JUDGMENT : S.NAGAMUTHU, J. The appellant is the first accused in S.C.No.217 of 2010, on the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Tirunelveli. There were three accused, who were arrayed as accused Nos.2 to 4. The Trial Court framed as many as seven charges against the accused, as detailed below. Charge Accused Penal Provisions 1 1 to 4 120(B) IPC 2 1 to 4 307 IPC 3 1 450 IPC 4 1 302 IPC 5 2 to 4 302 r/w 109 IPC 6 1 506(ii) IPC 7 2 to 4 506(ii) r/w 109 IPC By Judgment dated 21.12.2010, the Trial Court acquitted the accused Nos.2 to 4 from all the charges, but convicted the accused No.1, as detailed below:- Convicted under Sections Sentence imposed Fine amount 450 IPC To undergo ten years rigorous imprisonment Rs.2,500/- in default to undergo six months simple imprisonment. 302 IPC To undergo imprisonment for Life Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 506(ii) IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Rs.1,000/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. As against the said conviction and sentence, the appellant has come up with this Criminal Appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows:- The deceased, in this case, was one Mr.Murugesan. For quite sometime, before the occurrence, the accused and the deceased had joined the accused Nos.2 to 4 in a joint venture and they were all doing real estate business. In respect of the purchase of a property near Tenkasi New Bus Stand by the deceased and the accused Nos.2 to 4, there arose some dispute between them. This developed into an enmity. Due to such enmity, it is alleged that the accused Nos.2 to 4 conspired together to do away with the deceased. For the said purpose, the first accused was engaged by the accused Nos.2 to 4 to kill the deceased, for which they had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-as consideration. 2.1. It is further alleged that on 07.03.2008 as well as on 16.03.2008, the accused Nos.2 to 4 attempted to kill the deceased by dashing him by means of a Maruthi Omni Van. 3,00,000/-as consideration. 2.1. It is further alleged that on 07.03.2008 as well as on 16.03.2008, the accused Nos.2 to 4 attempted to kill the deceased by dashing him by means of a Maruthi Omni Van. On both the occasions, the first accused drove the vehicle and the other accused were sitting in the vehicle inducing the first accused to dash against the deceased. The deceased escaped from the above attempt on both the occasions. For these two occurrences, the Trial Court framed a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code against all the four accused. 2.2. PW-1 is the wife of the deceased. PW-2 and PW-3 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively of the deceased. The deceased was residing in a house at Bharathi Nagar along with PW-1. One Mrs.Krishnaveni was the owner of the house. The deceased had entered into a lease agreement with the said Mrs.Krishnaveni and thus, he was occupying the said house. On 18.08.2008, the deceased had gone out in his motorcycle. PW-2 and PW-3 had come to the house of the deceased in the evening. Since the house was a lonely house, PW-2 and PW-3 remained in the house along with PW-1 waiting for the deceased to return back home. By about 10.30 PM, the deceased returned in his motorcycle. PW-2 opened the veranda gate. The deceased entered into the compound in the motorcycle and kept the same inside the premises. Since the deceased had returned home, PW-2 and PW-3 left the house of the deceased for their house. The compound gate was already closed. At that time, the first accused/the appellant suddenly emerged from inside the compound wall. At that time, the deceased was standing by the side of the motorcycle. The first accused/the appellant started cutting the deceased with aruval indiscriminately. PW-1 raised the alarm. By the time, PW-2 and PW-3, who had gone a few yards from the place of occurrence, on hearing the alarm raised, rushed to the house of the deceased. The found the accused cutting the deceased. They all raised alarm. The deceased fell down with serious injuries. The accused scaled down the compound wall and ran away from the scene of occurrence, holding the aruval in his hand. PW-1 to PW-3 found the deceased struggling for life. PW-2, immediately, gave a phone call to his brother [PW-4] about the occurrence. They all raised alarm. The deceased fell down with serious injuries. The accused scaled down the compound wall and ran away from the scene of occurrence, holding the aruval in his hand. PW-1 to PW-3 found the deceased struggling for life. PW-2, immediately, gave a phone call to his brother [PW-4] about the occurrence. PW-4 rushed to the place of occurrence and informed PW-5, his brother's son, who was owning an auto, to rush to the place of occurrence. PW-5 came to the place of occurrence, immediately in his auto. Then, all of them took the deceased in the auto driven by PW-5 to the Government Hospital at Tenkasi. 2.3. PW-24, Dr.N.Saravanan examined him at 11.00 PM, on 18.08.2008. He found that there was no life. He declared him as dead. He was told that the deceased was cut just in front of the house at 10.30 PM. He found a number of injuries on the body of the deceased. He gave intimation to the police [vide EX-P4]. EX-P3 is the Accident Register. Then, he forwarded the dead body to the mortuary. 2.4. On receiving intimation from the hospital authorities, PW-31, the then Sub-Inspector of Police rushed to the Government Hospital at Tenkasi. PW-1 presented a written complaint at 12.30 AM, on 19.08.2008. On returning to the Police Station, he registered a case in Crime No.799 of 2008, under Sections 302 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code. EX-P1 is the complaint and EX-P23 is the First Information Report. In EX-P1, PW-1 did not mention the name of the first accused/the appellant, as he was not previously known to her. She had only given the description of the physical features of the assailant. PW-31 forwarded both the documents to the Court and handed over the investigation to the Inspector of Police. 2.5. Taking up the case for investigation, at 02.00 AM, on 19.08.2008, PW-35 proceeded to the place of occurrence. Then, he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased at the Government Hospital at Tenkasi and forwarded the dead body for postmortem. Then, he gave a request to the Forensic Expert as well as for a sniffer dog to come to the place of occurrence. At 07.00 AM, at the place of occurrence, he prepared an Observation Mahazer and a Rough Sketch in the presence of PW-28, the Village Administrative Officer at Kuthukalvalasai Village. Then, he gave a request to the Forensic Expert as well as for a sniffer dog to come to the place of occurrence. At 07.00 AM, at the place of occurrence, he prepared an Observation Mahazer and a Rough Sketch in the presence of PW-28, the Village Administrative Officer at Kuthukalvalasai Village. The forensic expert thoroughly examined the place of occurrence and he could not find anything. Similarly, the sniffer dog also proved futile. Then, he recovered bloodstained earth and sample earth from the place of occurrence. 2.6. In the meanwhile, PW-30, Dr.K.Marimuthu, conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased at the Government Hospital, Tenkasi. He found the following injuries:- "1. Cut injury over back of head, starts 5 cm from left ear lobe extends obliquely to right temporal area 5 cm above the right ear pinna 2-3 cm size breath, 2-4 cm in depth, Brain Matter was exposed. 2. Irregular injury over right shoulder skin feeded from the shoulder measuring 5.7 X 5.6 cm. 3. Cut injury over ant-aspect of neck, measuring 10 X 5 X 5 CM from right sterno mastoid muscle to left sterno mastoid [lower end] above 5 cm from chin below to thoid cartilage. All internal vital structures in the neck [Trachea, Blood Vessels Hyoid bone oesophagus] severely damaged. Opening of thorex lings pale. No fracture ribs. Heart chamber empty. Liver pale [N]. Both kidney's spleen pale [N] stomach has partially digested food, intestine empty, Bladder empty spine [N]. Open of skull, blood clot seen in the granial cavity". EX-P22 is the postmortem certificate. He gave opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and hemorrhage shock due to injury to vital organs [Brain, Trachea, blood vessels] 2.7. PW-35 recovered bloodstained clothing materials from the dead body of the deceased. He examined many more witnesses, including PW-1 to PW-3. Since he was transferred, he handed over the case diary to his successor, on 12.11.2008. PW-36, took up the case for investigation, on 13.11.2008. During investigation, he came to know about the occurrence, which had taken place on 16.03.2008. But, no break through was made in the investigation. While so, at 05.30 PM, on 05.03.2009, the first accused/the appellant appeared before PW-29, the then Village Administrative Officer of Kulasekarapatti Village, Tenkasi Taluk. His Village Assistant was by his side. The accused voluntarily wanted to confess. But, no break through was made in the investigation. While so, at 05.30 PM, on 05.03.2009, the first accused/the appellant appeared before PW-29, the then Village Administrative Officer of Kulasekarapatti Village, Tenkasi Taluk. His Village Assistant was by his side. The accused voluntarily wanted to confess. PW-29 enquired as to why he wanted to confess. He told him that since the advocates were on boycott of Court proceedings, he was unable to surrender before a Court and if he surrendered before the police, he would be tortured. After having ascertained that the first accused/the appellant wanted to confess voluntarily, he asked him to put it in writing. The first accused/the appellant requested him to reduce to writing as confessed by him, orally. Thus, as orally narrated by the first accused/the appellant, PW-29 reduced the same to writing. In the said statement, he confessed that it was he, who killed the deceased by cutting him with aruval. EX-P14 is the said extra judicial confession of the first accused/the appellant. 2.8. PW-29, then, took the first accused/the appellant to the Tenkasi Police Station, at 06.30 AM and produced him before PW-36. He produced EX-P14, as a special report, under EX-P15, to PW-36. In his presence and in the presence of his Village Assistant, the first accused/the appellant gave a voluntary confession to PW-36. In the said confession, he disclosed the place, where he had hidden an aruval. In pursuance of the same, he took PW-36, PW-29 and another witness to his house and produced MO-1 -aruval from the hide out. PW-36 recovered the same under a mahazer. Then, he forwarded the accused to the Court for judicial remand. 2.9. During the course of investigation, at 06.30 AM, on 06.03.2009, PW-36 arrested the accused Nos.2 to 4 at Tenkasi -Auyukudi Road, Senthil Andavar Polytechnic Bus Stop at Tenkasi. On such arrest, the second accused gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place, where he had hidden a Hero Honda Motorcycle, bearing Registration No.TN-76-6139. In pursuance of the same, he took PW-36, PW-29 and another witness to the said place and produced MO-7, the aruval, MO-6 motorcycle. PW-36 recovered the same under a mahazer. The third accused gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place, where he had hidden TVS Heavy Duty bike bearing Registration No.TN-76-B-2362. The said vehicle [MO-8] was recovered, as identified by him under a mahazer. PW-36 recovered the same under a mahazer. The third accused gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place, where he had hidden TVS Heavy Duty bike bearing Registration No.TN-76-B-2362. The said vehicle [MO-8] was recovered, as identified by him under a mahazer. The fourth accused gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place where he had hidden the motorcycle bearing Registration No.TN-76-B-4212, which was also recovered as identified by him under a mahazer. On returning to the police station, he forwarded the accused to the Court for judicial remand and handed over the material objects to the Court for chemical examination. 2.10. PW-36 then made a request to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for conducting test identification parade for the first accused/the appellant. On the orders of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, PW-32, the then Judicial Magistrate No.II, Tirunelveli, conducted test identification parade for the first accused/the appellant, at 02.35 PM, on 23.03.2009. PW-1 to PW-3 participated in the said test identification parade. During such test identification parade, on all the four rounds, all the three witnesses correctly identified the first accused/the appellant as the sole assailant of the deceased. EX-P27 is the recording of the test identification parade submitted by PW-32. PW-36, then, made a request to the Court to forward the material objects for chemical examination. The report revealed that there was human blood on all the material objects, except MO-1, the aruval. On completing the investigation, he laid charge sheet against all the four accused. 2.11. Based on the above materials, the Trial Court framed appropriate charges, as detailed in the first paragraph of this Judgment. When the accused were questioned in respect of the charges, they pleaded innocence. In order to prove the charges, on the side of the prosecution, 36 witnesses were examined, 31 documents and 13 material objects were marked. Out of the said 36 witnesses, PW-1 to PW-3 are the eye-witnesses to the occurrence, who have spoken vividly about the same. PW-4 is the brother of PW-2, who has stated that on receiving intimation from PW-2, he rushed to the place of occurrence and found the deceased lying with injuries, but still alive. He has further stated that he informed PW-5 to come to the place of occurrence with his auto to shift the deceased to the hospital. PW-5 has also stated so. 2.12. He has further stated that he informed PW-5 to come to the place of occurrence with his auto to shift the deceased to the hospital. PW-5 has also stated so. 2.12. PW-6 has stated that he owned a Maruthi Van, bearing Registration No.TN-09-M-0854. He has further stated that during the year 2008, he sold away the said Maruthi Van to the first accused. [According to the case of the prosecution, this vehicle was used in an attempt to kill the deceased by dashing him at 09.30 PM, on 16.08.2008, in which the deceased escaped with minor injuries]. PW-7 to PW-13 and PW-16 to PW-21 have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution in any manner. PW-14 has stated that on one day, in the morning of March 2008, when he was proceeding from Vedhampur to Tenkasi, a motorcycle, which was going ahead of him, was hit by a Red Colour Omni Van and the van did not stop. The motorcyclist fell down sustaining minor injuries. According to PW-14, he took him to the hospital. PW-22 has stated that a Maruthi Van bearing Registration No.TN-09-M-0834 was purchased by his uncle from one Mr.Madasamy. He has further stated that the said vehicle was seized by the police during the course of investigation. 2.13. PW-23, Dr.R.Sundar, has stated that at 11.00 PM, on 17.03.2008, the deceased came to him for treatment for the minor injuries sustained by him due to fall from the motorcycle. He has further stated that he treated him in the hospital. PW-24 -Dr.N.Saravanan had examined the deceased, at 11.00 PM, on 18.08.2008 and declared him dead. He has also stated about the intimation given to the police. PW-25 has turned hostile and he has not supported the case of the prosecution in any manner. PW-26 has stated that he issued an encumbrance certificate relating to Survey Nos.133 to 135, situated at Tenkasi Taluk, on the request made by the Investigating Officer. PW-27 is the Head Clerk of the Judicial Magistrate Court. He has spoken about the forwarding of the material objects for chemical examination. PW-28, the then Village Administrative Officer, has spoken about the preparation of the observation mahazer and the rough sketch at the place of occurrence and also recovery of the material objects from the place of occurrence. 2.14. PW-27 is the Head Clerk of the Judicial Magistrate Court. He has spoken about the forwarding of the material objects for chemical examination. PW-28, the then Village Administrative Officer, has spoken about the preparation of the observation mahazer and the rough sketch at the place of occurrence and also recovery of the material objects from the place of occurrence. 2.14. PW-29 is yet another Village Administrative Officer, who has stated that the first accused/the appellant appeared before him, at 05.00 PM, on 05.03.2009 and gave a voluntary confession orally. According to him, he reduced the same to writing, under EX-P14. He has further stated that he has produced the first accused/the appellant before PW-36 and before PW-36, the first accused/the appellant gave a voluntary confession, in which he disclosed the place, where he had hidden the aruval. He has also spoken about the arrest of the accused Nos.2 to 4, the disclosure statements made by them and the consequential recoveries of the material objects. PW-30 has spoken about the autopsy conducted by him and his final opinion regarding the cause of death. 2.15. PW-31, the then Sub-Inspector of Police, has stated that on receiving intimation from the hospital authorities, he went to the hospital, received the complaint from PW-1, at 12.30 AM, on 19.08.2008 and on returning to the Police Station, he registered a case in Crime No.799 of 2008 at 01.30 AM. PW-32 is the then learned Judicial Magistrate, who has stated about the test identification parade held by him, on 23.03.2009. He has further stated that on all the four rounds, PW-1 to PW-3 correctly identified the first accused/the appellant as the sole assailant. EX-P27 is the recording of the test identification parade proceedings. PW-33, is the Head Constable, who has stated that he handed over the First Information Report and the complaint to the jurisdictional magistrate, at 03.00 AM, on 19.08.2008. PW-34 is yet another Head Constable, who has stated that he carried the dead body to the hospital for postmortem. PW-35 and PW-36 have spoken about the investigation conducted by them and the filing of the final report. 2.16. When the Trial Court examined the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the incriminating evidences available against them, they denied the same as false. PW-35 and PW-36 have spoken about the investigation conducted by them and the filing of the final report. 2.16. When the Trial Court examined the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the incriminating evidences available against them, they denied the same as false. On the side of the accused, a xerox copy of a sale deed was marked [EXD1] to show that there was no dispute in respect of the real estate business between the accused Nos.2 to 4 and the deceased. Their defence was a total denial. Having considered all the above materials, the Trial Court acquitted the accused Nos.2 to 4 from all the charges, but convicted the first accused/the appellant, as detailed in the first paragraph of this Judgment and punished him accordingly. That is how, the appellant is now before this Court with this Criminal Appeal. 3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent and also perused the records carefully. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted written submissions. We have considered the same. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that PW-1 to PW-3 would not have witnessed the occurrence at all. According to him, the deceased and PW-1 were not residing in the house, in front of which the occurrence had taken place. As a matter of fact, they were residing in the ancestral house belonging to the deceased in a different place. He would further submit that PW-3 has stated that on reaching the place of occurrence, she enquired PW-1 as to what had happened. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, PW-2 and PW-3 would not have seen the occurrence at all. So far as PW-1 is concerned, according to the learned counsel, the appellant was not previously known to her. 6. Apart from the above, according to the learned counsel, the Trial Court had given weightage for the test identification parade. The learned counsel would further submit that there was an inordinate delay in holding the test identification parade and during such interregnum period, PW-1 to PW-3 would have had enormous opportunities to see the appellant either directly or through the photographs. The learned counsel would further submit that there was an inordinate delay in holding the test identification parade and during such interregnum period, PW-1 to PW-3 would have had enormous opportunities to see the appellant either directly or through the photographs. The learned counsel would further submit that in the summons issued by the learned Judicial Magistrate to the witnesses, the name of the first accused was mentioned and therefore, PW-1 to PW-3 had enough clue about the identity of the accused. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, no weightage could be given to the test identification parade. 7. The learned counsel would further submit that there was no independent witness examined, though there were houses in the vicinity of the occurrence. He would further submit that the First Information Report, in this case, is a doubtful document, because, according to PW-5, the then Sub-Inspector of Police, he came to the place of occurrence even when the deceased was being shifted in the auto to the hospital. He would further submit that the motive also has not been established by the prosecution. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts against the accused and therefore, he is entitled for acquittal. 8. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would, however, oppose this Criminal Appeal. According to him, it has been clearly established by means of evidence that the deceased and the accused were residing only in the house, in front of which the occurrence had taken place. According to him, there is no reason to reject the same. He would further submit that PW-1 is the natural witness whose presence cannot be doubted at all. He would next submit that PW-2 and PW-3 were of course not residents along with the deceased, as they were residing elsewhere in the same village. But, they have clearly explained the reasons for their presence at the place of occurrence and at the time of occurrence. Thus, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the presence of PW-2 and PW-3 cannot be doubted at all. He would further submit that though PW-3 has stated that she enquired about the occurrence with PW-1, it would not, in any manner, go to show that she did not see the occurrence. Thus, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the presence of PW-2 and PW-3 cannot be doubted at all. He would further submit that though PW-3 has stated that she enquired about the occurrence with PW-1, it would not, in any manner, go to show that she did not see the occurrence. Thus, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the evidences of PW-1 to PW-3 would go to clearly establish that the deceased was cut by this appellant. So far as the identity of the appellant is concerned, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that at the earliest opportunity, during the course of the test identification parade, PW-1 to PW-3 had identified the appellant on all the four rounds. Though there was delay in holding the test identification parade, that was on account of the administrative delay on the part of the learned Judicial Magistrate, for which the prosecution could not be blamed. 9. He would further submit that the said delay would not be the cause to reject the test identification parade. He would further submit that in EX-P1, PW-1 had given the identifying features of the appellant and such identifying features squarely tallied with the features of the appellant also. So far as the so-called discrepancies in the First Information Report are concerned, they are immaterial. He would further submit that the appellant had surrendered before the Village Administrative Officer -PW-29 and gave a voluntary confession, in which he had confessed his guilt. There is no reason to reject the same. This extra judicial confession itself is a substantive evidence and it would again corroborate the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-3, he contended. The recovery of MO-1, at his instance, also would go to further strengthen the case of the prosecution. So far as the motive is concerned, since the vital witnesses, who were examined to speak about the same, have turned hostile, the motive could not be established. On that score, the eye-witness account of PW-1 to PW-3, which draws corroboration from the confession of the appellant cannot be rejected, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended. Thus, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the prosecution has clearly proved the case beyond reasonable doubts. Thus, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the Trial Court does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 10. Thus, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the prosecution has clearly proved the case beyond reasonable doubts. Thus, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the Trial Court does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 10. We have considered the above submissions. 11. Admittedly, the appellant was not previously known to PW-1 to PW-3. There was no direct motive for this appellant to do away with the deceased. According to the case of the prosecution, the accused Nos.2 to 4 had engaged the first accused/the appellant for committing murder of the deceased. But, the prosecution could not succeed in proving the said fact, as the vital witnesses, who were examined to speak about the same, had turned hostile. Thus, admittedly, the prosecution could not succeed in proving the motive for this appellant to commit the murder of the deceased. But, in our considered view, on that score, the case of the prosecution cannot be either doubted or rejected, since there are other materials to prove the charges. 12. The occurrence, admittedly, had happened just within the compound wall of the house, where the deceased was residing. Though it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased was not residing along with PW-1 at the said house, we do not find any material even to remotely believe the said story propounded by the defence. PW-1 has categorically stated that the said house belonged to one Mrs.Krishnaveni and the same was taken on lease agreement by the deceased. PW-1 has further stated that she and her husband were residing in the said house together as husband and wife, as they were newly married. We do not find any material on record to disbelieve the said fact. The occurrence had taken place at 10.30 PM, on 18.08.2008. According to PW-1 to PW-3, the deceased had gone out in his motorcycle and PW-1 was waiting for his arrival. Since the house was a lonely house, PW-2 and PW-3 remained in the said house for the return of the deceased. Thus, the presence of PW-1 to PW-3, at the crucial time of occurrence, was quite natural and we do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence regarding their presence at the time of occurrence. 13. Since the house was a lonely house, PW-2 and PW-3 remained in the said house for the return of the deceased. Thus, the presence of PW-1 to PW-3, at the crucial time of occurrence, was quite natural and we do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence regarding their presence at the time of occurrence. 13. It is the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 that the deceased had returned to the house, at 10.30 PM, on 18.08.2008. PW-2 went out of the house and opened the gate enabling the deceased to enter into the compound wall. Since the deceased had returned, PW-2 and PW-3 had left for their house. On entering into the compound wall of the house, the deceased had kept the motorcycle and he was about to enter into the house. PW-1 was waiting at the door steps. The light was already put on by PW-2. At that time, according to PW-1, the appellant had suddenly emerged from the corner of the compound and rushed towards the deceased. On reaching him, the accused started attacking him with aruval indiscriminately. PW-1 raised the alarm and she was criminally intimidated by him not to raise alarm. PW-2 and PW-3 had just left and had gone few yards from the house. They rushed back to the house on hearing the alarm raised by PW-1 and they had also witnessed the occurrence. In this regard, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that PW-1 would not have seen the occurrence, as she was residing in the ancestral house situated elsewhere. We have already rejected this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and we have also given our reasons for the same. 14. So far as PW-2 and PW-3 are concerned, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that on reaching the place of occurrence, she enquired PW-1 as to what had happened. From and out of this fact, according to the learned counsel, it could be inferred that PW-2 and PW-3 would not have seen the occurrence. According to the learned counsel, had they witnessed the occurrence, there would have been no occasion for them to enquire PW-1 as to what had happened. From and out of this fact, according to the learned counsel, it could be inferred that PW-2 and PW-3 would not have seen the occurrence. According to the learned counsel, had they witnessed the occurrence, there would have been no occasion for them to enquire PW-1 as to what had happened. But, we do not find any force in the said argument at all, for the simple reason that PW-2 and PW-3 had not seen the entire occurrence, though they had seen only a later part of the occurrence. PW-3 would have enquired PW-1 about the origin of the occurrence, viz., the first part of the occurrence. Though it is elicited during cross-examination that she enquired PW-1 about the occurrence, there was no further question asked as to whether she enquired about the first part of the occurrence or the later part of the occurrence. Therefore, going by the natural human conduct, we presume under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that she would have enquired about the first part of the occurrence, which she did not witness. The fact remains that PW-2 and PW-3, on reaching the place of occurrence, had seen the accused still cutting the deceased. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that PW-1 to PW-3 had seen the occurrence, in which the sole assailant had attacked the deceased with aruval, which resulted in his death. 15. The next immediate question, which arises for consideration, is as to whether the sole assailant was the first accused/the appellant or not?. 16. PW-1 to PW-3 had identified him in Court during trial. Such identification made by them during trial has been duly corroborated by the identification made by them during the test identification parade. But, the learned counsel for the appellant would assail the test identification parade mainly on the ground that there was enormous delay in holding the test identification parade. Though it is true that there was some delay in holding the test identification parade, the said delay has been duly explained away by the prosecution. The Investigating Officer -PW-36 had made a request to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for holding test identification parade. But, by following the administrative procedure, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had nominated PW-32 to conduct test identification parade. Thus, there had occurred a delay of few days. The Investigating Officer -PW-36 had made a request to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for holding test identification parade. But, by following the administrative procedure, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had nominated PW-32 to conduct test identification parade. Thus, there had occurred a delay of few days. In our considered view, such delay cannot be the ground to reject the test identification parade. Apart from the above, the defence should be in a position to probabilize, by preponderance of probabilities, that during the interregnum period, the witnesses would have had occasion either to see the accused in person or to see his photograph at least. In the instant case, though PW-1 to PW-3 had been subjected to lengthy cross-examination, nothing was elicited to say that they had any occasion to see the accused either in person or to see his photograph, before the accused was put up for test identification parade. Therefore, we hold that the identification of the accused made by PW-1 to PW-3 during test identification parade has served its purpose and has not lost its value. Such identification made by PW-1 to PW-3, during test identification parade, has duly corroborated the identification made by them during trial. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant would, next, contend that in the summons issued to the witnesses, PW-32 had mentioned the name of the accused, which itself would have been sufficient for the witnesses to know about the physical features of the person whom they were going to identify. This, according to the learned counsel, vitiates the entire test identification parade. In support of the contention, the learned counsel has relied on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Laxmipat Choraria Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 938 , wherein in Paragraph No.21, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "The next question is whether Ethyl Wong's identification of Laxmipat and Balchand, whose photographs were shown to her at the Air Terminal at Bombay should be accepted. Reference in this connection has been made to English cases in which it has been laid down that the showing of a large number of photographs to a witness and asking him to pick out that of the suspect is a proper procedure but showing a photograph and asking the witness whether it is of the offender is improper. Reference in this connection has been made to English cases in which it has been laid down that the showing of a large number of photographs to a witness and asking him to pick out that of the suspect is a proper procedure but showing a photograph and asking the witness whether it is of the offender is improper. We need not refer to these cases because we entirely agree with the proposition. There can be no doubt that if the intention is to rely on the identification of the suspect by a witness his ability to identify should be tested without showing him the suspect or his photograph, or furnishing him the data for identification. Showing a photograph prior to the identification makes the identification worthless". 18. Referring to the above observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the appellant would submit that in the instant case also, in the summons, the witnesses were furnished with the data of the accused for the purpose of identification. We do not find any substance at all in the said argument. In the summons, the name of the accused alone had been mentioned. Mere mentioning of the name of the accused in the summons, in our considered view, would not give any clue at all regarding the identifying features of the assailant, whom they were going to identify. Therefore, this argument deserves only to be summarily rejected. 19. Apart from the evidences of PW-1 to PW-3, the prosecution has the benefit of extra judicial confession given by the appellant to PW-29. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the said extra judicial confession cannot be believed, because, the appellant had no reasons to go voluntarily to PW-29 and to make such a confession. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the appellant had no acquaintance with PW-29 and therefore, he would not have gone to him to confess. Though there is some force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, on that score, we are unable to disbelieve PW-29. It is not the universal rule that the accused would not go to a person with whom he had no acquaintance for the purpose of confessing his guilt. 20. Here, in this case, of course, it is true that PW-29 was not previously known to the appellant. It is not the universal rule that the accused would not go to a person with whom he had no acquaintance for the purpose of confessing his guilt. 20. Here, in this case, of course, it is true that PW-29 was not previously known to the appellant. Since the police had already started searching for him during investigation suspecting his involvement, the appellant would have found reasons to surrender before an independent revenue authority so as to escape from the police. PW-29 has stated that when he enquired the accused as to why he wanted to surrender and to make confession, he told him that the advocates were on boycott of Court proceedings and therefore, he was not able to surrender before the Court with the help of an Advocate and he also had fear for the police to go and surrender before the police. PW-29 had confirmed that the confession was made by the accused voluntarily. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the confession, under EX-P14, would not have been made by the appellant voluntarily to PW-29 is rejected. We hold that EX-P14 is the voluntary confession of the accused. In this regard, we may state that an extra judicial confession is, of course, a weak piece of evidence and if it does not inspire the confidence of the Court, the same cannot be the foundation for conviction, unless the same is corroborated by independent sources. But, here, in this case, the prosecution does not press for conviction on this extra judicial confession alone. Undoubtedly, EX-P14, the extra judicial confession, can be used to corroborate the eye-witness account of PW-1 to PW-3. Thus, the extra judicial confession given by the appellant to PW-29 also lends assurance to the case of the prosecution that it was this accused, who caused the death of the deceased. Apart from the above, the recovery of MO-1 -the Aruval on the disclosure statement made by the accused also goes to further strengthen the case of the prosecution. 21. But, the learned counsel for the appellant would assail the case of the prosecution by raising doubt in the First Information Report. Apart from the above, the recovery of MO-1 -the Aruval on the disclosure statement made by the accused also goes to further strengthen the case of the prosecution. 21. But, the learned counsel for the appellant would assail the case of the prosecution by raising doubt in the First Information Report. According to the learned counsel, PW-5, in whose auto the deceased was taken to the Government Hospital at Tenkasi, had stated that PW-31, the then Sub-Inspector of Police had already arrived at the place of occurrence, whereas, according to PW-31, on receiving intimation from the hospital authorities, he came to the place of occurrence. Similarly, the learned counsel would submit that PW-1 had admitted that the complaint was written by someone else, as dictated by her. However, the person, who wrote EX-P1 has not been examined. The learned counsel would further point out that PW-1 herself has studied up to 12th standard and therefore, there was no occasion or reason for her to ask someone else to write the complaint. 22. From the above, the learned counsel would submit that the First Information Report, in this case, is a doubtful document. In our considered view, it is not so. In EX-P1, PW-1 has not stated anything about the appellant at all by giving his name. In EX-P1, PW-1 had given only the identifying features of the assailant. The accused was identified only on his surrender before PW-29, on 05.03.2009. Until then, the identity of the assailant was not known. If the name of the appellant had been mentioned in EX-P1 itself, then, these discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant would have had some weightage so as to doubt the case of the prosecution. Further, PW-1, being an young wife of the deceased, having married the deceased only few months prior to the occurrence, would not have had the cool mind to speak and write the complaint. Therefore, someone else would have written the complaint, as dictated by her, in which, we do not find anything unnatural. So far as the presence of PW-31 at the place of occurrence as spoken to by PW-5 is concerned, PW-31, the then Sub-Inspector of Police has categorically stated that he went to the Government Hospital only on intimation from the hospital authorities. So far as the presence of PW-31 at the place of occurrence as spoken to by PW-5 is concerned, PW-31, the then Sub-Inspector of Police has categorically stated that he went to the Government Hospital only on intimation from the hospital authorities. Thus, the innocuous answer given by PW-5 that PW-31 had come to the Government Hospital, even when the deceased was being shifted in the auto to the hospital is of no consequence at all. 23. The learned counsel would further submit that PW-4, during cross-examination, has stated that when they were in the hospital, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Inspector of Police had also come to the hospital. May be true that these higher ranking officers would have come to the hospital, because it was a sensational murder case. In our considered view, these discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant are immaterial and they would not, in any manner, go to create any doubt in the credibility of PW-1 to PW-3 and the extra judicial confession made by the accused. 24. Apart from the above, from the medical evidence, the prosecution has proved that the death was due to the injuries caused by the appellant. Thus, going by the nature of the injuries, the weapon used and all the other attendant circumstances, we hold that the act of the accused would squarely fall within the ambit of First Limb of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. There are no materials to bring the act of the accused within any of the exceptions to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, we hold that by causing death of the deceased, the accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code; by trespassing into the house for committing murder of the deceased, the accused had committed an offence under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code and by criminally intimidating PW-1, he had committed an offence punishable under Section 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, we hold that the prosecution has clearly proved that the accused had committed the offences punishable under Sections 302, 450 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code. 25. Thus, we hold that the prosecution has clearly proved that the accused had committed the offences punishable under Sections 302, 450 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code. 25. Lastly, the learned counsel would submit that as per Rule 72 of the Criminal Rules of Practise and Circular Orders, 1958, the confession, under EX-P14, recorded by PW-29, after the investigation has begun is inadmissible. This argument of the learned counsel is rejected, in view of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sivakumar Vs. State by Inspect of Police, reported in 2006 (1) SCC 714 . 26. Now, turning to the quantum of punishment, the Trial Court has taken into account the aggravating as well as the mitigating circumstances and has imposed appropriate sentence, in which we do not find any reason to interfere. Thus, we do not find any merit at all in this Criminal Appeal. 27. In the result, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed; the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant, by Judgment dated 21.12.2010, made in S.C.No.217 of 2010, on the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Tirunelveli, is confirmed. Bail bond executed by the appellant and the sureties shall stand cancelled. The Trial Court shall take steps to secure the accused/appellant to commit him in prison to serve out the remaining period of sentence.