JUDGMENT A.K. Rath, J. 1. In this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed, inter alia, to quash the notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1, issued by the Recovery Officer, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.3, prohibiting the petitioner to withdraw the amount from Vijaya Bank, Balasore and restraining the said Bank from making any payment to the petitioner. By the said notice the Bank was also directed to transfer an amount of Rs.35,621/-to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund Account No.1 of the E.S.I. Corporation, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar within seven days from the date of receipt of the order, failing which, opposite party no.3 would take further proceedings to recover the amount due from the Bank as per Rule 36(3)(b) of the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the short facts of the case of the petitioner are that it is a Private Limited Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner company is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of HDPE Woven Sacks Fabrics and Tapes. The petitioner company has employed number of persons in its industries. It regularly deposits the ESI contribution from time to time. While the matter stood thus, on 21.9.1995 it received the demand notice issued by the opposite party no.3 in respect of contribution pertaining to the period from March, 1987 to June, 1990 and thereafter upto 31.7.1995 amounting to Rs.31,905/-. On 18.12.1995, the petitioner made a representation to the Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.1, stating therein that the verification report by the ESI authorities basing on the determination of contribution made, had not been supplied to the petitioner. A request was made to give a chance to the petitioner to produce its records and afford personal hearing, vide Annexure-2. Finally reminder was sent on 9.3.1996, vide Annexure-3. 3. Further case of the petitioner is that on 7.9.1996, it received a notice from opposite party no.3. In the said notice, the petitioner was directed to appear before him on 13.9.1996 for making payment of the certificate amount, failing which, the opposite party no.3 would proceed to recover the amount through coercive measure. 3. Further case of the petitioner is that on 7.9.1996, it received a notice from opposite party no.3. In the said notice, the petitioner was directed to appear before him on 13.9.1996 for making payment of the certificate amount, failing which, the opposite party no.3 would proceed to recover the amount through coercive measure. On 31.5.1997, the petitioner received another letter from the Deputy Director (Revenue), Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.2, refusing to afford the personal hearing and directed the petitioner to deposit the amount due as per the certificate issued. It is further stated that on 21.11.1998 when the petitioner went to Bijaya Bank for operating the bank account, he was refused to do so and informed that prohibitory order has been received from opposite party no.3 for not allowing him to withdraw any amount from the account, vide Annexure-1. 4. Pursuant to issue of notice, a counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties. The sum and substance of the case of the opposite parties is that under Section 75 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the ESI Act”), a dispute between the Principal Employer and the Corporation is to be adjudicated by the Employees’ Insurance Act as per the procedure laid down under the Orissa Employees’ Insurance Court Rules, 1951. Since the disputed questions of facts are involved, the same cannot be adjudicated in the writ application. It is further stated that the ESI Act had been made applicable to the petitioner company with effect from 24.3.1987. On inspection of the records of the petitioner company by the Inspectors of the Corporation, it was found that the contribution of Rs.20,222/-had not been paid for the period from March, 1987 to June, 1990. The opposite party no.2 issued letters on 28.3.1991 and 11.10.1993 to the petitioner to pay the aforesaid contribution. The petitioner did not pay the same. The opposite party no.2 issued a certificate on 4.9.1995 to the opposite party no.3 to recover the amount of Rs.20,222/-along with interest of Rs.11,683/-calculated upto 31.7.1995, total Rs.31,905/-and further interest from 1.8.1995 to the date of recovery under Section 45-C to 45-I of the ESI Act. On receipt of the aforesaid certificate, opposite party no.3 registered Certificate Case No.347 of 1995 and issued a notice on 21.9.1995 to the petitioner to recover the certificate dues. On receipt of the aforesaid certificate, opposite party no.3 registered Certificate Case No.347 of 1995 and issued a notice on 21.9.1995 to the petitioner to recover the certificate dues. Further, on subsequent inspection of records of the petitioner company by the Inspectors of the Corporation, it was also found that the contribution of Rs.770/-had not been paid for the period from July, 1990 to May, 1995. Thereafter, opposite party no.2 issued a certificate on 28.4.1997 to the opposite party no.3 to recover the contribution of Rs.770/-along with interest of Rs.187/-, calculated upto 31.1.1997, totalling to Rs.957/-and further interest from 1.2.1997 to the date of recovery under Section 45-C to 45-I of the ESI Act. On receipt of the said certificate, opposite party no.3 registered Certificate Case No.236 of 1997 and issued notice on 21.5.1997 to the petitioner to recover the certificate dues. It is further stated that on further inspection of records of the petitioner company by the Inspector of the Corporation, it was also found that no compliance was made for the period from June, 1995 to February, 1996 in respect of three security guards. As the petitioner did not pay the same, opposite party no.2 issued a certificate on 20.1.1998 to the opposite party no.3 to recover the contribution of Rs.2,451/-along with interest of Rs.308/-, calculated upto 30.6.1997, totalling to Rs.2,759/-and further interest from 1.7.1997 to the date of recovery. The petitioner did not pay the certificate dues pertaining to the aforesaid three certificates, i.e., Certificate Case Nos.347 of 1995, 236 of 1997 and 22 of 1998 though he was statutorily liable to pay the same. As such, opposite party no.3 issued prohibitory order dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1, to recover the certificate dues of Rs.35,621/-pertaining to the aforesaid three certificates. 5. Mr. Sidharth Ray, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the existence of alternative remedy available under the ESI Act is not a bar to entertain the writ application. He further submitted that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner before issuing notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1. 5. Mr. Sidharth Ray, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the existence of alternative remedy available under the ESI Act is not a bar to entertain the writ application. He further submitted that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner before issuing notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1. In support of his contentions, he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Kishinchand Chellaram vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City-II, AIR 1980 SC 2117 , State of H.P and others vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and another, AIR 2005 SC 3936 , Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others, AIR 2003 SC 2120 , Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 and the decision of this Court in the case of Babulal Agrawal vs. State of Orissa, 108 (2009) CLT 440. 6. Mr. Purnendu Prasad Ray, learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that the dispute in question can be adjudicated by the Employees’ Insurance Court under Section 75 of the ESI Act. Since alternative remedy is available under the ESI Act, the writ application is not maintainable. He further submitted that the provisions of Section 45-A of the ESI Act will be attracted only if returns, registers or records are not submitted by the principal or immediate employer or any other person mentioned therein or the Inspector or other official of the Corporation is prevented in any manner by the principal or immediate employer or any other person in exercising its functions or discharging its duties under Section 45 of the ESI Act. He further submitted that in the instant case such contingency does not arise as the petitioner himself produced returns and records and on the basis of the information in the said returns and records, the amount of Rs.31,905/-was determined. 7. On the pleadings of the parties and the submissions made at the Bar, really two points arise for consideration of this Court. I. Whether the existence of alternative remedy would operate as a bar in entertaining a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution? II. Whether the notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1, issued by the opposite party no.3 is an infraction of principle of natural justice? 8. I. Whether the existence of alternative remedy would operate as a bar in entertaining a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution? II. Whether the notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure-1, issued by the opposite party no.3 is an infraction of principle of natural justice? 8. Point No. I After survey of the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 in paragraphs 15 and 20 of the report held as follows: “15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely or some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” “20. Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.” 9. The same view was expressed in Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd (supra) and Harbanslal Sahnia (supra). 10. The same view was expressed in Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd (supra) and Harbanslal Sahnia (supra). 10. Thus alternative remedy is not a bar to entertain a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution in at least three categories mentioned in Whirlpool Corporation (supra), namely, where the writ application has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 11. Point No. II The concept of natural justice has undergone a sea change in recent years. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression “civil consequences” encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights, but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non pecuniary damages. It takes within its sweep everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 12. In Uma Nath Pandey and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, AIR 2009 SC 2375 , the Supreme Court held as follows:- “6. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 7. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal justice” do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants’ defence. 8. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants’ defence. 8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the “Magna Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to “vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”. In the celebrated case of Cooper vs. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1863) 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated: “Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. “Adam” says God, “where are thou? hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat”.” 13. It is apt to refer here the verdict in Kesar Enterprises Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2011) 13 SCC 733 wherein the Supreme Court was considering the applicability of principles of natural justice to Rule 633 (7) of the Utter Pradesh Excise Manual. It is apt to refer here the verdict in Kesar Enterprises Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2011) 13 SCC 733 wherein the Supreme Court was considering the applicability of principles of natural justice to Rule 633 (7) of the Utter Pradesh Excise Manual. The said Rule provided that if certificate was not received within the time mentioned in the bond or pass, or if the condition of bond was infringed, the Collector of the exporting district or the Excise Inspector who granted the pass shall take necessary steps to recover from executant or his surety the penalty due under the bond. In para-30 of the report, it is held as under: “30. we are of the opinion that keeping in view the nature, scope and consequences of direction under sub-rule (7) of Rule 633 of the Excise Manual, the principles of natural justice demand that a show cause notice should be issued and an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to the person concerned before an order under the said Rule is made, notwithstanding the fact that the said Rule does not contain any express provision for the affected party being given an opportunity of being heard.” 14. In Kishinchand Chellaram (supra), the Supreme Court held that the proceedings under the income tax law are not governed by the strict rules of evidence and, therefore, it might be said that even without calling the manager of the bank in evidence to prove this letter, it could be taken into account as evidence. But before the I.T authorities could rely upon it, they were bound to produce it before the assessee so that the assessee could controvert the statements contained in it by asking for an opportunity to cross-examine the manager of the bank with reference to the statements made by him. 15. This Court in the case of M/s. Ferro Alloys Corporation Limited vs. State of Orissa, 77 (1994) CLT 248 held that where a material is sought to be utilized against an assessee, adequate opportunity has to be granted to it to rebut the same before the materials can be utilized against the assessee. The same view was echoed in Babulal Agrawal (supra). 16. The same view was echoed in Babulal Agrawal (supra). 16. An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Star Security Service v. The Deputy Director (Revenue), Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar & others, WP (C) No. 11815 of 2003 disposed of on 4.12.2003. A Division Bench of this Court held that even de hors the provisions of the proviso to Section 45-A of the ESI Act the petitioner was entitled to reasonable opportunity of being heard before determination of the quantum of contribution payable by the petitioner by virtue of the principles of natural justice. 17. It is neither disputed nor denied by the opposite parties that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner before determining the amount of Rs.31,905/-. The submission of Mr. Ray that no opportunity of hearing is required to be provided to the petitioner has no legs to stand in view of the decisions referred to supra. Neither the matter which was sought to be utilised against the petitioner was supplied to him nor the petitioner had been afforded any opportunity of hearing before determination of the amount. Had the petitioner been given an opportunity of hearing, it could have come out with extenuating circumstances defending such action, though default was made and opposite party no.2 was not satisfied with the explanation offered. 18. In view of the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs, the inescapable conclusion is that the notice dated 17.11.1998, vide Annexure1, issued by the Recovery Officer, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.3, is an infraction of the principle of natural justice. The same is accordingly quashed. This Court directs the Deputy Director (Revenue), Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.2, to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and determine afresh the quantum of contribution payable for the aforesaid period by the petitioner. The petitioner will appear before the opposite party no.2 on 15th June, 2015 when opposite party no.2 will either hear the petitioner or fix up another date of hearing and thereafter pass a fresh order in accordance with law. Since the petitioner does not dispute the applicability of the ESI Act to his establishment and disputes the quantum of contribution, in case the petitioner is still aggrieved, it is open to the petitioner to raise the dispute under the ESI Act before the Employees’ Insurance Court. Since the petitioner does not dispute the applicability of the ESI Act to his establishment and disputes the quantum of contribution, in case the petitioner is still aggrieved, it is open to the petitioner to raise the dispute under the ESI Act before the Employees’ Insurance Court. The writ application is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.