the possibility of the deceased hanging herself with the rope found around her neck. The report of FSL (Ex.PW.18/Q) evidences the fact that rope found around the neck of the deceased could not have withstood, without breaking, a sudden force of about 30 kg F. This force is the maximum that an average built man can apply on a loop constructed of the thread. Medical record establishes that deceased had strong body. She was 35 years of age, well built and having height of 5 ft. 5 inches. From the testimony of Dr. Harmeet Singh it has also come on record that deceased could not have hanged herself with the only thread found around her neck. Accused wants the Court to believe that deceased hanged herself from the hook of the fan, but the rope with which she hung herself has never handed over to the police. Nor was it found there. Thus medical evidence effectively negates the theory of suicide. 19. It be also observed that the son, daughter and neighbour of the accused/deceased have not fully supported the prosecution. They were extensively cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor and in our considered view their testimonies can be dissected and correctly appreciated and relied upon not only to prove the fact that accused misled the relatives in believing them of the theory of suicide, but also in corroborating the version so narrated by the prosecution witnesses. 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 have held that evidence of hostile witness may contain elements of truth and should not be entirely discarded. Their Lordships have held as under: “22. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted the doctor had not given his written opinion that the deceased was fit enough to give her statement. Though orally, the doctor said so. Their Lordships have held as under: “22. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted the doctor had not given his written opinion that the deceased was fit enough to give her statement. Though orally, the doctor said so. Relying on this part of the evidence especially the evidence of the husband of the deceased, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even though the husband may have been declared hostile, the law relating to appreciation of evidence of hostile witnesses is not to completely discard the evidence given by them. This Court has held that even the evidence given by hostile witness may contain elements of truth. 23. This Court has held in State of U.P. vs. Chetram and others, AIR 1989 SC 1543 , that merely because the witnesses have been declared hostile the entire evidence should not be brushed aside. [See para 13 at page 1548]. Similar view has been expressed by three-judge Bench of this Court in Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [ AIR 1991 SC 1853 ]. At para 6, page 1857 of the report this Court speaking through Justice Ahmadi, as His Lordship then was, after referring to various judgments of this Court laid down that just because the witness turned hostile his entire evidence should not be washed out.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajju alias Karan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 327 have held that evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. Their Lordships have held as under: “36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. Section 154 of the Act enables the Court, in its discretion, to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. 37. Section 154 of the Act enables the Court, in its discretion, to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. 37. The view that the evidence of the witness who has been called and cross-examined by the party with the leave of the court, cannot be believed or disbelieved in part and has to be excluded altogether, is not the correct exposition of law. The Courts may rely upon so much of the testimony which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other evidence. It is also now a settled cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the part which has been allowed to be cross-examined can also be relied upon by the prosecution. These principles have been encompassed in the judgments of this Court in the cases: (a) Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat (1999) 8 SCC 624 (b) Prithi v. State of Haryana (2010) 8 SCC 536 (c) Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 (d) Ramkrushna v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 13 SCC 525 ” 22. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Harijan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 777 have again reiterated that any portion of evidence consistent with case of prosecution or defence can be relied upon. Their Lordships have further held that seizure/recovery witnesses though turning hostile, but admitting their signatures/thumb impressions on recovery memo, they could be relied on by prosecution. Their Lordships have held as under: “23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross examine him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 ; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 ; Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 ; and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853 ). 24. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 ; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 ; Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 ; and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853 ). 24. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2766 , this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543 ; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 951 ; Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320 ; and Subbu Singh v. State by Public Prosecutor, (2009) 6 SCC 462 . Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. (See also: C. Muniappan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718; and Himanshu @ Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36 )” 23. Perusal of statements of Rahual (PW-7) and Ms. Kanchan Devi (PW.13) reveal that relations between the accused and the deceased were cordial and deceased committed suicide by hanging herself with the hook of the fan. Reason being that she was suffering from T.B. remained ill. But from the cross-examination part of testimony of Ms. Kanchan Devi, it is evident that she is trying to help her father. Version that deceased committed suicide by hanging was not so disclosed by her to the police as she admits not to have got such fact recorded in her previous statement, so recorded by the police, with which she was confronted. She admits not to have complained about the factum of false implication of her father. 24. Version that deceased committed suicide by hanging was not so disclosed by her to the police as she admits not to have got such fact recorded in her previous statement, so recorded by the police, with which she was confronted. She admits not to have complained about the factum of false implication of her father. 24. According to Mohinder Pal (PW.16), after learning about the death of deceased, he went to the house of accused, where he saw the deceased hanging from the ceiling fan. Surprisingly, he did not inquire about the cause of death. This witness undisputedly is a close relative of the accused. Deposition of this witness, in our considered view, is false. This we say so for the reason that deceased had already died at the time when he saw her hanging from the fan. Then why is it that he sent one Sanju to call for the doctor. Further witness states that deceased was hanging from a rope tied to the hook of the fan. Now where is this rope? Why is it that he did not disclose such fact to the police? Who concealed the rope from the Investigating Officer? Why did the accused not produce the same in the Court or hand it over to the Investigating Officer? these are the questions which remained unanswered, rendering version of children of the deceased as also this witness to be not worthy of credence, if not false. At this juncture, we may observe the demeanor of this witness, so recorded by the trial Court in the following language:- “While deposing the witness tended to be evasive while replying to the question in his examination in chief. He was more than eager to reply to the questions put by the defence counsel. The demeanor of the witness throughout the examination was such that he did not answer one question looking straight. Throughout his deposition the witness kept on gazing towards the floor.” 25. We may only observe that their version, in no manner renders the prosecution case to be false or doubtful. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & another vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 has held that:- “6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspectives in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & another vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 has held that:- “6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspectives in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary contest of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles of golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then breaks down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned author [ Glanville Williams in ‘Proof of Guilt’] has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted ‘persons’ and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “ a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent … …” In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the Courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India the law has been laid down on these times long ago.” [Emphasis supplied] 27. We find that even Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat namely Viney Kumar (PW.12), who had independently informed the police of the incident tried to support the accused. But when cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor on the question of relationship between the accused and the deceased, he admits to have informed the police about such fact and also got recorded in his prior statement Mark E with which he was confronted that on the basis of complaint, pertaining to discord between the accused and the deceased, 3-4 times Khangi Panchayat was convened. Thus this witness contradicts the version of the children that there was nothing wrong with the relations between the deceased and the accused. That something was amiss between the parties to the extent that the matter had to be taken out of the four walls of home, warranting interference of third party stands established on record. 28. To establish the fact that accused created evidence of misleading the cause of death of the deceased, prosecution seeks reliance upon the testimonies of Vebabh Lath (PW.14) and Sham Lal (PW.15). Conjoint reading of their testimonies would establish that in the middle of night, accused went to the house of Vebabh Lath and asked him to see the deceased who was suffering from a stomach pain. Sham Lal went on the asking of accused. Both the witnesses depose that when they reached the house of the accused, they found the dead body of the deceased lying on the double bed. Their testimonies remain unrebutted. Now if deceased had already committed suicide, then where was the question of accused having gone to the house of Vebabh Lath and also sent someone else to the house of Sham Lal, asking them to check the deceased who allegedly was suffering from stomach pain. Children state that while their father was sleeping with them, deceased committed suicide by hanging. Children state that while their father was sleeping with them, deceased committed suicide by hanging. So where does the issue of stomach pain arise. It is not the case of the accused that deceased complained about the stomach pain to him thereafter he went to get the doctor and in between she committed suicide. Noticeably, even Mohinder Pal (PW.16) states that at the time when he went to the house of accused, deceased was hanging from the rope tied to the hook of the fan. Now if this were so, then why did he send someone to the house of Sham Lal (PW.15). Obviously he wanted to conceal the occurrence of the events and misled the Investigating Agency with regard to the same. 29. That relations between the accused and the deceased were not cordial, is evident from the testimony of relatives of the deceased, Tara Chand (PW.1) brother of the deceased, Ravinder Kumar (PW.10) and uncle Paramjit Singh (PW.11). According to the witness accused would often maltreat and beat the deceased, who informed her relatives of such acts. Even Pradhan admits of having convened a Khangi Panchayat for such purpose. One cannot forget that incident pertains to the remote corner of the State and parties are illiterate, poor and rustic villagers. They are not worldly-wise and familiar with the procedure of law. It is in this backdrop that deceased who was just 35 years of age, had informed her relatives of the maltreatment and complaints, oral in nature, were lodged with the Pradhan. Though the witness could not state the exact date and time of alleged atrocities but we cannot ignore the socio economic conditions and background surrounding the parties. 30. We find the accused to have confessed his guilt of having killed the deceased by strangulating her. Tara Chand (PW.1) states that in the night intervening 12-13.11.2007, Suresh, Madan and one Tari came to their house and informed that deceased was suffering from stomach pain. On their asking he went to the house of the deceased alongwith his brothers and their wives. In the house of accused they found the dead body of the deceased lying on the bed and 5-6 women sitting there. On their asking he went to the house of the deceased alongwith his brothers and their wives. In the house of accused they found the dead body of the deceased lying on the bed and 5-6 women sitting there. When enquired about the cause of death, accused disclosed that “deceased was suffering from a stomach pain and when he had gone to take medicine and when I returned back to his house he found Popla Devi dead. Except this the accused had nothing told to me.” At this juncture, it be observed that this witness, brother of the deceased, was declared hostile and when cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor, he supported the prosecution by deposing that “ It is correct that I had also stated to the police that on my persistent enquiry the accused disclosed me that on 12.11.2007 there was quarrel between the accused and the deceased and the accused had also disclosed that in the quarrel and due to anger I strangulated the deceased with my hands with the help of amulet which was tied around the neck of the deceased in a nylon thread. I had also disclosed to the police that the accused Nasib Chand had also disclosed to me that in order to get rid off from the deceased I strangulated her.” Now crucially, there is no cross-examination by the accused to this part of the testimony. That accused admitted to such guilt is also evident from the testimony of Kanta Devi (PW.4) wife of Ravinder Kumar (PW.10). She categorically states the accused to have informed “ that when he pulled the amulet string of nylon then Popla Devi died due to strangulation.” We do not find version of the witnesses with regard to confessional statement, to be an exaggeration. It is so recorded in their previous statements recorded by the police, which fact is also corroborated by Inspector Mehar Chand (PW.18), who uncontrovertedly correctly recorded the same. 31. Law with regard to confessional statement is now well settled. The apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , has held thus: “18. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court. Extra-judicial confessions are generally those made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the Code or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra-judicial confession, two questions arise : (i) were they made voluntarily ? And (ii) are they true? As the section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the accused person, (2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to the charge against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to the charge against the accused person, or (b) it does not proceed from a person in authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that, by making it, he could gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24. The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is admissible in evidence. One important question, in regard to which the Court has to be satisfied with is, whether when the accused made confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by them for the purpose of securing such a confession. The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. All the factors and all the circumstances of the case, including the important factors of the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a feeling of threat, inducement or promise, must be considered before deciding whether the Court is satisfied that (in) its opinion the impression caused by the inducement, threat or promise, if any, has been fully removed. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. [See R. v. Warwickshall; (1783) Lesh 263)]. It is not to be conceived that a man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession of guilt, so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the facts confessed were not true. Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt, if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the statement is made as a result of the harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. An involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of the maker of it. So where the statement is made as a result of the harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or of threat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat, a promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat of prosecution if it is not. (See Woodroffe Evidence, 9th Edn. Page 284). A promise is always attached to the confession, alternative while a threat is always attached to the silence-alternative; thus, in the one case the prisoner is measuring the net advantage of the promise, minus the general undesirability of a false confession, as against the present unsatisfactory situation; while in the other case he is measuring the net advantages of the present satisfactory situation, minus the general undesirability of the confession against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions which are testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or promise must be such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid analysis the Court is to determine the absence or presence of inducment, promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the confession. The words `appear to him' in the last part of the section refer to the mentality of the accused. 19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. 19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.” (Emphasis supplied) 32. In Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 , the apex Court has held as under: “29. The issue that emanates for appreciation is whether such confessional statement should be given any credence or thrown overboard. In Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 , the apex Court has held as under: “29. The issue that emanates for appreciation is whether such confessional statement should be given any credence or thrown overboard. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 , wherein, after referring to the decisions in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 , Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 234 , Narayan Singh V. State of M.P., (1985) 4 SCC 26 , Kishore Chand v. State of H.P., (1991) 1 SCC 286 and Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14, it has been opined that it is the settled position of law that extra judicial confession, if true and voluntary, can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra-judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and his evidence is credible. The evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused before the witness cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that it was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. The aspects which have to be taken care of are the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. That apart, before relying on the confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and it is not the result of inducement, threat or promise as envisaged under Section 24 of the Act or brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. 30. Recently, in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403 , after referring to the rulings in Sk. 30. Recently, in Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403 , after referring to the rulings in Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165 , a two-Judge Bench has laid down that the extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself and it has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution; that it should be made voluntarily and should be truthful; that it should inspire confidence; that an extrajudicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence; that for an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities; and that such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law. The Court cautioned that confession would have to be proved like any other fact, which would depend upon veracity of the witness. Also, such confession can be relied upon and conviction based thereupon, if evidence comes from the mouth of the witness, who appears to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in respect of whom nothing is brought, which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. The Court has to satisfy with regard to voluntariness of the confession, truthfulness thereof and corroboration, if so required. The Court further held that:- “15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the Court in the case of Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan [ (2010) 10 SCC 604 ] held that: “29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P., Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41 & 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.] 30. In the present case, the extrajudicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. Azad v. State of W.B.] 30. In the present case, the extrajudicial confession by Balwan has been referred to in the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the Special Judge, and it has been corroborated by the other material on record. We are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” 15.7. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra-judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in the case of Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat [ (2009) 5 SCC 740 ], held as under : “It appears therefore, that the appellant has retracted his confession. When an extra-judicial confession is retracted by an accused, there is no inflexible rule that the court must invariably accept the retraction. But at the same time it is unsafe for the court to rely on the retracted confession, unless, the court on a consideration of the entire evidence comes to a definite conclusion that the retracted confession is true.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extrajudicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. [Ref . Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. [ (2011) 11 SCC 754 ] and Pancho v. State of Haryana [ (2011) 10 SCC 165 ].” [Emphasis supplied] 33. We find that to Ravinder Kumar (PW.10), brother of the deceased, accused had given a totally different version of the cause of death. To him he disclosed that deceased died by hanging from the ceiling fan. At that time he was sleeping in the other room. Version so narrated, apparently was false, as the witness noticed dust on the ceiling fan and accordingly lodged complaint with the police (Ex.PW.10/A). 34. Paramjit Singh (PW.11) was the first one who had gone to the police and informed about the incident. Ex.PW.9/A is the daily diary report which records apprehension of the complainant party with regard to the death of the deceased. 34. Paramjit Singh (PW.11) was the first one who had gone to the police and informed about the incident. Ex.PW.9/A is the daily diary report which records apprehension of the complainant party with regard to the death of the deceased. On such a complaint, police reached the spot. It is true that at that point in time, no specific suspicion against the accused was pointed out, but then apprehension was expressed. From the cross-examination part of the testimony of the witness, accused wants the prosecution to believe that during the night of the incident, he was sleeping with his children in one room, whereas, deceased was sleeping in the adjoining room. It is not a case where a third person ever entered the house. Accused never disclosed such apprehension. There is nothing against the children, pointing to their guilt. Thus involvement of third party is ruled out in the instant case. That the deceased committed suicide by hanging cannot be said to have been probablized. In fact ocular or medical evidence belies such stand. 35. Accused was the last to have been seen in the company of the deceased. This fact stands established by the prosecution and admitted by the accused. For after all even according to him, she had complained about the stomach pain to him. There is no evidence of any medical history or ailment of the deceased. She was just 35 years of age at the time of her death. Even doctors, who conducted the postmortem did not find signs of previous ailment. As such, prosecution was able to establish even this circumstance of last seen, beyond reasonable doubt. 36. Conduct of the accused by creating evidence, showing that deceased was suffering from ailment as a result of which she committed suicide, is also a material circumstance pointing finger towards his guilt. 37. Thus, from the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, that accused committed murder of deceased Smt.Popla Devi. 38. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. 38. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Findings cannot be said to be erroneous in any manner. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back.