JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Jamal Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 18.9.2015 and 27.3.2002 passed by the Prescribed Authority under Minimum Wages Act/Deputy Labour Commissioner, U.P. Varanasi Region, Varanasi in Minimum Wages Case No. 442 of 2001. vide order dated 27.3.2002, the case filed under Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (in short the Act) regarding non-payment of minimum wages has been allowed and an amount of Rs. 4,49,976/- was directed to be deposited alongwith damages to the tune of Rs. 22,49,880/- (total of which comes to Rs. 26,99,856/-); whereas by the order dated 18.9.2015, the restoration application filed by the petitioner seeking recall of the order dated 27.3.2002 has been rejected as barred by time. 3. While assailing these orders, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was never served with notice issued by respondent No. 1 and the case had proceeded ex parte and the impugned order dated 27.3.2002 was passed without considering the case of the petitioner. It is contended that the petitioner came to know about the order of the Prescribed Authority only in May, 2015 and immediately thereafter, filed restoration application, but the same has been rejected. It is submitted that the Prescribed Authority has erred in rejecting the petitioner’s application as barred by time as the application was within time from the date of knowledge of the order dated 27.3.2002. It is further submitted that the alleged workmen were never employed with the petitioner and they were the employees of Pashu Ahar Nirman Shala, therefore, on the basis of false claim, the damage has been imposed upon the petitioner. 4. Learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of State - respondents submits that notice was issued to the petitioner as well as Pashu Ahar Nirman Shala through registered post on the correct address, but the acknowledgement has not been received back, therefore, in view of the provisions contained under the proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, service of notice would be deemed to be sufficient and there was no escape for the Prescribed Authority, except to proceed with the matter ex parte. It is further submitted that in such situation, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their submissions and perused the impugned orders and the restoration application as well. 6. From the perusal of the restoration application, it transpires that the petitioner has no where stated regarding the efforts made by him for searching in his Office as to whether notice was served or not. The petitioner falls in the ambit of State and run by a well managed Office where receipt and dispatch clerk also works. Neither receipt and dispatch register was produced before the Prescribed Authority, nor any affidavit of receipt and dispatch clerk was filed before the Prescribed Authority stating therein that this notice had never been received in the Office of the petitioner. 7. The learned Prescribed Authority has rejected the restoration application on the ground that the same is barred by time. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 29 of Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950, provides that any order passed ex parte may be set aside on the sufficient cause being shown by defaulting party within one month from the date of said order. Here in this case, the award was passed on 27.3.2002 and the restoration application was filed in the year 2015. The rule does not provide any relaxation regarding computation of period of limitation from the date of knowledge of the order. Further, there is no provision for condonation of delay, which itself oust the applicability of the Limitation Act. 8. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the learned Prescribed Authority has erred in rejecting the petitioner’s restoration application as barred by time. So far as the challenge to the order dated 27.3.2002 is concerned, the petition suffers from laches for more than 13 years and there is no plausible explanation for not challenging the award earlier. 9. In view of the foregoing discussions, I do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned orders. The writ petition is dismissed.