ORDER : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. The questions that arise for decision in these matters are as follows : (a) Does an appeal lie under Section 60 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, for short, the "K.V.A.T. Act", against an order refusing to admit an appeal under Section 55 of that Act, presented after the expiration of the period prescribed for such presentation in terms of sub-section (1) of that section? If so, what, if any, are the restrictions in relation to the consideration of grounds of such an appeal ? (b) Does a revision lie under Section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, for short, the "K.G.S.T. Act", against an order refusing to admit an appeal under Section 39 of that Act, presented after the expiration of the period prescribed for such presentation in terms of sub-section (1) of that Section ? if so, what, if any, are the restrictions in relation to the consideration of grounds of such a revision ? (c) Are the decisions rendered by this Court in Andhra Steel Corporation v. State of Kerala ( 1987 (2) KLT 503 = (1987) 67 STC 348 ), Balakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT SN 16 (C.No. 24)) and Solar Cashew v. State of Kerala ( 2009 (2) KLT 486 ) wrong in law, particularly, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Messrs. Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab ((1956) SCR 166) ? 2. The correctness of the decisions of this Court in Andhra Steel Corporation (supra), Balakrishnan Nair (supra) and Solar Cashew (supra) are doubted through the Order of Reference to the Full Bench, made in the captioned Writ Appeal. It was held in Balakrishnan Nairthata revision is not maintainable under Section 41 of the K.G.S.T. Act, if the appeal before the Tribunal was dismissed on the ground of delay in filing the appeal. Solar Cashew was rendered holding that when an appeal is rejected by the Appellate Authority as not maintainable on account of non-payment of admitted tax, such order is not one passed in the appeal and no appeal will thereupon lie to the Tribunal. It was further held that the order of the Tribunal rejecting such an appeal is not revisable before the High Court under Section 41 of the K.G.S.T. Act. It was further held that the order of the Tribunal rejecting such an appeal is not revisable before the High Court under Section 41 of the K.G.S.T. Act. Andhra Steel Corporation was decided noticing Mela Ram and holding that an order dismissing an appeal in limine for want of proof of payment of admitted tax is an order which could be appealed against; however that the scope of that appeal before the Tribunal would be limited to the question whether the non-entertainment of the appeal for non-compliance was proper or not. It was held that questions relating to the merits of the assessment would be beyond the purview of that appeal. Fundamentally, the Reference Order is on the pivotal issue that those decisions of this Court are opposed to the law laid by the Apex Court in Mela Ram (supra). The revision petitions which are tagged along, are filed under Section 41 of the K.G.S.T. Act, and are before the Full Bench, in view of the fact that Balakrishnan Nair and Solar Cashew, the correctness of which are doubted in the Reference Order, were rendered in relation to revisional jurisdiction under the K.G.S.T. Act. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant in the Writ Appeal and the 1 earned Government Pleader. 4. It was held in Balakrishnan Nair that an order of the Tribunal declining to admit an appeal to file on the ground that it is barred by limitation is one refusing to admit the appeal beyond the period of limitation and such an order of the Tribunal, declining to entertain the appeal, is not revisable under Section 41 (1) of the K.G.S.T. Act. Solar Cashew was rendered holding that an order rejecting an appeal for nonpayment of admitted tax is not revisable under Section 41 (1) of the K.G.S.T. Act. We have also come across the decision of this Court in Sivasankaran Nair v. State of Kerala ( 2006 (3) KLT 804 ), rendered holding that a revision is not maintainable before the High court under Section 41 (1) of the K.G.S.T. Act if the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay and that no revision lies to the High court against an order dismissing the petition for condonation of delay. We may, however, note that all those judgments were rendered without noticing Mela Ram. 5. We may, however, note that all those judgments were rendered without noticing Mela Ram. 5. Mela Ram was rendered by the Apex Court interpreting the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1922. The substance of the consideration of the different statutory provisions dealt with in that case led to the law laid in that precedent, to the effect that the refusal to excuse delay in instituting an appeal amounts to refusal to admit an appeal after the expiration of the period prescribed for such an appeal and an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time barred is one passed in that appeal. Resultantly, it was held that an order holding that there were no sufficient reasons for excusing the delay, and as a consequence, rejecting the appeal as time barred, would amount to an order which would be open to an appeal, and it would make no difference in the position whether the order of dismissal is made before or after the appeal is admitted. Accordingly, it was laid down that the resultant rejection of an appeal on account of the dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay, is appealable before the superior forum. 6. Andhra Steel Corporation was decided noticing and applying Mela Ram. The decisions of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Filmistan Ltd. ( (1961) 42 ITR 163 (SC)) and Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner ( (1968) 21 STC 154 (SC)) were also referred to and followed to conclude that any disposal of the appeal, whether on merits or on preliminary grounds like limitation, non-payment of admitted tax, irregularity in filing it or otherwise necessarily amounts to appealable order under Section 39 of the K.G.S.T. Act. The sum and substance of the conclusions of the discussions in that regard, in Andhra Steel Corporation, is that any disposal of a statutory appeal, whether on merits or on any preliminary ground, such as limitation, non-payment of admitted tax, irregularity in its institution, or otherwise, would result in a situation where the appeal sought to be instituted stands rejected or dismissed, facilitating a further appeal in terms of the statutory provisions. We are in complete agreement with the assimilation of law and application of the ratio of Mela Ram in Andhra Steel Corporation. We are in complete agreement with the assimilation of law and application of the ratio of Mela Ram in Andhra Steel Corporation. Resultantly, we cannot but hold that the decisions of this Court in Balakrishnan Nair, Solar Cashew and Sivasankaran Nair are contrary to the law laid by the Apex Court in Mela Ram. We therefore, respectfully, overrule them. 7. We do not see any critical variation between the contents of the relevant provisions providing for appeal or revision in terms of the provisions of the K.V.A.T. Act and the K.G.S.T. Act. Hence, in the light of the aforesaid enunciation of the legal issues, we are of the view that appeals and revisions would lie under both those legislations against disposal of statutory appeals, without any distinction as to whether the decision of that Appellate Authority was on merits or on any preliminary ground such as limitation, non-payment of admitted tax, irregularity in the institution of the appeal or any other technical ground. 8. What remains for consideration is as to whether this Court went wrong in Andhra Steel Corporation, to the extent it was held that the scope of appeal before the Tribunal will be limited to questions as to the non-entertainment of the appeal ; and, that questions relating to the merits of the assessment are beyond the purview of such an appeal. To hold so, reliance was placed on Bhubaneswar Flour Mills v. State of Orissa ( (1983) 52 STC 192 (Ori.)). Having regard to what has been stated in the preceding paragraphs on the basis of the law laid by the Honourable Supreme Court in Mela Ram and the other decisions of the Apex Court referred to in that precedent, what is available to a litigant in a superior forum is an appeal or revision on all grounds as against the order of the subordinate authority, of which that litigant is aggrieved. Hence, we are unable to concur with the restrictions imposed as regards the grounds of any appeal in Andhra Steel Corporation, following Bhubaneswar Flour Mills. We therefore, respectfully, overrule the decision of this Court in Andhra Steel Corporation, partly, to the extent it holds that the scope of appeal before the Tribunal will be limited to questions as to the non-entertainment of the appeal ; and, that questions relating to the merits of the assessment are beyond the purview of such an appeal. We therefore, respectfully, overrule the decision of this Court in Andhra Steel Corporation, partly, to the extent it holds that the scope of appeal before the Tribunal will be limited to questions as to the non-entertainment of the appeal ; and, that questions relating to the merits of the assessment are beyond the purview of such an appeal. However, we hasten to add that it may be a matter of prudence of the superior appellate or revisional authority, to conclude, in its own wisdom, as to whether it would go ahead in deciding all issues in such an appeal or revision ; or would rather make an order of remit on such conditions and terms, even as to costs, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. We answer the reference made to the Full Bench as above. The office will place the files of these cases in terms of the roster for further decision.