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2015 DIGILAW 3332 (ALL)

NASARUDIN v. STATE OF U. P.

2015-10-27

RAN VIJAI SINGH

body2015
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Uttar Kumar Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Siddharth Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 20.8.2015 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Food & Civil Supplies), Agra Division, Agra (respondent No. 2) in Appeal No. 295/2006 (Dharmpal Singh v. State of U.P.) and order dated 9.9.2015 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Iglas, Aligarh restoring the agreement to run fair price shop of respondent No. 5. 3. While assailing the impugned orders, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 2 has erred in allowing the appeal filed by respondent No. 5; whereas the respondent No. 5 has committed various irregularities, which have been mentioned by the Tehsildar in his report, but the respondent No. 2, without looking into the same, has allowed the appeal. 4. A preliminary objection has been raised by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel by submitting that the petitioner is the subsequent allottee and prior to allotment in favour of the petitioner, respondent No. 5 was the fair price shop agent and his agreement to run fair price shop was cancelled, but appeal has been allowed, therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the impugned orders. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The facts giving rise to this case are that respondent No. 5 was the fair price shop agent of Village Alipura, Block Gonda, Tehsil Iglas, Aligarh. However, on the allegation of irregularities committed by him in distribution of scheduled commodities, his agreement to run fair price shop was cancelled by the Sub Divisional Officer on 29.8.2006. Aggrieved by the order dated 29.8.2006, respondent No. 5 filed Appeal No. 295/2006 (Dharmpal Singh v. State of U.P.) before the respondent No. 2 under order 28 of U.P. Schedule Commodities Order, 2004. The appellate Court, after going through the charges levelled against the applicant and the reply of respondent No. 5, came to the conclusion that the Sub Divisional Officer has erred in cancelling the agreement for running fair price shop of respondent No. 5. The appellate Court, after going through the charges levelled against the applicant and the reply of respondent No. 5, came to the conclusion that the Sub Divisional Officer has erred in cancelling the agreement for running fair price shop of respondent No. 5. The petitioner, who happens to be the subsequent allottee, was appointed fair price shop agent on 9.6.2008 pending appeal filed by respondent No. 5 and now, the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 has been allowed. The appointment of the petitioner as fair price shop agent during the pendency of the appeal, in my opinion, is to be treated as temporary appointment, subject to decision in the appeal and once the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 has been allowed, the present petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the same as he would not fall in the ambit of person aggrieved. 7. The controversy as to who will be the person aggrieved is no more res judicata as the Apex Court as well as this Court in a catena of decisions, while considering as to who could be said to be the “person aggrieved”, observed that although the meaning of expression “person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the Statute and facts of the case nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance; a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly deprived him of something or wrongfully refused something, or wrongfully affected his title to someone. 8. In M.S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and others, (2000) 7 SCC 552 , the Supreme Court considered the matter at length and placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including the Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das (Mrs.) and others, AIR 2000 SC 988 ; held that the Court must examine the issue of locus standi from all angles and the petitioner should be asked to disclose as what is the legal injury suffered by him. 9. The term “person aggrieved” was also considered and defined in Re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458, wherein it has been observed as under : “The words ‘’person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. 9. The term “person aggrieved” was also considered and defined in Re: Sidebotham, (1880) 14 Ch. D. 458, wherein it has been observed as under : “The words ‘’person aggrieved’ do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 10. In K. Ramadas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2177 , the Supreme Court examined the case of a resident of a locality where a cinema hall was to be constructed contrary to the Building Town Planning Scheme. The resident was held to be entitled to maintain writ on the ground that the residential area would stand spoiled by the construction in violation of the statutory provisions and the municipal authorities owed a public duty and an obligation under the Statute not to allow the construction of a cinema hall in a residential area. The Supreme Court observed as under : “... The question whether an individual who is one of a class for whose benefit such an obligation is imposed can or cannot enforce performance by an action must depend on the purview of the legislature in the particular statute. Injury may be caused either by the fulfillment of the duty cast by statute or by failure to carry it out or by negligence in its performance. In order to succeed in an action for damages for breach of statutory duty the plaintiff must establish a breach of a statutory obligation which, on the proper construction of the statute was intended to be a ground of civil liability to a class of persons of whom he is one. He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection.” 11. In the Nagar Rice and Flour Mills and others v. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection.” 11. In the Nagar Rice and Flour Mills and others v. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. and others, AIR 1971 SC 246 , the Supreme Court rejected the claim of an existing Mill owner that in case any other Mill is shifted to the locality wherein his Mill is situated, he would be adversely affected, therefore, has a locus standi to maintain the suit/writ. The Supreme Court held that the right to carry on business being fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law in the interest of general public under Article 19 (6) (i) of the Constitution. 12. The “person aggrieved” means a person who is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive and it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. “Person aggrieved” means a person who is injured or he is adversely affected in a legal sense. (Vide K.N. Lakshminarasimaiah v. Secretary, Mysore S.T.A.T., (1966) 2 Mys LJ 199). 13. Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, must be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving in each case. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons. 14. In the case of R.V. London Country Keepers of the Peace of Justice, (1890) 25 QBD 357, the Court held as under: “A person who cannot succeed in getting a conviction against another may be annoyed by the said findings. He may also feel that what he thought to be a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Magistrate. He thus may be said to be a person annoyed but not a person aggrieved, entitle to prefer an appeal against such order.” 15. In Messrs. Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs. He may also feel that what he thought to be a breach of law was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Magistrate. He thus may be said to be a person annoyed but not a person aggrieved, entitle to prefer an appeal against such order.” 15. In Messrs. Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Messrs. Raman & Raman (Private) Ltd. and others, AIR 1961 Mad 180 , a Full Bench of Madras High Court, while considering the provisions of Madras Motor Vehicles Act, considered the issue and approved the law laid down in The King v. Richmond Confirming Authority, (1921) 1 KB 248; and The King v. Groom and others, 1901 (2) KB 157, and laid down the principle as under : “The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered.” 16. Here, in this case, as has been discussed above, a right was created by executing an agreement after cancellation of the agreement executed in favour of respondent No. 5 and once cancellation order has been set aside, whatever right was created in favour of the petitioner pending litigation has come to an end. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner will neither fall in the ambit of person aggrieved, nor has any locus standi to challenge the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Food & Civil Supplies), Agra Division, Agra in the appeal in favour of respondent No. 5 restoring the agreement. The view taken by me also finds support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Poonam v. State of U.P. and others (Civil Appeal No. 6774 of 2015, decided on 29.10.2015). 17. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable.