JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., a company incorporated, functioning under the control of the department of Petroleum and Natual Gas, Government of India, engaged in refining and selling of petroleum products, through its territory manager, has filed the present writ petition challenging the orders passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Meerut in Suit No. 1020 of 2013 dated 29.3.2014, granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, as well as its affirmance in appeal No. 63 of 2014 vide order dated 28.10.2014. 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to filing of writ petition, are that the plaintiff-respondent was appointed as dealer by the petitioners for sale of its petroleum products and a dealership agreement was executed between the parties on 14.6.1996. An inspection of the retail outlet of the plaintiff-respondent was conducted on 16.4.2013, by a team of officers including Chief Manager quality control cell, wherein, following short comings are alleged to have been found: “(i) The ULP dispensing unit Z line L & % GX11064 was delivering short 240 ml. 250 ml. And 230 ml. Per 5 litre product dispensed in three consecutive deliveries. On switching on and off the electrical panel, the deliveries were within limits. W & M Seals were not properly put on the totalizer and totalizer was removal keeping W & M Seals intact. 91.48% of sales were done through this dispensing unit during the last four months. (ii) The ULP dispensing unit Z line L & T 4532 W & M seals were not properly put on the totalizer and totalizer was removable keeping W & M seals intact. (iii) The HSD dispensing unit Midco MEM 03A1513V was delivering 110 ml., 100 ml. Short per 5 litre product dispensed. On switching on/off the power supply, the dispensing unit was delivering 100 ml. Short per litre measure dispensed. 44.34% sale was done through this dispensing unit in last four months. (iv) The HSD dispensing unit Midco 980C 8M2614 could not be checked for deliveries. The totalizer was temperable after opening the top cover. The glass cover could be removed easily giving access to the totalizer gears. (v) In HSD Midco Old Model 840 totalizer was temparable with W & M seals intact. (vi) Positive stock variation in MS by 5619 litres beyond permissible limit of +/.4% of tank stock and 0.75% of handing loss. The totalizer was temperable after opening the top cover. The glass cover could be removed easily giving access to the totalizer gears. (v) In HSD Midco Old Model 840 totalizer was temparable with W & M seals intact. (vi) Positive stock variation in MS by 5619 litres beyond permissible limit of +/.4% of tank stock and 0.75% of handing loss. (vii) Positive stock variation in HSD by 27557 litres beyond permissible limit +/.4% of tank stock and 0.20% of handing loss. (viii) Hydrometer/thermometer calibration certificate expired on 18.10.2011 and calibration certificate thereafter was not available. (ix) Samples were also taken for checking petroleum products so that aspects of adulteration could be verified.” 3. An inspection report was prepared, which was signed by the officials of the petitioners and it also contains the stamp and signatures of the plaintiff-respondent. However, the plaintiff-respondent disputed their signatures on the inspection report and it is alleged that the inspection report itself was manipulated. The charges essentially against the plaintiff-respondent were in two parts;(i) adulteration of petroleum products and (ii) short supply of petroleum products. With regard to allegation of adulteration, it appears that samples were taken from 3 different sources i.e. (i) supply location sample, (ii) corresponding tank lorry sample and (iii) retail out let sample. It is admitted to the petitioners that only first sample i.e. the supply location sample met the standard contemplated, whereas, the 2nd and 3rd samples i.e. tank lorry sample and retail out let sample failed. It was found that the allegation of short supply of petroleum products, however, were found,which have already been referred to in the inspection report. 4. Based upon the aforesaid inspection report, supply of petroleum products was stopped and a show-cause notice dated 9.5.2013 was issued to the petitioners alongwith the copy of the test reports dated 29.4.2013, seeking explanation of the plaintiff-respondent within a period of 15 days. A reply to the show-cause notice was submitted by the plaintiff on 20.5.2013, wherein, receiving of show-cause notice alongwith the inspection report dated 16.4.2013 was admitted. Various allegations were made including that blank sample labels were got signed, the inspection report was not got singed and the standard procedure of inspection was not followed. Opportunity of personal hearing from the Director (Marketing) was also sought in the matter. The show-cause notice and its reply are enclosed as Annexures-5 and 6 to the writ petition. 5. Various allegations were made including that blank sample labels were got signed, the inspection report was not got singed and the standard procedure of inspection was not followed. Opportunity of personal hearing from the Director (Marketing) was also sought in the matter. The show-cause notice and its reply are enclosed as Annexures-5 and 6 to the writ petition. 5. From the records, it appears that before any decision could be taken upon the reply of the plaintiff-respondent to the show-cause notice dated 9.5.2013, the plaintiff filed Original Suit No. 137 of 2013 at Delhi, which was entertained and following directions were issued on 17.7.2013. “In the given circumstances, defendants are hereby restrained from terminating the dealership of plaintiff and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the retail outlet at Mawana, Meerut Road, Distt. Meerut (U.P.) on the basis of inspection report dated 16.4.2013 and not to disconnect the sale and supply of plaintiff’s retail outlet as mentioned above as well as the plaintiff is not to be restrained from resuming sale of MS/HSD and defendant company/ BPCL, till next date of hearing written statement be filed by defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 1 and 2 be served as observed above on 5.8.2013". 6. Petitioner moved an application under Order-7 Rules- 10 and 12 CPC as well under Order-39 Rule-4 CPC, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to entertain the suit as well as the order of injunction on the ground that the same could not have been passed. The Civil Court at Delhi found that the suit itself was not maintainable at Delhi, yet, while returning the plaint vide order dated 1.8.2013 for presentation before the appropriate Court, the protection granted vide order dated 17.7.2013 was allowed to continue till 6.9.2013. It is thereafter that the suit in question has been instituted before the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Meerut and has been numbered as Original Suit No. 1030 of 2013. The Trial Court entertained the suit and passed an order on the temporary injunction application on 5.9.2013, extending the order passed by the Delhi Civil Court on 17.7.2013, as extended on 1.8.2013 and the defendants were directed not to terminate the dealership and to continue with the supply of Petroleum products. The defendant-petitiner preferred a Civil Revision No. 155 of 2013, challenging the order dated 5.9.2013, which was dismissed on 5.10.2013. The defendant-petitiner preferred a Civil Revision No. 155 of 2013, challenging the order dated 5.9.2013, which was dismissed on 5.10.2013. Aggrieved against the orders dated 5.9.2013 and 5.10.2013, the defendant-petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 10193 of 2014, which was entertained and orders were passed on 18.2.2014, operative portion whereof reads as under : “Until further orders of this Court, operation of the impugned order dated 5.9.2013 and the consequential orders extending the interim order are stayed but the pendency of this writ petition and this order would not affect the jurisdiction of the Court below to decide the injunction application filed in the above suit on its own merits taking into account the objections filed by the petitioners as also any other application which may have been filed by the petitioners objecting to the maintainability of the suit”. 7. Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court to proceed with the matter and decide injunction application, the trial Court has allowed the injunction application and the defendants have been restrained from dis-continuing the supply of petroleum products to the plaintiff, on the basis of inspection report dated 16.4.2013 and to continue the supply of petroleum products as per the the dealership agreement dated 111.6.1996 and the defendants were further restrained from terminating the dealership agreement on the basis of inspection dated 16.4.2013 vide order dated 29.3.2014. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant- petitioners have field Misc. Appeal No. 63 of 2014, which has also been rejected on 28.10.2014. Aggrieved by the two orders, allowing the injunction application of the plaintiff-respondent, the defendants-petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 8. I have heard Sri Vikas Budhwar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Anurag Khanna and Sri Nipun Singh for the respondents. The orders passed by the Courts below have been challenged essentially on the ground that under the facts and circumstances of the present case, no case for grant of injunction was made out within the settled parameters of law. Sri Budhwar contends that the plaintiff had been appointed as a dealer by the defendants, pursuant to an agreement dated 14.6.1996, which was on record and had been taken note of by the Courts below, which itself contained clause-12, providing that agreement could be terminated. Sri Budhwar contends that the plaintiff had been appointed as a dealer by the defendants, pursuant to an agreement dated 14.6.1996, which was on record and had been taken note of by the Courts below, which itself contained clause-12, providing that agreement could be terminated. It is contended that directions to restore supply of petroleum product and not to terminate the dealership agreement was in teeth of the express provisions contained in the agreement, which permitted the oil company to terminate the agreement forthwith or at any time on the happening of the specified acts. Sri Budhwar further submits that Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act clearly provides that such a contract, since by its nature is determinable, could not have been specifically enforced. It is also submitted that the grant of relief, otherwise, is in teeth of Section 14(1)(c) of the Act and the injunction granted by the Courts below is contrary to law. It is further submitted that relief, which has been claimed, since was not liable to be granted under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, considerations of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were all against the plaintiff and such relief could not have been granted. Reliance has also been placed upon various decisions, which shall be appropriately dealt with. 9. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, on the contrary submits that the plea of adulteration, which was made the basis for initiating action against the plaintiff was not substantiated as tank lorry sample itself had failed. He contends that tank lorry sample illustrates the petroleum product received by the dealer from the oil company and if the supply from the tank lorry itself contained adulteration, no fault can be attributed to the plaintiff. He submits that so far as the allegation of short supply of petroleum product is concerned, it could not have given rise to an action of termination by virtue of Clause-8.4 and 8.5.1 of the marketing guidelines issued by the defendants-petitioners, according to which, short delivery is merely a minor irregularity and as this was first instance of such allegation levelled against the plaintiff, therefore, warning at best, could have been issued. He further submits that the inspection report dated 16.4.2013 is a manipulated document and the Courts below have rightly found prima facie substance in such allegations and, therefore, such report could not have been made the basis for stopping of supply of petroleum product or to terminate the dealership agreement itself on its basis. Sri Shashi Nandan further submits that the plea with regard to the relief of injunction not being available by virtue of Sections 14 and 41 of Specific Relief Act was not pleaded before the Court below and in the absence of any consideration by the Courts on that account, it is not open for the defendants-petitioners to raise such issues for the first time in present writ petition. It is lastly submitted that the plaintiff had been running its retail outlet since 1996, without any complaint and as such the injunction granted by the Courts below in the facts and circumstances, requires no interference. 10. Having considered the aforesaid submissions, this Court finds that the action against the plaintiff has been initiated by the defendant oil company, on the basis of inspection report dated 16.4.2013. This inspection report has been brought on record before the Courts below. The allegations are essentially two folds i.e. short supply and (ii) adulteration. A show-cause notice in respect of the inspection report has admittedly been issued to the plaintiff on 9.5.2013. This show-cause notice has been received by the plaintiff and a reply to it has also been given on 20.5.2013. No further action has been taken by the defendants against the plaintiff in the matter. Proceedings pursuant to show-cause notice is yet to be concluded. So far as the stoppage of supply of petroleum products to the plaintiff is concerned, the same is merely a temporary measure adopted by the defendants till proceedings initiated pursuant to show-cause notice, is concluded. The Courts below have restrained the defendant-petitioners from stopping the supply of petroleum products to the plaintiff and also from terminating the dealership agreement, pursuant to this inspection report dated 16.4.2013. 11. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court has taken note of the plaint allegations, which are to the effect that under a planned conspiracy, the official of the defendants had inspected the premises of the plaintiff with an intent of falsely implicating the plaintiff. 11. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court has taken note of the plaint allegations, which are to the effect that under a planned conspiracy, the official of the defendants had inspected the premises of the plaintiff with an intent of falsely implicating the plaintiff. It is alleged in the plaint that no irregularity was found by the inspecting team and the officials of the defendant left after taking signatures of the plaintiff on blank pages. It as alleged that neither any inspection report was supplied to the plaintiff nor any notice was given in the matter required and the sample papers were all destroyed and a false report in night was subsequently prepared by the officials who were staying in a particular hotel. Allegation of change of samples were also levelled and no intimation was given for being present at the time of inspection. The Courts below have also taken note of the fact that the tank lorry sample has failed and it has been further observed that once the adulterated petroleum materials were supplied to the plaintiff itself, the plaintiff cannot be penalised for it. In consistency in taking of sample report etc. has also been noticed. 12. So far as the issue of short supply is concerned, the Courts below have found that no device was found in the panel of dispensing unit installed at the outlet. It has further been stated that no officials of the department of weights and measures were associated at the time of inspection and concerned officials of the department in a subsequent inspection have found all equipments to be in order. It has further been observed that the dispensing unit were provided by Larson and Tubro and, therefore, they have been impleaded as a defendant in the suit and any defect in the dispensation of the petroleum product can be examined only after the units are examined by them. The Courts below, therefore, have observed that on the basis of materials placed, the inspection report dated 16.4.2013 cannot be made the basis for stopping supply of petroleum product or from terminating the dealership agreement. 13. This Court finds that the inspection report, which has been placed on record of the Courts below and a copy of which has been annexed alongwith the writ petition contains the seal and signatures of the plaintiff, wherein various short comings have been noticed. 13. This Court finds that the inspection report, which has been placed on record of the Courts below and a copy of which has been annexed alongwith the writ petition contains the seal and signatures of the plaintiff, wherein various short comings have been noticed. Whether or not the signatures or seals of plaintiff upon the inspection report is genuine or manipulated, can only be ascertained at the stage of trial. In the absence of evidence led by the parties on this aspect, it cannot be held that inspection report is manipulated. The plaintiff’s contention that their blank signatures were obtained, is again a matter of evidence. A show-cause notice admittedly has been issued, to which a reply has also been submitted by the plaintiff. The matter is engaging the attention of the defendant/oil company and since the relationship between the parties is governed by the terms of agreement, therefore, the defendant is entitled to take a final decision in the matter, in accordance with law. Whether or not, a case is made out against the plaintiff is to be gone into by the defendant- company, at the first instance. Such consideration on merits, on the basis of materials placed in accordance with the provisions of the agreement is yet to be arrived at. 14. It is to be seen in the facts and circumstances of the present case as to whether any occasion has arisen for the plaintiff to approach the Civil Court and for the Court itself to grant relief as has been claimed in the suit. This Court finds that merely a show-cause notice has been issued to the plaintiff in the matter. The jurisdiction of the defendant to issue show-cause notice is not under challenge. Such power, otherwise, is available to the defendant by virtue of the dealership agreement, therefore, issuance of show-cause notice by the defendant to the petitioners, cannot be said to be an act which is in excess of jurisdiction. 15. The defendant Corporation is required to examine the reply submitted by the plaintiff in the matter, pursuant to the show-cause notice and take a final decision. The show-cause notice issued on 9.5.2013 merely asked for an explanation from the plaintiff as to why an action including the termination should not be taken against the dealer. The action against the plaintiff, pursuant to the show-cause notice is yet to be taken. The show-cause notice issued on 9.5.2013 merely asked for an explanation from the plaintiff as to why an action including the termination should not be taken against the dealer. The action against the plaintiff, pursuant to the show-cause notice is yet to be taken. Any interference or adjudication at this juncture was clearly to preampt any possible taking of action against the plaintiff, in accordance with the dealership agreement, which was impermissible. It was open for the plaintiff to have resorted to legal proceedings, if any action was taken prejudicial to it, pursuant to the show-cause notice. 16. This Court further finds that the relationship between parties were to be governed by the provisions of dealership agreement which was on record. The agreement itself was determinable in view of clause 12 thereof. In such circumstances, provisions of Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act were clearly attracted, and the contract itself could not be specifically enforced. No injunction,even otherwise, therefore, for the said purposes, could have been granted. 17. Apex Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Amritsar Gas Service and others, (1991) 1 SCC 533 , had an occasion to deal with the provisions of Section 14(1)(c) in a matter arising out of an award by the arbitrator. Taking note of the contents of the agreement that the contract itself was determinable, it was observed as Under : “The finding in the award being that the Distributorship Agreement was revokable and the same being admittedly for rendering personal service, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act were automatically attracted. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act specifies the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced, one of which is ‘’a contract which is in its nature determinable’. In the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which also may be attracted in the present case since clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. In the present case, it is not necessary to refer to the other clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which also may be attracted in the present case since clause (c) clearly applies on the finding read with reasons given in the award itself that the contract by its nature is determinable. This being so granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breach was committed by the appellant-Corporation is contrary to the mandate in Section 14(1) of the Specific Relief Act and there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award which is stated to be made according to ‘’the law governing such cases’. The grant of this relief in the award cannot, therefore, be sustained”. 18. Sri Budhwar has also placed reliance upon the judmgent of this Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. through its Territory Manager (Retail), Kanpur v. M/s Khaybar Transport Pvt. Ltd. through its Director, 2011 (86) ALR 511. Relying upon Amritsar Gas Service (Supra), it has been observed as under : “Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly provides that the contracts of the nature provided therein cannot be specifically enforced namely a contract which in its nature is determinable. The relevant provision of Section 14 is quoted below : 14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.—(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely,- (a)....... (b)..... (c) a contract which is in its nature determinable; (d)... The above provision in effect provides that a contract which is terminable in any event at the option of the parties cannot be enforced through a Court. It is not disputed that the agreement in question dated 15.12.05 under its terms and conditions is revokable. Moreover, the said contract was in the nature of a licence which is always revokable as licencee has no right or any interest and the lincence is simply a permission and the person granting the permission has every right to revoke the permission so granted. Therefore, in such cases of revokation of permission the only remedy available is to sue for damages and not for the enforcement of the licence or the contract. Therefore, in such cases of revokation of permission the only remedy available is to sue for damages and not for the enforcement of the licence or the contract. The Apex Court in the case of Amritsar Gas Service (supra) while considering the termination of the distributorship of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. viz-a-viz the provisions of Section 14(1) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 held granting the relief of restoration of the distributorship even on the finding that the breech was committed by the Corporation is contrary to the mandate of Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and held that the restoration of the distributorship was not sustainable in law. It further added that in such a situation, the agreement being revokable, the only relief which could be granted was the award of compensation. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the legal position, the plaintiff-respondent is not entitled to grant of relief No. 1 as claimed in the plaint and consequently relief No. 2 which is dependent on the above relief cannot also be granted”. 19. The judgment in Khaybar Transport Pvt. Ltd (Supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Rani Goldi, Proprietor M/s R.G. Filling Station and another v. Territory Manager (Retail) Bharat Petroleum Corporation and another, in First Appeal No. 373 of 2012, relevant part of which is being quoted below : “Indisputably, the appellants herein are enforcing the contract of agency which was unilaterally terminated by the order dated 25th of June, 2009, according to the appellants illegally. In such matters, the only remedy is to claim damages for illegal breach of the contract. We find that in similar circumstances, the Apex Court has examined the matter in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Amritsar Gas Service and others, (1991) 1 SCC 533 , wherein it has been held that Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 clearly provides that the contracts of the of the nature provided therein cannot be specifically enforced namely a contract which in its nature is determinable. On a careful consideration of the matter, we find that the Court below has rightly held that the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction is not maintainable and the only remedy, if any, is available to the appellants is that of claiming damages for breach of the contract. There is no error in the order of the judgment of the trial Court. We find that the trial Court while making reference of the ruling has not given the complete citation of the ruling. It has not given the name of the parties. We expect that in future the judicial officer shall keep in mind that the full particulars including the name of the parties should be mentioned in the judgment and order. We find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed summarily.” 20. Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment of this Court in F.A.F.O. No. 1753 of 2011, Samai Singh v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, decided on 3.7.2012. It is submitted that since no relief was liable to be ultimately granted in the suit itself, as such, no interim injunction could have been granted to the plaintiff, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the nature of relief which has been granted by the Courts below could only have been awarded if the suit itself had succeeded, and such relief could not have been granted at the interim stage, as it amounted to the suit itself being decreed infavour of the plaintiff. Reliance has been placed upon Burn Standard Company Ltd. v. Deen Bandhu Majundar, AIR 1995 SC 1499 and State of U.P. v. Ram Sakhi Devi, AIR 2005 SC 284 . 22. It is also submitted that the grant of injunction, in the facts of the present case, is clearly impermissible in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Sri Sriman Narayan and another, 2002 (3) AWC 2486 (SC). 23. 22. It is also submitted that the grant of injunction, in the facts of the present case, is clearly impermissible in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Sri Sriman Narayan and another, 2002 (3) AWC 2486 (SC). 23. Dealing with the issue of grant of injunction in a matter relating to termination of dealership agreement of a petrol pump, Apex Court relied upon the judgment in Dorab Casasji Warden v. Commi Sorab Warden and others, 1990(2) SCC 117 and Amritsar Gas Service, and it was observed in the facts of the said case that ordinarily the relief to be granted to a plaintiff in such matters is awarding of damages and interim injunction of mandatory nature cannot to be granted. 24. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, on the other hand, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and others v. Super Highway Services and another, (2010) 3 SCC 321 , to contend that cancellation of dealership agreement is a serious business and cannot be taken lightly and the authority has to act fairly and in adherence to the applicable guide-lines. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. M/s Jagannath & Company and others, 2013 (99) ALR 61, as well as judgment of Apex Court in M/s Allied Motors Ltd. v. M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., AIR 2012 SC 709 , to contend that the authorities cannot act arbitrarily. It is also contended that the dealership agreement does not contain any arbitration clause and, therefore, the suit itself was maintainable before the Civil Court and the grant of temporary injunction, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be said to be arbitrary. 25. This Court finds that the judgment of the Apex Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, in Super Highway Services (Supra) and M/s Jagannath and Company (Supra) were cases arising out of termination of the dealership agreement itself, where the Apex Court found that the provisions of law and the guidelines have not been followed. However, in the facts of the present case, no termination of dealership agreement has taken place and, therefore, the judgment relied upon do not apply on the facts of the present case. 26. However, in the facts of the present case, no termination of dealership agreement has taken place and, therefore, the judgment relied upon do not apply on the facts of the present case. 26. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior counsel has laid emphasis upon the pleadings of the petitioners before the Court below to contend that the provisions of Sections 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act were not pressed before the Court below and feeble attempt to site Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act in appeal was also not pressed and, therefore, this Court need not examine the applicability of the aforesaid provisions of the Act. This argument, though appears to be attractive at the out set, but is not liable to be accepted upon a deeper security. The Civil Court for the purposes of grant of relief in a suit is otherwise required to consider the relevant parameters laid down in applicable laws. The grant of injunction by Civil Court has to be guided by the provisions of Order-39 CPC,deals which dealt with the procedure prescribed whereas, Section 94 CPC as well as relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act, particularly Chapter-III thereof, deal with the substantive provisions relating to grant of injunction. Once the Civil Court examine the issue of grant of relief in a case brought before it, the Court concerned is required to consider the claim placed before it with reference to relevant provisions of law and grant relief within the parameters of applicable laws. What is the nature of relief claimed in a particular case and is required to be granted would be regulated by substantive provisions of law and the mere fact that an objection in this regard was not taken in the pleadings, would not be of much relevance. It is otherwise settled that legal provisions are not required to be cited in pleadings and what is relevant is that relevant ingredients on facts are available on record. This Court finds that the dealership agreement was available on record and had been relied upon. It is otherwise settled that legal provisions are not required to be cited in pleadings and what is relevant is that relevant ingredients on facts are available on record. This Court finds that the dealership agreement was available on record and had been relied upon. In such circumstances, it was the duty of the Court to examine the nature of plaintiff’s claim and once it was apparent on record that the basis of claim is a dealership agreement, which is determinable in nature, thereafter, the Court concerned was required to keep in mind the provisions of Sections 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act and no injunction in such circumstances for specific performance by directing restoration of supply of petroleum product and restraining the defendant from terminating the agreement, could have been granted. This Court is of the considered opinion that infact, no occasion had arisen to the Civil Court to intervene in the matter, at this juncture, in the facts and circumstances already noticed above, as has been so done. 27. Even on facts, this Court finds that the allegation in the plaint that no short coming was found in the inspection and only blank signatures were obtained by the officials of the Corporation could not have been accepted merely for the asking. Although accusation of adulteration may not have been prima facie substantiated but the allegation of short supply was in itself a serious allegation. It was alleged that the action of the officials are mala fide but no specific allegation against any official was levelled. The Oil Company was entitled under the agreement to investigate the charges, which had been levelled in accordance with law and no interference, at such juncture, was required. It would also not be reasonable to presume that while examining the reply to the show-cause notice and taking a decision in the matter, the oil company would not take note of the marketing guide-lines or any other instructions binding upon the oil company. 28. Even otherwise, at best the allegations contained in the plaint amounted to breach of an agreement for which adequate alternative relief could be considered. There was absolutely no justification to injunct the defendants from terminating the agreement and directing resumption of supply by way of interim relief. 28. Even otherwise, at best the allegations contained in the plaint amounted to breach of an agreement for which adequate alternative relief could be considered. There was absolutely no justification to injunct the defendants from terminating the agreement and directing resumption of supply by way of interim relief. The case of plaintiff that the inspection report was fabricated, could not have been treated as gospel truth particularly when it had the signatures and stamp of the plaintiff. This Court finds, in view of the discussions aforesaid, that even final relief of the nature sought could not have been granted and as such aspects of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were clearly not favouring the plaintiff. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds that both the Courts below have grossly erred in the eyes of law in granting the relief, vide the orders impugned and, therefore, the same is not liable to be sustained. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders impugned dated 29.3.2014 and 28.10.2014 (Annexures- 15 and 17 to the writ petition) are set aside. No order is passed as to costs. ——————