JUDGMENT : Umesh Chandra Dhyani, J Present Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2015, passed by learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Haridwar, in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2008 (General Manager v. Mamraj Singh), whereby the suit of the plaintiff/appellant has been dismissed and judgment & decree dated 19.09.2008, passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)/1st FTC, Haridwar in Original Suit No. 141 of 1997 (Mamraj v. General Manager and others) has been set aside. Plaintiff/appellant filed a suit against the defendant/respondents for realizing a sum of Rs. 28,948.79/- in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Haridwar. The learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Haridwar, vide judgment and decree dated 19.09.2008, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was directed to pay Rs. 15,266.79/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The defendant was also directed to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realization of the money. Aggrieved against the same, the defendant preferred a Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2008, which was allowed by learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Haridwar, vide judgment and decree dated 25.02.2015. The order passed by learned Trial Court on 19.09.2008 was set aside. Learned Lower Appellate Court has held, among other things, that the suit was barred by limitation. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted, among other things, that Article 70 of the Schedule along with Section 18 of the Limitation Act (Act No. 36 of 1963) and not Article 24 of the Schedule shall be applicable to the facts of the case. 3. Let us see the legal provisions referred to above: 4. 18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing.--(1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation:--................................. 5. As per Section 18, acknowledgement can be with respect to not only property or right but it can be even with respect to the liability. A suit could be filed after three years from the date of breach of contract only if there was acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. The group of articles beginning from 21 to 24 deal with the creditors and debtors and the deposit of the money by one for the use of the other. 7. Article 24 applies to the suits for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use. This article ought to apply wherever the defendant has received, which in justice and equity, belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances, which in law, render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. This form of action lies for money paid by mistake, or upon a consideration which happens to fail, or for money got through imposition (express or implied) or extortion or operation or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In other words, this form of action would be maintainable in cases in which the defendant at the time of receipt, in fact or by presumption or in fiction of law, receives the money to the use of the plaintiff. 8. In order to attract the application of Art. 24, the facts should be such as to entitle the plaintiff to claim receipt of the money forthwith from the defendant. In other words, the defendant should be liable to pay the money to the plaintiff as soon as it is received. 9. In Municipal Council Vs. The R. Udayagiri Regional Marketing Co-operative Society and Others, AIR 1984 Ori 73 the following was observed: “10. ............................. Article 120, called the 'omnibus' Article of the old Act, applies to suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule. 9. In Municipal Council Vs. The R. Udayagiri Regional Marketing Co-operative Society and Others, AIR 1984 Ori 73 the following was observed: “10. ............................. Article 120, called the 'omnibus' Article of the old Act, applies to suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule. The Article being final and residuary, the court ought not to regard a case as coming under this Article unless it is satisfied that it does not come under any of the other Articles dealing with the subject. The nature of transactions as it appears from the pleadings and proved by the documents exhibited in the case clearly comes within Article 62 of the old Act which runs as follows:-- “For money payable by defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, three years when the money is received.” In order to attract Article 62, it is not necessary that the defendant should have actually intended to receive it for the use of the plaintiff at the moment of receipt, of the money. It is sufficient if receipt of the money by the defendant creates an obligation in law to retain it for the use of the plaintiff and refund to him when demanded. In the case reported in A. Venkata Subba Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1773 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that if the money was received as tax by the defendant-State from the plaintiff which the plaintiff was not bound in law to pay but which he was compelled or forced to pay because of the threats or apprehension of the legal process, then, notwithstanding that the receipt by the defendant purported to be for his own benefit, it was the money which at the very moment of receipt, in justice and equity, belonged to the plaintiff and the suit claiming refund thereof would be governed by Article 62. The basis of Article 62 as explained by Mookerjee, J. in the case reported in (1905) ILR 32 Cal 527 (Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer) was accepted to be the correct interpretation of law. This view of Their Lordships finds support from various other decisions discussed in the said judgment. The basis of Article 62 as explained by Mookerjee, J. in the case reported in (1905) ILR 32 Cal 527 (Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer) was accepted to be the correct interpretation of law. This view of Their Lordships finds support from various other decisions discussed in the said judgment. Once it is held that Article 62 of the old Act governs the case of the plaintiff the cause of action for which arose prior to 1-1-1964, the corresponding Article 24 of the new Act would govern the transactions made thereafter. The period of limitation in Article 62 of the old Act as well as in Article 24 of the new Act is 3 years, the starting point being when the money is received. Thus, Section 30 of the new Act has no application whatsoever in the facts of this case as the period of limitation provided under the old Act and the new Act is the same. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the benefit the plaintiff would have got had Section 30 of the new Act been applicable. It may, however, be noted that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has not taken into consideration the amendment by Act 10 of 1969 to Section 30 of the new Act which enhances the period to 7 years. We refrain from considering the effect of the said amendment inasmuch as in our view Section 30 does not at all apply to the facts of this case. The conclusion, therefore, is that the octroi tax paid by the plaintiff to the defendant-Municipality within the period from 7-5-1966 to 6-5-1969 is recoverable and the rest would be barred by time.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. A reference of A. Venkata Subba Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1773 may be had in this regard: “(58) Various bases have been suggested in modern times as the rationale and proper foundations on which to rest this action. But we are not concerned with these theories or their history and evolution in England. What is of relevance is the content and significance of the words “received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use”. Article 62 in its present form was first enacted in the Limitation Act of 1871 as Art. 60 and it has continued in the same terms since men with only a change in its number. What is of relevance is the content and significance of the words “received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use”. Article 62 in its present form was first enacted in the Limitation Act of 1871 as Art. 60 and it has continued in the same terms since men with only a change in its number. We have, therefore, to see what exactly the draftsmen of this Article meant when it was first introduced in 1871. In ILR 32 Cal 527 at p. 533, Mookerjee, J., explained the basis of Art. 62 in these terms: “The Article, when it speaks of a suit for money received by the defendant for the plaintiffs use, points to the well-known English action in that form; consequently the Article ought to apply wherever the defendant has received money which in justice and equity belongs to the plaintiff under circumstances which in law render the receipt of it a receipt by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff.” (Emphasis supplied) In other words, the learned Judge held that it was not necessary in order to attract Article 62 that at the moment of the receipt the defendant should have actually intended to receive it for the use of the plaintiff and that it was sufficient if the receipt was in such circumstances that the law would impute to him an obligation to retain it for the use of the plaintiff and refund to him when demanded. In Biman Chandra Dutta Vs. Promotho Nath Ghose and ok his Death His Heiress And Lrgal Representative, Srimati Mrinalini Dasi, AIR 1922 Cal 157 : 68 Ind. Cas. 94, it was said, following the decision in ILR 32 Cal 527, that Article 62 most nearly approaches the formula of 'money had and received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, if read as a description and apart from the technical qualifications imported in English Law and Procedure'. 60. Having considered the matter carefully we are inclined to prefer the interpretation of the Article by Mookerjee, J. in Mahomed Wahib's, case ILR 32 Cal 527 . What we are solely concerned with is the meaning of the words employed in the first column of the Article which specifies the nature of the suit dealt with that they were derived and adopted from the terminology employed in the English action for money had and received is not disputed. What we are solely concerned with is the meaning of the words employed in the first column of the Article which specifies the nature of the suit dealt with that they were derived and adopted from the terminology employed in the English action for money had and received is not disputed. The Courts in India being courts administering both law and equity, no doubt we are not concerned with the technicalities of the English forms of action which originated at a time before the Judicature Acts when law and equity were administered by different Courts. But that is only as regards the merits of a claim and its maintainability in a Court. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided Anantaram Bhattacharjee Vs. Hem Chandra Kar and Others, AIR 1923 Cal 379. We are unable to agree that the changes which the doctrine has undergone in England have any bearing on what the Article meant in 1871 when the legislature lifted the words descriptive of a form of an English action and incorporated it in the Indian statute. Nor are we impressed with the argument that if the terms of a specific Article do apply to a specific case, one could ignore it and seek a general Article merely on the ground that the latter affords a longer period of limitation for the filing of a suit. (Emphasis supplied) 62. Before referring to Govind Singh Gurudatta Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1961 MP 320 it would be convenient to clarify the position as regards certain circumstances in which the Article would be applicable without making any exhaustive list. Where the defendant occupies a fiduciary relationship towards the plaintiff it is clear that Article 62 is inapplicable. Next even if the claim could have been comprehended under the omnibus caption of the English “action for money had and received”, still if there are other more specific articles in the Limitation Act-vide e.g., Article 96 (mistake), Article 97 (consideration which fails) Article 62 would be inapplicable. Lastly, if the right to refund does not arise immediately on receipt by the defendant but arises by reason of facts transpiring subsequently, Article 62 cannot apply, for it proceeds on the basis that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting the suit at the very moment of the receipt.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Lastly, if the right to refund does not arise immediately on receipt by the defendant but arises by reason of facts transpiring subsequently, Article 62 cannot apply, for it proceeds on the basis that the plaintiff has a cause of action for instituting the suit at the very moment of the receipt.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. The word 'deposit', used in Article 70 , shows that this article is applicable where the property is deposited or pawned with another under an express trust or under circumstances from which a trust may be implied. There can be no deposit in the strict sense of the term where the moveable property deposited is not itself to be returned but some work is agreed to be done in return of it. [Chandrabhan Bansilal Ramratan Das Vs. The Municipal Council, Bikaner, AIR 1975 Raj 35 : (1974) 7 WLN 133 ] 12. Under Article 70, limitation starts not from the date of demand but from the date of refusal following demand. If the case is one of bailment, Art. 70 will doubtless apply. That being the special article in relation to bailment, other articles including Art. 3 or 4 will not have any application. In view of the specific finding about the existence of the relationship of bailor and bailee, Art. 70 is immediately attracted. Thereunder the cause of action starts only from the date of refusal after demand. [Vijaya Bank Vs. United Corporation and Others, AIR 1991 Ker 209 . 13. Facts of the present case revealed that it was not an instance of deposition or pawn. Even if the word 'moveable property' includes money for the purpose of its Article, the same was neither deposited nor pawned, and therefore Article 70 would not be applicable. Limitation would begin to run from the date the money was received as per Article 24 of the Schedule. 14. Learned Trial Court has therefore, committed a mistake in holding that Article 70, and not Article 24, would govern the field. Per contra, learned Lower Appellate Court has taken a correct view and therefore the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage itself. 15. Since there is no perversity in the judgment of lower appellate court, therefore, this Court is neither inclined to formulate any substantial question of law nor summon the lower court record nor interfere in the judgment of first appellate court. 15. Since there is no perversity in the judgment of lower appellate court, therefore, this Court is neither inclined to formulate any substantial question of law nor summon the lower court record nor interfere in the judgment of first appellate court. Proposed substantial questions of law thus formulated by the appellant can be decided without the aid of lower court record and, therefore, this Court has made an endeavour to decide the same with the able assistance of learned counsel for the parties and with the guidance of the decisions rendered in the past. Second Appeal thus fails, and is dismissed at the admission stage itself.