JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya, J.—Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the State. 2. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for setting aside the order dated 26.11.2014 passed by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, CBI, Ghaziabad Case No. 35 of 2014 arising out of RC No. 120 of 2012 A0003 CBI, ACB, Ghaziabad, under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, PS CBI/ACB, Ghaziabad. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that admittedly the applicant is not a public servant as defined under the Act. The cognizance taken by the trial Court is illegal, inasmuch as the order taking cognizance has been passed in a mechanical manner. The matter relates to mis-appropriation of money by playing fraud and cheating against various borrowers of Punjab and Sindh Bank, Branch Diwan Public School, Meerut. The applicant has not drawn any amount of money. The Bank Authority having mis-appropriated the money has falsely implicated the applicant. No criminal liability can be fixed on the applicant. Thus, she is entitled for the relief prayed for. 4. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel for the CBI has opposed the application and has submitted that according to the charge-sheet, investigation revealed that the accused-applicant alongwith Bhudev Singh got opened a saving bank account No. 2574 in fictitious names of Smt. Maya Devi and Rajesh in Punjab and Sindh Ban, Diwan Public School, Meerut on 28.3.2011. Smt. Renu Saxena, the present applicant, co-accused Smt. Bimla Devi and Smt. Kanchan executed sale-deed dated 29.3.2011 in the office of Sub-Registrar-III, Meerut for the property House No. 1237 (half part), Shiv Shakti Nagar, Meerut, in which the co-accused Bhudev Singh was the witness. All the aforesaid accused-persons executed the sale-deed in fictitious names. Thus, there was sufficient evidence before the trial Court to take cognizance and summon the accused-applicant. There are allegations of criminal conspiracy against the present applicant, for substantive offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel for the CBI has further submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down in Dr Monica Kumar and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (9) SCALE 166 , that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel for the CBI has further submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down in Dr Monica Kumar and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (9) SCALE 166 , that inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. 5. The propositions of law which emerge this are that: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. 6. It is furthermore well known that no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by the Parliament. 7. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by the Parliament. 7. This Court cannot adopt a strictly hyper-technical approach and sieve the complaint through a calendar of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under the appropriate sections as an endeavour may be justified during trial. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that no case is made out against the applicant. 8. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it was the trial Court. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate material and documents on record but it cannot appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produces are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. The Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. 9. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel for the CBI has opposed the application and has further submitted that at this stage, this Court cannot enter into merits of the case and as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Eicher Tractor Ltd and others v. Harihar Singh and another, 2009 (1) Crimes (SC) 144, in which the Apex Court has laid down that it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. Hence, the application is liable to be dismissed. 10. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. Hence, the application is liable to be dismissed. 10. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by the Apex Court are as follows: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) “ (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The powers have to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, where the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. 12. When the words ‘rarest of rare cases’ are used after the words ‘sparingly and with circumspection’ while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasize and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words ‘sparingly and with circumspection’. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 I.P.C., but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the F.I.R. or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection. 13. From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is made out against the applicant. All the submissions made at the bar relate to the disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. jurisdiction. 14. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the prayer for setting aside the impugned order dated 26.11.2014 is refused. 15. Accordingly, the application is rejected. ——————