JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J.—This is a bunch of writ petitions which involve similar issues, therefore, same were heard together and are being decided together by a common judgment. 2. The petitioners herein are colleges imparting education in Bachelor of Pharmacy (B. Pharma). They are affiliated to the U.P. Technical University (hereinafter referred as “U.P.T.U.”) which is the examining body created under the U.P. Technical Universities Act 2000 (hereinafter referred as “Act of 2000”). All the petitioner-institutions are approved by the All India Council for Technical Education (hereinafter referred as “A.I.C.T.E.”) as also by the Pharmacy Council of India (hereinafter referred as “P.C.I.”). 3. A.I.C.T.E. has been created under the A.I.C.T.E. Act 1987 (hereinafter referred as “A.I.C.T.E. Act”) while the P.C.I. has been created under a Pre-Constitutional enactment known as the Pharmacy Council of India Act 1948 (hereinafter referred as “P.C.I. Act”). 4. The question involved in this bunch of writ petitions is as to who is competent to determine the intake capacity in B.Pharma course run by an institution i.e. whether it is the A.I.C.T.E. or U.P.T.U. or P.C.I. which has a final say in the matter ? 5. The case of the petitioners is that the approval granted to them by the A.I.C.T.E. for running B. Pharma Course mentions their annual intake capacity for running the said course and this intake capacity is binding upon the U.P.T.U. and the State Government and the same also prevails over the intake capacity as approved by the P.C.I. 6. The Stand of the U.P.T.U. is that it is entitled to determine the annual intake capacity of the course run by a college affiliated to it in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2000. The affiliating committee of the State Government on the recommendation of the affiliating committee of the Universities recommended that the intake capacity as determined by the A.I.C.T.E. and P.C.I., whichever is less, shall be applicable for the year 2014-15 and the said decision is applicable for 2015-16 also. 7. As per P.C.I. the intake capacity is 60 seats per annum which can be increased to 100 seats, however, as of now there is no decision of the P.C.I. enhancing the intake capacity of any of the colleges from 60 seats to 100 seats. 8. 7. As per P.C.I. the intake capacity is 60 seats per annum which can be increased to 100 seats, however, as of now there is no decision of the P.C.I. enhancing the intake capacity of any of the colleges from 60 seats to 100 seats. 8. The A.I.C.T.E while granting approval to the petitioner-institutes for B. Pharma has determined therein the intake capacity which is higher than that determined by the Pharmacy Council. In some cases it is 120 while in others 100 seats. 9. The University and the State Government have decided the intake capacity of the petitioner-colleges as 60 seats per annum based on P.C.I. Norms as it is less than the intake capacity fixed by the A.I.C.T.E. 10. Based on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaya Gokul Educational Trust v. Commissioner & Secy. to Government Higher Education Department, (2000)5 SCC 231 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, (1995) 4 SCC 104 ; Rungta Engineering College, Bhilai and another v. Chattishgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University and another, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 772; as also a judgment of this Court dated 13.8.2004 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 51826 of 1999, Savita Gupta and others v. Pharmacy Council of India and others, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the A.I.C.T.E. Act being a central enactment referable to Entry No. 66 of List I of the Constitution of India has precedence over the U.P.T.U. Act of 2000 which is a State enactment and the role of the examining body i.e. the affiliating university is very limited and does not extend to the determination of annual intake capacity of a course run by a college. The decision of the A.I.C.T.E. in this regard prevails. They also placed reliance upon certain regulations framed by the A.I.C.T.E. in this regard. 11. It was also contended by them that the P.C.I. Act is a pre-constitutional Act relating to regulation of the profession and practice of pharmacy which has nothing to do with imparting of education in the field of Pharmacy which is squarely covered by the provisions of A.I.C.T.E. Act. 11. It was also contended by them that the P.C.I. Act is a pre-constitutional Act relating to regulation of the profession and practice of pharmacy which has nothing to do with imparting of education in the field of Pharmacy which is squarely covered by the provisions of A.I.C.T.E. Act. It being a subsequent enactment of the Parliament, therefore, in view of Article 372 of the Constitution of India and as the Legislature is supposed to know the existence of an earlier enactment on the same subject and the subsequent enactment i.e. A.I.C.T.E. Act is the last will expressed by the legislature and as it is applicable, shall prevail over any decision of the P.C.I. In fact, according to them, P.C.I. Act to this extent stands impliedly repealed in view of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. 12. On behalf of the P.C.I. it was contended that the P.C.I. Act is a complete code in itself which not only regulates the practice and profession of Pharmacy, but also the standards of education etc. in the field of Pharmacy. Courts are loathe to apply the principle of the “implied repeal”, unless the necessary pre-requisites are satisfied. The P.C.I. Act is a special Central Act relating to the field of Pharmacy whereas A.I.C.T.E. Act is a General Act relating to technical education in general. A.I.C.T.E. Act does not contain any non-obstante clause so as to give it overriding effect over the P.C.I. Act. There is nothing in the A.I.C.T.E. Act to come to the conclusion that it has prevailing effect over the P.C.I. Act. In this regard, reliance has been placed over the provision of the P.C.I. Act including its objects and preamble. Reliance has also been placed upon various regulations made under the P.C.I. Act. There is nothing in the A.I.C.T.E. Act to come to the conclusion that it has prevailing effect over the P.C.I. Act. In this regard, reliance has been placed over the provision of the P.C.I. Act including its objects and preamble. Reliance has also been placed upon various regulations made under the P.C.I. Act. In this regard reliance was placed upon a judgment dated 22.7.2010 passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 10132 of 2005; AIR 1963 SC 1561 and (1997)1 SCC 450, Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph and others; (2002)5 SCC 285 , Union of India and another v. Venkateshan S. and another; (2003)7 SCC 389 , State of M.P. v. Kedia and Liquor Ltd.; (1989)3 SCC 537 , Ratan Lal Adukia and another v. Union of India; R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and another, AIR 1992 SC 81 ; Ajoy Banerjee v. Union of India, (1984)3 SCC 127 ; Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, (1999)7 SCC 76 ; Maharaja Prathap Singh Bahadur v. Thakur Man Mohan Dey, AIR 1966 SC 1931 ; U.P. Electricity Board v. Hari Shankar Jain and others, AIR 1979 SC 65 ; D.K. Yadav v. R.K. Singh, (2003)3 SCC 110 and Paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen, AIR 1977 SC 36 . 13. In the pleadings and even during the course of arguments the contention of the U.P.T.U. and the State Government was that approval of both the bodies i.e. A.I.C.T.E. and P.C.I. was required, but according to them the P.C.I. being a special body relating to the field of Pharmacy and the P.C.I. Act being a special enactment, the determination of intake capacity by P.C.I. should prevail over that of A.I.C.T.E. 14. It was contended by the University that it cannot exceed the limit fixed by the A.I.C.T.E. but it can certainly reduce it to 60, as this was the intake determined by the P.C.I. 15. The U.P.T.U. has been created under U.P. Technical University Act, 2000. It was contended by the University that it cannot exceed the limit fixed by the A.I.C.T.E. but it can certainly reduce it to 60, as this was the intake determined by the P.C.I. 15. The U.P.T.U. has been created under U.P. Technical University Act, 2000. Section 6 of the said Act defines the powers of the university which inter alia are to admit any college to privileges of affiliation or to enlarge the privileges of any college already affiliated, or to withdraw of curtail any such privilege and to guide and control the work of such colleges; to lay down the condition of affiliation of colleges and to satisfy itself by periodical inspection that such conditions are satisfied; to do all such other acts or things whether incidental to the powers aforesaid or not, as may be necessary to further the objects of the University. Section 23 deals with the subject of affiliation of colleges. The Executive Council of University may with the previous Permission/Approval of the State Government admit any college which fulfills such conditions of affiliation, as may be prescribed to the privileges of affiliation or enlarge the privileges of any college already affiliated or withdraw or curtail any such privilege. Section 30 deals with the Regulations made intact and the subject-matter in respect of which the same may be made. It is under the aforesaid provisions that U.P.T.U. claims right to determine the intact deposit of the colleges affiliated to it. 16. From the statement of object and reasons, introduction, preamble and provisions of P.C.I. Act, it is borne out that the said Act not only regulates the profession and practice, but also regulates education in the field of Pharmacy. A reading of the introduction to the Act shows the background in which it was introduced. It states-in India there was no restriction to practise the profession of pharmacy. Persons having no knowlege and having having no education in pharmacy or pharmaceutical chemistry or pharmacology, were engaged in this profession. Hundreds of cases were brought to the notice of the Government wherein the compounding, mixing or dispensing of medicines was being done by persons who were not adequately educated in this line. The system was causing great harm to the health of people. Therefore, it was found necessary to enact a law for the regulation of the profession and practice of pharmacy. The system was causing great harm to the health of people. Therefore, it was found necessary to enact a law for the regulation of the profession and practice of pharmacy. The statement of object, and reasons of the Act states “it is desirable that as in most other countries, only persons who have attained a minimum standard of professional education should be permitted to practise the Profession of Pharmacy. It accordingly proposed to establish a Central Council of Pharmacy which will prescribe the minimum standards of education and approve courses of study and examinations for Pharmacists. The Preamble to the P.C.I. Act states it is expedient to make better provision for the regulation of the profession and practise of pharmacy and for that purpose to constitute Pharmacy Councils. 17. Under Section 10 of the Act, the Central Council of P.C.I., subject to approval of the Central Government, is empowered to make regulations to be called “Education Regulations” prescribing the minimum standard of education required for qualification as a Pharmacist. As per Section 11 thereof, at any time after the constitution of the State Council under Chapter III and after consultation with the State Council, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the Education Regulations shall take effect in the State; Though the word “may” has been used in Section 11, it is followed by a proviso which states that where no such declaration has been made, the Education Regulation shall take effect in the State on the expiry of three years from the date of the constitution of the State Council. Thus, such regulations even in the absence of notification by the State Government, become applicable mandatorily on expiry of three years from the constitution of the State Council. It is nobody’s case that that the State Council has not been constituted in the State of U.P. under the aforesaid Act. 18. Section 12 provides that any authority in a State which conducts a course of study for pharmacists may apply to the Central Council for approval of the course, and the Central Council, if satisfied, after such inquiry as it thinks fit to make, that the said course of study is in conformity with the Education Regulations, shall declare the said course of study to be an approved course of study for the purpose of admission to an approved examination for pharmacists. Sub-section (2) and 12 provides that any authority in a State which holds an examination of pharmacy may apply to the Central Council for approval of examination, and the Central Council, if satisfied, after such inquiry as it thinks fit to make, that the said examination is in conformity with the Education Regulations, shall declare the said examination to be an approved examination for the purpose of qualifying for registration as a Pharmacist under this Act. 19. Section 18 empowers the Central Council of the P.C.I. with the approval of the Central Government to make regulations consistent with this Act to carry out the purposes of this Chapter i.e. Chapter II of which Sections 10 and 11 are a part. Section 29 deals with the preparation and maintenance of register. Section 30 deals with preparation for first register. 20. Section 31 deals with the qualifications for entry on first register. Section 32 deals with the Qualfications for subsequent registration i.e. after the date appointed under sub-section (2) of Section 30 and before the Education Regulations have, by or under Section 11, taken effect in the State. Sub-section (2) of Section 32 provides that after the Education Regulations have by or under Section 11 taken effect in the State, a person shall on payment of the prescribed fee be entitled to have his name entered on the register, if he has attained the age of eighteen years, if he resides, or carries on the business or profession of pharmacy, in the State and if he has passed an approved examination or possesses a qualification approved under Section 14 or is a registered pharmacist in another State. 21. Thus, a conjoint reading of the introduction, the statement of objects and reasons, the preamble, Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 29, 30, 31 and 32 of the P.C.I. Act reveals that the Act not only regulates the profession and practice of Pharmacy, but also empowers the P.C.I. to lay down the minimum standards of education and approved courses of study and examinations for Pharmacists. In fact, the regulation of profession and practice of Pharmacy is inextricably interlinked with the regulation of education of in Pharmacy. It is in this context that the P.C.I. claims authority to determine the intake capacity for B.Pharma course. 22. In fact, the regulation of profession and practice of Pharmacy is inextricably interlinked with the regulation of education of in Pharmacy. It is in this context that the P.C.I. claims authority to determine the intake capacity for B.Pharma course. 22. During the course of arguments the counsel for the parties cited before the Court various decisions wherein the role of A.I.C.T.E. viz-a-viz the State Universities created under the State enactment and its primacy in matters of approval of courses relating to technical education came up for consideration. Considering the said decisions, it is necessary to consider as to whether in the light of the said judicial pronouncements right from the decisions in the cases of Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute (supra); Jaya Gokul Educational Trust (supra); Bharthidasan University v. All India Council for Technical Education, (2001)8 SCC 676 ; Parshwanath Charitable Trust and others v. All India Council for Technical Education and others, (2013) 3 SCC 385 ; Association of Management of Private Colleges v. All India Council for Technical Education and others, (2013)8 SCC 271 ; Rungta Engineering College (supra); and Varun Saini and others v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 834, whether A.I.C.T.E. has any role in the approval of courses of technical education being run by the colleges affiliated to a University, what to say of its primacy in such matters, viz-a-viz such Universities and other statutory bodies such as P.C.I., and if it does not have any role, then the question of its primacy becomes irrelevant. 23. The jurisdiction of the A.I.C.T.E. in such matters came up for consideration in the case of Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute (supra). In the said decision the Supreme Court ruled in favour of A.I.C.T.E. in matters of approval, and not the State university. Section 10(k) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act was referred in the said case. 24. The issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court again in Gaya Gokul’s case (supra) and the following questions were considered: “(I) Whether in view of the judgment of this Court in State of T.N. v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, (1995)4 SCC 104 , the provisions of the AICTE Act 1987 occupied the field and it was not necessary to obtain the further approval of the Government or other authority ? Whether any statute in the State of Kerala if it is required such approval, would be void ? (II) Whether the orders of rejection passed by the State Government were valid on merits and whether the University should have granted further orders to continue the affiliation solely on the basis of AICTE permission ?” 25. After considering the provisions of A.I.C.T.E. Act and the provisions of the State enactment, under which a separate State university had been created, the Supreme Court held as under: “22. As held in the Tamil Nadu case, the Central A.I.C.T.E. Act and in particular, Section 10(k) occupied the field relating the ‘grant of approvals’ for establishing technical institutions and the provisions of the Central Act alone were to be complied with. So far as the provisions of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act or its statutes were concerned and in particular statute 9(7), they merely required the University to obtain the ‘views’ of the State Government. That could not be characterised as requiring the “approval’ of the State Government. If, indeed, the University statute could be so inter-preted, such a provision requiring approval of the State Government would be repugnant to the provisions of Section 10(k) of the AICTE Act, 1987 and would again be void. As pointed out in the Tamil Nadu case there were enough provisions in the Central Act for consultation by the Council of the AICTE with various agencies, including the State Governments and the Universities concerned. The State Level Committee and the Central Regional Committees contained various experts and State representatives. In case of difference of opinion as between the various consultees, the AICTE would have to go by the views of the Central Task Force. These were sufficient safeguards for ascertaining the views of the State Governments and the Universities. No doubt the question of affiliation was a different matter and was not covered by the Central Act but in the Tamil Nadu case, it was held that the University could not impose any conditions inconsistent with the AICTE Act or its Regulation or the conditions imposed by the AICTE. Therefore, the procedure for obtaining the affiliation and any conditions which could be imposed by the University, could not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Act. The University could not, therefore, in any event have sought for ‘approval’ of the State Government. 23. Therefore, the procedure for obtaining the affiliation and any conditions which could be imposed by the University, could not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Act. The University could not, therefore, in any event have sought for ‘approval’ of the State Government. 23. Thus we hold, in the present case that there was no statutory requirement for obtaining the approval of the State Government and even if there was one, it would have been repugnant to the AICTE Act. The University statute 9(7) merely required that the ‘views’ of the State Government be obtained before granting affiliation and this did not amount to obtaining ‘approval’. If the University statute required ‘approval’, it would have been repugnant to the AICTE Act. Point 1 is decided accordingly.” 26. In the year 2001 the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the question as to whether the Bharthidasan University created under a State enactment i.e. the Bharthidasan University Act 1981, having its area of operation in certain districts in the State of Tamil Nadu, was required to seek prior approval of the A.I.C.T.E. to start a department for imparting a course or programme in technical education or a technical institution as an adjunct to the University itself, to conduct technical course of its choice. A.I.C.T.E. filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to forebear the University authorities from running/conducting any course and programme in those technical courses as it had not applied for and had not secured the prior approval for those courses as envisaged under A.I.C.T.E. A.I.C.T.E. Act and the statutory regulations made thereunder. The stand of the University was that it did not fall within the definition of “Technical Institution” as defined in Section 2(h) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act. Consequently the regulations made were in excess of the regulation making powers of A.I.C.T.E. 27. Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court accepted the stand of A.I.C.T.E. by applying the ratio of a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Rao v. Osmania University, (1997)1 An LT 629(FB). The Supreme Court while deciding the controversy held that A.I.C.T.E. Act does not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies, having their own assigned roles to perform. The Supreme Court while deciding the controversy held that A.I.C.T.E. Act does not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies, having their own assigned roles to perform. In the objects and reasons of the A.I.C.T.E. Act it is specifically stated that A.I.C.T.E. was originally set up by a Government resolution as a national expert body to advice the Central and State Governments for ensuring the coordinated development of technical education in accordance with approved standards was playing an effective role, but, however, in recent years a large number of private engineering colleges and polytechnics had come up in complete disregard of the guidelines laid down by the A.I.C.T.E. and taking into account the serious deficiencies of even rudimentary infrastructure for imparting proper education and training and the need to maintain educational standards and curtail the growing erosion of standards statutory authority was meant to be conferred upon the A.I.C.T.E. to play its role more effectively by enacting the A.I.C.T.E. A.I.C.T.E. Act. It considered the definition of “Technical Institution” contained in Section 2(h) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act and held that a University was not covered therein. It also considered the earlier decisions in the case of Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute (supra) and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust (supra). Paragraph-10 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharthidasan University v. All India Council for Technical Education (supra) reads as under: “10. Since it is intended to be other than a University, the Act defines in Section 2(i) ‘’University to mean a University defined under clause (f) of Section 2 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and also to be inclusive of an institution deemed to be a University under Section 3 of the said Act. Section 10 of the Act enumerates the various powers and functions of the AICTE as also its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfillment of the same. One such as envisaged in Section 10(1)(k) is to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned. Section 23, which empowers the Council to make regulations in the manner ordained therein emphatically and specifically, mandates the making of such regulations only not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules. Section 23, which empowers the Council to make regulations in the manner ordained therein emphatically and specifically, mandates the making of such regulations only not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules. The Act, for all purposes and throughout maintain the distinct identity and existence of ‘’technical institutions and ‘’universities and it is in keeping tune with the said dichotomy that wherever the University or the activities of the University is also to be supervised or regulated and guided by the AICTE, specific mention has been made of the University alongside the technical institutions and wherever the University is to be left out and not to be roped in merely refers to the technical institution only in Sections 10, 11 and 22(2)(b). It is necessary and would be useful to advert to Section 10(1)(c), (g), (o) which would go to show that Universities are mentioned alongside the ‘’technical institutions and clauses (k), (m), (p), (q), (s) and (u) wherein there is conspicuous omission of reference to Universities and reference being made to technical institutions alone. It is equally important to see that when the AICTE is empowered to inspect or cause to inspect any technical institutions in clause (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 10 without any reservation whatsoever, when it comes to the question of universities it is confined and limited to ascertaining the financial needs or its standards of teaching, examination and research. The inspection may be made or cause to be made of any department or departments only and that too, in such manner as may be prescribed as envisaged in Section 11 of the Act. Clause (t) of sub-section (1) of Section 10 envisages the AICTE to only advice the UGC for declaring any institution imparting technical education as a deemed University and not do any such thing by itself. Likewise, clause (u) of the same provision which envisage the setting up of a National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct evaluation of technical institutions or programmes on the basis of guidelines, norms and standards specified by it to make recommendation to it, or to the Council, or to the Commission or to other bodies, regarding recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme. All these vitally important aspects go to show that the AICTE created under the Act is not intended to be an Authority either superior to or supervise and control the Universities and thereby super impose itself upon such Universities merely for the reason that it is imparting teaching in technical education or programmes in any of its Departments or Units. A careful scanning through of the provisions of the AICTE Act and the provisions of the UGC Act in juxtaposition, will show that the role of AICTE vis-a-vis the Universities is only advisory, recommendatory and a guiding factor and thereby subserve the cause of maintaining appropriate standards and qualitative norms and not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce any sanctions by itself,except submitting a Report to the UGC for appropriate action. The conscious and deliberate omission to enact any such provision in theAICTE Act in respect of Universities is not only a positive indicator but should be also one of the determining factors in adjudging the status, role and activities of AICTE vis-a-vis Universities and the activities and functioning of its departments and units. All these vitally important facets with so much glaring significance of the scheme underlying the Act and the language of the various provisions seem to have escaped the notice of the learned Judges, their otherwise well-merited attention and consideration in their proper and correct perspective. The ultra activist view articulated in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) on the basis of supposed intention and imagined purpose ofthe AICTE or the Act constituting it, is uncalled for and ought to have been avoided, all the more so when such an interpretation is not only bound to do violence to the language of the various provisions but also inevitably render other statutory authorities like UGC and Universities irrelevant or even as non-entities by making the AICTE a super power with a devastating role undermining the status, authority and autonomous functioning of those institutions in areas and spheres assigned to them under the respective legislations constituting and governing them.” Paragraph 12 of this very judgment reads as under: “12. It is by now well-settled that Parliament has enacted the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 as well as the AICTE Act, 1987 in the purported exercise of the powers envisaged in Entry 66 of List-I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which reads as Co-rdination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions. It was permissible for the Parliament to enact a law with the object and aim of co-ordination and determination of standards among a particular class or category of institutions, which may deal with different kinds of education and research as also scientific and technical institutions of different disciplines and specialised branches of even such disciplines. The Parliament, while enacting the AICTE Act, was fully alive to the existence, in full force and effect the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956, which specifically dealt with the coordination and determination of standards at university level of institutions as well as institutions for higher studies of the category or class other than but deemed to be universities and yet roped into the definition of technical institution only institutions not being a University as defined in Section 2(i). Apart from so defining technical Institutions so as to be exclusive of University even in empowering the AICTE to do certain things, special care seems to have been conspicuously and deliberately taken to make specific mention of universities, wherever and whenever alone the AICTE was expected to interact with universities and University Departments as well as its constituent Institutions. In the statement of objects to the AICTE Act, the evil sought to be curbed was stated to be the coming up indiscriminately of number of private engineering colleges and polytechnics in complete disregard of the guidelines resulting in diluted standards, unplanned growth, inadequate facilities and lack of infra-structural facilities in them and not of any anomalies arising out of any university bodies or UGC to even think of either sidelining or subjugating them by constituting AICTE. The guarded language employed for the said purpose and deliberate omission to refer to the universities in Section 10 (1) (k) of the AICTE Act while empowering AICTE to accord approval for starting new technical institutions and introduction of new programmes or courses by or in such institutions cannot be ignored to be of any insignificance. The guarded language employed for the said purpose and deliberate omission to refer to the universities in Section 10 (1) (k) of the AICTE Act while empowering AICTE to accord approval for starting new technical institutions and introduction of new programmes or courses by or in such institutions cannot be ignored to be of any insignificance. A careful analysis of the various provisions contained in Sections 10,11 and 22 will further go to show that the role of interaction conferred upon AICTE vis-a-vis Universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring the proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system so as to conform to the standards laid down by it, with no further or direct control over such universities or scope for any direct action except bringing it to the notice of the UGC or other authorities only, of any lapses in carrying out any directions of the AICTE in this regard, for appropriate action. While stating that autonomy of universities should not mean a permission for authoritarian functioning, the High Courts by the construction placed by them have virtually allowed such authoritarianism to the AICTE to such an extent as to belittle the importance and elegant role assigned to the universities in the Educational system of the country and rendered virtually subordinate to the AICTE. In our view, that does not seem to be the object of creating AICTE or passing of the AICTE Act. Such construction as has been placed by the Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) which found favour of acceptance of the Court in the present case ought to have been avoided and the same could neither be said to have been intended or was ever in the contemplation of the Parliament nor should the UGC and the universities been relegated to a role subordinate to the AICTE. The UGC and universities have always had and have an accepted and well-merited role of Primacy to play in shaping as well as stepping up a co-ordinated development and improvement in the standards of education and research in the sphere of education. When it is only Institutions other than universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not correct to state in the decisions under challenge that an University, which cannot grant affiliation to a technical institution, cannot grant the same to itself. When it is only Institutions other than universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not correct to state in the decisions under challenge that an University, which cannot grant affiliation to a technical institution, cannot grant the same to itself. Consequently, the conclusions rendered based on the principles for classifying enactments into ‘’general law and ‘’special law to keep them within their respective limits or area of operation are not warranted and wholly uncalled for and do not merit our approval or acceptance. Paragraph 13 of this very judgment reads as under: “13. The AICTE cannot, in our view, make any regulation in exercise of its powers under Section 23 of the Act, notwithstanding sub-section (1), which though no doubt enables such regulations being made generally to carry out the purposes of the Act, when such power is circumscribed by the specific limitation engrafted therein to ensure them to be not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the rules. So far as the question of granting approval, leave alone prior or post, Section 10(1) k) specifically confines the limits of such power of AICTE only to be exercised vis-a-vis technical institutions, as defined in the Act and not generally. When the language is specific, unambiguous and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give an expansive meaning under the pretext of a purposive construction to perpetuate an ideological object and aim, which also, having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the AICTE Act, are not warranted or justified. Therefore, the regulation insofar as it compels the universities to seek for and obtain prior approval and not to start any new department or course or programme in technical education (Regulation 4) and empower itself to withdraw such approval, in a given case of contravention of the regulations (Regulation 12) are directly opposed to and inconsistent with the provisions of Section 10(1)(k) of the Act and consequently void and unenforceable.” Paragraph 15 of the judgment in Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) reads as under: “15. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of AICTE Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a ‘’University, the same has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of AICTE Act will make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a ‘’University, the same has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. For example, while under clause (k) of Section 10 only ‘’technica lnstitutions are referred to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the guidelines for admission of students to ‘’technical institutions and ‘’Universities imparting technical education. If we look at the definition of a ‘’technical institution under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is clear that a ‘’technical institution cannot include a ‘’University. The clear intention of the Legislature is not that all institutions whether University or otherwise ought to be treated as ‘’technical institutions covered by the Act. If that was the intention, there was no difficulty for the Legislature to have merely provided a definition of ‘’technical institution by not excluding ‘’University from the definition thereof and thereby avoided the necessity to use alongside both the words ‘’technical institutions and University in several provisions in the Act. The definition of ‘’technical institution excludes from its purview a ‘’University. When by definition a ‘’University is excluded from a ‘’technical institution, to interpret that such a clause or such an expression wherever the expression ‘’technical institution occurs will include a ‘’University will be reading into the Act what is not provided therein. The power to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned is covered by Section 10(k) which would not cover a ‘’University but only a ‘’technical institution. If Section 10(k) does not cover a ‘’University but only a ‘’technical institutio, a regulation cannot be framed in such a manner so as to apply the regulation framed in respect of ‘’technical institution to apply for Universities when the Act maintains a complete dichotomy between a ‘’University and a ‘’technical institution. Thus, we have to focus our attention mainly to the Act in question on the language adopted in that enactment. In that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary to examine the scope of other enactments or whether the Act prevails over the University Act or effect of competing entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.” 28. In that view of the matter, it is, therefore, not even necessary to examine the scope of other enactments or whether the Act prevails over the University Act or effect of competing entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-a-vis Entry 25 of List-III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.” 28. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the University not being covered by the definition of “Technical Institution” contained in Section 2(h) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act, Section 10(1)(k) of the same requiring prior approval by A.I.C.T.E. was also not applicable. It opined that the legislature wherever it has intended the application of the said Act to Technical Institutions and Universities, has used the word “University” also and at other places it has omitted to do so. In this regard, it referred to Section 10(1)(o) providing for the guidelines for admission of students to technical institutions and universities imparting technical education. Thus, the said provision would apply to Universities also. The clear intention of the legislature is not that all institutions whether University or otherwise had to be treated as “Technical Institutions” covered by the Act. The definition of “Technical Institution” excludes from its purview “University”. The power to grant approval for starting new Technical Institution and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned is covered by Section 10(1)(k) which would not cover a University, but only a “Technical Institution”, therefore, a regulation could not be framed in such a manner so as to apply it in respect of Universities also when the A.I.C.T.E. Act maintains a complete dichotomy between a “University” and a “Technical Institution”. 29. Having held as above the Supreme Court in para 16 of its judgment also placed on record the correct position of law that the challenge to the action of the A.I.C.T.E. does not mean that the University has no obligation/duty to conform to the standards and norms laid down by the A.I.C.T.E. for the purpose of ensuring a coordinated and integrated development of Technical Education and maintenance of standards. Thus, words occurring in the aforesaid judgment are indicative of the role of A.I.C.T.E., which is, to ensure coordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards and corresponding obligation upon the universities and colleges to conform such standards and norms prescribed by the A.I.C.T.E. so as to facilitate the purpose and object of the A.I.C.T.E. Act, however, as regards the requirement of seeking prior approval the said decision held that the University was not required to seek any such prior approval and Section 10(k) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act was not applicable to such Universities. 30. This issue again came up for consideration initially before the Madras High Court in respect to the requirement of seeking prior approval of A.I.C.T.E. By colleges affiliated to such Universities created under the State enactment. The Madras High Court held that even though the University is not required to take permission from the A.I.C.T.E., its affiliating colleges are required to do so. Ultimately the matter came up before the Supreme Court in the year 2013 in the case of the Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra). The case of the appellants before the Supreme Court was that the judgment of the Madras High Court was contrary to the law laid down by it in the Bharthidasan University’s case (supra). The Supreme Court framed various questions. One of the question was whether the colleges affiliated to the University are obliged to take prior permission/affiliation from A.I.C.T.E. to run classes in technical courses or only the affiliating University of the colleges is not required to obtain any permission/approval under the A.I.C.T.E. Act ? Another question was whether the rules or regulations made under an Act over-ride or enlarge the provisions of the Act ? While deciding the issues involved the Supreme Court in paragraph 47 of its judgment framed as many as six questions. Question/Points 47.1, 47.2 and 47.6 were as under: “47.1) Whether the colleges affiliated to a university comes within the purview of exclusion of the definition of “Technical Institution” as defined under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act, 1987? 47.2) Whether the AICTE has got the control and supervision upon the affiliated colleges of the respective universities of the member colleges of the appellant in C.A.No. 1145/2004 and the appellants in connected appeals? 47.2) Whether the AICTE has got the control and supervision upon the affiliated colleges of the respective universities of the member colleges of the appellant in C.A.No. 1145/2004 and the appellants in connected appeals? 47.6) Whether the law laid down by this Court in Bharathidasan University’s case, Adhiyaman Education and Research Institute case and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust case is applicable to the fact situation of the concerned colleges of the appellants?” 31. Question/points 47.1 and 47.2 were answered in the negative in favour of the private affiliated colleges. The Supreme Court considered the definition of “Technical Education”, “Technical Institution”, “University” as contained in Section 2(g), 2(h) and 2(i); functions of the Council under Section 10; the function of University as contained under Section 2(f) of the University Grants Commission Act 1956 (hereinafter referred as “Act of 1956”) and Sections 12, 12-A, 13 and 14 thereof. The Supreme Court considered its earlier judgments in Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute’s case (supra) Jaya Gokul’s case (supra) Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) as also the subsequent decision in Parshwanath Charitable Trust and others (supra). 32. It took note of paragraphs 19 and 20 of its judgment in Parshwanath Charitable Trust’s case (supra) and in paragraphs 52,53,55,60 of its judgment in Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) it held as under: “52. The italicised portions from the said decision referred to supra would make it clear that the AICTE Act does not contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies which they are assigned to perform. Further, the AICTE Act does not intend to be an authority either superior or to supervise or control the universities and thereby superimpose itself upon the said universities merely for the reason that it is laying down certain teaching standards in technical education or programmes formulated in any of the department or units. It is evident that while enacting the AICTE Act, the Parliament was fully alive to the existence of the provisions of UGC Act, 1956 particularly, the said provisions extracted above. It is evident that while enacting the AICTE Act, the Parliament was fully alive to the existence of the provisions of UGC Act, 1956 particularly, the said provisions extracted above. Therefore, the definition in Section 2(h) technical institution in AICTE Act which authorizes the AICTE to do certain things, special care has consciously and deliberately been taken to make specific mention of university, wherever and whenever the AICTE alone was expected to interact with university and its departments as well as constituent institutions and units. It was held after analyzing the provision of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the AICTE Act that the role of the inspection conferred upon the AICTE vis-à-vis universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring proper maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education system so as to conform to the standard laid down by it with no further or direct control over such universities or scope for any direct action except bringing it to the notice of UGC. In that background, this Court in Bharathidasan University case made it very clear by making the observation that it has examined the scope of the enactment as to whether the AICTE Act prevails over the UGC Act or the fact of competent entries fall in Entry 66 List I vis-à-vis Entry 25 of List III of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. 53. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of Bharathidasan University’s case which are extracted above makes it very clear that this Court has exempted universities, its colleges, constituent institutions and units from seeking prior approval from the AICTE. Also, from the reading of paragraphs 19 and 20 of Parashvanath Chartitable Trust case it is made clear after careful scanning of the provisions of the AICTE Act and the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 that the role of AICTE vis-a-vis universities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providing guidance and has no authority empowering it to issue or enforce any sanctions by itself. 55. It is also relevant to refer to the exclusion of university from the definition of ‘’technical institution’ as defined under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act. 55. It is also relevant to refer to the exclusion of university from the definition of ‘’technical institution’ as defined under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act. The Institution means an institution not being university, the applicability of bringing the university as defined under clause 2 (f) of UGC Act includes the institution deemed to be a university under Section 3 of the said Act and therefore the affiliated colleges are excluded from the purview of technical institution definition of the AICTE Act. The submission made on behalf of the colleges which are affiliated to the respective universities which are being run by the appellants in the connected appeals will also come within the purview of the university referred to in the above definition of technical institution. The above interpretation sought to be made by the learned senior counsel and another counsel is supported by the provisions of the UGC Act. Section 12A of the UGC Act clearly speaks of regulation of fees and provisions of donation in certain cases which refers to the phrase affiliation together with its grammatical variation included in relation to a college, recognition of such college by, association of such college with, and admission of such college to the privileges of universities. A careful reading of sub-sections (2)(c), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 12A of the UGC Act makes it abundantly clear about colleges which are required to be affiliated to run the courses for which sanction/approval will be accorded by the university or under the control and supervision of such universities. Therefore, affiliated colleges to the university/universities are part of them and the exclusion of university in the definition of technical institution as defined in Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act must be extended to the affiliated colleges to the university also, otherwise, the object and purpose of the UGC Act enacted by the Parliament will be defeated. The enactment of UGC Act is also traceable to Entry 66 of List I. The aforesaid provisions of the UGC Act have been examined by this Court with reference to the provisions of AICTE Act in Bharathidasan University’s case. The enactment of UGC Act is also traceable to Entry 66 of List I. The aforesaid provisions of the UGC Act have been examined by this Court with reference to the provisions of AICTE Act in Bharathidasan University’s case. Therefore, it has clearly laid down the principle that the role of the AICTE Act is only advisory in nature and is confined to submitting report or giving suggestions to the UGC for the purpose of implementing its suggestions to maintain good standards in technical education in terms of definition under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act and to see that there shall be uniform education standard throughout the countryto be maintained which is the laudable object of the AICTE Act for which it is enacted by the Parliament. The provisions of the AICTE Act shall be implemented through the UGC as the universities and its affiliated colleges are all governed by the provisions of the said Act under Section 12A of the UGC Act read with Rules Regulations that will be framed by the UGC in exercise of its power under Sections 25 and 26 of the said Act. Therefore, the conclusions arrived at in Bharathidasan University case is supported by the eleven Judge Constitution Bench decision in T.M.A. Pai case (supra) wherein this Court has overruled the directions given in Unni Krishnan J.P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others[6] to the Central Government and others regarding the reservations and schemes. 60. A reading of the aforesaid paragraphs extracted from TMA Pai’s case makes it very clear that in view of decision of the eleven Judges Constitution Bench of this Court, the scheme framed under the Unni Krishnan’s case has been overruled. Therefore, the autonomy of the university is recognized in the said case and the object and intendment of the Parliament in excluding the universities from the definition of technical institution as defined under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act makes is explicitly clear, after scanning the definition of education institution with reference to the exclusion of universities and Sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the AICTE Act. The object of the statutory enactment made by the Parliament has been succinctly examined by this Court in Bharathidasan University and Parshvanath Charitable Trust cases referred to supra therefore they have rightly made observations that the role of the AICTE Act in view of the UGC Act and the powers and functions conferred by the UGC for controlling and regulating the universities and its affiliated colleges has been explicitly conferred upon the UGC. Hence, they have been given the power to regulate such universities and regulations in relation to granting sanctions/approvals and also maintaining educational standards and over-seeing the prescription of the fee structure including the admission of students in various courses and programmes that will be conducted by the university and its institutions, constituent colleges, units and the affiliated colleges. Therefore, we have to hold that the Bharathidasan University case (supra) on all fours be applicable to the fact situation of these appeals and we have to apply the said principle in the cases in hand whereas in the decisions of Adhiyaman Education and Research Institute case and Jaya Gokul Education Trust’s case (supra) this Court has not examined the cases from the aforesaid perspective. Therefore, the same cannot be applied to the fact situation. The reliance placed upon those judgments by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the AICTE is misplaced.” 33. Though the Supreme Court in Association of Management of Private Colleges took specific notice of paragraphs 19 and 20 of Parshwanath’s case, it is also relevant to see para 24,25 and 28 of the said judgment. 34. In paragraph 63 of its judgment the Supreme Court considered as to whether the M.C.A. course was a course pertaining to technical education or not and it held that it was and, therefore, it further held that it comes within the definition of “Technical Education”, but for its proper conduct of courses and regulation the role of A.I.C.T.E. must be advisory and for the same a note will be given to U.G.C. for its implementation by it, but not A.I.C.T.E. 35. In paragraph 68 of its judgment while answering point 47.6 it distinguished the law laid down in Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute’s case (supra) and Jaya Gokul’s case (supra) from Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) based on the reasoning given in the earlier part of the judgment and held the latter case to be applicable to the facts and issues before it and held that the judgment in the former cases were not applicable and the matter had not been examined from this perspective as was done in the latter case. Thus, the Supreme Court held that even the private colleges affiliated to the Universities were not covered under the definition of “Technical Institutions” contained in Section 2(h) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act nor by the provisions of Section 10(k) of the said Act, therefore, they were not required to seek any prior approval from the A.I.C.T.E. before starting a course relating to technical education. The decisions in Jaya Gokul’s case (supra) and Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute’s case (supra) had no application to such scenario. 36. Though in this case all the petitioner-colleges have not only applied for approval of their courses from A.I.C.T.E., but have also got the requisite approval with the annual intake capacity mentioned therein, but the fact of the matter is that if Section 10(k) read with Section 2(h) does not cover Universities and its constituent or affiliated colleges, then the A.I.C.T.E. has no domain over such institutions for granting approval or determining its intake capacity. 37. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements and the definition of “Technical Institutions” contained in Section 2(h) and the provision contained in Section 2(k) as also the dictum of the Supreme Court in Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) as also the subsequent decision, Association of Management of Private College’s case (supra), the U.P.T.U., its constituent/affiliated colleges are not required to seek prior approval for starting an institution in the filed of technical education including Pharmacy or starting a new course relating to technical education. It being so, the A.I.C.T.E. will also not have any authority to determine the annual intake capacity for courses of technical education being run by such institutions, as, such determination is interlinked with the processing of the matter for approval under Section 10(k) and there is no other provision under the A.I.C.T.E Act under which the intake capacity of each institution could be specifically determined by A.I.C.T.E., independent of the process of approval as is evident from the A.I.C.T.E. (grant of approval for Technical Education) Regulations 2012. In view of the aforesaid decision the Regulations of 2012 framed by the A.I.C.T.E., which relate to intake capacity also will also not apply to such courses run by affiliated and constituent colleges of the U.P.T.U. 38. As per the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court the role of the A.I.C.T.E. is advisory. It can lay down guidelines for a coordinated and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards laid down by it for such courses, lay down norms and standards for courses, curricula, physical and infrastructural facilities, staff pattern, staff qualifications, quality instructions assessment and examinations, provide guidelines for admission as envisaged under Sections 10(1)(a) to 10(1)(j) and 10(1)(L) to (v) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act etc., but it has no authority to grant approval for colleges affiliated to U.P.T.U. for starting new institutions or for introduction of new courses or programmes. If it lays down any norms and standards, the University and colleges will be bound to conform to the same as observed in the case of Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra). 39. In view of the aforesaid scenario, the contention of the petitioners that determination of intake capacity by the A.I.C.T.E. while granting approval is final and cannot be tampered with, appears to be unacceptable. In this regard, it is the role of the U.P.T.U. as per the provisions of the U.P.T.U. Act 2000 which appears to be paramount, subject of course, to the norms and standards laid down by the A.I.C.T.E. in this regard and the role of P.C.I. which shall be considered in the later part of the judgment. 40. As far as the reliance placed by the petitioners on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jaya Gokul’s case (supra), Adhiyaman’ case (supra), Savita Gupta’s case (supra) etc. 40. As far as the reliance placed by the petitioners on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jaya Gokul’s case (supra), Adhiyaman’ case (supra), Savita Gupta’s case (supra) etc. is concerned, as per the dictum in Association of Management of Private Colleges, the relevant aspects were not considered therein and they were subsequently considered in Bharthidasan’s case (supra) and again in the case of Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra). The judgment of this Court in Savita Gupta’s case (supra), relied upon by the petitioners, also did not consider the judgment of the Suprteme Court in Bharthidasan’s case (supra) and in any case it was rendered prior to the judgment in Association of Management of the Private Colleges’ case (supra). 41. As far as reliance placed upon the Rungta Engineering College Case (supra) is concerned, though the judgment has been rendered subsequent to the judgment in Association of Private Colleges (supra), however, a perusal thereof reveals that it is based upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in Adhiyaman’s case (supra) and Jaya Gokul’s case (supra) as also the judgment in Bhartiya Educational Society v. State of of H.P., (2011) 4 SCC 527 . The said judgment in Rungta Engineering College case (supra) does not take into consideration the judgment of the coordinate bench in Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) nor does it take into consideration the definition of “Technical Institutions” contained under Section 2(h) and the provisions of Section 10(1)(k) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act. 42. In view of the above-mentioned pronouncements of the Supreme Court, reliance placed upon Article 372 in this regard would also be of no consequence, as, if the A.I.C.T.E. does not not have a role in the approval of the courses and the determination of the intake capacity of the petitioners in respect thereof it cannot be said that there is any conflict between A.I.C.T.E. Act and the P.C.I. Act in this regard. Question of implied repeal would also pale into insignificance. The decisions of U.P.T.U./State Government to follow the intake capacity determined by P.C.I. will prevail, as, neither the U.P.T.U. nor the State Government has asserted its preferential right to determine the intake capacity viz-a-viz P.C.I. 43. Question of implied repeal would also pale into insignificance. The decisions of U.P.T.U./State Government to follow the intake capacity determined by P.C.I. will prevail, as, neither the U.P.T.U. nor the State Government has asserted its preferential right to determine the intake capacity viz-a-viz P.C.I. 43. At this stage it is necessary to take note of a division bench judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 8.9.2004 in the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House’s College of Architecture v. State of Maharashtra and others. In the said case also an issue similar to one which has arisen in this case arose i.e. whether the A.I.C.T.E. Act over-rides the provisions of the Architects Act 1972 in the matter of prescribing and regulating norms and standards of Architectural Institutions. In other words whether the A.I.C.T.E. Act which is a later Act has impliedly repealed the provisions of Architects Act. The only difference in the said case was that in place of the P.C.I. Act the other Act under consideration was the Architects Act 1972, which was also a Central Act. 44. It is not in dispute that Architecture is also a field of technical education which is covered in the definition of “Technical Education” as contained in Section 2(h) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act. The course involved therein was Bachelor of Architects Course. In the said case also the dispute was with regard to the determination of intake capacity as also other issues. After examining the provisions of the two Acts the Division Bench held that the Architects Act was a special Act dealing with the Architects and the maintenance of standards in Architectural education and profession with recognized qualifications. The Architects Act was a complete Code in itself. It contained a non-obstante clause giving it overriding effect over other laws. Scope and ambit of the A.I.C.T.E. Act though wide ranging and covering various programmes of education the main function of the A.I.C.T.E. under the A.I.C.T.E. Act was coordinated development of technical education as defined in the said Act. It was not confined to nor is its sole or main concern Architecture, Architects and their professional conduct. It held that Architectural education was governed by the Architects Act, which was a special legislation, whereas the A.I.C.T.E. Act was a general legislation. It also repelled the argument that the Architects Act stood impliedly repealed by the A.I.C.T.E. Act which was a later Act. It held that Architectural education was governed by the Architects Act, which was a special legislation, whereas the A.I.C.T.E. Act was a general legislation. It also repelled the argument that the Architects Act stood impliedly repealed by the A.I.C.T.E. Act which was a later Act. The decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gandhi College of Pharmacy v. All India Council of Technical Education, AIR 1995 P&H 315 , which has also been relied by this Court in Sarita Gupta’s case (supra), on which the petitioners herein have placed reliance, but, it held that the said case was not applicable as the scheme of the Architects Act differs from the Pharmacy Act in many respects, specially, as the latter did not contain a non-obstante clause giving over-riding effect over the provisions of A.I.C.T.E. Act. It held that the functions of the A.I.C.T.E. mentioned in Section 10(1)(k) and 10(1)(p) are more apposite in cases where there are no existing special body like Council of Architecture already carrying out the same functions under the Architects Act. In paragraph 19 of its judgment it considered the dictum of the Supreme Court in Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) and following the said decision held that the legislature never intended to confer in the A.I.C.T.E. a super-power undermining the status, authority and autonomous functioning of the existing statutory bodies in areas and spheres assigned to them under the respective legislations. 45. The aforesaid Division Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court was put to challenge before the supreme Court by means of S.L.P. No. 26936 of 2004 wherein no stay was granted. The said S.L.P. was converted into Civil Appeal No. 364 of 2005. The said appeal came to be connected with W.P. No. 895 of 2013 wherein similar issues had been raised. The said writ petition in turn was connected with S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014 arising out of judgment dated 18.12.2013 passed in Writ (C) No. 27639 of 2013 by the Orissa High Court at Cuttack involving similar issues relating to the role of A.I.C.T.E. viz-a-viz other statutory bodies. In the meantime, on 24.3.2014 in the connected writ petition No. 895 of 2013 an order was passed by the Supreme Court as under: “Rule nisi. In the meantime, on 24.3.2014 in the connected writ petition No. 895 of 2013 an order was passed by the Supreme Court as under: “Rule nisi. Having regard to the important issue involved in the Writ Petition, we think that it will be appropriate if the matter is heard by a Bench of three Judges. The matter may be listed accordingly within six months from today.” 46. It is not out of place to mention that all the decisions which have been referred and considered in the earlier parts of this judgment were rendered by a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court, therefore, the matter, considering its importance, was ordered to be placed before a three Judge Bench. 47. Though in S.L.P. No. 26936 of 2004 (Civil Appeal No. 364 of 2005), arising out of the Bombay High Court, no interim order was granted, but in S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014 (Civil Appeal No. 6938 of 2015) arising out of the proceedings before Orissa High Court, even after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra), an interim order was passed on 17.4.2014 as under: “In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, i.e., All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), it is stated that Approval Process Handbook (2013-14) is presently in force and the same has been extended and made applicable for the Academic Year 2014-15 as well. AICTE shall now proceed in accordance with the Approval Process Handbook for the Academic Year 2014-15 insofar as the members of the petitioner Association and all colleges and institutions situated similarly to the members of the petitioner Association are concerned and necessary orders shall be issued by AICTE within ten days. Prayer for interim relief is ordered accordingly.” 48. AICTE shall now proceed in accordance with the Approval Process Handbook for the Academic Year 2014-15 insofar as the members of the petitioner Association and all colleges and institutions situated similarly to the members of the petitioner Association are concerned and necessary orders shall be issued by AICTE within ten days. Prayer for interim relief is ordered accordingly.” 48. Thereafter, the matter was placed before a Three Judge Bench and another interim order was passed on I.A. No. 2-3 of 2014 in S.L.P. (C) No. 7277 of 2014 as under on 9.5.2014: “The order dated 17.4.2014 passed by this Court is clarified and it is directed that prior approval of All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) is compulsory and mandatory for conduct of a technical course including the MBA/Management course by an existing affiliated Technical College and also new Technical College which will require affiliation by a University for conduct of its Technical Courses/Programmes for the academic year 2014-15. The time given in the order dated 17.4.2014 is extended by 10.6.2014. IA Nos. 2 and 3 of 2014 stand disposed of as above.” 49. Again on 27.4.2015 the Supreme Court passed two orders on I.A. No. 11 and I.A. No. 12 of 2015 in S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014, inter alia, de-tagging the said S.L.P. from writ petition (C) No. 895 of 2013 and permitting the institutions which had been approved by the A.I.C.T.E. and which were imparting studies in the field of architecture to get themselves approved by the Council for Architecture so that the students passing out from their institutions may not have to face any problem and further permitting the A.I.C.T.E. as under: “IA No. 12 of 2015 has been filed with the prayer (a) as follows : “permit the AICTE to process all applications of technical institutions for extension of approval, variation of intake, new courses, establishment of new technical institutions etc. in accordance with the new AICTE Approval Process Handbook (2015-16). There is no opposition. Accepting the reasons given in the application, IA No. 12 is allowed. However, it is clarified that if the institutions have to approach for enhancement/variation of intake, it should approach through National Board of Accreditation (N.B.A.).” 50. The said order was clarified on 6.5.2015 to the extent that in place of words “there is no opposition” the words “though there is opposition” were substituted. 51. However, it is clarified that if the institutions have to approach for enhancement/variation of intake, it should approach through National Board of Accreditation (N.B.A.).” 50. The said order was clarified on 6.5.2015 to the extent that in place of words “there is no opposition” the words “though there is opposition” were substituted. 51. Thereafter, on 16.10.2014 a Bunch of writ petitions seeking extension in the time-schedule fixed by the Supreme Court in Parshwanath Charitable Trust’s case (supra) came to be decided, the leading writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 853 of 2014, Varun Saini and others v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University. In this judgment the Supreme Court considered the decision of Parshwanath Charitable Trust’s case (supra) as also the decision rendered by it in Bharthidasan University’s case (supra) and Association of Private Colleges (supra) and in paragraph 53, inter alia, it observed as under: “53. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of Bharathidasan University case which are extracted above makes it very clear that this Court has exempted universities, its colleges, constituent institutions and units from seeking prior approval from AICTE. Also, from the reading of paragraphs 19 and 20 of Parashvanath Chartitable Trust case it is made clear after careful scanning of the provisions of the AICTE Act and the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 that the role of AICTE vis-a-vis universities is only advisory, recommendatory and one of providing guidance and has no authority empowering it to issue or enforce any sanctions by itself.” 52. However, in the same paragraph the Supreme Court referred to the interim order dated 24.3.2014 passed in W.P. No. 895 of 2013 by which, considering the importance of the issue involved, the matter was ordered to be placed before a Three Judge Bench. It also referred to the interim orders passed on 17.4.2014 and 9.5.2014. (S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014), which have already been quoted hereinabove. It also referred to the interim orders passed on 17.4.2014 and 9.5.2014. (S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014), which have already been quoted hereinabove. After taking note of various other interim orders passed in S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014, ultimately it observed as under: “We have referred to the orders passed by this Court in a sequential manner only to highlight that for the academic year 2014-15 there was some cavil with regard to the jurisdiction of AICTE till the four-Judge Bench by order dated 9.5.2014 clarified prior approval of AICTE is compulsory and mandatory for conduct of technical course including MBA/Management course by exiting affiliated technical college and also including technical college which would require affiliation by a university for conduct of its technical process/programmes for the academic year 2014-15. The time schedule originally postulated in the Parshvanath case was extended regard being had to the special features of each case.” 53. The Court took note of the fact that there were some doubts with regard to the jurisdiction of A.I.C.T.E. till the Four Judge Bench (in fact it was a three Judge Bench) by order dated 9.5.2014 clarified that prior approval of A.I.C.T.E. is compulsory and mandatory for conducting of a a technical course. The doubt referred therein was on account of the judgment in Bharthidasan Universities case (supra) and Parshwanath Charitable Trust case (supra) and Association of Management of Private College’s case (supra), therefore, according to the Supreme Court as per its judgment dated 16.10.2014 rendered in Varun Saini’s case (supra) the interim order dated 9.5.2014 passed in S.L.P. 7277 of 2014 had cleared the doubt (at least for the moment till the pending S.L.Ps/appeals/writ petitions are decided by the Supreme Court) and accordingly the Supreme Court proceeded to pass requisite orders and dispose of the writ petition No. 853(C) of 2014. It extended the time granted by the order dated 17.4.2014 accordingly. 54. It extended the time granted by the order dated 17.4.2014 accordingly. 54. As per the dictum of the Supreme Court Bharthidasan’s case (supra) and Association of Management of Private College’s case (supra), the petitioners, who are affiliated colleges of U.P.T.U., are not covered within the definition of “Technical Institutions” contained in Section 2(h) of A.I.C.T.E. Act, therefore, the approval of A.I.C.T.E. is not required by such colleges for running the B.Pharma Course, nor does it have any authority to determine the intake capacity of the petitioners in respect to the said course, as, the determination of intake capacity is interlinked with the grant of approval under Section 10(1)(k) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act and there appears to be no other provision in the said Act under which A.I.C.T.E. could do so, but, considering the interim orders of the Supreme Court operating in S.L.P. No. 7277 of 2014 (Civil appeal No. 6938 of 2015), quoted hereinabove, which have been passed after the judgment in Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) rendered on 25.4.2013, and have been followed by the Supreme Court in its subsequent judgment dated 16.10.2014 in Varun Saini’s case (supra) and considering that there has to be uniformity on these issues in respect to courses of technical education covered under Section 2(g) of the A.I.C.T.E. Act, which include Pharmacy, it is not possible for this Court to decide the controversy herein in terms of the aforesaid judgments nor to consider the question of primacy of role of A.I.C.T.E. viz-a-viz the U.P.T.U. or P.C.I. unless the issue pending before the Supreme Court regarding the very role of A.I.C.T.E. is decided and resolved. 55. 55. As any decision by this Court in terms of the dictum in Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) would be in conflict with the interim orders passed by the Supreme Court subsequently, as also the observations made in Varun Saini (supra) quoted hereinabove, therefore, till the matter is resolved by the Supreme Court, it is provided that for the next academic-session the A.I.C.T.E. shall undertake a re-determination of the intake capacity of the petitioners in respect to the course in question keeping in mind the interim orders dated 17.4.2014, 27.4.2015 and 9.5.2015 referred hereinabove, but, in consultation with the P.C.I. and U.P.T.U., as, the approval orders passed by it do not show any consultative process having been resorted by it with the said bodies, though Section 10(1)(k) of the A.I.C.T.E. enjoins it to do so and the P.C.I. also has the authority to approve such courses under the P.C.I. Act, specially keeping in mind Section 32 of the said Act. The intake capacity so determined will be subject to any further orders in the proceedings pending before the Supreme Court or final decision therein, meaning thereby if any order is passed by it or decision is rendered otherwise, the parties shall act accordingly. If any approval for the course in question is to be sought, the interim orders of the Supreme Court referred hereinabove shall be adhered and the approval of P.C.I. be also taken to avoid future complications for the students. If aggrieved, it shall be open for the parties to approach the Court again as and when the cause-of-action arises. 56. As far as academic-session 2015-16 is concerned, the aforesaid arrangement will not apply to it as the session has already started and admissions made. 57. All the writ petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.