JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. Challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal is to the judgment and order, dated 9th April, 2012, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 522 of 2010-A, titled as Mahesh Dahiya versus Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, whereby the inquiry proceedings and the order of compulsory retirement were quashed with a command to the writ respondent to reinstate the writ petitioner-respondent herein forthwith and to grant all consequential benefits with a further direction to open the sealed cover and promote him to the post of Superintending Engineer, if found suitable by the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short "the impugned judgment"). 2. Writ petitioner-respondent herein, a senior officer of the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (for short "Board") was diagnosed as "Loculated Fluid Collections (Exudative) (Rt) Pleural cavity echo Tubocular" (Pleural Effusion T.B.) and was made to suffer because of the said disease. 3. Admittedly, perusal of the pleadings of the parties does disclose that the writ petitioner-respondent herein was Senior Executive Engineer (Commercial) at the relevant point of time, suddenly fell ill, was constrained to go to Indira Gandhi Medical College and Hospital, Shimla (for short "IGMC") for his check up on 04.06.2005. After detecting the disease as tuberculosis, he was admitted in IGMC on 04.06.2005 and was discharged on 16.06.2005, vide discharge slip Annexure RJ-1to the writ petition, was advised bed rest and after examination, he was found fit to discharge duties and accordingly, fitness certificate was issued on 23.07.2005 and he joined on 25.07.2005 and resumed his duties. 4. Admittedly, the writ petitioner-respondent herein had applied for leave for the said period and had also claimed medical reimbursement. The leave as well as the medical reimbursement was granted without any objection, rather, without any whisper. 5. It is pleaded in the writ petition and also taken as a defence before the Inquiry Officer during the inquiry proceedings that the writ petitioner-respondent herein developed chest pain suddenly on 30.07.2005 while he was in office, constraining him to rush to IGMC and the doctor, after noticing his deteriorating condition, advised him complete bed rest, proper medication, good diet and proper care. He applied for leave on medical grounds alongwith station leave to the Director (Commercial) on 30.07.2005. He applied for leave on medical grounds alongwith station leave to the Director (Commercial) on 30.07.2005. Thereafter, vide letters dated 25.08.2005 and 21.10.2005, the writ petitioner-respondent herein was asked to appear before the Medical Board to be constituted by the Chief Medical Officer, Shimla. Telegrams were also sent to him to appear before the Medical Board. It is averred that he had sent telegrams in response to the letters/telegrams that he was not in a position to appear before the Medical Board or to join his duties because of the serious ailment from which he was suffering and was under treatment from Pt. B.D. Sharma Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Rohtak (for short "Pt. B.D. Sharma PGIMS"). 6. When he failed to report, he was placed under suspension on 21.01.2006 (Annexure P-4 to the writ petition). He obtained medical certificates from IGMC and Dr. B.D. Sharma PGIMS (Annexure P-5 to the writ petition) to the effect that the period of his absence from duty was necessary in order to recover from the ailment from which he was suffering. He submitted his joining report on 20.02.2006 (Annexure P-6 to the writ petition) alongwith representation (Annexure P-7 to the writ petition) seeking revocation of his suspension order, was not reviewed but was made applicable till further orders and a charge sheet was framed against him in terms of the mandate of Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short "CCS (CCA) Rules"), which reads as under: "That the said Er. Mahesh Dahiya while functioning as Sr. Executive Engineer (Elect.) in the office of the Chief Engineer (Comm.), HPSEB, Shimla-4 during the period from 2005-06 proceeded on leave on 30-7-05 on medical ground. Er. Dahiya was repeatedly directed vide Chief Engineer (Comm.), HPSEB, Shimla-4 letter dated 25.8.05, 7.9.05, 26.10.05 and 2.12.05 to appear before the Medical Board but he failed to do so. Thus Er. Dahiya has wilfully absented himself from official duties and has disobeyed the directions of his superiors. He has therefore acted in a manner which is unbecoming of an officer of his status. The said Er. Mahesh Dahiya, Sr. Executive Engineer (Elect.) has thus violated the provisions of Rule-3(I) (i) (ii) (iii) of CCS Conduct Rules 1964 and which made him liable for disciplinary action under Rule-14 of CCS (CCA) Rules-1965." 7. He has therefore acted in a manner which is unbecoming of an officer of his status. The said Er. Mahesh Dahiya, Sr. Executive Engineer (Elect.) has thus violated the provisions of Rule-3(I) (i) (ii) (iii) of CCS Conduct Rules 1964 and which made him liable for disciplinary action under Rule-14 of CCS (CCA) Rules-1965." 7. Precisely, there are two charges against the writ petitioner-respondent herein - (i) that he has disobeyed the orders of his superiors, and (ii) that he has willfully remained absent from his duties. 8. The disciplinary authority appointed Inquiry Officer. The inquiry was conducted. The Presenting officer examined two witnesses, i.e. Shri S.D. Rattan, Director (Commercial) as PW-1 and Shri Brij Lal Kaishta, Section Officer, as PW-2 in support of the charge. The writ petitioner-respondent herein examined one witness, namely Er. P.C. Sardana, whose statement is at Page-96 of the paper book of the writ petition. The Inquiry Officer concluded and returned finding that the charge stands proved and, accordingly, submitted his findings to the disciplinary authority. 9. The Whole Time Members of the Board (for short "WTM") examined the inquiry report and came to the conclusion, vide its decision, dated 25.02.2008, that the writ petitioner-respondent herein is to be removed from service. Memorandum, dated 02.04.2008 (Annexure P-19 to the writ petition) alongwith copy of inquiry report and decision of WTM was served upon him, was removed from service vide order, dated 06.07.2009 (Annexure P-23 to the writ petition). 10. He was asked to make representation on quantum of penalty, constraining him to make a representation on 21.07.2009 (Annexure P-24 to the writ petition), which was considered and the penalty of removal from service was converted into compulsory retirement vide order, dated 25.08.2009 (Annexure P-25 to the writ petition). 11. The writ petitioner-respondent invoked the procedural remedy by the medium of the appeal (Annexure P-26 to the writ petition), which was dismissed on 10.12.2009 (Annexure P-1 to the writ petition). 12. In view of the above, the writ petitioner-respondent herein was left with no other option, but to approach this Court by the medium of CWP No. 522 of 2010, which was admitted on 05.01.2011 and was posted for final hearing. 13. During the pendency of the writ petition, learned Single Judge, vide orders, dated 10.05.2011 and 19.07.2011, issued a show cause notice to Dr. 13. During the pendency of the writ petition, learned Single Judge, vide orders, dated 10.05.2011 and 19.07.2011, issued a show cause notice to Dr. B.M. Sharma, who had issued the certificate on 18.02.2006 (Annexure P-5 to the writ petition) whereby he had certified that the writ petitioner-respondent herein was unable to attend the duty from 01.08.2005 to 11.11.2005, appeared and explained the circumstances and the reasons for issuance of the said certificate. The show cause notice was dropped vide order, dated 03.11.2011. It is apt to reproduce the relevant portion of order, dated 03.11.2011, passed by the learned Single Judge, herein: "Notice was issued to Dr. B.M. Sharma. Dr. Brij Sharma present in person and states that in fact the certificate has been issued by him and his name is Dr. Brij Sharma and not Dr. B.M. Sharma. He has explained in what circumstances the certificate was issued by him. Therefore, notice issued to him is discharged. List on 24th November, 2011." 14. The order, quoted hereinabove, has not been questioned by the Board, is suggestive of the fact that the said certificate was genuine, which lends credence to the defence of the writ petitioner-respondent herein. 15. The writ petitioner has specifically pleaded in the writ petition, as discussed hereinabove, what were the reasons for his admission in IGMC Shimla at the first instance and after joining, why he rushed from office to IGMC Shimla on 30.07.2005. He has given all details in paras 5 to 10 of the writ petition. 16. The writ respondent has not replied the said averments specifically, but evasively. The averments contained in paras 19 to 25 have also not been denied by the writ respondent, thus, stand admitted in view of the mandate of the Civil Procedure Code (for short "CPC"). 17. The writ petitioner has sought writ of certiorari and writ of mandamus on the grounds taken in para 28 (A) to 28 (R). The core of the entire litigation is contained in grounds (C) to (F), which are virtually admitted by the writ respondent-appellant. The writ respondent has not denied grounds (C) to (F) and (H) of the writ petition, but virtually have admitted that inquiry report was not supplied to the writ petitioner and WTM decided to pass order of removal from service without hearing him. 18. The writ respondent has not denied grounds (C) to (F) and (H) of the writ petition, but virtually have admitted that inquiry report was not supplied to the writ petitioner and WTM decided to pass order of removal from service without hearing him. 18. The facts do disclose that WTM had made up a mind to pass removal order without hearing the writ petitioner. The grounds (G) and (H) contained in the writ petition have not been denied by the writ respondent-appellant herein specifically, thus, admitted. It stands corroborated and proved by the statement of Dr. Brij Sharma. Abovesaid facts read with order, dated 03.11.2011, passed by the learned Single Judge are factors leading to the conclusion that the absence of the writ petitioner was not deliberate or willful, but was beyond his control. 19. The writ petitioner has filed rejoinder and has explained all circumstances which have been taken as grounds by the appellant-writ respondent in the reply for conducting the inquiry and imposing the penalty upon the writ petitioner-respondent. 20. All officers have lost sight of the fact that the writ petitioner was suffering from such a disease, which is contagious and it is the duty of the person suffering from the said disease to take all such measures/precautions so that the persons, who are around him would not get infected. It is the duty of a Doctor also to advise such patient to take all preventive steps which are required as per medical jurisprudence. 21. Having said so, the core question is - whether the inquiry is to be quashed from the stage where the Inquiry Officer/disciplinary authority has committed fault, i.e. from the stage of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, i.e. non-supply of inquiry report, findings and other material relied upon by the Inquiry Officer/disciplinary authority to the writ petitioner-respondent herein to explain the circumstances, which were made basis for making foundation of inquiry report or is it a case for closure of the inquiry in view of the fact that there is not even a single iota of evidence, prima facie, not to speak of proving by preponderance of probabilities, that the writ petitioner has absented himself willfully and he has disobeyed the directions? 22. Keeping in view the discussions made hereinabove, findings are to be returned after applying the ratio of the Apex Court judgments. 23. 22. Keeping in view the discussions made hereinabove, findings are to be returned after applying the ratio of the Apex Court judgments. 23. The Apex Court in a case titled as Krushnakant B. Parmar versus Union of India and another, reported in (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 178, discussed all the aspects and held that in case an employee explains that his absence was beyond his control and due to compelling circumstances, it was not possible for him to attend the duties, it cannot be said to be willful absence. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 to 24 of the judgment herein: "16. In the case of appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion of duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether "unauthorised absence from duty" amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence can not be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold the absence is wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty. 20. 19. In the present case the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold the absence is wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty. 20. The question relating to jurisdiction of the Court in judicial review in a departmental proceeding fell for consideration before this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 , wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 95, para 25) "25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi- criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." 21. In the present case, the disciplinary authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was wilful, no such finding has been given by the inquiry officer or the appellate authority. Though the appellant had taken a specific defence that he was prevented from attending duty by Shri P. Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur who prevented him to sign the attendance register and also brought on record 11 defence exhibits in support of his defence that he was prevented to sign the attendance register, this includes his letter dated 3rd October, 1995 addressed to Shri K.P. Jain, JD, SIB, Ahmedabad, receipts from STD/PCO office of Telephone calls dated 29th September, 1995, etc. but such defence and evidence were ignored and on the basis of irrelevant fact and surmises the Inquiry Officer held the appellant guilty. 22. Mr. but such defence and evidence were ignored and on the basis of irrelevant fact and surmises the Inquiry Officer held the appellant guilty. 22. Mr. P. Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur, who was the complainant and against whom appellant alleged bias refused to appear before the Inquiry Officer in spite of service of summons. Two other witnesses, Shri Jivrani and Shri L.N. Thakkar made no statement against the appellant, and one of them stated that he had no knowledge about absence of the appellant. Ignoring the aforesaid evidence, on the basis of surmises and conjectures, the Inquiry Officer held the charge proved. 23. Though the aforesaid facts noticed by the appellate authority but ignoring such facts giving reference of extraneous allegations which were not the part of the charge, dismissed the appeal with following uncalled for observation: "The appellant even avoided the basic training required for the job and asked JAD Ahmedabad to send all the training papers for his training at IB Training School, Shivpuri (Madhya Pradesh) to his residence at Ahmedabad. 'An untrained officer is of no worth to the department'." 24. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of dismissal passed by disciplinary authority, affirmed by the Appellate Authority; Central Administrative Tribunal and High Court are set aside. The appellant stands reinstated." 24. While applying the test to the instant case, admittedly, the writ petitioner was suffering from tuberculosis disease, admitted in hospital, discharged from hospital, was advised to take bed rest and was issued a certificate by the concerned Doctor that he was fit to discharge his duties, is sufficient to hold that his absence was not willful. It is also worthwhile to record herein that the writ respondent has sanctioned the leave in favour of the writ petitioner after his joining on 25.07.2005 and also medical reimbursement was made in his favour. Then, how can it lie in the mouth of the employer-writ respondent-appellant that the writ petitioner was not suffering from any disease or has willfully absented himself. 25. The writ petitioner has specifically taken a defence that on 30.07.2005, he suffered chest pain, which made him to rush to IGMC, was asked by the Doctor for bed rest, as discussed hereinabove. All these facts are supported by the medical certificate issued by Dr. 25. The writ petitioner has specifically taken a defence that on 30.07.2005, he suffered chest pain, which made him to rush to IGMC, was asked by the Doctor for bed rest, as discussed hereinabove. All these facts are supported by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Sharma, who appeared before the learned Single Judge and explained how the certificate was issued and what was the reason for the same. 26. Not only this, the Engineer of a higher rank, who reached the age of superannuation on 30.07.2005, appeared as defence witness and admitted that on that day, the writ petitioner made a request to him that he was not in a position to attend his farewell party and also admitted that the writ petitioner was suffering from tuberculosis and had gone to IGMC on that day. 27. Thus, it was for the writ respondent-appellant to plead and prove that all these documents, including medical certificates, were false or forged. It is not the case of the writ respondent that documents (Annexures P-5 and RJ-1 to the writ petition) were forged or managed by the writ petitioner-respondent herein. 28. The Apex Court in its latest judgment in a case titled as Chhel Singh versus MGB Gramin Bank, Pali and others, reported in (2014) 13 Supreme Court Cases 166, held that the unauthorized absence due to genuine medical reasons cannot be termed as willful absence. It is apt to reproduce paras 10 and 12 of the judgment herein: "10. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in setting aside the order of reinstatement. The Division Bench has accepted that the inquiry stood vitiated by disallowing the request of the appellant to summon the rest of the five witnesses. For the said reason, the Division Bench has not interfered with such part of the finding and order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the impugned order of termination dated 17-10-1994 and the Appellate Authority order dated 26-12-1994 were quashed. The order of termination being quashed by the High Court, in absence of any observation and grounds to refuse the reinstatement, the appellant automatically stood reinstated. Without reinstatement in service, the question of further inquiry does not arise. The order of termination being quashed by the High Court, in absence of any observation and grounds to refuse the reinstatement, the appellant automatically stood reinstated. Without reinstatement in service, the question of further inquiry does not arise. There was no occasion for the Division Bench of the High Court to direct further inquiry, without reinstatement of appellant. 11. .......................... 12. From a plain reading of the charges we find that the main allegation is absence from duty from 11-12-1989 to 11-12-1989 (approximately 10½ months), for which no prior permission was obtained from the competent authority. In his reply, the appellant has taken the plea that he was seriously ill between 11-12-1989 and 11-12- 1989, which was beyond his control; he never intended to contravene any of the provisions of the service regulations. He submitted the copies of medical certificates issued by Doctors in support of his claim after rejoining the post. The medical reports were submitted after about 24 days. There was no allegation that the appellant's unauthorized absence from duty was willful and deliberate. The Inquiry Officer has also not held that appellant's absence from duty was willful and deliberate. It is neither case of the Disciplinary Authority nor the Inquiry Officer that the medical reports submitted by the appellant were forged or fabricated or obtained for any consideration though he was not ill during the said period. In absence of such evidence and finding, it was not open to the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the Doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days delay." 29. The Apex Court in the case titled as Kuldeep Singh versus The Commissioner of Police and others, reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 677, held that in case the inquiry proceedings are perverse and foundation is not as per the true facts, said inquiry cannot stand and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 30. In the case titled as Anant R. Kulkarni versus Y.P. Education Society and others, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 515, the Apex Court has held as to under what circumstances fresh/de novo inquiry/second inquiry/re-inquiry is permissible. It is apt to reproduce paras 17, 28, 31 and 34 to 37 herein: "17. 30. In the case titled as Anant R. Kulkarni versus Y.P. Education Society and others, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 515, the Apex Court has held as to under what circumstances fresh/de novo inquiry/second inquiry/re-inquiry is permissible. It is apt to reproduce paras 17, 28, 31 and 34 to 37 herein: "17. The purpose of holding an enquiry against any person is not only with a view to establish the charges levelled against him or to impose a penalty, but is also conducted with the object of such an enquiry recording the truth of the matter, and in that sense, the outcome of an enquiry may either result in establishing or vindicating his stand, and hence result in his exoneration. Therefore, fair action on the part of the authority concerned is a paramount necessity. 18 to 27. .................. 28. The Tribunal, as well as the learned Single Judge of the High Court have recorded a categorical finding of fact to the effect that initiation of departmental enquiry against the appellant had been done with malafide intention to harass him. The charges were not specific and precise; in fact, they were vague and unspecific. Furthermore, the Management committee had failed to observe the procedure prescribed in Rules 36 & 37 of Rules, 1981. The said Rules 36 & 37, prescribe a complete procedure for the purpose of holding an inquiry, wherein it is clearly stated that an inquiry committee should have minimum three members, one representative from the Management committee, one to be nominated by the employees from amongst themselves, and one to be chosen by the Chief Executive Officer, from amongst a panel of teachers who have been awarded National/State awards. In the instant case, there was only a two member committee. The procedure prescribed under the Rules is based on the Principles of Natural Justice and fair play, to ensure that an employee of a private school, may not be condemned unheard. It is pertinent to note that the Management committee failed to prove even a single charge against the appellant. 29. ..................... 30. ..................... 31. The procedure prescribed under the Rules is based on the Principles of Natural Justice and fair play, to ensure that an employee of a private school, may not be condemned unheard. It is pertinent to note that the Management committee failed to prove even a single charge against the appellant. 29. ..................... 30. ..................... 31. The conclusion reached by the Division Bench that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge had found that there was a defect in the manner in which the enquiry was held, and therefore there was no question of it recording a finding on merit to the effect that charges levelled against the appellant were not proved, is also not sustainable in law. It is always open for the Court in such a case, to examine the case on merits as well, and in case the Court comes to the conclusion that there was in fact, no substance in the allegations, it may not permit the employer to hold a fresh enquiry. Such a course may be necessary to save the employee from harassment and humiliation. 32. ........................ 33. ........................ 34. We may add that the court has not been apprised of any rule that may confer any statutory power on the management to hold a fresh enquiry after the retirement of an employee. In the absence of any such authority, the Division Bench has erred in creating a post-retirement forum that may not be permissible under law. 35. In light of the facts and circumstances of the case, none of the charges are specific and precise. The charges have not been accompanied by any statement of allegations, or any details thereof. It is not therefore permissible, for the respondents to hold an enquiry on such charges. Moreover, it is a settled legal proposition that a departmental enquiry can be quashed on the ground of delay provided the charges are not very grave. 36. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have examined all the charges on merit and also found that the enquiry has not been conducted as per the Rules 1981, it was not the cause of the Management Committee which had been prejudiced, rather it had been the other way around. In such a fact-situation, it was not necessary for the Division Bench to permit the respondents to hold a fresh enquiry on the said charges and that too, after more than a decade of the retirement of the appellant." 31. The Inquiry Officer has not discussed the statement of defence witness, who has specifically supported the case of the writ petitioner-respondent herein, though, being the employee of the appellant-writ respondent. 32. The Apex Court in a case titled as Roop Singh Negi versus Punjab National Bank and others, reported in (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 570, held that it is a duty of the Inquiry Officer to scan the entire evidence in order to arrive at a finding after judging the case of all the parties, adhering to the principles of natural justice, otherwise, the inquiry is vitiated and the finding recorded is also not in accordance with law. It is apt to reproduce para 23 of the judgment herein: "23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 33. Applying the test to the instant case, admittedly, the Inquiry Officer has not discussed the evidence of the defence witness, who, though was a senior officer of the writ respondent-appellant. 34. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 33. Applying the test to the instant case, admittedly, the Inquiry Officer has not discussed the evidence of the defence witness, who, though was a senior officer of the writ respondent-appellant. 34. The specific case of the writ petitioner is that the Inquiry Officer/WTM and the disciplinary authority have violated the principles of natural justice and had made up a mind to remove the writ petitioner-respondent herein from service and to throw him out, even without hearing him. Meaning thereby prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner-respondent herein. 35. The Apex Court in the case titled as Union of India and others versus R.P. Singh, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 3475, held that non-supply of copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent at pre-decisional stage amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. It is apt to reproduce paras 25 to 28 of the judgment herein: "24. We will be failing in our duty if we do not refer to another passage which deals with the effect of non-supply of the enquiry report on the punishment. It reads as follows: - "[v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the [pic]concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice". 25. After so stating, the larger Bench proceeded to state that the court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished. The courts/tribunals would apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of report could have made a difference to the result in the case then it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the said procedure the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/ management to proceed with the enquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the enquiry from that stage of furnishing with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement, if ultimately ordered, should invariably left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. 26. We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso as we find that in the said case it has been opined by the Constitution Bench that non-supply of the enquiry report is a breach of the principle of natural justice. 26. We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso as we find that in the said case it has been opined by the Constitution Bench that non-supply of the enquiry report is a breach of the principle of natural justice. Advice from the UPSC, needless to say, when utilized as a material against the delinquent officer, it should be supplied in advance. As it seems to us, Rule 32 provides for supply of copy of advice to the government servant at the time of making an order. The said stage was in prevalence before the decision of the Constitution Bench. After the said decision, in our considered opinion, the authority should have clarified the Rule regarding development in the service jurisprudence. We have been apprised by Mr. Raghavan, learned counsel for the respondent, that after the decision in S.K. Kapoor's case (2011 AIR SCW 1814), the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training vide Office Memorandum dated 06.01.2014 has issued the following directions: "4. Accordingly, it has been decided that in all disciplinary cases where the Commission is to be consulted, the following procedure may be adopted :- (i) On receipt of the Inquiry Report, the DA may examine the same and forward it to the Commission with his observations; (ii) On receipt of the Commission's report, the DA will examine the same and forward the same to the Charged Officer along with the Inquiry Report and his tentative reasons for disagreement with the Inquiry Report and/or the advice of the UPSC; (iii) The Charged Officer shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether the Inquiry report/advice of UPSC is in his favour or not. (iv) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation of the Charged Officer and take further action as prescribed in sub-rules 2(A) to (4) of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 27. After the said Office Memorandum, a further Office Memorandum has been issued on 5.3.2014, which pertains to supply of copy of UPSC advice to the Charged Officer. (iv) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation of the Charged Officer and take further action as prescribed in sub-rules 2(A) to (4) of Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 27. After the said Office Memorandum, a further Office Memorandum has been issued on 5.3.2014, which pertains to supply of copy of UPSC advice to the Charged Officer. We think it appropriate to reproduce the same: "The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's O.M. of even number dated 6.1.2014 and to say that it has been decided, in partial modification of the above O.M. that a copy of the inquiry report may be given to the Government servant as provided in Rule 15(2) of Central Secretariat Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The inquiry report together with the representation, if any, of the Government servant may be forwarded to the Commission for advice. On receipt of the Commission's advice, a copy of the advice may be provided to the Government servant who may be allowed to submit his representation, if any, on the Commission's advice within fifteen days. The Disciplinary Authority will consider the inquiry report, advice of the Commission and the representation(s) of the Government servant before arriving at a final decision". 28. In our considered opinion, both the Office Memoranda are not only in consonance with the S.K. Kapoor's case (2011 AIR SCW 1814) but also in accordance with the principles of natural justice which has been stated in B. Karunakar's case ( AIR 1994 SC 1074 )." 36. Applying the test to the instant case, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority have violated the principle of natural justice. 37. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, no case for interference is made out. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment is upheld for the reasons recorded hereinabove. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.