Judgment :- 1. In this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners/A.1 and A.2 seek to quash the order dated 17.10.2014 in Crl.M.P.No.1725 of 2014 in C.C.No.84 of 2013 passed by learned III Special Magistrate, Hyderabad, whereunder the learned Judge declined to return the complaint to the complainant to present the case before an appropriate Court having territorial jurisdiction in Vijayawada City. 2. The factual matrix of the case is thus: a) The complainant originally filed C.C.No.110 of 2005 on 18.05.2005 under Sec.138 of N.I.Act against accused before Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Gurgaon. The case was transferred from Gurgaon to the Court at Hyderabad and renumbered as C.C.No.135/2008 before XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The petitioners/A.1 and A.2 appeared before XIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 21.02.2008. Then A.3 appeared on 13.03.2008. When the case was pending for the appearance of A.4 to A.7, it was transferred to XIII Special Magistrate Court, Hyderabad. A.3 to A.5 died on 08.08.2013. A.2, A.6 and A.7 were present. At this stage, the case was transferred from XIII Special Magistrate Court, Hyderabad to III Special Magistrate, Hyderabad and renumbered as C.C.No.84 of 2013. A.1, A.2 and A.6 were examined under Sec.251 Cr.P.C on 09.07.2014 for the offence under Sec.138 of N.I. Act and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. b) When the case was posted for trial, petitioners/A.1 and A.2 filed Crl.M.P.No.1725 of 2014 seeking for return of complaint to the complainant for presentation before proper Court at Vijayawada City in view of the ruling given by Apex Court in the case of DashrathRupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014 (2) ALD Crl.190 (SC) = (2014) 9 SCC 129 ). Their case was that the cheques involved in this case were drawn on Union Bank of India, Vijayawada and issued by the accused to complainant and they were presented at Gurgaon for collection of the cheques and subsequently the cheques were bounced for the reason “payment stopped by the drawer” and in view of the decision in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase(1 supra), the Court in whose jurisdiction the cheque was bounced alone will have the power to try the case and hence the case is to be returned to the complainant. The trial Court dismissed the application on two grounds: i) Firstly on the ground that though in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase(1 supra) the Apex Court held that the Court within whose jurisdiction the cheque was bounced will alone have jurisdiction to try the offence under Sec.138 of N.I. Act, still depending upon the stage of the case Apex Court exempted certain pending cases from being returned to the complainant. According to the said ruling, if post the summoning and appearance of the accused, the recording of evidence as envisaged in Sec.145(2) of N.I.Act has commenced, the proceedings will continue in that Court and the case need not be returned to the complainant. Then the trial Court further observed that in the instant case recording of evidence shall be deemed to be commenced in view of another judgment of Apex Court rendered in Indian Bank Association and others vs. Union of India (UOI) and another ( AIR 2014 SC 2528 = (2014) 5 SCC 590 ). As per Para 16 coupled with direction No.4 of the said judgment, the complainant is not required to examine himself twice i.e, once after filing the complaint and once after summoning of the accused and the affidavit and documents filed by him along with complaint for taking cognizance of the offence are good enough to be read in evidence at both the stages i.e, pre-summoning stage and post-summoning stage. Subsequently when the accused appeared, the Court can examine him under Sec.251 Cr.P.C and post the case for defence evidence unless he files an application under Sec.145(2) N.I.Act for recalling of complainant and his witnesses for cross-examination. The trial Court observed that in view of this judgment, by the time accused appeared and examined under Sec.251 Cr.P.C, the evidence of complainant side shall be deemed commenced and completed. a) By conjunctively applying these two Apex Court judgments to the facts of the instant case, the trial Court observed that by the date of examination of accused under Sec.251 Cr.P.C on 09.07.2014 the evidence of complainant was already deemed to be commenced and further, the accused did not file any application under Sec.145(2) N.I Act to recall the complainant for cross-examination and hence, the complaint need not be returned for presentation before proper Court. ii) Secondly, on the ground that Hon’ble Apex Court in Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos.161-171 of 2005 dated 03.03.2006 directed that all the cases pending between complainant and accused shall be tried by a Court at Hyderabad and for this reason also the case cannot be returned. 3. Heard learned Counsel for petitioners. Notice to R.2 was unserved. 4. Learned counsel for petitioners has argued that the trial Court has not properly applied the ratio in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra) and prayed to allow the petition. 5. The point for determination is: “Whether there are merits in this petition to allow?” 6. POINT: On perusal of the record and the two Apex Court decisions, it must be said that the trial Court has not properly applied the ratio of the two decisions to the case on hand. The impugned order would show that on 09.07.2014, A.1, A.2 and A.6 were examined by the trial Court under Sec.251 Cr.P.C and they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and hence the matter was posted for trial. This was the stage when the accused filed Crl.M.P.No.1725 of 2014 relying upon the judgment in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra). The dates of judgments of Apex Court in Indian Bank Association’s case (2 supra) and Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra) are important for the purpose of this case. The former judgment was on 21.04.2014 and latter was on 01.08.2014. In the judgment of Indian Bank Association’s case (2 supra), the Apex Court gave certain directions for expeditious disposal of N.I. Act offences. As rightly observed by the trial Court, Para 16 and Direction No.4 are relevant. Para 16 would show that a complainant need not be examined twice i.e, once at pre-cognizance stage and latter at post-cognizance stage. Affidavits and documents filed by him along with complaint can be treated as his evidence at both stages. In other words, there is no necessity to recall and reexamine the complainant after summoning the accused unless the Magistrate passes a specific order as to why the complainant was to be recalled. Affidavits and documents filed by him along with complaint can be treated as his evidence at both stages. In other words, there is no necessity to recall and reexamine the complainant after summoning the accused unless the Magistrate passes a specific order as to why the complainant was to be recalled. Then as per direction No.4, after appearance of the accused the Court should direct him to furnish bail-bond to ensure his appearance during trial and examine him under Sec.251 Cr.P.C to enable him to enter his plea of defence and post the case for defence evidence unless an application is made by the accused under Sec.145(2) N.I.Act for recalling of complainant’s witnesses for cross-examination. When the ratio in the above decision is applied to the instant case, it is no doubt true that by 09.07.2014 when A.1, A.2 and A.6 were examined under Sec.251 Cr.P.C, the trial was already deemingly commenced. 7. Then coming to DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra), it was delivered on 01.08.2014. The principal ratio in that decision is that prosecution in offences under Sec.138 of N.I.Act has to be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonor took place. In this process, the earlier judgment in K.Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 ) which permitted prosecution of N.I. Act offences at any one of the five different places indicated in that judgment was overruled. However, considering the impact of this decision on the pending cases, Ho n ’b le Apex Court has carved out an exception to the pending cases depending upon the stage of the case as follows: “Para 20: xx xx Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged Accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place. To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the Complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured…..” So in a pending case if by 01.8.2014, the recording of evidence has been commenced as envisaged under Sec.145(2) of N.I.Act, then that case need not be returned to be presented to the Court which has territorial jurisdiction as laid down in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra). If that stage is not reached, the case shall be returned to the complainant for fling in a proper Court. Apex Court has given the clarification as to what amounts to the commencement of recording of evidence as envisaged under Sec.145(2) N.I Act. If at the pre-summoning stage i.e, pre-cognizance stage if the complainant gave his sworn statement either by affidavit or by oral statement, that cannot be treated as commencement of recording of evidence under Sec.145(2) of N.I. Act. This aspect has been emphasized in the subsequent judgment of Apex Court and by this High Court. a) In the case of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. vs. Rakesh Kumar Singh and others , the Apex Court further clarified the ratio of DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra) as follows: “Para 5: On a perusal of the conclusions drawn in paragraph 22, extracted hereinabove, we feel that the proceedings initiated prior to the rendering of the judgment i n DashrathRupsingh Rathod'scase (supra) on 01.08.2014, will be preserved at the place they were filed, only when "post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881". In order to further explain its intent, the judgment clarifies, that merely leading of evidence at the pre-summoning stage, either by way of affidavit or by oral statement will not exclude applicability of the judgment in DashrathRupsingh Rathod'scase (supra). In order to further explain its intent, the judgment clarifies, that merely leading of evidence at the pre-summoning stage, either by way of affidavit or by oral statement will not exclude applicability of the judgment in DashrathRupsingh Rathod'scase (supra). The above judgment, thereby seeks to confirm the position, that only when recording of evidence at the post-summoning stage had commenced, before 01.08.2014 (the date on which the judgment in DashrathRupsingh Rathod'scase was pronounced), such proceedings would not be dislodged….” b) This High Court in KalakotiNiranjan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh has observed thus: “Para 9: xx xx …It must be noted that the Apex Court has given the clarification also regarding what amounts to the commencement of recording of evidence as envisaged under Sec.145(2) of N.I. Act. If at the pre-summoning stage i.e., pre-cognizance stage the complainant led evidence either by affidavit or by oral statement, that cannot be treated as commencement of the recording of the evidence as envisaged under Sec.145(2) of N.I. Act. Such sworn statement in the form of oral submission or written affidavit given by the complainant for taking cognizance of the case cannot be treated as evidence in the main case for deciding whether or not to transfer the case. From this clarification of Hon'ble Apex Court, it is manifest that when only sworn statement in the form of written affidavit or oral statement which was reduced to writing was available but no evidence in trial was commenced in terms of Sec.145(2) of N.I. Act, the case is liable to be returned to the complainant for filing in the proper court. This is the obvious intendment of the Apex Court.” 8. So when the judgments in Indian Bank Association’s case (2 supra) and DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra) are studied, there appears to be a dichotomy in the matter of treating the oral/written sworn statements along with documents submitted by the complainant for taking cognizance as evidence at post-cognizance stage. As per Indian Bank Association’s case (2 supra), the complainant need not be examined twice and the affidavit and other documents filed by him along with complaint for taking cognizance are good enough to be read in evidence at both stages i.e, pre-summoning stage and post-summoning stage. As per Indian Bank Association’s case (2 supra), the complainant need not be examined twice and the affidavit and other documents filed by him along with complaint for taking cognizance are good enough to be read in evidence at both stages i.e, pre-summoning stage and post-summoning stage. However, as per DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase(1 supra), leading of evidence at the pre-summoning stage either by way of affidavit or by oral statement cannot be treated as commencement of recording of evidence under Sec.145(2) of N.I. Act. 9. In view of above dichotomy, the harmonious interpretation is necessary for applying the ratio in both the judgments. So in N.I. Act offence cases, generally the Courts can apply the ratio i n Indian Bank Association’ s case(2 supra) and treat the affidavits and documents filed by the complainant at pre-summoning stage as evidence also at post-summoning stage. The trial Court on appearance of accused examine him under Sec.251 Cr.P.C and post the case for defence evidence unless he files an application for recalling the complainant and his witnesses for cross-examination. However, when the trial Court is determining the stage of the case for the purpose of returning the file to complainant for presentation in proper Court in the light of DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase(1 supra), it shall not treat the oral/written sworn statements along with documents submitted by the complainant at pre-summoning stage as evidence under Sec.145(2) of N.I.Act. So in the instant case, the trial Court ought to have held that recording of evidence has not commenced and consequently returned the file for presentation before appropriate Court. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court on the first ground cannot be countenanced. However, that is not the end of the matter. As per the impugned order, it appears, Hon’ble Apex Court directed that all the cases between the parties for convenience sake shall be tried in a Court at Hyderabad. In view of the said specific order, the case on hand shall be continued before the trial Court irrespective of the decision in DashrathRupsingh Rathod’scase (1 supra). 10. In the result, with the above observation, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.