JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. The plaintiff Smt. Paragiya, widow of Shyam Lal has filed a suit for permanent injunction against defendant Ram Vishal with averment that disputed house was constructed and owned by her husband Shyam Lal, and after the death of Shyam Lal 10 years ago, she became owner in possession of the said house. In August, 1994 the defendant asked the plaintiff that said house belong to him. He asked the plaintiff to remove his possession from that house then cause of action arose. Plaintiff Smt. Paragiya had filed a suit against the defendant for seeking relief that she be declared owner of the disputed house. During proceedings of the suit, original plaintiff Paragiya died and she was substituted by one Harish Chandra Pandey, son of Har Prasad Pandey, who is the present appellant. 2. In Original Suit defendant filed a written statement denying the plaintiff's case and pleaded that disputed house was initially owned by Shyam Lal who had performed her first marriage with Indi, and thereafter kept Smt. Paragiya, who is not the legally wedded wife of Shyam Lal. So Smt. Paragiya cannot inherit his property and has no right to institute the suit for said property. Shyam Lal had executed registered sale deed dated 12.10.1983 by which he sold disputed house to the plaintiff for Rs. 15000/- and gave him the possession of this house. Shyam Lal had constructed a temple alongwith some small rooms in which he resided till his death. From very beginning the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and is liable to be dismissed. 3. In replication filed by the plaintiff in original suit, it was pleaded that Shyam Lal had not executed any sale deed regarding disputed house and alleged sale-deed dated 12.10.1983 does not contain thumb impression of Shyam Lal. Therefore, it is illegal and void. 4. The trial court had framed issues accepted the evidences of the parties and thereafter passed judgment dated 1.10.2014 in which it was held that Shyam Lal had executed sale-deed of disputed property in favour of the defendant, and handed over its possession to him. It was also held that the plaintiff's suit is barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was also held that it is not proved that the plaintiff was owner of the disputed house. It was also held that the plaintiff's suit is barred by section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was also held that it is not proved that the plaintiff was owner of the disputed house. On this finding, the trial court dismissed the original suit. Against which plaintiff had preferred Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2014. 5. The first appellate court had afforded opportunity of hearing to the parties, perused the records, framed point of determination in the appeal and thereafter passed impugned judgment dated 09.07.2012 by which the appeal was dismissed and judgment of the trial court was confirmed and upheld. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the two courts below, the present second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff. 7. A perusal of the two judgments of the courts below reveal that technically the plaintiff's suit for declaration was not maintainable and barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Plaintiff's plaint also reveals that the alleged cause of action arose when the defendant-respondent had claimed his right over the disputed house and threatened the plaintiff to vacate the said property. If suit was filed for restraining the defendant-respondent from evicting the plaintiff from disputed house then relief should have been sought to that effect relating to permanent injunction, but no such relief was sought in original suit. Proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act provides that "No court shall make any such declaration where the the plaintiff, being able to seek fruther relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so." This provision is mandatory in nature. For the cause of action allegedly arose, as mentioned in the plaint, Smt. Paragiya was able to seek appropriate relief of permanent injunction against defendant-respondent, but she has deliberately chosen not seek this relief. Therefore the two courts below had rightly held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by section 34 of the said Act. When the court raised this point before the learned counsel for the appellant in this second appeal, he could not answer it properly and merely cursed the lawyer who drafted the plaint of original suit. 8. Therefore the two courts below had rightly held that the plaintiff's suit was barred by section 34 of the said Act. When the court raised this point before the learned counsel for the appellant in this second appeal, he could not answer it properly and merely cursed the lawyer who drafted the plaint of original suit. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that when plaintiff had specifically pleaded in her replication that Shyam Lal had not executed any sale-deed of disputed house then burden of proving the execution of the said sale deed was on defendant-respondent, who had not proved the execution of any such sale deed by Shyam Lal. The execution of sale-deed dated 12.10.1983 on behalf of Shyam Lal in favour of defendant-respondent is admitted fact. The registration of sale-deed in itself is proof of its execution on behalf of Shyam Lal. This sale deed was executed in favour of defednant Ram Vishal who had proved its execution. The execution of this registered sale deed was challenged on behalf of Smt. Paragiya in her replication, but she could not be examined in evidence because of her death, and there is no evidence that any forgery or fraud has been committed in regard to execution of said sale-deed. The trial court as well as first appellate court had discussed this point and came to this finding that execution of said sale-deed is a proved fact and plaintiff-appellant had failed to discharge his burden in this regard. The two courts below had also discussed evidences and came to conclusion that from the time of execution of sale deed, defendant-respondent was in possession of the disputed house within the knowledge of Smt. Paragiya, and her suit for declaration is barred by limitation 9. There is concurrent finding of fact on this point. A perusal of two judgments reveals that trial court as well as first appellate court had appreciated the facts, circumstances and evidences adduced by the parties and thereafter passed their judgments after application of judicial mind. Their judgments and findings are apparently correct and acceptable. 10. On examination of the reasonings recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of trial court as well as of first appellate court are well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of entire evidences of record. 10. On examination of the reasonings recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of trial court as well as of first appellate court are well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of entire evidences of record. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law was involved in the case. No perversity or infirmity found in the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the two courts below to warrant interference. None of the contention of the counsel for the appellant-plaintiff can be sustained. 11. In view of the above, this court finds that no substantial question of law arose in this appeal. Therefore, the present second appeal is dismissed.