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2015 DIGILAW 340 (HP)

Prabhat Chand v. State of H. P.

2015-04-16

RAJIV SHARMA, SURESHWAR THAKUR

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JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. FIR No. 8/2014 was registered against the petitioner under sections 7 and 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Petitioner was put under suspension. The disciplinary authority has decided to initiate disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner on 22.8.2014. Petitioner was issued summary of charges on 14.10.2014. Petitioner has submitted the reply to the summary of charges. However, fact of the matter is that the charge-sheet till date has not been framed against the petitioner. Petitioner has made a representation on 17.10.2014 for putting the departmental inquiry under abeyance till the conclusion of criminal case. In a criminal case, offence is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt whereas during the course of disciplinary proceedings, charges have to be proved only on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 2. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (Dead) through LRs v. Union of India and others, (2012) 13 SCC 142 have held that departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously with criminal trial, except where both proceedings are based on same set of facts and evidence in both proceedings is common. Their Lordships have further held that stay of disciplinary proceedings would be available only in cases involving complex questions of facts and law. 3. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 have reiterated the co-relation between departmental/domestic enquiry and a criminal case. Their Lordships have held as under: “24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co- relation between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical namely whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India[ AIR 1964 SC 787 ] this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression 'honourable acquittal' was considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal[ (1994) 1 SCC 541 ], where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame' and 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 26. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 26. In light of above, we are of the opinion that since the purpose of departmental proceedings is to keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the department, if found necessary, because they pollute the department, surely the above principles will apply with more vigour at the point of entry of a person in the police department i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the Screening Committee that the person against whom a serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in it.” 4. Even the present petition is also pre-mature since as per the averments contained in para 8 of the reply, till date a charge-sheet has not been drawn. 5. Accordingly, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. The Inquiry Officer is directed to complete the inquiry within a period of six weeks from today, if not already completed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.