R. Raghavendra Rao v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority
2015-03-30
ANAND BYRAREDDY
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Anand Byrareddy, J. 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. The appellant was the plaintiff before the Trial Court seeking protection against the alleged interference of the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA', for brevity). It transpires that the BDA who was the defendant in the suit, had entered appearance and had filed its written statement and had produced material to indicate that the suit property was the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings under a preliminary notification issued under Section 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA Act' for brevity) on 23-3-1988 and final notification issued under Section 9 of the BDA Act on 9-4-1994 and also produced documents such as the mahazar on handing over of possession, apart from the layout plan, to demonstrate that the property stood vested in the State and consequently, the BDA. In that, possession has been taken of the land by the BDA. Hence, the plaintiff claiming to be in settled possession, was being untenable. On that footing, the suit was dismissed. 2. It is to be noticed at the outset that one significant circumstance that a civil suit would not be maintainable in respect of lands which are subject-matter of compulsory acquisition, is now the settled legal position. This may not have been taken note of by the Trial Court, as is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and Another v. Brijesh Reddy and Another 2013 (4) Kar. L.J. 66 (SC) : (2013) 3 S.C.C. 66 : 2013 AIR S.C.W. 2378. The very suit was not maintainable. In any event, the suits having been dismissed on findings of fact, cannot also be faulted. 3. Though the learned Counsel Sri R.B. Sadasivappa would point out that there is material produced by the plaintiff to indicate that he is in settled possession and even if the BDA has acquired the lands in question, the plaintiff who was in settled possession, could not be disturbed, otherwise than under due process of law. And the law does not arm the BDA to take law into its own hands in forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff who is in settled possession. He also seeks to rely on the judgment of this Court in the case of John B. James and Others v. Bangalore Development Authority and Another, 2001 (1) Kar.
And the law does not arm the BDA to take law into its own hands in forcibly dispossessing the plaintiff who is in settled possession. He also seeks to rely on the judgment of this Court in the case of John B. James and Others v. Bangalore Development Authority and Another, 2001 (1) Kar. L.J. 364 (D.B.) and would further contend that even on merits, the BDA claiming to have acquired the land in question under a final notification of the year 1994, has not taken any steps to form any layout in the area and in which event, in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act, the entire acquisition proceedings would lapse and the BDA would have no authority to disturb the possession of the plaintiff. 4. Given the above circumstances and the contentions urged, it is now the settled legal position that insofar as lands which are the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings, as admittedly the property claimed by the plaintiff in the present appeal was situated in the area notified for acquisition by the BDA and as claimed by the BDA, possession also having been taken, is a question which would necessarily have to be addressed in writ proceedings, if at all. In that, even after having taken possession if the BDA has failed to form a layout and the Scheme has lapsed pursuant to which the lands were acquired, it has to be canvassed in the writ jurisdiction of this Court which has the jurisdiction to declare that such a turn of event has come about. While reserving such liberty to the plaintiff to avail such remedy if it is available to him in law, notwithstanding the long lapse of time, the question is left open and may be urged before the Writ Court. The appeal, however, would not be maintainable and is rejected. In view of the rejection of the appeal, I.A. No. 2 of 2013 does not survive for consideration and is accordingly dismissed.