JUDGMENT The three special appeals are directed against a judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 September 2015. Writ-A No 30616 of 1993 was instituted before the learned Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution by three petitioners [(i) Rajan Lal Sharma; (ii) Smt Janki Devi Dixit; and (iii) Laxmi Naraian Pathak]. By the writ petition, the three petitioners sought a mandamus to the State to pay to them their salary as Assistant Teachers working in the primary section of B C Jhuria Higher Secondary School, Hathras, Aligarh. Besides, an order passed by the Joint Director of Education on 4 May 1993 denying the claim was called into question. On 2 September 1993, an interim order was passed in the writ petition directing the respondents to allow the original petitioners to work on their posts and for the payment of their salary as and when it fell due each month. As a consequence of the interim order dated 2 September 1993, the salary which was being paid to another Assistant Teacher Shiv Kumar came to be stopped on 19 June 1995 by the District Inspector of Schools, Aligarh which led to the filing of Writ-A No 18548 of 1995. Both the writ petitions were heard and disposed of by a common judgment of the learned Single Judge on 8 September 2015. 2. When the petitions were called out for hearing, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original petitioners stated that the first petitioner of Writ-A No 30616 of 1993 – Rajan Lal Sharma had died and hence the writ petition stood abated insofar as Rajan Lal Sharma is concerned. No application for substitution or for setting aside the abatement appears to have been filed before the learned Single Judge. Despite this, as the operative directions in the impugned judgment and order dated 8 September 2015 indicate, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by Rajan Lal Sharma by directing the payment of salary to him. No application for substitution or for setting aside the abatement appears to have been filed before the learned Single Judge. Despite this, as the operative directions in the impugned judgment and order dated 8 September 2015 indicate, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by Rajan Lal Sharma by directing the payment of salary to him. The order of the learned Single Judge in that regard reads as follows: “Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and it is held that the petitioner Rajan Lal Sharma will be entitled to salary under the Act, 1971 considering the fact that he is continuously being teaching from the date of his appointment and if any payment has not been made to him from that date he shall also be entitled to arrears of salary with other consequential benefits.” 3. Having regard to this factual background, the first aspect of the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge which needs to be mentioned is that though the writ petition filed by Rajan Lal Sharma was held to have abated, in the ultimate analysis, the learned Single Judged has allowed the claim of that very petitioner. The order of the learned Single Judge would, hence, be clearly unsustainable. 4. That leaves the Court with the appeals which have been filed by Laxmi Narain Pathak (Special Appeal No 726 of 2015) and by Shiv Kumar (Special Appeal No 750 of 2015 and Special Appeal (D) No 722 of 2015). The reasoning which seems to have weighed with the learned Single Judge is that though the report of the District Inspector of Schools indicated a total strength of students of 340, only 245 students could be certified. Taking a student-teacher ratio of 1: 40, the learned Single Judge held that the requisite strength of teachers for teaching 245 students would be six teachers. The learned Single Judge held that Rajan Lal Sharma (the deceased petitioner whose writ petition is stated to have abated) would fall within the requisite strength of six teachers whereas Shiv Kumar and Laxmi Narain Pathak would be beyond the strength of six teachers and hence would be in excess of the requisite strength. 5. The learned Single Judge held that Rajan Lal Sharma (the deceased petitioner whose writ petition is stated to have abated) would fall within the requisite strength of six teachers whereas Shiv Kumar and Laxmi Narain Pathak would be beyond the strength of six teachers and hence would be in excess of the requisite strength. 5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the learned Standing Counsel, we are of the view that quite apart from the objection to the ultimate direction which has been issued by the learned Single Judge in favour of an Assistant Teacher whose writ petition stood abated, the issue as to whether the two appellants were within or beyond the sanctioned strength would require a fresh consideration. The attention of the Court has also been drawn to the fact that on 11 January 1993, a learned Single Judge had delivered a judgment in a writ petition (Civil Misc Writ petition No 30589 of 1991) in which one of the petitioners was Laxmi Narain Pathak, the appellant in Special Appeal No 726 of 2015. While dealing with the said writ petition, the learned Single Judge held as follows: "The management has supported the case of the petitioners and has alleged that list of nine teachers was submitted to the respondent no.1, which included the name of the petitioners but the respondent no.1 for the reasons, best known to him, sanctioned payment of salary for only six teachers. It was further stated that the name of the petitioners was again submitted with their service record and other details, but so far no action has been taken. In my opinion, from the material, which has come on record, specially the report of the respondent no.1, submitted to the Joint Director of Education (Finance) dated 8.1.1992, it is fully established that the petitioners were working at the institution from before the institution was given grant-in-aid to their primary section in 1989. The respondent no.1 in his recommendation has not pointed out any defect or legal impediment which may indicate that the petitioners for any other reasons are not entitled for payment of salary from the grant-in-aid given by the State. The stand taken in the counter affidavit by the respondent no.1, in view of the own recommendation of respondent no.1, does not appear to be correct." 6. The stand taken in the counter affidavit by the respondent no.1, in view of the own recommendation of respondent no.1, does not appear to be correct." 6. The learned Single Judge directed the Joint Director of Education (Finance) to consider the case and to pass appropriate orders for the payment of salary from the grant-in-aid issued to the primary section of the institution. We are of the view that the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the effect of the observations contained in the earlier judgment dated 11 January 1993 merits consideration. 7. For these reasons, we are of the view that the special appeals will have to be allowed and the respective writ petitions should be restored to the file of the learned Single Judge for disposal afresh. We accordingly allow the special appeals by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 8 September 2015. Writ - A No 30616 of 1993 and Writ-A No 18548 of 1995 are accordingly restored to the file of the learned Single Judge for disposal afresh. 8. The special appeals are accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.