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2015 DIGILAW 324 (GAU)

Harekrishna Das v. State of Assam

2015-03-18

K.SREEDHAR RAO, PRASANTA KUMAR SAIKIA

body2015
JUDGMENT : K. Sreedhar Rao, J. 1. In consequence of National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, the National Council for Teacher Education (Determination of Teachers Regulations) were framed in 2001. Section 2 of the Regulation envisage that in the elementary education, for primary schools, the minimum educational qualification is: “pass in senior secondary school certificate course with diploma or certificate in basic teachers training of duration of not less than two years or Bachelor of Elementary Education (B.E. Ed)”. For elementary upper education, the minimum qualification prescribed is senior secondary school certificate or intermediate or its equivalent and diploma or certificate in elementary teacher training of duration of not less than two years or Bachelor of elementary education or graduate with bachelor of education (B.Ed.) or its equivalent. For the purpose of the cases at hand, the above qualifications prescribed for elementary -- primary and upper sections -- are only germane for consideration. 2. The Government of Assam amended the Assam Elementary Education Provincialisation Rules, 1977, prescribing the basic qualification for the post of teacher in primary school as pass in secondary school certificate course and the requirement of Diploma/Certificate in Elementary Teachers training course was made a preferential qualification with the advantage of award of additional 10 marks for the preferential qualification at the time of selection. 3. After the said amendment, advertisement was issued in the year 2005 calling for appointments for filling of the post of teachers in upper primary and lower primary schools. In the advertisement, persons with qualification of pass in senior secondary school certificate without diploma or certificate in basic teachers training were also permitted to apply. However, persons with diploma or certificate in B.E. Ed etc qualification were said to be given preference in the matter of appointment. 4. The validity of the advertisement as well as the amended Rules, 1977, was challenged in WP(C) No. 8727/2005 as being contrary to the NCTE Regulations, 2001. During pendency of the writ petition, there was no stay granted for selection process. Therefore, selection process continued to a stage where interviews of all the candidates were complete. At that point of time, the writ petition came to be disposed of. During pendency of the writ petition, there was no stay granted for selection process. Therefore, selection process continued to a stage where interviews of all the candidates were complete. At that point of time, the writ petition came to be disposed of. This Court found that 11 he amendment Rules, 1977, and the advertisement permitting persons with only having pass certificate in senior secondary school certificate to apply for the post is illegal and contrary to the NCTE Regulations. However, the Court, having found that the process of selection almost being complete, did not find it proper to interfere with the selection process. Therefore, allowed the selection process to go on giving discretion to the Government to proceed with the selection process. 5. The petitioners, aggrieved by the said order, filed Civil Appeal No. 2153/2011 before the Supreme Court. The said case is popularly called as Ranu Hazarika's case. The Supreme Court held that despite the High Court's finding that the Assam Elementary School Provincialisation Amendment Rules being illegal and contrary to NCTE Regulation therefore permitting the selection process to be continued on the basis of the said Rules is illegal. Hence, set aside the order and quashed the advertisement, dated 02.12.2005 based on which the selection process was initiated. 6. In 2009, when Ranu Hazarika's case was pending in the Supreme Court, the Right to Education Act, 2009, came into being with effect from 26th August, 2009. Section 23 of the said Act empowered the Central Government by notification to fix the minimum academic qualifications. Sub-Section (2) of Section 23 provides for relaxation of the minimum qualifications by the Central Government where a State does not have adequate institutions offering training course for appointment as a teacher for such a period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the notification. 7. The Central Government issued a notification, dated 23rd August, 2010, prescribing the minimum qualification of a teacher of lower and upper elementary education and in addition, should pass the Teachers Eligibility Test. 8. It is the case of the Government that after disposal of Ranu Hazarika's case by the Supreme Court, the State Government cancelled the advertisement dated 02.12.2005 issued for appointment of teachers in lower primary and upper primary schools. 9. 8. It is the case of the Government that after disposal of Ranu Hazarika's case by the Supreme Court, the State Government cancelled the advertisement dated 02.12.2005 issued for appointment of teachers in lower primary and upper primary schools. 9. The 21 petitioners filed WP(C) No. 3882/2011 and withdrew the writ petition and filed afresh WP(C) No. 6192/2011 seeking a direction against the State authorities to take necessary steps for appointment of the petitioners seeking due relaxation of the minimum educational qualification from the Central Government. 10. The State Government during the pendency of WP(C) No. 6192/2011, wrote a letter to the Central Government about the paucity of training institutions and sought for exemption. Accordingly, the Central Government by notification, dated 26.08.2011, issued an order giving exemption for a period till the end of March, 2015 in accordance with Section 23 (2) of the Right to Education Act (RTE Act). 11. This Court dismissed the writ petition in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranu Hazarika's case. Against the said order, WA No. 186/2012 was filed. The writ appeal also came to be dismissed confirming the order of the learned Single Judge. The Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1018/2014 set aside the order and remanded the matter to the High Court on the ground that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the effect of the relaxation notification issued by the Central Government. Therefore, directed the matter to be decided keeping in view of the effect of the relaxation notification of the Central Government, dated 26.08.2011. 12. As a consequence of the order of the Supreme Court, WP(C) 6192/2011 was placed before the learned Single Judge. Since WA 126/2013 was pending before Division Bench involving similar question of fact and law, the writ petition consequently got transferred to the Division Bench to be heard and decided along with WA No. 126/2013. Thereafter, the other writ petitions involving similar question of law and fact, were filed and they were also came to be clubbed. 13. When the Civil Appeal No. 1018/2014 was pending, about 1000 persons, who are similarly placed like the 21 petitioners, made an application for intervention. The intervention application was also disposed of. Thereafter, the other writ petitions involving similar question of law and fact, were filed and they were also came to be clubbed. 13. When the Civil Appeal No. 1018/2014 was pending, about 1000 persons, who are similarly placed like the 21 petitioners, made an application for intervention. The intervention application was also disposed of. Consequently, the said 1000 persons made applications before this Court to get impleaded as co-petitioners and apart from them, 500 more persons similarly placed also made applications to get impleaded as co-petitioners. Therefore, in all, in WP(C) 6192/2011,1563 petitioners are before this Court. 14. In WP(C) 1095/2014, there are 16 petitioners. In WP(C) 1096/2014, there are 21 petitioners. In WP(C) 1098/2014, there are 5 petitioners. In WP(C) 1788/2014, there are 195 petitioners, who claim that they are similarly placed like petitioners in WP(C) 6192/2011 and they are also entitled to the similar relief of declaration of result of the selection process and appointment orders to be issued to them if they are found to be selected. 15. In WP(C) 4837/2012, there are 284 petitioners. The petitioners in WP(C) 4837/2012 filed Civil Appeal No. 2154/2011 for recall of the orders of the Supreme Court passed in Ranu Hazarika's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the application. When the petitioners found that Civil Appeal No. 1018/2014 was pending, they made an application to get impleaded. Since the said SLP was disposed of along with the intervention application, the petitioners have filed the present petition for a direction to publish the select list in respect of the selection process pursuant to the advertisement dated 02.12.2005 by giving effect to the relaxation order, dated 26.08.2011. 16. WP(C) No. 4705/2014 is filed by two petitioners subsequent to the order of remand made by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1018/2014. WP(C) 2325/2011 is filed by one petitioner seeking relief similar to one in WP(C) 6192/2011. 17. About 540 petitioners filed WP(C) No. 133/2012 on the ground that the notification issued for admission to the Teachers Training Course had an explicit promise and guarantee of employment. The petitioners having lured by the said admission notification, underwent the training course. Therefore, on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, they should be appointed. 18. About 540 petitioners filed WP(C) No. 133/2012 on the ground that the notification issued for admission to the Teachers Training Course had an explicit promise and guarantee of employment. The petitioners having lured by the said admission notification, underwent the training course. Therefore, on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, they should be appointed. 18. Out of the 540 petitioners, in WP(C) 133/2012, 212 are TET qualified and they applied to the post pursuant to the advertisement in the year 2012 and got appointed. Hence, they have filed a memo to withdraw their claim in the writ petition. 19. Smt. DR Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners referred to the order of the Supreme Court, which remanded the matter for fresh consideration to this Court and with specific reference to the observations of the Supreme Court made in paragraph Nos. 12 and 14, which read as follows: “12. In our considered opinion, the view expressed by the High Court is not correct for the reason that the subsequent notification has given relaxation for appointment of teachers for classes I to VIII as one time measure. The High Court ought to have looked into the notification and expressed its opinion one way or the other on the aforesaid notification. Without doing so, the High Court has washed its hands by merely observing that it is bound by the views expressed by this Court. 14. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the writ petition as well as the writ appeal. Therefore, we set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 6192 of 2011, dated 06.06.2012 and confirmed in Writ Appeal No. 186 of 2012, dated 29.06.2012 and remand the matter to the High Court with a request to consider the effect of the notification issued by the Central Government, dated 26.08.2011 in accordance with law and in accordance with the provisions of the Act as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within six months' time from today. We fix the time limit only for the reason that the aspirants are teachers in primary schools and are waiting for their appointment from the date of the advertisement, i.e., from 14.04.1999.” 20. Mrs. We fix the time limit only for the reason that the aspirants are teachers in primary schools and are waiting for their appointment from the date of the advertisement, i.e., from 14.04.1999.” 20. Mrs. Goswami, learned counsel also referred to the exemption notification, dated 26.08.2011, relating to relaxation of qualification as regard Section 23 of the RTE Act, which reads as follows: “Section 23 RTE Act. Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers:- (1) Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorized by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. (2) Where a State does not have adequate institutions offering courses or training in teacher education, or teachers possessing minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1) are not available in sufficient numbers, the Central Government may, if it deems necessary, by notification, relax the minimum qualifications required for appointment as a teacher, for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in that notification: Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not possess minimum qualification as laid down under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of five years. (3) The salary and allowances payable to and the terms and conditions of service of, teachers shall be such as may be prescribed.” 21. In view of the exemption and relaxation of the training qualification, the petitioners, who have basic qualifications sans Diploma/Certificate in Elementary Teachers Training (CEETT) would not suffer disqualification for being appointed during the relaxation period. The advertisement for appointment issued in 2005, would not render invalid in view of the relaxation of the training qualification by virtue of the notification, dated 26.08.2011. The selection process was completed only the declaration of result was kept in abeyance. The contention of the State that the notification, dated 02.12.2005 was issued for filling up the posts has been cancelled, is not the fact brought to the notice of this Court either in the writ petitions, in the writ appeals and as well in the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court. The petitioners, in question. have no knowledge about the cancellation to challenge the same at any earlier point of time because of non-disclosure of information by the State. 22. The petitioners, in question. have no knowledge about the cancellation to challenge the same at any earlier point of time because of non-disclosure of information by the State. 22. The Supreme Court has categorically directed that this Court should take into consideration the effect of notification relating relaxation of training qualification and of passing of proper orders. In that view of the matter. it was strenuously submitted that since the training qualification has been relaxed, the selection process is completed; the publication of result alone remains to be done. Therefore, there is no legal impediment for the State, now, to declare the results of the selection process and the candidates, who are found to be selected in the selection process, should be given appointment. 23. The counsel further submitted that the notification relating to relaxation has retrospective effect because of the fact that there was dearth of training institutions in the State of Assam when RTE Act came into force and the said fact also finds mention in the judgment of this Court in Ranu Hazarika's case (supra). In view of such situation, relaxation notification is issued, which is deemed to have retrospective effect. Therefore, the State, in order to give effect to object for which relaxation was sought and given, is bound to declare the results and appoint those, who are selected, else all the untrained teachers, who are before this Court have become over aged and they do not have age qualification to appear in the future selections. Therefore, on the ground of equity also it was argued that the writ petitions have to be allowed and the petitioners, who are untrained teachers, should be appointed upon declaration of selection list if they are found to be selected. 24. It is further argued that the relaxation notification has beneficial purport. Therefore, it has to be interpreted liberally to give benefit to the petitioners and to revive the discontinued selection process of 2005 and the benefit of one-time measure of relaxation has to be given to the petitioners. 25. The counsel appearing in the appeal in WA 126/2013, strenuously submitted that some of the appellants, who have appeared in the selection process, pursuant to the 2005 notification, upon declaration of the result, if they are found to be selected, they have to be appointed. Similar argument is canvassed by the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 1095/14, 4837/12 and 4705/14. 26. The counsel appearing in the appeal in WA 126/2013, strenuously submitted that some of the appellants, who have appeared in the selection process, pursuant to the 2005 notification, upon declaration of the result, if they are found to be selected, they have to be appointed. Similar argument is canvassed by the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 1095/14, 4837/12 and 4705/14. 26. Sri AK Bhattacharyya, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 133/2012 and 6551/2011, strenuously submitted that the petitioners got admitted to the Teachers Training Course in view of the admission notice promising appointment after successful completion of the training course. The petitioners did undergo training course pursuant to the contents of the admission notice. They have spent substantial period of 2 years of time and money of about Rs. 10,000/- each in undergoing the training and; therefore, as per the promise held out in the admission notice, they should be appointed. The counsel has referred to the contents of admission notice, the relevant contents of the said notification read as follows: “Admission Notice Dated 14.04.1999 This is for information of all concerned that the Govt. of Assam has decided to introduce a Pre-Service training course teaching to a Diploma in Education for improvement of the professional skills of the persons to be recruited as teachers in Elementary Schools against the vacancies to be occurred in near future. In order to maintain a minimum standard and quality in class-room transaction in Primary Schools, it has been decided to introduce a pre-service, training course from the current academic session which is likely to be modified from the next academic session. Applications are therefore, invited from the candidates having aptitude to serve in rural/backward areas with dedication as teacher in Primary Schools for admission into a pre-service training course to be started during the current academic session.” 27. The decision of the Supreme Court in M/S Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 , MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Asstt. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax & Ors., reported in, (2006) 8 SCC 702 and State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cement Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 274 , are relied on. 28. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 , MRF Ltd., Kottayam v. Asstt. Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax & Ors., reported in, (2006) 8 SCC 702 and State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cement Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 274 , are relied on. 28. The pith and substance of the ratio laid down in the said decisions declare that a promisee should have acted in the reliance on the promise and it is not necessary that he should have suffered any detriment. The promisor, if retracts from the promise, it would result in injustice to the promisee and that would be a necessary ingredient for invoking of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is further held in the said decision that doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable plea and must be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. 29. In the decision of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cement Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 274 , it is held in paragraph 35 that the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in the following circumstances: “35. In our opinion, the aforesaid statement of law covers the submissions of Dr. Dhavan and Mr. Dwivedi that in order to invoke the aforesaid doctrine, it must be established that: (a) a party must make an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct to the other party; (b) the representation was intended to create legal relations or affect the legal relationship, to arise in the future; (c) a clear foundation has to be laid in the petition, with supporting documents; (d) it has to be shown that the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the promise; (e) it is possible for the Government to resile from its promise when public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise; (f) the Court will not apply the doctrine in abstract.” 30. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be applied even against the Government where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be applied even against the Government where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. However, the Government or even a private party under the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law: 31. In respect of principle of legitimate expectation, it is observed as follows: “183. As there are parallels between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation because both these doctrines are founded on the concept of fairness and arise out of natural justice, it is appropriate that the principles of legitimate expectation are also noticed here only to appreciate the case of the appellants founded on the basis of the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.” 32. In view of the above observations, it is submitted that the petitioners are entitled to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to seek appointment since they have successfully undergone training and without the need of any selection process. 33. The NCTE issued a notification, which declares the minimum educational qualification of passing senior secondary with varying specific percentage of marks and pass in 2 year Diploma in Elementary Education (by whatever name known). The said notification further insists that apart from the basic educational qualification, pass in Teachers Eligibility Test (TET), which should be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the guidelines framed by the NCTE is also necessary. 34. With respect to teachers appointed before the date of notification, following conditions are stipulated: “4. Teacher appointed before the date of this Notification.-The following categories of teachers appointed for Classes I to VIII prior to date of this Notification need not acquire the minimum qualification specified in Para (1) above,: (a) A teacher appointed on or after the 3rd September, 2001, i.e. the date on which the NCTE (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulations, 2001 (as amended from time to time) came into force, in accordance with that Regulation. Provided that a teacher of class I to V possessing B.Ed qualification, or a teacher possessing B.Ed (Special Education) or D.Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo an NCTE recognized 6-month special programme on elementary education. Provided that a teacher of class I to V possessing B.Ed qualification, or a teacher possessing B.Ed (Special Education) or D.Ed (Special Education) qualification shall undergo an NCTE recognized 6-month special programme on elementary education. (b) A Teacher of class I to V with B.Ed qualification who has completed a 6-month Special Basic Teacher Course (Special BTC) approved by the NCTE; (c) A teacher appointed before the 3rd September, 2001, in accordance with the prevalent Recruitment Rules.” 35. In these cases, all the petitioners before the Court do not process TET qualification and many of them do not process training qualification. 36. The appellants in WA 126/2013 have challenged the advertisement, dated 22.11.2012, which invited applications for the post of primary school teachers on the ground that the TET qualification introduced in the year 2010, should not be made applicable to them and should not be made applicable to the posts, which fell vacant prior to the year 2010. In this regard, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Manoharan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 641 and made specific reliance to the observations made in paragraph 25, which reads as follows: “25. Furthermore, the Regulations have been amended only with effect from 11.8.2004. It would have a prospective effect. It cannot be applied retrospectively. Any vacancy which has arisen prior to coming into force of the said amended Regulations must be filled up in terms of the law as was existing prior thereto. (State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayal reported in (1997) 10 SCC 419 )” 37. In paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh Rathore & Ors. v. B.N. Chaturvedi & Ors., reported in (2007) 11 SCC 605 , following observations are made: “5. Mr. Calla, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has argued that the matter was fully covered by the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. R. Dayall wherein it had been held that the vacancies to be filled by pro motion were to be filed under the rules which were in operation on the date when the vacancies had occurred. Relying on and referring to an earlier judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao it was opined as under: (SCC p. 422, para 8) “8.... Relying on and referring to an earlier judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao it was opined as under: (SCC p. 422, para 8) “8.... This Court has specifically laid (sic) that the vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not by the amended Rules. Accordingly, this Court had held that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amendment of the Rules would be governed by the original Rules and not the amended Rules. As a necessary corollary, the vacancies that arose subsequent to the amendment of the Rules are required to be filled in accordance with the law existing as on the date when the vacancies arose." 6. The above legal position has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for Respondents 6 and 7. We are therefore of the opinion that the vacancies which had occurred prior to the enforcement of the Rules of 1998 had to be filled in under the Rules of 1988 and as per the procedure laid down therein. We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Single Judge needs to be restored. We order accordingly." 38. In view of the said decision, it is submitted that 25 of the appellants submitted applications pursuant to the notification, dated 02.12.2005 and 23 of them have undergone the selection process, the result of the selection process have to be declared and persons, who are found to be selected have to be appointed without the need and insistence of TET qualification, in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. 39. Sri R. Majumdar, learned Government Advocate per contra submits that the 2005 notification came to be quashed by the Supreme Court in Ranu Hazarika's case, therefore, the entire selection process whatever done under notification, dated 02.12.2005 has become nullified. Thereafter, the State has cancelled the advertisement, hence, the question of declaration of such result after cancellation of the advertisement, dated 02.12.2005 does not arise. The cancellation of the advertisement was not for any arbitrary reason. It is because of the finding of the Supreme Court that the relaxation of qualification to select untrained teachers being contrary to the NCTE Regulations and the Supreme Court quashed the advertisement. The State, in order to give effect to the decision of the Supreme Court cancelled the advertisement. The cancellation of the advertisement was not for any arbitrary reason. It is because of the finding of the Supreme Court that the relaxation of qualification to select untrained teachers being contrary to the NCTE Regulations and the Supreme Court quashed the advertisement. The State, in order to give effect to the decision of the Supreme Court cancelled the advertisement. Therefore, the question of considering the claim of the petitioners on the basis of extinct advertisement does not arise under any circumstances. 40. With regard to the relaxation notification, it is submitted that the Supreme Court while remanding the matter, has directed to look into the effect of notification issued by the Central Government relaxing the diploma or training qualification without expressing opinion on merits. The said notification relaxing the training or diploma qualification for appointment will have only prospective effect and apply only to persons who are already appointed and in service. Hence, the said relaxation does not apply to the earlier selection process, which have become extinct in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ranu Hazarika's case (supra) and consequent cancellation of the advertisement by the Government. 41. The Government, pursuant to 2010 notification issued notification in the year 2012 conducted TET examination. Several thousand of candidates appeared and passed TET examination. The advertisement issued in the year 2012 calling for appointment of 11266 posts. Pursuant to the said advertisement, interviews have been held and all the posts have been filled up. The appointment orders have been issued to all the candidates, who are selected, however, subject to the result of the SLP No. 25550/12. Since the relaxation of the qualification was only prospective in effect, the question of claim of any of the petitioners, who do not have diploma or training in education or passing TET cannot claim any relief. The appeal and writ petitions have to be dismissed. 42. The counsel for the State relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 of State of A.P. v. D. Dastagiri, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 373 . In paragraph 4 following observations have been made: "4. The appeal and writ petitions have to be dismissed. 42. The counsel for the State relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 of State of A.P. v. D. Dastagiri, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 373 . In paragraph 4 following observations have been made: "4. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in Civil Appeal No. 915 of 2000, in para 16 it is stated that the process of selection was cancelled at the last stage i.e. before publishing the list of selected candidates on the sole ground that the State Government wanted to introduce prohibition and obviously the Government felt that there was no need of Excise Constables during imposition of prohibition in the State. There is serious dispute as to the completion of selection process. According to the appellants, the selection process was not complete. No record has been placed before us to show that the selection process was complete, but, it is not disputed that the select list was not published. In para 16 of the counter-affidavit, referred above, the respondents themselves had admitted that the selection process was cancelled at the last stage. In the absence of publication of select list, we are inclined to think that the selection process was not complete. Be that as it may, even if the selection process was complete and assuming that only select list remained to be published, that does not advance the case of the respondents for the simple reason that even the candidates who are selected and whose names find place in the select list, do not get vested right to claim appointment based on the select list. It was open to the State Government to take a policy decision either to have prohibition or not to have prohibition in the State. Certainly, the Government had right to take a policy decision. If pursuant to a policy decision taken to impose prohibition in the State there was no requirement for the recruitment of Constables in the Excise Department, nobody can insist that they must appoint the candidates as Excise Constables. It is not the case of the respondents that there was any mala fides on the part of the appellants in refusing the appointment to the respondents after the selection process was complete. It is not the case of the respondents that there was any mala fides on the part of the appellants in refusing the appointment to the respondents after the selection process was complete. The only claim was that the action of the appellants, in not appointing the respondents as Excise Constables, was arbitrary. In the light of the facts that we have stated above, when it was open to the Government to take a policy decision, we fail to understand as to how the respondents can dub the action of the respondents as arbitrary, particularly, when they did not have any right as such to claim appointments. In the absence of selection and publication of select list, mere concession or submission made by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the appellant State cannot improve the case of the respondents. Similarly, such a submission cannot confer right on the respondents, which they otherwise did not have." 43. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Singh Dalai v. State of Haryana, reported in 1993 Supp (2) SCC 600, in para 10 following observations are made: "10. Assuming (without deciding) that the withdrawal of the earlier notifications by the subsequent notification dated December 30, 1991 does not, stricto sensu. attract the provision of Section 19 extracted above, counsel for the appellants overlooks the fact that since the appellants have no legal right to insist on their selection and appointment to the vacant posts in question, the mode of arresting the process recedes in the background as the State Government could have informed the HPSC not to proceed with the selection process as it desired to revise the norm for appointment. Once it is realised that merely because the State Government had sent a requisition to the HPSC to select candidates for appointment did not create any vested right in the candidates called for interviews, regardless of the fact that the selection process had reached an advanced stage, it does not matter whether the selection process is arrested by cancelling the earlier notifications by another notification or by a mere communication addressed to the HPSC. Even if the HPSC were to complete the process and select candidates, such selection by itself would not confer a right to appointment and the Government may refuse to make the appointment for valid reasons. Even if the HPSC were to complete the process and select candidates, such selection by itself would not confer a right to appointment and the Government may refuse to make the appointment for valid reasons. At best the Government may be required to justify its action on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case the pleadings do not show that the subsequent notification dated December 30, 1991 is specifically put in issue in the memo of appeal nor is there material placed on record to so hold. Besides, the proviso to Rule 5 requires the method for recruitment to be specified by notification after consultation with the HPSC. The consultation with the HPSC has to be in regard to the positive act of specifying the method for recruitment and not in regard to the decision whether or not to resort to special recruitment. The proviso enables the making of special recruitment but the method of such recruitment has to be specified by notification. It is, therefore, obvious that even after the State Government has decided to resort to special recruitment, it may for valid reasons change its mind and one of the reasons could be that it desires to revise the extant eligibility criteria or substitute the same. This can be communicated to the HPSC for arresting the selection process which need not be done by a notification nor does it require consultation with the HPSC. Prior consultation with the HPSC is required before the issuance of a notification specifying the method of recruitment which was done when the notification of March 9, 1992, was issued. Therefore. counsel's submission that if Section 19applied, the notification of December 30, 1991 would be rendered invalid for want of prior consultation on the thrust of the words 'in the like manner' employed therein, is clearly misconceived. Even if Section 19 does not apply, stricto sensu, we see no reason to hold that a State Government which has the power to specify the method of special recruitment by notification has no inherent power to revise the same if it for good reasons considers the same necessary. To so hold would mean that even if the State Government has committed a mistake it has no power to rectify or correct the same. To so hold would mean that even if the State Government has committed a mistake it has no power to rectify or correct the same. The authority which has power to specify the method of recruitment must be deemed to have the power to revise and substitute the same in the same manner. On the analogy of Section 19such an inherent power always exists in the authority to alter, vary, change or replace its creation." 44. In para 26 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 , the following observations are made: "26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows: (i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication." 45. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication." 45. In view of the above observations, it is strenuously argued that the provisions of RTE Act, the notification issued by the NCTE and the relaxation notification issued by the Government of India, should necessarily be understood to have only prospective operation since it not only changes the qualifications, but creates new rights and liabilities; therefore, the petitioners and the appellants before the Court are not entitled to any relief and the petitions and the appeal are to be dismissed. 46. Upon thorough consideration of the facts and the submissions made at the Bar, the following questions arise for consideration: "(1) Whether the posts that were vacant prior to issuance of the 2010 notification should have to be filled up without insistence of the TET qualification? (2) Whether withdrawal/cancellation of the 2005 advertisement issued by the Government of Assam is valid and sustainable? (3) Whether the notification issued by the Central Government relaxing the diploma/ training qualification for the teachers has retrospective effect? (4) Whether the petitioners in WP(C) 133/2012 and 6551/2011 can invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation to seek appointment without undergoing any selection process?" 47. With regard to the first question, the decisions of the Supreme Court in A. Manoharahan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 641 , and Arun Singh Rathore & Ors. v. B.N. Chaturvedi & Ors., reported in (2007) 11 SCC 605 , were cited at the Bar by Shri P. Deka, learned counsel, to contend that the vacancies, which arose prior to the notification of the year 2010 with regard to TET qualification have to be filled up without insisting the TET qualification. The said decisions per se do not have any application to the facts of the case. In the said decisions, it was the question of promotion to the vacancy and not for initial appointment. The persons, who are appointed under the Service Rules and were eligible to be promoted under the Rules should not be denied promotion by change of the Rules. In the said decisions, it was the question of promotion to the vacancy and not for initial appointment. The persons, who are appointed under the Service Rules and were eligible to be promoted under the Rules should not be denied promotion by change of the Rules. In that context, it was held that the vacancies that arose prior to the change of the Rules have to be filled up by the old Rules and the future vacancies after coming into force of the new Rules have to be filled up according to the new Rules. The facts of the present is otherwise and it is a case of initial appointment. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the posts, which fell vacant prior to the notification of the year 2010, have to be filled up by persons without TET qualification is untenable. 48. The question Nos. 2 and 3 are considered together because they have mutual bearing on the facts, in question. It is a fact that the advertisement was issued in the year 2005 for filling up of about 7400 posts of elementary school teachers. In the said notification, the non-diploma holder or untrained teachers were also permitted to apply to the post, which was contrary to the 2001 NCTE Regulations. The case ultimately culminated in appeal before the Supreme Court and in the said appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the High Court was wrong in permitting the selection process to go on despite the finding that the advertisement, which permits non-trained and non-diploma holders to apply the post is contrary to the NCTE Regulations. Therefore, found that the advertisement of 2005 is bad in law and, thus, quashed the advertisement. 49. The State consequently withdrew the notification. Such withdrawal on the part of the State was only a formality because the Supreme Court had quashed the advertisement and as a result, the advertisement had become a nullity. 50. After dismissal of the Ranu Hazarika's case, the non-diploma holders and non-trained teachers filed writ petitions for directing the Assam Government to make a request under Section 23 of the RTE Act seeking relaxation since there were no adequate institutions for training of the teachers for elementary schools. 50. After dismissal of the Ranu Hazarika's case, the non-diploma holders and non-trained teachers filed writ petitions for directing the Assam Government to make a request under Section 23 of the RTE Act seeking relaxation since there were no adequate institutions for training of the teachers for elementary schools. During pendency of the said writ petition, at the instance of the Government of Assam, the Central Government issued the notification in August, 2011 relaxing the qualification of diploma or pass in teacher's training course. The relevant conditions in the said notification germane for our consideration are noted below: "(i) the State Government of Assam shall conduct the Teacher Eligibility Test as specified in the said notification of the Council in accordance with the Guidelines for conducting Teacher Eligibility Test, dated 11th February, 2011, issued by the Council and those persons who pass the Teacher Eligibility Test be considered for appointment as a teacher in classes I to VIII. (ii) the State Government and other school managements shall ensure that teachers employed or engaged by them who do not possess the minimum qualifications required for appointment of teachers laid down in the said notification of the Council shall acquire minimum qualifications within the time limit specified under sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. (iii) the State Government and other school management shall ensure that teachers who are appointed with the relaxed qualification, acquire the minimum qualification specified in the said notification within a period of two years from the year of their appointment." 51. The Supreme Court, while remanding the matter to this Court, made observations in para 12 and 14 noted supra. The said observations only direct this Court to consider the effect of the notification issued by the Central Government in accordance with law. The question whether the notification has prospective or retrospective effect and whether the notification hands out any benefit to the petitioners is kept open for consideration by this Court. 52. The conditions stipulated in the notification relating to relaxation of training qualification, namely, conditions No. (i), (v) and (vi) would only suggest that the said relaxation has only prospective effect because the first condition insists that TET examinations have to be conducted as per the guidelines dated 11th February, 2011, and those who possess TET qualification alone, become eligible for appointment after February, 2011. The condition Nos. (v) and (vi) disclose that teachers who are employed or engaged by the schools run by the Government or private management who do not possess the minimum qualification required for appointment, namely, diploma or training in teacher's course have to acquire the said qualifications within the time limit specified under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. 53. The said conditions clearly disclose that those, who are appointed and in service without diploma or pass in teacher's training course should be permitted to acquire the said qualifications within two years and appointments after 11.02.2011 can be made only if the person has passed the TET examination. 54. The cumulative effect of the said conditions only discloses that relaxations are conditional and prospective in nature and cannot apply retrospectively to persons, who are not appointed and not in service. The Supreme Court, in fact, in the remand order had kept the question open to consider the effect of the notification vis-à-vis the claim of the petitioners. The case of the petitioners is based on inchoate selection process, which came to be nullified by the Supreme Court in Ranu Hazarika's case. Withdrawal of the 2005 notification by the State Government is only a formality. Therefore, any of the acts done pursuant to the advertisement, dated 11th February, 2005, have become non est and nullity. Hence, the claim of the petitioners on the basis of the inchoate discontinued selection process, that the results have to be declared and selected candidates have to be appointed is an untenable contention. In that view, question No. 2 is answered in affirmative and question No. 3 is answered in negative. 55. The claim of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 133/2012 and 6551/2011, that on the equitable principle of promissory estoppel, they have to be appointed without selection process is a bizarre argument. The decisions cited at the Bar which elucidate the principle of promissory estoppel have absolutely no application to the facts of the case. 56. The admission notification, dated 14.04.99. states that: "the Government of Assam has decided to introduce pre-service training course teaching to a Diploma in Education for improvement of professional skills of the persons to be recruited as teachers in elementary schools against the vacancies to be occurred in near future." 57. 56. The admission notification, dated 14.04.99. states that: "the Government of Assam has decided to introduce pre-service training course teaching to a Diploma in Education for improvement of professional skills of the persons to be recruited as teachers in elementary schools against the vacancies to be occurred in near future." 57. The admission notification only speaks of imparting skills to be recruited to the teachers in the elementary schools against the vacancies to be occurred. The notice does not say anything that bypassing the selection procedure, appointments would be made. In that view, the claim that on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the petitioners have to be appointed is a bizarre and untenable argument. The question No. 4 is accordingly answered in negative. 58. For the reasons and discussions made above, the appeal and the writ petitions are dismissed. The Misc. Case Nos. 2279/2014, 2168/2014, 1285/2014, 2870/2014, 3162/2014, 3321/2014, 3623/2014, 74/2015, 301/2015, 449/2015, 581/2015, 3506/2014, 3348/2012 and 3347/2012 shall also stand dismissed. 59. Counsel for the appellants in WA 126/2013 submitted that the appellants may be permitted to appear for the TET examinations conducted by the Government of Assam. In this regard, it is always open for the appellants/petitioners to appear for TET and they cannot be prevented from appearing for TET to be conducted once in a year subject to the eligibility requirement. Hand delivery of the judgment be furnished to Mr. B.P. Bora, learned counsel. Petition Dismissed.