JUDGMENT : B.P. Ray, J - The appellant has filed this appeal challenging the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 30.6.1999 passed by the learned Special Judge (C.B.I.), Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No. 136/4 of 1999/98 convicting him under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for one year on each count and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count, in default, to undergo R.I. for six months more on each count. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently subject to benefit of set off. The prosecution case, in nutshell, is that the appellant was working as Manager in Mines No. 3 of Orient Colliery, MCL at Jharsuguda and Mukteswar Choudhury (P.W.1) was a Majdoor under him. Due to long absence of said Mukteswar Choudhury (P.W.1) due to his ailment as Leprosy and T.B., his case was to be referred to the Medical Board. It is alleged that despite the request of P.W. 1 and his adopted son Sekhar Naik (P.W. 2), the same was not done by the appellant, as a result of which, they approached him on many occasion. Ultimately, the appellant demanded Rs. 20,000/- for reference of P.W. 1 to the Medical Board and when inability was expressed to pay the amount at a time, they were told to pay Rs. 1,000/- at the first instance for making the records ready. This was done ten to twelve days before the date of occurrence, i.e., 27.8.1997. Accordingly, the P.Ws. 1 and 2 discussed the matter between themselves and decided to lodge F.I.R. before the S.P., C.B.I. Then the written report (Ext. 10) signed by both P.Ws. 1 and 2 was taken by P.W. 2 to Bhubaneswar and on 25.8.1997 it was given to the S.P., C.B.I. Thereafter, the case was registered on the next day and trap was laid. 2. On 27.8.97 the raiding party arrived at Jharsuguda and sent for P.W.2 and two independent witnesses namely, Narottam Rath (P.W.3) and Pramod Kumar (P.W.4) who were Inspector, Customs and Central Excise and Development Officer of National Insurance, Jharsuguda respectively. In their presence in the Railway retiring room demonstration was made and P.W. 2 was introduced to them. 2. On 27.8.97 the raiding party arrived at Jharsuguda and sent for P.W.2 and two independent witnesses namely, Narottam Rath (P.W.3) and Pramod Kumar (P.W.4) who were Inspector, Customs and Central Excise and Development Officer of National Insurance, Jharsuguda respectively. In their presence in the Railway retiring room demonstration was made and P.W. 2 was introduced to them. They also went through the written report and the ten hundred rupee notes produced by P.W. 2 were tainted with phenolphthalein powder and the same was kept in an envelop and it was given to P.W. 2 to hand it over to accused on demand. At about 3 p.m. on that day they proceeded to the Quarters of the accused at Brajarajnagar and arrived there at about 4.15 p.m. Keeping the jeep 200 yards away from the house of accused they went to his quarters in batches of two and took their position near his quarter. At about 4.30 p.m. the jeep of the accused arrived and when accused came out of his house, P.W. 2 wished him and after the money was asked for he paid the same to the accused who after receiving it verified the notes by inserting his fingers inside the envelop and held it by his left hand. At that time seeing the signal of P.W. 2 the raiding party arrived and caught hold of the accused with the envelop (M.O.XV) in his hand. He was then taken to the nearby Police Station where his hand wash was collected and as it turned pink it was kept in two bottles (M.O.II and III). Thereafter the currency notes were brought out from M.O.XV and on comparison with the pre-trap memorandum (Ext. 15) the same was found to have tallied with each other. Then the case was further investigated and after chemical test as the hand wash was found to have contained phenolphthalein, the accused was charge-sheeted as indicated above. 3. The plea of the appellant-accused is one of denial and false implication as the appellant did not oblige in their nefarious design of providing employment to P.W. 2. The further case of the appellant is that P.W. 1 was punished in a departmental inquiry for long unauthorized absence and was reverted to the post of Badli. Another departmental proceeding was also pending against the P.W. 1 and the appellant had issued him notice to show cause. The further case of the appellant is that P.W. 1 was punished in a departmental inquiry for long unauthorized absence and was reverted to the post of Badli. Another departmental proceeding was also pending against the P.W. 1 and the appellant had issued him notice to show cause. The appellant had referred the case of P.W. 1 to the Deputy Chief Medical Officer on 22.3.1997 and it was the said authority to refer the case of P.W. 1 to the Medical Board. There was thus no occasion for the appellant to demand and accept bribe from P.W. 1. P.W. 2 handed over the envelope containing the alleged bribe money saying that the same was a letter sent by Sri P.K. Sahoo, Area Finance Manager and without knowing that the envelope contained currency notes, the appellant accepted the same when the C.B.I. officials pounced upon him all of a sudden. 4. In order to bring home the charge, prosecution has examined as many as ten witnesses, out of whom, P.W. 1 is the Mazdoor, who alleged demand of bribe, P.W. 2 is the so-called adopted son of P.W. 1, P.Ws. 3 and 4 are independent witnesses associated with the trap, P.Ws. 5 and 6 were the employees of Mahanadi Coal Fields, P.W. 7 was the driver of the appellant, who was allegedly present at the time of trap, P.W. 8 is the immediate authority of P.W. 1, P.W. 9 is the sanctioning authority and P.W. 10 is the Investigating Officer. P.Ws. 1 and 2 stand on no better footing than accomplices and, as such, their evidence should have been subjected to such rigorous scrutiny as is warranted in such a case before the same is found fit for acceptance. The informant (P.W.1) stated in paragraph-9 of his deposition that he does not remember exactly the year when he first met the accused and also he could not remember the date and year when accused demanded Rs. 20,000/- from him. He further stated that he met the appellant once in his office when he demanded the money. However, contradicting this, P.W. 2 stated that along with P.W. 1 he met the appellant six times and the last demand was made on 24.8.1997. P.W. 2 has all along been described as the adopted son of P.W. 1. However, a scrutiny of the evidence will reveal that the said stand of P.Ws. However, contradicting this, P.W. 2 stated that along with P.W. 1 he met the appellant six times and the last demand was made on 24.8.1997. P.W. 2 has all along been described as the adopted son of P.W. 1. However, a scrutiny of the evidence will reveal that the said stand of P.Ws. 1 and 2 is false. P.W. 1 admitted that he was trying to engage P.W. 2 in service in MCL and for that he was adopted by him. Both P.Ws. 1 and 2 admitted that in all official documents as well as voter list, the name of the natural father of P.W.2 is recorded. P.W. 2 could not be able to speak the name of the brother of the P.W.1's wife. He also admitted that he stays separately and not with P.W.1. P.W. 2 also stated in his deposition that he is aged about 28 years at the time of he deposed in the court in 1999. However, he stated in his deposition that he married in the year 1985 or 1988. In the unregistered deed of adoption, it is mentioned that P.W. 1 adopted P.W. 2 as there was no possibility of any male issue. However, the evidence on record discloses that after the so-called adoption, the daughters of P.W. 1 took birth. Therefore, the stand of the appellant is probablized that the present case is foisted falsely as the appellant refused to give job to P.W. 2 in view of the invalidity of P.W.1. 5. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in a case of trap, undisputedly, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the provisions of the P.C. Act. In the instant case, there is absolutely no credible evidence of demand of bribe by the appellant. Admittedly, P.W. 1 was a long absentee for more than three years. In terms of the circular, a person after remaining absent for more than six months can join his duty only when he is found fit by the Medical Board. The appellant had referred the case of P.W. 1 as far back as 22.3.1997 under Ext. 11. P.W. 2, the informant has categorically admitted this fact. Subsequently, under Ext. In terms of the circular, a person after remaining absent for more than six months can join his duty only when he is found fit by the Medical Board. The appellant had referred the case of P.W. 1 as far back as 22.3.1997 under Ext. 11. P.W. 2, the informant has categorically admitted this fact. Subsequently, under Ext. 12, the Deputy Chief Medical Officer wrote back to the appellant for referring the case of P.W. 1 and two others to the Headquarters for further action. The letter was received by the appellant on 16.4.1997 and on the same day, the appellant endorsed it to the Deputy Personnel Manager under Ext. A. All these chronological events go to show that the appellant had acted with utmost dispatch in dealing with the case of the Mazdoor and not even a day, the case was kept pending with the appellant. Hence, these proved facts falsify the theory of demand of bribe by the appellant. Moreover, there being absolutely no evidence nor it being the case of the prosecution that the appellant had made any demand of bribe from P.W. 1 prior to referring his case under Ext. 11, the very genesis of the prosecution case becomes doubtful and the story of demand as deposited by P.Ws. 1 and 2 has been invented in order to harass the appellant by falsely implicating him. (See State of Maharashtra Vs. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede, (2009) 12 JT 515 : (2009) 10 SCALE 355 : (2009) 15 SCC 200 : (2009) 12 SCR 513 . Mr. Das in support of his argument also relied upon the decision in Debananda Das Vs. State of Orissa, (2011) 2 OLR 603 , wherein this Court has held as follows:-- "...........Law is well settled that in a trap case, the evidence of a decoy has to satisfy a double test. The evidence must be reliable and if this test is satisfied, it must be sufficiently corroborated." In the case of Jadunath Khatua Vs. The State, (1982) CriLJ 954, this Court has held that the Court can act upon the uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, if it is satisfied from facts and circumstances that the witness is a witness of truth. In the case of State of Kerala and Another Vs. The State, (1982) CriLJ 954, this Court has held that the Court can act upon the uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, if it is satisfied from facts and circumstances that the witness is a witness of truth. In the case of State of Kerala and Another Vs. C.P. Rao, (2012) CriLJ 2607 : (2011) 2 Crimes 289 : (2011) 3 RCR(Criminal) 688 : (2011) 6 SCALE 358 : (2011) 6 SCC 450 : (2011) 2 SCC(Cri) 1010 : (2011) 4 UJ 2126 : (2012) AIRSCW 2879, the Hon'ble apex Court has held that when there is no corroboration of testimony of complainant regarding demand of bribe by accused, it has to be accepted that complainant's version is not corroborated and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant cannot be relied on. 6. Mr. Narasingh, learned counsel for the respondent - C.B.I. submitted that if the plea of the defence as agitated before this Court regarding impossibility of performance is taken into account, then the Explanation (d) to section 7 of the P.C. Act would be rendered nugatory and in support of his aforesaid submission, he relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel Vs. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1976 SC 1497 : (1976) CriLJ 1180 : (1976) 3 SCC 46 : (1976) SCC(Cri) 351 : (1976) 3 SCR 1052 and Syed Ahmed Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 2012 SC 3359 : (2012) CriLJ 4017 : (2012) 3 Crimes 202 : (2012) 3 JCC 2266 : (2012) 7 JT 193 : (2012) 7 SCALE 44 : (2012) 8 SCC 527 : (2012) AIRSCW 4389 : (2012) 5 Supreme 232 . Mr. Narasingh, learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial court has taken great care and caution to analyze the evidence of P.W. 2 the decoy and has clearly stated that he paid the money on demand. From the very nature of the transaction which took place, it will clearly establish that the appellant accepted the envelope and also verified the tainted currency notes which goes to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that the test of payment of demand of illegal gratification is amply established in this case. In support of the aforesaid submission, he has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Trilok Chand Jain Vs. In support of the aforesaid submission, he has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Trilok Chand Jain Vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 666 : (1976) 78 PLR 323 : (1975) 4 SCC 761 and M. Narsinga Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2001 SC 318 : (2001) CriLJ 515 : (2000) 3 JT 559 Supp : (2000) 10 JT 268 : (2000) 8 SCALE 303 : (2001) 1 SCC 691 : (2000) 5 SCR 584 Supp : (2000) AIRSCW 4427 : (2000) 8 Supreme 498 . The learned counsel also submitted that the learned trial court in paragraph-10 of the impugned judgment has considered the case of the defence that the appellant is a victim of the conspiracy and arrived at the finding that such defence does not hold water as he has not adduced any evidence to the said effect. 7. Law is well settled that one infirm witness cannot corroborate with another witness of the same brand. The evidence is to be weighted and not to be counted. In such view of the matter, P.Ws. 1 and 2 cannot corroborate each other. There being no other evidence in support of the theory of demand of bribe by the appellant, the learned Special Judge should have disbelieved the theory of demand of bribe set up by P.Ws. 1 and 2, particularly when, their evidence in this regard is hopelessly discrepant. 8. The allegation of not referring the case of the mazdoor to the Medical Board in spite of repeated approach is not only false but also wholly unfounded and contrary to the documentary evidence on record. In terms of the Circular under Ext. A/1, an employee retuning from long absence should be referred to the A.M.O. and the A.M.O. in his turn would refer to the C.M.O. who would constitute a Medical Board of concerned Specialist for examination of state of fitness. The appellant has no authority to refer the case of any person directly to the Medical Board for examination. In such circumstances, demand of bribe for referring the case to the mazdoor is nothing but a myth. Further, in view of the documentary evidence under Ext. A/1, no reliance should have been placed on the oral evidence which runs counter to it. 9. Admittedly, P.W. 1 was proceeded departmentally twice. In such circumstances, demand of bribe for referring the case to the mazdoor is nothing but a myth. Further, in view of the documentary evidence under Ext. A/1, no reliance should have been placed on the oral evidence which runs counter to it. 9. Admittedly, P.W. 1 was proceeded departmentally twice. In both the occasions, the articles of charges were proved against him. Punishment was imposed on him by reducing his permanent status to Badli. The appellant being the disciplinary authority had issued the second show cause notice to him. P.Ws. 1 and 2 evidently bore grudge against him for the aforesaid reasons and were in search of an opportunity to take revenge. Since P.Ws. 1 and 2 were carrying ill-feeling against the appellant and in view of the fact that there was no demand of any bribe when the case of the workmen was referred to under Ext. 11, there is existed a strong motive for false implication which has come up only after the notice imposing punishment was issued. The learned Special Judge has lost sight of the most important circumstance which discredits the prosecution evidence to a great extent. 10. Law is also well settled that failure of the prosecution to prove the story of demand of bribe set up by it casts a cloud of doubt over the story of acceptance of bribe. There is absolutely no evidence that the appellant has accepted any bribe money consciously. Admittedly, the alleged bribe money concealed inside an envelope was handed over to the appellant while he was about to leave his residence in the official jeep. There is no credible evidence to show that the appellant had knowledge that the said envelope was containing any currency note. The theory of counting the aforesaid money without bringing the same from out of the envelope is wholly untrue and improbable. If there was any demand from the side of the appellant, it was not necessary to conceal the money inside an envelope and pass on the same to the appellant. This is a telling circumstance which militates against the case of the prosecution. As it is aptly said, men may lie but circumstances do not. 11. The alleged acceptance of bribe by the appellant also goes against the normal human conduct and probability. This is a telling circumstance which militates against the case of the prosecution. As it is aptly said, men may lie but circumstances do not. 11. The alleged acceptance of bribe by the appellant also goes against the normal human conduct and probability. The so-called money was allegedly given to the appellant when he came out of his house and was going to board the jeep. It hardly stands to reason that the appellant asked P.W.2 for the money and accepted the same in presence of many strangers and the driver of the jeep. It is against all probability and normal human conduct that the appellant being the highest authority of the mines would demand and accept bribe from a mazdoor not only in presence of a driver but in the presence of a large number of strangers as well. 12. Strangely enough, the members of the trap party were only ten feet away from the appellant when he allegedly demanded and accepted bribe from P.W.2. None of them, not even P.Ws. 3 and 4, who were set up as independent witnesses and were supposed to see the transaction and overhear the conversation between the appellant and the decoy, heard the appellant asking P.W.2 for the bribe money. This deficiency in the case of the prosecution is tell-tale. 13. It is in the evidence of P.W. 7 that while the appellant was boarding the jeep a person handed over an envelope to him saying that one Sahoo Sahib had sent that letter. The learned Special Judge has grossly erred in rejecting the evidence of P.W. 7 without assigning any valid reason. Merely because the witness told a different sequence of event, his evidence cannot be rejected in toto. This witness is the most competent witness to throw light to the actual happening as he was only food apart from the appellant. P.W. 7 disclosed the real fact which was different from the story presented by the other witnesses. This certainly cannot be a ground to disbelieve the witness. 14. The learned Special Judge has grossly erred in drawing a presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act when the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance of the bribe money by the appellant. In absence of proof of demand, the question of raising the presumption would not arise. (See V. Venkata Subbarao Vs. 14. The learned Special Judge has grossly erred in drawing a presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act when the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance of the bribe money by the appellant. In absence of proof of demand, the question of raising the presumption would not arise. (See V. Venkata Subbarao Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, A.P., AIR 2007 SC 489 : (2007) CriLJ 754 : (2006) 14 SCALE 125 : (2006) 13 SCC 305 . Admittedly, the money was hidden inside an envelope and handed over to the appellant. There was no scope for the appellant to know its contents without bringing the contents out. Merely because, the appellant held it in his hand, the same can never be termed as acceptance of the bribe. Acceptance is a positive act which is done with consciousness. In absence of any prior knowledge of the contents of the envelope, mere holding the same would not amount to acceptance warranting a criminal prosecution. 15. The prosecution not having led any evidence to show that the envelope in which the alleged bribe money was put did not contain any trace of phenolphthalein powder and in view of the finding of the learned trial court that the envelope might have been soiled with phenolphthalein, while keeping the tainted notes in it, the learned Special Judge erred in utilizing the hand-wash as an incriminating circumstance against the appellant. None of the independent witnesses (P.Ws. 3 and 4) having said that the appellant touched the tainted money, the fact that the hand-washes of the appellant turned pink was itself suggestive of the fact of false implication. 16. P.W. 1 was trying to take retirement on health ground so that an employment for P.W. 2 could have been secured. As the same was not achieved, P.W. 1 hatched an evil design in association with P.W. 2 to teach the appellant a good lesson for not yielding to their plan. This circumstance goes to show that P.Ws. 1 and 2 had animosity against the appellant. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 30.6.1999 passed by the learned Special Judge (C.B.I.) Bhubaneswar, in T.R. No. 136/4 of 1999/98 is set-aside. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The bail bonds are cancelled. Final Result : Allowed