JUDGMENT S.S. Chauhan, J. This appeal has been filed challenging the judgement and decree dated 21.02.2006 passed by the trial court, by means of which marriage solemnised between the appellant and the respondent dated 15.2.1989 has been dissolved by a decree of divorce. 2. The facts relating to the present dispute are that respondent filed a suit under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (fro short 'the Act') for dissolving the marriage with the appellant dated 15.2.1989 by a decree of divorce on 26.10.2002 alleging therein that marriage between the respondent and the appellant was solemnised on 15.2.1989 at the residence of the appellant situate in District Kanpur Dehat according to Hindu rites and customs in presence of family members, relatives and friends of the parties. The respondent is having degrees of MBBS and MD and is a qualified doctor and was doing private practice at the time of marriage. The appellant also happens to be a qualified doctor having BAMS degree and she was at the relevant time posted as Medical Officer in Ayurvedic Hospital, Chunar, District Mirzapur. It is alleged that the appellant was having superiority complex in her mind and so she behaved roughly with the respondent at the initial stage. The respondent has to struggle a lot for establishing himself in the profession and during the infancy of the profession income of the respondent was almost nil. The appellant on the other hand was a Government employee and was drawing a handsome salary. The respondent always tried to cooperate with the appellant, but the appellant kept on mounting her hostile attitude. The respondent always tried to maintain the matrimonial obligations and tolerated the cruel behaviour of the appellant and within the period of seven years, he became the father of three children, namely, Km. Garima Shekhar aged about 11 years, Km. Deep Shikha aged about 10 years and Master Raj Shekhar aged about 6 years. The respondent devoted himself to the profession and in a short period of time, he gained excellency in his profession and established Shekhar Hospital as a branch name in the city of Lucknow. The appellant took a long leave and remained in the house like a boss from 1989 to 1997 to give support to the respondent. The respondent devoted himself to the profession and in a short period of time, he gained excellency in his profession and established Shekhar Hospital as a branch name in the city of Lucknow. The appellant took a long leave and remained in the house like a boss from 1989 to 1997 to give support to the respondent. Since the respondent was living in a joint family along with his father, mother, two sisters and one brother, the behaviour of the appellant had never been kind towards his family and she always used hot and bad language to his father, mother, sisters and brother and bhabhi and habitual in insulting all those during whole time. Unfortunately, the elder brother of the respondent expired in the year 1996 (1998) and it became the duty of the respondent to look after the family of his elder brother, who were living along with the respondent. It is alleged that appellant wanted to throw them from the house and, therefore, she made allegation of illicit relation with his bhabhi, which caused great mental agony to the respondent and it is burning example of cruelty against the respondent. The appellant soon after the death of respondent, made allegations and started quarreling and beating the respondent and continued mental and physical injury to the respondent till bhabhi of the respondent left the house in the year 1998 (2000). The relations of the appellant had never been cordial with any of the family members and she never fulfilled her marital obligations towards father-in-law, mother-in-law, sisters-in-law as well as her own children. Everybody was feared that anytime the appellant can beat and abuse them without any rhyme or reason. The appellant left the house of the respondent for her parental house (Maika) after quarreling, abusing and beating the respondent and his family members many times during the last 13 years of her married life and since the parents and other members of the appellant were fully aware of the attitude of the appellant, so she was sent back to the respondent's house. The hospital of the respondent being a big hospital, a number of female employees like Receptionists, Nurses and Maids (Aayas) etc. The hospital of the respondent being a big hospital, a number of female employees like Receptionists, Nurses and Maids (Aayas) etc. are working and the appellant used to charge the respondent for illicit relations with a number of female workers of the hospital, so much so she compelled to terminate the services of female workers and the respondent has followed her instructions every time for the sake of peace of the family members, but the aforesaid act of the appellant gave the respondent mental agony and social pain and the appellant never care for it. The appellant always used to behave rudely with both the sisters of the respondent till their marriage and after their marriage, she never took care of the social responsibilities against them. It is alleged that the appellant crossed all the limits on 14.7.2002 as on the said date when the ISO team was inspecting the hospital for giving the ISO Certificate to the hospital, the appellant shouted loudly and made an attempt to beat the employees and the respondent in presence of the ISO team because of the reasons best known to her. The aforesaid behaviour of the appellant created a fear in the mind of everybody presented in the hospital. Anyhow, the respondent handled the situation and regretted to the employees and guests for the cruelty of the appellant. It is also alleged that in the night when the respondent entered in his bedroom after finishing his work, the appellant beaten him badly and scratched by nails on his mouth and other vital parts of the body and kicked him out of bedroom, but because of social status no FIR was lodged by the respondent about the said incident. On 16.7.2002 when the respondent was celebrating his birthday party organised in Geneses Club, Lucknow, where also the appellant made an attempt to beat him thrice before his friends and relatives. The appellant always treated the respondent with mental and physical cruelty while alone or in public, but the respondent tolerated all such things because of his social status and welfare of his family, but all in vein. It is further alleged that the appellant made allegations against the respondent that he has illicit relations with one senior Gynecologist who was working in the hospital and as a result of that, the doctor left the hospital and it caused irreparable loss to the hospital. It is further alleged that the appellant made allegations against the respondent that he has illicit relations with one senior Gynecologist who was working in the hospital and as a result of that, the doctor left the hospital and it caused irreparable loss to the hospital. The appellant continuously made allegations of illicit relations with every female worker in the hospital and the respondent became incapable of doing anything against the appellant looking to his social status and for the sake of welfare of his family. The aforesaid act of the appellant was a clear example of cruelty which was caused by her against the respondent, his children and his family members. The situation became intolerable to the respondent and if he continued to live with the appellant, then he will certainly become a psychiatric patient. The appellant was posted in the Government Ayurvedic Hospital, Khairabad, District Sitapur in December, 2001 and thereafter she left the entire obligations against the family and she always use to meet and felicitate her office colleagues and friends only either before the respondent or behind the back. The appellant also used to say that she is getting salary from the Government and she will destroy the respondent as well as his family and image of the hospital. The appellant always used to come to the house with her friends and some of those are residing with her at Sitapur. The respondent came to know from the Dispensary at Khairabad, District Sitapur that two persons are regularly living with the appellant at her residence at Sitapur and she is having illicit relations with them. The aforesaid act of the appellant was a clear case of bigamy. The appellant was not performing her matrimonial obligations since long back and there were having no relations as husband and wife between the respondent and wife for more than two years. After posting of the appellant at Ayurvedic Hospital, Khairabad in December, 2001, she was residing at Sitapur continuously without any care of the respondent or her children, but as and when she comes to the respondent's residence and hospital at Lucknow, she creates ruckus (hungama) in the family as well as in the hospital. The children of the appellant are also afraid of the cruel behaviour of her mother and they do not want to live with her mother and are living with the respondent. The children of the appellant are also afraid of the cruel behaviour of her mother and they do not want to live with her mother and are living with the respondent. In the aforesaid circumstances, it became impossible for the respondent to live with the appellant as husband and wife and to survive in the society with such relationship and, therefore, the marriage with the appellant was liable to be dissolved. 3. Written statement was filed by the appellant admitting the fact that marriage with the respondent took place on 15.2.1989, but clarified that the marriage was solemnised from the house of the uncle (Sri Naresh Chandra Sachan) of the appellant, which was within the campus of HBTI, Kanpur. It was also said that father of the appellant had died prior to her marriage, therefore, Kanya Daan was performed by the said uncle of the appellant. It was also stated that bhabhi of the respondent shifted to her own house i.e. House No.8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow in March-April, 2000 on the advice of respected Guruji Sri J.K. Singh, the priest, who was leading the family of the respondent for the last so many years. The allegations which have been made in para 15 of the plaint have been set up as a foundation to protect the illicit relations of the respondent with his subordinate Richa Mishra, who was working as Management Executive in the hospital (Shekhar Hospital) of the respondent to whom the respondent was wishing to marry after getting divorce from her. The elder sister of the respondent Smt. Savita was already married in 1976 much before the marriage of the respondent with the appellant on 15.2.1989. The respondent was having illicit relations with Richa Misra and he wanted to marry her. It is also said that even after filing of the divorce petition, the appellant was living with the respondent and she was performing all matrimonial obligations and she was not aware of the proceedings of the said divorce petition and it was for the first time on 14.12.2002 when the respondent produced the ex-parte order dated 7.12.2002 before the appellant to prohibit her to enter into the residence of the respondent, then only she came to know about the divorce proceedings. 4. 4. In the additional pleas, the prevailing facts have been explained by stating that both the parties belong to a middle class family and the father of the appellant had already expired prior to her marriage and her mother was a housewife, who is still alive and quite old and after marriage, the appellant used to live along with the respondent at House No.530/52, Shekhpur, Bara Chandganj, Lucknow where the parents of the respondent, his younger sister Km. Geeta and the family of his elder brother were living as joint family. The elder brother of the respondent was posted at Shikohabad, District Mainpuri and used to come to the house on week ends. At the time of marriage, the respondent was doing private practice in medicine and had a clinic in the name of Shekhar Nursing Home at Church Road, B-Block, Indira Nagar, Lucknow. The appellant was in Government service and was working as Medical Officer in Ayurvedic Hospital at Mirzapur and after marriage on the advice and persuasion of the respondent, the appellant took long leave from her service and devoted herself with the respondent in his aforesaid clinic. While the appellant was working with the respondent in his clinic, she worked hard and invested all her savings and funds and cooperated with the respondent in all the way to develop the said clinic and as a result of her labour, devotion and investments of both the parties, the clinic of the respondent which was running in a tin shed, was developed into a three storied Nursing Home in May, 1991. On the completion of three storied building of Shekhar Nursing Home, the respondent with the appellant and his daughter Km. Garima shifted his residence in May, 1991 to one portion of the Nursing Home, which was a two room set at second floor of the building and all other family members continued to live at the house situate at Bara Chandganj, Lucknow. On 28.4.1998 the elder brother of the respondent expired at house situated at Bara Chandganj, Lucknow and thereafter in July, 1998 all the family members i.e. parents, younger sister Km. Geeta and the family members of deceased elder brother of the respondent also shifted their residence to the premises of Shekhar Nursing Home. Younger sister of the respondent Km. On 28.4.1998 the elder brother of the respondent expired at house situated at Bara Chandganj, Lucknow and thereafter in July, 1998 all the family members i.e. parents, younger sister Km. Geeta and the family members of deceased elder brother of the respondent also shifted their residence to the premises of Shekhar Nursing Home. Younger sister of the respondent Km. Geeta had love affair with one Amit Arya and wanted to marry him, but the respondent was opposing the said marriage, which resulting into some confrontation between Km. Geeta and the respondent and in turn Km. Geeta lodged an FIR with the police against the respondent for her illegal confinement and thereafter with the help of the police, Km. Geeta left the house of the respondent in October, 1999 and married to Amit Arya on 5.3.2000. Km. Annu Sachan, the niece of the respondent (daughter of his elder brother) had love affair with one Shailendra Yadav and on 2.1.2000 she left the house with Shailendra Yadav and went to Varanasi. An FIR of the said incident was lodged by the bhabhi of the respondent and then on 14.1.2000 Km. Annu Sachan was recovered by the police from Varanasi and Shailendra Yadav was arrested and sent to jail. The aforesaid immoral activities of Km. Annu Sachan created a lot of disturbance in the family of the respondent and he himself was very much disturbed from the activities of his sister Geeta and thereafter his niece Annu Sachan, then Guruji Sri J.K. Singh, the priest who is leading the family of the respondent for the last so many years, advised the bhabhi of the respondent to shift in her own house i.e. House No.8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow, which was purchased by her in the year 1991 from U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and on the advise of Guruji, bhabhi of the respondent shifted to her own house with her children in March-April, 2000. The appellant always cooperated with the respondent and always paid regards to him as well as to his family members and performed all marital obligations. The appellant always cooperated with the respondent and always paid regards to him as well as to his family members and performed all marital obligations. Since the solemnization of the marriage and till April, 2002, the relations between the appellant and the respondent were very cordial and harmonious and in the society they were being treated as an ideal couple and in this period, they were blessed with two daughters and one son, who are presently aged about 14 years, 12 years and 8 years respectively. It is also stated that with the joint efforts, labour and devotion of the parties, the aforesaid Shekhar Nursing Home was developed quickly and after construction of other stories in the building, the said Shekhar Nursing Home was converted into Shekhar Hospital Private Limited and the same was got incorporated under the Companies Act in the year 1995. In the said company, the respondent became Managing Director and the appellant was the Director besides Dr. Harish Chandra, who was the Medical Director. In the year 2001, the respondent along with his children and parents was shifted to fourth floor of the building of the aforesaid hospital. The appellant devoted herself to the respondent to such an extent that she did not care for her government service and further she did not visit even her mother's place properly and in the span of 14 years when she lived with the respondent, the appellant visited her parental house (Maika) for about ten times only and except one or two occasions, the visits were for few hours only. In this entire period, the appellant stayed at her parental house for 3 or 4 nights only and that too in the marriage of her nephew and such other occasions. On 14.7.2002 when the ISO team was inspecting the hospital for giving ISO Certificate to the hospital, the appellant cooperated with the respondent and had also served the breakfast etc. to the members of the ISO team. The appellant being the Director of the hospital, remained with the respondent throughout the period when the ISO team visited the hospital. The appellant joined and celebrated all the birthday parties of the respondent including that of 16.7.2002 with full zeal and enthusiasm and there had been no occasion of any disturbance from the side of the appellant. The appellant being the Director of the hospital, remained with the respondent throughout the period when the ISO team visited the hospital. The appellant joined and celebrated all the birthday parties of the respondent including that of 16.7.2002 with full zeal and enthusiasm and there had been no occasion of any disturbance from the side of the appellant. In fact, the true fact is that on such occasions, the respondent used to wear the dresses which were selected and suggested by the appellant. On account of the fact that long leave was taken from the service, some complications arose in the service of the appellant and after great efforts and on intervention of the Court, the appellant resumed her service on 18.12.2001 at Government Ayurvedic Dispensary, Khairabad, District Sitapur and she used to go to Sitapur in morning and return to home in evening after performing her duties. One Richa Misra joined in the Shekhar Hospital in April, 2000 as Store Keeper on a salary of Rs.2,500/- per month and thereafter suddenly in the beginning of the year 2002, she was promoted to the post of Pathology Technician and Management Executive and her salary was enhanced to Rs.19,000/- per month. The appellant in due course of time could understand the reason as to why the salary of Richa Misra was increased abnormally, then she came to know about the illicit relations between the respondent and Richa Misra. In some times in April, 2002, the appellant found a sudden change in the behaviour of the respondent and she noticed that relations between the respondent and Richa Misra were becoming more friendly and stimulating. The respondent also started to come back to the house at late hours of the night and he also used to talk on phone with Richa Misra for a long time. It was further revealed that the respondent has illicit relations with Richa Misra and such relations have resulted into drastic change in the behaviour of the respondent with appellant. In October, 2002, the respondent disclosed his wishes to the appellant to marry Richa Misra and for that purpose, he put a proposal with the appellant for divorce with mutual consent, but the appellant refused to accept the said proposal of the respondent. In October, 2002, the respondent disclosed his wishes to the appellant to marry Richa Misra and for that purpose, he put a proposal with the appellant for divorce with mutual consent, but the appellant refused to accept the said proposal of the respondent. The respondent also disclosed his parents about his wishes to marry Richa Misra after taking divorce from the appellant and for the said purpose, he persuaded his parents to convince the appellant, but his parents also did not support him and the father of the respondent also reprimanded him which caused annoyance between the respondent and his father. When the appellant did not support the proposal of the respondent, then the respondent instituted the present divorce proceedings on false and fabricated grounds with mala fide intention. It has also been contended that even after the date of institution of the present proceedings, the appellant was living with the respondent and was performing all her marital obligations and she was not aware of the divorce proceedings and it was for the first time on 14.12.2002 when the respondent produced the ex-parte injunction order dated 7.12.2002 before the appellant to prohibit her to enter into the residence, then only she came to know of the said divorce proceedings. The appellant had left the house in the morning for performing her duties at Sitapur and returned back to the house in the evening, but she was restrained by the respondent to enter into the house on the basis of the aforesaid ex-parte order dated 7.12.2002, as a result of which all the belongings of the appellant including service records, cash, ornaments, car, clothes, Fixed Deposit Receipts, National Saving Certificates, Life Insurance Policies and other valuables were left in the custody and possession of the respondent and at the time of leaving the house, the appellant had nothing with her except the clothes on her person and a purse containing some cash. Shri Radhey Shyam Sachan, father of the respondent, who is aged about 74 years, tried to pacify the matter and to convince the respondent that after 14 years of marriage and being the father of three minor children, demand regards to the second marriage after taking the divorce from the first wife, will ruin the entire social status of the family and further it would effect the future of the children adversely. The respondent instead of understanding the advice of his father, became annoyed with him and has thrown him out of his residence. Thereafter, father of the respondent having left with no other alternative, started living alone in his village house. However, mother of the respondent could not dare to oppose his son, therefore, she has been permitted to continue to live with the respondent and she is under his control and influence. In order to create pressure upon the appellant, the respondent has also started to raise false allegations against her character, whereas the true fact is that the respondent has always been a devoted and faithful wife of the respondent and further she has performed all her marital obligations till she was removed by the respondent under the garb of ex-parte injunction order dated 7.12.2002 passed by the trial court. Richa Misra with whom the respondent has illicit relations, is a married lady, but she was not faithful to her husband Rajendra Kumar Misra S/o Raj Nath Misra, resident of 221/8K, Ganga Vihar, Transport Nagar, Allahabad and a divorce petition being Matrimonial Petition No.161 of 2003, Rajendra Kumar Misra vs. Richa Misra is pending between them before the family Court at Allahabad. The appellant invested all her funds and savings which she had accumulated prior to the marriage with the respondent and further she has put hard labour and devoted herself for the developments of the said hospital. The Shekhar Hospital, which is quite big and has a great name and fame, is the result of joint labour, investments, sacrifice and devotion of the respondent and the appellant. The said hospital was originally an ordinary clinic in a tin shed in the year 1989 when the appellant was married to the respondent and as such the Shekhar Hospital is not an exclusive property of the respondent, but the appellant too is a co-sharer and owner of the said Hospital. After solemnization of the marriage, the appellant has never treated the respondent with cruelty and still in case this Hon'ble Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant has treated the respondent with cruelty, then also the alleged cruelty stands condoned by the act of the respondent as the parties have continuously lived together even after the institution of the present suit and they have preformed all marital obligations. The respondent himself is guilty of instituting the present divorce petition on wrong, false and fabricated facts and he wants to take advantage of his own wrong. It is also stated that the divorce petition was defective for non-compliance of Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court Rules framed under the Hindu Marriage Act. The petition was also defective for non-observations of Section 20 of the Act and lastly, it was said that the divorce petition was liable to be dismissed as it has been filed on wrong, false and fabricated facts. 5. The trial court after adducing evidence of the respective parties and after appreciating the entire material and the evidence on record, dissolved the marriage solemnised between the appellant and the respondent dated 15.2.1989 by a decree of divorce. Hence this appeal. 6. Sri Ashok Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there has been unnecessary delay in filing the divorce petition and that too after 14 years of marriage and the divorce petition was bad for non-joinder of necessary party as Richa Misra, with whom the respondent has illicit relation, was not impleaded as a party in the divorce petition. The divorce petition was filed on 26.10.2002 and the appellant was turned out from the house by the respondent on 14.12.2002 by obtaining an injunction order from the trial court, which has acted illegally in not considering the documentary evidence produced by the appellant by saying that those documents were photostat copies. Submission is that the said documents could not have been rejected in view of the provisions contained in Section 14 of the Family Courts Act as they were admissible in evidence to deal with the factual dispute in question though they were not otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. He has further submitted that the cruelty, if any, stood condoned by the act of the respondent as he continuously lived with the appellant and has co-habitation with the appellant with no grudge and any sort of staint relations. He has further submitted that the cruelty, if any, stood condoned by the act of the respondent as he continuously lived with the appellant and has co-habitation with the appellant with no grudge and any sort of staint relations. Notice was issued to Richa Misra with whom the respondent has illicit relation, on the application moved by the appellant as contemplated under Sections 14 and 21 of the Act to answer the allegations of adultery made against her, but she did not turn up and made an endorsement in the notice to the effect that she has filed a defamation suit against the appellant and apart form it, nothing was said that and neither she appeared to answer the allegations made against her. It is submitted that it was incumbent upon Richa Misra to have come to the Court and answer the allegation of adultery made against her as specific allegation of adultery was made against Richa Misra in paras 48 to 54 of the written statement by the appellant. It is also submitted that the appellant did not receive any notice in respect of defamation suit alleged to be filed by Richa Misra against her. It has further been submitted that while granting divorce, the trial court has relied upon and accepted the statement of the respondent though no specific instance was pleaded by him in the pleadings, whereas the statement as well as the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant was rejected on the ground that the allegations have not been made in the written statement in respect of one incident and, therefore, the said evidence cannot be taken into consideration. The evidence of Radhey Shyam Sachan (D.W.-2), father of the respondent was rejected solely on the ground that he happens to be the interested witness as he left the house and is living separately, whereas the evidence of Keshkali, mother of the respondent (P.W.-3), who was also an interested witness, was accepted. The age of the father of the respondent on the date of statement was 76 years and at this stage if any allegation of illicit relation with the appellant was made, then it was made just to malign the image of his wife, and to make the evidence of Radhey Shyam Sachan, father of the respondent doubtful. The age of the father of the respondent on the date of statement was 76 years and at this stage if any allegation of illicit relation with the appellant was made, then it was made just to malign the image of his wife, and to make the evidence of Radhey Shyam Sachan, father of the respondent doubtful. The respondent cannot take the advantage of his own wrong as on the date of filing of the suit, stigma was existing against him as he was illicit relations with Richa Misra and if he at all filed the suit for divorce in such circumstances, then the suit be liable to be dismissed rather than giving protection to the respondent of his misconduct and wrongful act. Section 23 of the Act specified the aforesaid legal position. The allegation of adultery was made by both the parties and the trial court did not find the adultery to be proved by both the parties. An interim order was passed by this Court restraining the respondent from remarrying on 19.9.2007 and when the Court passed the said order, a specific finding was recorded that a statement was made by the counsel for the respondent that the respondent has not married and an affidavit has also been filed to that effect. Considering the undertaking of the respondent, a restraint order was passed, but it is submitted that the restraint order was violated by placing on record a marriage certificate dated 19.6.2006 when it is alleged that a Geeta Path and Home Warming Ceremony took place at the residence of the respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that allegation of manipulation in the affidavit by the appellant, is not substantiated from the record as the initial made by the Stamp Reporter itself goes to indicate that at the time of swearing the affidavit, the aforesaid statement was there that the respondent has not remarried. Counsel for the appellant has taken us to the various paragraphs of the affidavit and if they read in continuity, then he submits that only one irresistible conclusion can be drawn that the respondent has not married by that time. Counsel for the appellant has taken us to the various paragraphs of the affidavit and if they read in continuity, then he submits that only one irresistible conclusion can be drawn that the respondent has not married by that time. It is also submitted that if the evidence is taken into consideration, then the marriage as alleged by the respondent, is an anti dated document and no effort was made by the respondent to have entered into the marriage under the Special Marriage Act Act Lucknow as the parties were residing at Lucknow, but they opted to get themselves married before the Marriage officer at Barabanki. There is no justification of such marriage which on the face of it, appears to be a manipulation of the respondent. The respondent was having proper notice of the appeal being filed as the divorce decree was passed on 21.2.2006 and the caveat was filed on 22.2.2006 and copy of the appeal along with documents was served upon the respondent on 27.3.2006. The appeal was in time upto 3.7.2006 according to the report of the Stamp Reporter, but later on it was found that the period of limitation is one month, so it became time barred and ultimately an application for condonation of delay was moved and the delay was condoned and the appeal was admitted. So the respondent cannot say that he was not having any knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings or the likelihood of the appeal being filed. If it was in the knowledge of the respondent regarding the likelihood of filing of the appeal, then he ought to have waited for the decision of the Court irrespective of the fact that as to whether it was filed or it was in the process of being filed. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that if it is in the knowledge of the respondent that the appeal was under process or is being filed, then it was incumbent upon him to have waited for the result of the appeal, rather than remarrying on an anterior date in view of the provisions contained under Section 15 of the Act. The factum of adultery has been proved in view of the admission of the respondent that he has married Richa Misra on 19.6.2006. The factum of adultery has been proved in view of the admission of the respondent that he has married Richa Misra on 19.6.2006. The evidence at the relevant time before the trial court was to the effect that the respondent was having illicit relations with Richa Misra and he gave a proposal for divorce with mutual consent telling the appellant that he wants to marry Richa Misra and divorce her, but the appellant did not agree to the same. The aforesaid fact finds established from the statement of Radhey Shyam Sachan, father of the respondent (D.W.-2). The factum of cruelty on which the divorce suit has been decreed, is only on the basis of general averments made in respect of the female employees, doctors of the hospital except that one name Dr. Aparna Sharma has been mentioned, but she has not been produced in court to prove that any such allegation was made by the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that only allegation of cruelty has been cited in respect of illicit relations with bhabhi, but it is submitted that in the written statement and in the evidence, the appellant explained the circumstances on account of which bhabhi of the respondent had to leave the house and live in her own house i.e. 8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow. He has also submitted that there was no denial of allegation of illicit relations with bhabhi when the entire circumstances were explained in her statement. The circumstances were compelled the bhabhi of the respondent and then on the advice of family Guruji Sri J.K. Singh, she left the house as her daughter has eloped with one Shailendra Yadav regarding which an FIR was lodged and thereafter he was arrested and sent to jail. It is also submitted that the family atmosphere was not such which was allowing her to continue in the hospital building as the respondent was very much careful about his career and upliftment of the hospital and he wanted that there should not be any situation which may give impression otherwise. The factum of adultery in respect of other female employees has been mentioned, but only general allegation has been made and no evidence has been adduced and neither any female employee has been produced as a witness to prove the aforesaid allegation. The factum of adultery in respect of other female employees has been mentioned, but only general allegation has been made and no evidence has been adduced and neither any female employee has been produced as a witness to prove the aforesaid allegation. The general allegations without any specific event in the evidence, are of no consequence and the evidence from the pleadings can also not been taken into consideration if nothing was said in the pleadings as general allegation was made in the pleadings except in respect of allegation against bhabhi of the respondent. The appellant never denied to perform her marital obligations, but after an injunction order was obtained by the respondent on 7.12.2002 when she has gone to attend her duties at Khairabad, District Sitapur and when she returned in the evening, she was asked to go away. The plight of the appellant can be imagined that she was without any clothes, jewellery, cash and without any infrastructure to survive and, therefore, the circumstances to part away with the respondent were created by the respondent himself rather than the appellant being responsible for the same. It has further been submitted that the relations between the respondent and the appellant were good up till February, 2002 when she was met with an accident and the relations remained cordial up till April, 2002. Thereafter intimacy with Richa Misra by the respondent was observed by the appellant and the appellant also went to the house of Richa Misra on 2.10.2002 and found her husband therein in the one room set house of Richa Misra after Richa Misra opened the door. Submission is that if allegation of illicit relation has been made, then it is not necessary that evidence should be stated in the pleadings. In the pleadings facts have to be stated and it is to be proved by evidence and the evidence can be of any magnitude to rely to the fact stated in the pleadings. The sudden rise of salary of Richa Misra from Rs.2,500/- to Rs.19,000/- and also close association of respondent with Richa Misra ultimately created some suspicion between the husband and the wife and when the relations of respondent with Richa Misra came to the knowledge of the appellant directly, then only a divorce proposal with mutual consent was moved. The sudden rise of salary of Richa Misra from Rs.2,500/- to Rs.19,000/- and also close association of respondent with Richa Misra ultimately created some suspicion between the husband and the wife and when the relations of respondent with Richa Misra came to the knowledge of the appellant directly, then only a divorce proposal with mutual consent was moved. The things turn around after 2.10.2002 and the divorce petition was filed on 26.10.2002 and an injunction order was obtained on 7.12.2002. The respondent, therefore, cannot take the benefit of his own wrong. The factum of cruelty before the ISO team is also not established from the statement of P.V. Thapa S/o Dan Bahadur Thapa (P.W.-2) and the evidence of the respondent (P.W.1) and there is material contradiction in the statements of both the persons. Two dates have been mentioned in respect of cause of action i.e. 14.7.2002 and 16.7.2002 in respect of the incident when the appellant misbehaved with the ISO team. Submission is that the respondent cannot claim anything beyond that and neither any evidence adduced beyond that can be taken into consideration. The respondent has not taken as a cause of action so far the illicit relation with his bhabhi is concerned. Similar is the case of incident of 16.7.2002, wherein there is material contradiction in the statements of the respondent (P.W.-1) and the mother of respondent Keshkali (P.W.-3). He has also submitted that the factum of illicit relation with bhabhi has not been proved as bhabhi has not been produced as a witness. The respondent could not have succeeded on the witnesses of the appellant and it was on the part of the respondent to have proved his case. It has also been submitted that the trial court had decreed the suit on the ground of cruelty, but in the changed circumstances and in view of the subsequent development, which has taken place in the form of remarriage, the charge of illicit relationship with Richa Misra itself goes to indicate that the respondent has committed misconduct before filing the suit for divorce. 7. The appellant's counsel has also submitted that the appellant also gave her statement before this Court on 8.10.2013 that she wants to live along with the respondent and even before the trial court on 3.5.2003 she gave a statement that she wants to live along with the respondent. 7. The appellant's counsel has also submitted that the appellant also gave her statement before this Court on 8.10.2013 that she wants to live along with the respondent and even before the trial court on 3.5.2003 she gave a statement that she wants to live along with the respondent. In the list of witnesses filed before the trial court, name of bhabhi was given, but she was not examined and neither any application was made to call her. The relations between the appellant and bhabhi of the respondent were good and there were no differences between them and this fact is further fortified from the fact that the letters which were written by the children, were not handed over to the appellant, so the appellant asked them to sent the letters on the address of their aunt (bhabhi of the respondent) and thereafter the said letters were received by the appellant and those letters have been filed in evidence to prove the aforesaid fact. In sum and substance, the submission is that the trial court while dissolving the marriage between the appellant and the respondent by means of decree of divorce, has committed illegality in not considering the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant by saying the they were photostat copies and rejecting the statement of father of the respondent, Radhey Shyam Sachan (D.W.-2) by saying that he was an interested witness, whereas evidence adduced by the respondent and the statement of mother of the respondent have been accepted, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 8. Dr. L.P. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that allegations of adultery made against the appellant in para 22 of the plaint have not been replied with. He has further submitted that there is no violation of the interim order passed by this Court as the respondent had remarried on 19.6.2006 much prior to passing of the interim order dated 19.9.2007. He has also been submitted that interpolation has been made in the affidavit and, therefore, the said interpolation would not be binding upon him. Apart from it, an argument has also been advanced that no instructions were given to the counsel to make such a statement that the respondent has not married. Submission, therefore, is that the application moved by the appellant under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC is liable to be rejected. Apart from it, an argument has also been advanced that no instructions were given to the counsel to make such a statement that the respondent has not married. Submission, therefore, is that the application moved by the appellant under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC is liable to be rejected. So far the factum of cruelty is concerned, learned counsel has submitted that the factum of cruelty is fully established from the evidence on record as serious allegation of illicit relations with bhabhi was made and so it was not possible for the respondent to live along with the appellant in such a scenario where every time she used to make allegations against the lady doctors and female employees of the hospital. The respondent often beaten by the appellant and he was also thrown away from the bedroom. He was having no illicit relation or intimacy with Richa Misra and Richa Misra was a simple employee in his hospital, but after the grant of divorce decree both have decided to marry and they have married. Richa Misra is having a daughter from the earlier husband. The respondent is performing all his family liabilities i.e. his two daughters and one son and also the daughter of Richa Misra are studying and on which substantial money is being spent by the respondent. The appellant has made wild allegation in respect of character of the respondent and the appellant has also made complaint to the University as well as to the other authorities against the respondent where he is teaching. It is submitted that when living with the appellant became impossible, then the respondent has moved an application seeking injunction against the appellant as it became nearly impossible to live along with her in view of her changed attitude towards the respondent and thereby creating problem every now and then in the hospital. He has also submitted that there was no bar in marrying Richa Misra as the appeal was not filed within time and copy of the appeal with all documents were given to the respondent on 27.3.2006, but the appeal became time barred and it was not filed within limitation, therefore, there was no bar as contemplated under Section 15 of the Act to remarry. The appellant is living separately for the last 13 years and irretrievable breakdown of marriage has taken place and as such the decree of divorce cannot be set aside at such a belated stage and the Allahabad High Court Rules are not applicable in view of the provisions of Section 23 of the Family Courts Act as the 'Court' refers under the Hindu Marriage Act and not in the Family Courts Act. The allegations in regard to adultery against the respondent have not been found to be proved by the trial court and, therefore, they cannot be looked into by this Court in appeal. The respondent tried to patch up with the appellant till end, but she did not agree for the same. He, therefore, submits that there is no illegality in the judgement and decree passed by the trial court whereby the marriage between the appellant and the respondent has been dissolved by a decree of divorce nor this Court has the power to re-appreciate the evidence being the court of record. 9. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent took place on 15.2.1989 according to the Hindu rites and customs from the residence of the uncle of the appellant as the father of the appellant expired much prior to the marriage. Kanya Daan was also done by the uncle and aunt of the appellant. At the time of marriage, the appellant was working as Medical Officer in the Ayurvedic Hospital, Chunar District Mirzapur and the respondent started a Nursing Home in a tin shed in Indira Nagar, Lucknow with only one or two beds and the said Clinic used to close at 8 or 9'O Clock in the evening. The appellant took long leave and used to live along with the parents of the respondent at 530/52, Shekhpur, Bara Chandganj, Lucknow along with younger sister of the respondent Km. Geeta and the family of his elder brother and all were living jointly. The elder brother of the respondent was posted at Shikohabad, District Mainpuri and he used to come to the house at the week ends. Geeta and the family of his elder brother and all were living jointly. The elder brother of the respondent was posted at Shikohabad, District Mainpuri and he used to come to the house at the week ends. The appellant and the respondent both did hard labour, devotion and investment for setting up of the Clinic, which in due course of time developed into a three storied Nursing Home in May, 1991 and after completion of the aforesaid Nursing Home, the name has changed to Shekhar Nursing Home and the appellant along with the respondent and her elder daughter Km. Garima shifted to a portion of the aforesaid Nursing Home as their residence, which was a two room set at the second floor of the building. The other family members continued to live at the house situate at Bada Cahndganj, Lucknow. The elder brother of the respondent expired on 28.4.1998 and thereafter in July, 1998 all the family members i.e. parents, younger sister Km. Geeta and the family members of the deceased elder brother of the respondent also shifted their residence to the premises of the Shekhar Nursing Home, where all the family members were living peacefully and enjoying their life. There was no quarrel of any nature nor any annoyance with anybody in the family. The hospital flourishing with its own speed and the appellant and the respondent were enjoying the marital life with love and affection to each other. Certain development took place at this juncture as Km. Geeta, younger sister of the respondent developed love affair with one Amit Arya and she wanted to marry him, but the respondent was opposing the said marriage, as a result thereof, there was confrontation between Km. Geeta and the respondent, consequence thereof, Km. Geeta lodged an FIR with the police against the respondent for her illegal confinement and thereafter with the help of the police, Km. Geeta left the house of the respondent in October, 1999 married to Amit Arya on 5.3.2000. The aforesaid incident raised much hue and cry in the family and there was turmoil in the family so far the reputation of the family is concerned, but hardly they come out of the said trauma, the niece (daughter of elder brother) of the respondent Km. The aforesaid incident raised much hue and cry in the family and there was turmoil in the family so far the reputation of the family is concerned, but hardly they come out of the said trauma, the niece (daughter of elder brother) of the respondent Km. Annu Sachan had love affair with one Shailendra Yadav and she left the house on 2.1.2000 and went to Varanasi with Shailendra Yadav, regarding which an FIR was lodged by the bhabhi of the respondent and on 14.1.2000 Km. Annu Sachan was recovered by the police from Varanasi and Shailendra Yadav was arrested and sent to jail. After this second incident, a lot of turmoil prevailed in the family and the respondent found difficult to continue to live with his bhabhi and his family after the Shailendra Yadav was arrested and sent to jail on the basis of the FIR lodged by his bhabhi. There was confrontation in the family and so family Guruji Sri J.K. Singh was called for to settle the things in an amicable manner, so that the family members may live in peace. The family Guruji advised bhabhi of the respondent to shift to her own house i.e. 8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow, which was purchased by her in the year 1991 from U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and on the advice of the family Guruji, bhabhi of the respondent shifted to her own house and the other family members remained to live in the premises of the Nursing Home. After the solemnization of the marriage up till April, 2002, the relations between the appellant and the respondent were very affectionate and cordial and they were enjoying their life. During this period, the appellant was blessed with two daughters and one son, who are 25 years, 21 years and 19 years of age at present. With the joint effort, labour and devotion of the appellant and the respondent, the Shekhar Nursing Home developed into Shekhar Hospital Private Limited and was incorporated under the Companies Act in the year 1995. The respondent became the Managing Director and the appellant was the Director besides Dr. Harish Chandra, who was the Medical Director. The appellant and the respondent along with parents and children shifted their residence in the year 2001 to the fourth floor of the said hospital. The respondent became the Managing Director and the appellant was the Director besides Dr. Harish Chandra, who was the Medical Director. The appellant and the respondent along with parents and children shifted their residence in the year 2001 to the fourth floor of the said hospital. The appellant devoted herself with full zeal and enthusiasm for setting up of the hospital as both the parties belong to the middle class and, therefore, they were serious about their profession and also their devotion for setting up of the said Hospital. The appellant who was cooperating and devoting herself for setting up of the hospital, developed some problem in her service and so she filed a writ petition before this Court and on the intervention of the Court, she was allowed to resume her duties on 18.12.2001 at Government Ayurvedic Dispensary, Khairabad, District Sitapur. The appellant used to go to Sitapur in the morning and returned in the evening after performing her duties. The respondent taking the advantage of the aforesaid absence of the appellant, developed intimacy with one Richa Misra, who has joined in the hospital in April, 2000 as Store Keeper on a salary of Rs.2,500/- per month and thereafter suddenly in the beginning of 2002 she was promoted to the post of Pathology Technician and Management Executive and her salary was enhanced to Rs.19,000/- per month. The appellant in due course of time could understand the reason as to why the salary of Richa Misra was increased abnormally, then she came to know about the illicit relations between the respondent and Richa Misra. From April, 2002 the appellant found a sudden change in the behaviour of the respondent and she noticed that the relations between the respondent and Richa Misra were becoming more friendly and stimulating. The respondent thereafter started coming late to the house at night hours and it was also noticed that he was talking to Richa Misra for a long time during night hours. The result of such relationship was that the behaviour of the respondent became rude with the appellant. On 2.10.2002 the appellant received a phone call from an unknown person that in House No.A 1415/5 Near Meena Market, Indira Nagar her husband was there along with Richa Misra. The result of such relationship was that the behaviour of the respondent became rude with the appellant. On 2.10.2002 the appellant received a phone call from an unknown person that in House No.A 1415/5 Near Meena Market, Indira Nagar her husband was there along with Richa Misra. The appellant went to that house and knocked the door and thereafter door was opened by Richa Misra, which was one room set and in the house except Richa Misra and the husband of the appellant nobody was there. The appellant immediately returned back to her house and her husband was taken by surprise and was in a bewildered position. Thereafter, the respondent demanded divorce on the basis of mutual consent and he sent a divorce agreement to the appellant, but the appellant did not agree for the same and thereafter the things went more bitter between both the parties. When the appellant refused to sign the divorce papers, she was threatened that she will be seen in the court of law and she will be reduced to ashes. The aforesaid fact was also disclosed by the respondent to his parents to convince the appellant to sign the divorce papers on mutual consent, but he did not receive any support from his parents and rather the father of the respondent reprimanded him for such an act and thereafter annoyance developed between the respondent and his father, consequent thereof the divorce proceedings were initiated by the respondent. During the course of divorce proceedings, it is to be noted that the court wanted to know as to whether the appellant was still ready to live along with the respondent, so the appellant was asked to give a specific statement in this regard and she gave a statement on 3.5.2003 stating therein that she was ready to live along with her husband. Even before this Court the statement of the appellant was recorded on 8.10.2013, wherein she has stated in clear terms that she wants to live along with her husband. The relevant portion of the order dated 8.10.2013 is quoted below :- " ................................ On 17.9.2013, both the parties were directed to appear before this Court today and as such both the parties are present. The appellant-Dr. The relevant portion of the order dated 8.10.2013 is quoted below :- " ................................ On 17.9.2013, both the parties were directed to appear before this Court today and as such both the parties are present. The appellant-Dr. Shailesh Kumari submits that she wants to maintain her relationship with her husband as a wife at all costs even if, her husband has entered into a second marriage. ........................" Even after recording the statement of the appellant before the trial court, the respondent refused to accept her as a wife and the proceedings went and the divorce decree was granted and the marriage was dissolved. 11. The first point, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that there has been unnecessary delay in initiating the divorce proceedings as in para 4 of the plaint, it has been stated that the appellant always used to have rough behaviour with the respondent, whereas it was specifically pleaded before the trial court that till April, 2002 the relations between the husband and the wife were very cordial and attractive and out of their wedlock, two daughters and one son were born and they were enjoying their life in an affectionate manner and she used to go to her Maika on various occasions and her husband used to take her to Delhi, Mumbai, Goa and the appellant and the respondent used to celebrate the birthdays of children and their own and they also used to give gifts to each other. On 11.2.2002 when the appellant met with an accident, hectic effort was made by the respondent in her treatment, but the aforesaid finding has been brushed aside and no weight has been given to the aforesaid facts by the trial court. The respondent also purchased a Maruti Zen Car in the name of the appellant. The appointment of the respondent on the post of Lecturer in the King Georges Medical College and the rejoining of the appellant in service and the birthday of their daughter on 1.1.2002, all these things were taken into consideration and as a consequence thereof a Maruti Zen Car was presented to the appellant on 1.1.2002 on the birthday of their daughter. The aforesaid car met with an accident on 11.2.2002 in which all have received injuries, but the appellant received more grievous injury and she was taken care of and treated well at the instance of her husband and after she recovered, a recital (Akhand Ramayan Path) was also took place in the hospital. The respondent also purchased a Ford Ikon Car in the name of the appellant. So on the basis of the aforesaid incidents, it has been submitted that the relations between the appellant and the respondent were cordial and affectionate till April, 2002. Some complications arose in respect of service of the appellant and so she filed a writ petition before this Court and on the intervention of the Court, she was allowed to resume her duties on 18.12.2001 at Government Ayurvedic Dispensary, Khairabad, District Sitapur. The appellant used to go to Sitapur in the morning and returned in the evening after performing her duties. The respondent taking the advantage of the aforesaid absence of the appellant, developed intimacy with one Richa Misra, who has joined in the hospital in April, 2000 as Store Keeper on a salary of Rs.2,500/- per month and thereafter suddenly in the beginning of 2002, she was promoted to the post of Pathology Technician and Management Executive and her salary was enhanced to Rs.19,000/- per month. The appellant in due course of time, could understand the reason as to why the salary of Richa Misra was increased abnormally, then she came to know about the illicit relations between the respondent and Richa Misra. From April, 2002 there was a sudden change in the behaviour of the respondent and he came close to Richa Misra as is evident from the fact that he started coming late to the house at night hours and he used to talk to Richa Misra for a long time during night hours. On 2.10.2002 the appellant received a phone call from an unknown person that in House No.A 1415/5 Near Meena Market, Indira Nagar her husband was there along with Richa Misra and in order to verify the truth to the said call, the appellant went to that house and knocked the door and thereafter door was opened by Richa Misra, which was one from set and in the house except Richa Misra and the husband of the appellant nobody was there. The appellant immediately returned back to her house and her husband was taken by surprise and was in a bewildered position. Thereafter, the respondent stepped into his immoral act and made it known to the appellant by forwarding a copy of the divorce agreement on mutual consent and it was also made known to the appellant that he wants to marry Richa Misra. The appellant refused to sign the aforesaid agreement, whereupon she was threatened and was told her that she would be reduced to ashes and she will be seen in the court of law. The respondent also tried to convince his parents, but they did not agree and his father reprimanded the respondent. Thereafter the respondent has married to Richa Misra on 19.6.2006 before the Marriage Officer, Barabanki though the parties are living at Lucknow, but no effort was made to get themselves married at Lucknow under the Special Marriage Act for the reasons best known to them. 12. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent did not come to the Court with clean hands and has rather tried to take advantage of his own wrong as provided under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. Learned counsel has emphasized that the respondent has committed misconduct by developing illicit relations with Richa Misra, which stands proved now by passage of time after entering into marriage with her on 19.6.2006 though copy of the appeal along with documents was received by the respondent on 27.3.2006 and it was in his knowledge that the appeal was going to be filed. Section 23 of the Act provides that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief. Section 23 of the Act provides that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief. The wrong committed by the respondent is apparent from the fact that after April, 2002, a sudden change in his behaviour was found by the appellant on account of the fact that owing to some complications in her service, the appellant approached this Court by filing a writ petition and on the intervention of the Court, she was allowed to resume her duties on 18.12.2001 at Government Ayurvedic Dispensary, Khairabad, District Sitapur and she used to go to Sitapur in the morning and returned in the evening after performing her duties and this gave an opportunity to the respondent to develop intimacy with Richa Misra. The salary of Richa Misra was enhanced to Rs.19,000/- abnormally in 2002 though she was appointed in the year 2000 as Store Keeper on a salary of Rs.2,500/-. The respondent, therefore, on the date of filing the divorce suit, was suffering from disability as contemplated under Section 23 (1) (a) of the Act and in order to take advantage of his own wrong, he cannot claim divorce as he suffers from disability for the said purpose. 13. The second wrong, which was committed by the respondent was that he obtained an injunction order against the appellant on 7.12.2002 and the appellant was left bewildered when she returned in the evening from Sitapur after performing her duties to know the fact that there was an injunction order against her and she could not enter into her residence. All the belongings of the appellant, including cash, jewelery, clothes, Insurance Policies, National Saving Certificates and Fixed Deposit Receipts etc. were left inside the house and she was deprived of the same. Therefore, the submission is that the respondent, who has committed wrong, cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 14. In support of his contention, counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a decision rendered by the apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Jain vs. Sumati Jain, 2013 (31) LCD 1127 , wherein in paragraph 13 of the judgement, the apex Court held as under :- "13. 14. In support of his contention, counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon a decision rendered by the apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Jain vs. Sumati Jain, 2013 (31) LCD 1127 , wherein in paragraph 13 of the judgement, the apex Court held as under :- "13. Under subclause (a) of clause (1) of Section 23, in any proceeding under the Act, if the Court is satisfied that any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her won wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, the Court shall grant relief under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act. Therefore, it is always open to the Court to examine whether the person seeking divorce "is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief". On such examination if it is so found that the person is taking advantage of his or her wrong or disability it is open to the Court to refuse to grant relief." 15. In the case of Chetan Dass vs. Kamla Devi, 2001 AIR SCW 1660, the apex Court again considered the same issue and found that the husband, who was leading adulterous life, cannot be given advantage of his own wrong and cannot be granted divorce on the ground of desertion on part of his wife who is still prepared to live with him provided he snaps his relationship with other woman. In paras 18, 19 and 20 of the judgment, the apex Court held as under :- " 18. .................................... In the present case, the allegations of adulterous conduct of the appellant have been found to be correct and the Court s below have recorded a finding to the same effect. In such circumstances, in our view, the provisions contained under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act would be attracted and the appellant would not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In such circumstances, in our view, the provisions contained under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act would be attracted and the appellant would not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Let the things be not misunderstood nor any permissiveness under the law be inferred, allowing an erring party who has been found to be so by recording of a finding of fact in judicial proceedings, that it would be quite easy to push and drive the spouse to corner and then brazenly take a plea of desertion on the part of the party suffering so long at the hands of the wrong doer and walk away out of the matrimonial alliance on the ground that marriage has broken down. Lest the institution of marriage and the matrimonial bonds get fragile easily to be broken which may serve the purpose most welcome to the wrong-doer who, by heart, wished such an outcome bypassing on the burden of his wrong-doing to the other party alleging her to be the deserter leading to the breaking point. 19. In this case, we also find that the respondent is still prepared to live even at this stage of her life with the appellant but rightly on the condition that the appellant disassociates himself from Sosamma Thomas. There has been no cause of grievance or any allegation of objectionable behaviour by any one except the meek plea put forward by the husband that she was dissatisfied with the living conditions at Kirawad and she wanted him to live in Vijaynangar. Such allegations have been found to be incorrect. She also lived in Ganganagar. Had only living in Kirawad been the problem, there was no occasion for her to be dissatisfied in living in Sriganganagar, at least none has been indicated by the appellant. 20. In this case, the averments made in the petition for obtaining a decree for divorce, namely, desertion on the part of the wife without any reasonable cause have not been found to be correct. The petition was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. The defence of the respondent for having a justified reason to live away from the husband has been found to be correct. Behaviour of the appellant certainly falls in the category of misconduct on his part. The petition was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. The defence of the respondent for having a justified reason to live away from the husband has been found to be correct. Behaviour of the appellant certainly falls in the category of misconduct on his part. In such circumstances, it is too much on his part to claim that he be given the advantage of his own wrong and be granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion on the part of his wife who is still prepared to live with him provided he snaps his relationship with the other woman. Similar offer had also been made on behalf of the appellant, which, we have already dealt in the earlier part of the Judgment. He perhaps prefers to snap relationship with the respondent rather than with Sosamma Thomas. A decree of divorce on the ground of marriage having been irretrievably broken cannot be granted in the facts and circumstances of the case as indicated above." 16. In the case of Brajesh Kumar vs. Smt. Anjali, 2009 (1) ALJ 424 , learned Single Jude of this Court also considered the issue in similar circumstances and in para 27 of the judgment, it has been held as under :- "27. In my considered opinion, by no stretch of imagination, the said letter/complaint of the respondent caused any aspersion on the character of the petitioner. Nor it amounts mental cruelty. At this stage, it is relevant to note here that it is the petitioner who filed the divorce petition but the respondent has shown great restraint and has not taken recourse to any criminal or civil court proceedings which are usual in such matters. This also fortifies the view taken by the court below that the respondent has not treated the petitioner with cruelty, mental or physical." 17. A coordinate Bench of this Court considered the similar question in the case of Ajay Lavania vs. Smt. Shobhna Dubey, 2011 (88) ALR 618 and found that the husband was suffering from disability and he could not have taken advantage of his own wrong. In paragraphs 63 and 64 of the judgment, this Court held as under :- "63. As observed (supra), continuance of marriage is 'rule' and divorce is an exception. Exception cannot become rule by liberal approach. In paragraphs 63 and 64 of the judgment, this Court held as under :- "63. As observed (supra), continuance of marriage is 'rule' and divorce is an exception. Exception cannot become rule by liberal approach. Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act is enabling provision and enabling provision deal with disability or contingencies in special circumstances but it does not confer power to invoke the provision with regard to divorce as a matter of right. The courts should be conscious to ensure that the statutory provision with regard to divorce or maintenance is not abused by either of the spouse for extraneous reasons or as an instrument to wreak vengeance. 64. Courts have to ensure that the matrimonial life continue to its entirety and the duo husband and wife may consume their natural life, as far as possible. It shall be necessary for the plaintiff/ petitioner who approached the Court under Section 13 of the Act to establish that he or she has not been at fault and possess impeccable character and made all efforts for continuance of matrimonial life. There shall be dual burden on the plaintiff, first to prove his or her own impeccable character and efforts made for continuity for matrimonial life and secondly, it shall be necessary to establish that the conduct of other side is so impractical and serious that it shall cause irreparable loss and injury warranting dissolution of marriage. Keeping in view the provision contained in Sections 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, burden to prove the grounds with regard to divorce shall be on the plaintiff to establish the facts. There may be situation when both side does not possess impeccable character or both are flirt or have been indulged in unethical practice, then in such situation, it is for the court to decide the issue in a just and proper manner to secure the interest of both sides. In case, the defendant in a divorce suit possess impeccable character and discharge her/his obligation in the manner which is expected from a person of common prudence or except some minor violence or incidence at the spur of moment, then in such situation, it shall not be proper for the Court to decree a divorce suit." 18. In the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. In the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 , the apex Court while considering the similar controversy, held in paragraph 33 of the judgment as under :- "33. We must therefore try and understand this Dr. Dastane and his wife Sucheta as nature his made them and as they have shaped their lives. The only rider is that interdict of Section 23 (1)(a) of the Act that the relief prayed for can be decreed only if the Court is satisfied that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his own wrong. Not otherwise." 19. In the case of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chadra Pandey, 2002 AIR SCW 182 , the apex Court in paragraph 13 of the judgement held as under :- "13. In any proceedings under the Act whether defended or not the Court would decline to grant relief to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner was taking advantage of his or her won wrong or disability for the purposes of the reliefs contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act. No party can be permitted to carve out the ground for destroying the family which is the basic unit of the society. The foundation of the family rests on the institution of a legal and valid marriage. Approach of the Court should be to preserve the matrimonial home and be reluctant to dissolve the marriage on the asking of one of the parties." 20. The second point, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the cruelty, if any, stood condoned in view of the behaviour of the parties during the long duration of period. The behaviour of the parties after the marriage in the year 1989 till April, 2002 remained with full of love and affection as stated by the appellant. He has also submitted that even if the allegations made in the plaint are taken on their face value, then the respondent shall be deemed to have condoned the cruelty on the part of the appellant and it is apparent and clear from the pleadings of the respondent in the suit that the cruelty as pleaded has not been condoned. He has also submitted that even if the allegations made in the plaint are taken on their face value, then the respondent shall be deemed to have condoned the cruelty on the part of the appellant and it is apparent and clear from the pleadings of the respondent in the suit that the cruelty as pleaded has not been condoned. The respondent in para 6 of the plaint has stated that in order to pleasure of matrimonial life, he tolerated the cruel behaviour of the appellant and in para 10 of the plaint it has been stated that the appellant used to ill treat the family members i.e. father, mother and two sisters and bhabhi of the respondent. In para 12 of the plaint, it has been stated that soon after the death of elder brother of the respondent in the year 1996 (1998), the appellant started quarreling, abusing and beating the respondent and continued mental and physical injury to the respondent. In para 13 of the plaint, it has been stated that the appellant was not having cordial relations with any of the family members of the respondent and everybody lived with a fear in mind that any time the appellant can beat and abuse them without any rhyme or reason. In para 15 of the pliant, it has also been stated that the appellant made allegations of illicit relations of the respondent with a number of female employees of the hospital and at the instance of the appellant services of the female workers were terminated. If all these allegations are taken into consideration, then as stated by the appellant in her statement that the appellant and the respondent were having joint bank accounts which could be operated by anybody. They nominated each other in the insurance policies. On the date of statement also, the respondent-husband continued as nominee in the policies. They used to go to Delhi, Mumbai, Goa, Mysore, Mussoree and Dehradun every year where their children are studying and many times they have gone to pilgrimages like Vaishno Devi. The marriage anniversary and the birthdays of the children were celebrated together and they used to give gifts to each other. They used to go to Delhi, Mumbai, Goa, Mysore, Mussoree and Dehradun every year where their children are studying and many times they have gone to pilgrimages like Vaishno Devi. The marriage anniversary and the birthdays of the children were celebrated together and they used to give gifts to each other. The appointment of the respondent as Lecturer in the King Georges Medical College and the rejoining of the appellant in her services after the order of this Court and the birthday of their daughter on 1.1.2002 were celebrated together and on this occasion the appellant was gifted a Maruti Zen Car by her husband-respondent. The new car met with an accident on 11.1.2002 and all the persons received injuries in the said accident, but the appellant received more grievous injuries and she was looked after by her husband during the treatment period and after she recovered, a recital (Akhand Ramayan Path) also took place in the hospital. In March, 2002, the respondent also purchased a Ford Ikon Car in the name of the appellant. All these facts go to indicate that the cruelty, if any, as pleaded by the respondent was existing, then it stood condoned in view of the provisions contained in Section 23(1) (b) of the Act, which reads as under :- " 23 (1) (b). where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and " 21. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the condonation of cruelty has to be considered in the light of the conduct of the parties, their behaviour with each other and their discharge of marital obligations and sexual relations. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgement rendered by the apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane (supra), wherein in paragraph 56 of the judgement, it has been held as under:- " 56. The evidence of condonation consists here in the fact that the spouses led a normal sexual life despite the respondent's -acts of cruelty. N.G. Dastane (supra), wherein in paragraph 56 of the judgement, it has been held as under:- " 56. The evidence of condonation consists here in the fact that the spouses led a normal sexual life despite the respondent's -acts of cruelty. This is not a case where the spouses, after separation, indulged in a stray act of sexual intercourse, in which case the necessary intent to forgive and restore may be said to be lacking. Such stray acts may bear more than F one explanation. But if during co-habitation the spouses, uninfluenced by the conduct of the offending spouse, lead a life of intimacy which characterises normal matrimonial relationship, the intent to forgive and restore the offending spouse to the original status may reasonably be inferred. There is then no scope for imagining that the conception of the child could be the result of a single act of sexual intercourse and that such an act could be a stark animal act unaccompanied by the nobler graces of marital life. One might then as well imagine that the sexual act was undertaken just in order to kill boredom or even in a spirit of revenge. Such speculation is impermissible. Sex" plays an important role in marital life and cannot be separated from other factors which lend to matrimony a sense of fruition and fulfilment. Therefore, evidence showing that the spouses led a normal sexual life even after a series of acts of cruelty by one spouse is proof that the other spouse condoned that cruelty. Intercourse, of course, is not a necessary ingredient of condonation because there may be evidence otherwise to show that the offending spouse has been forgiven and has been received back into the position previously occupied in the home. But intercourse in circumstances as obtain here would raise a strong inference of condonation with its dual requirement, forgiveness and restoration. That inference stands uncontradicted, the appellant not having explained the circumstances in which he came to lead and live a normal sexual life with the respondent, even after a series of acts of cruelty on her part." 22. The apex Court while considering the aforesaid issue in the case of Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava vs. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava and another, AIR 1967 SC 581 , held in paragraph 13 as under :- " 13. The apex Court while considering the aforesaid issue in the case of Smt. Chandra Mohini Srivastava vs. Shri Avinash Prasad Srivastava and another, AIR 1967 SC 581 , held in paragraph 13 as under :- " 13. reliance in this connection is placed on Perry v. Perry (1952) 1 All ER 1076, as to the content of condonation, which involves forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. That was however, a case of desertion. It is urged that in order that forgiveness may be confirmed or made effective, something more than stray acts of cohabitation between husband and wife have to be proved. But where as in this case, judicial separation is being claimed on the ground of S.10 (1)(f), the fact that the husband cohabited with the wife even after the knowledge that she had been guilty of cohabiting with another person would in our opinion be sufficient to constitute condonation, particularly, as in this case, the first respondent knew of the alleged adultery in May/June 1958 and still continued to cohabit with the appellant thereafter upto October, 1958. Further the statement of the first respondent to the effect that he kept his wife after may/June 1958 a the instance of his friends is a clear indication of condonation even in the sense of forgiveness confirmed or made effective by reinstatement. We are, therefore, of opinion that the first respondent is not even entitled to a decree of judicial separation." 23. The evidence as discussed above goes to indicate that the parties were enjoying the sexual life and they were going for outstations together and love and affection is further established from the fact that a Maruti Zen Car was purchased and after the accident, a new Ford Ikon Car was also purchased by the respondent in the name of appellant. In these circumstances, we find that the cruelty, if any, stood condoned by the respondent in the given circumstances. 24. The third point, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial court has refused to consider the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant on the ground that they are photostat copies, as such they cannot be read in evidence. 25. 24. The third point, which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial court has refused to consider the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant on the ground that they are photostat copies, as such they cannot be read in evidence. 25. In this regard, counsel for the appellant has referred to the finding recorded by the trial court, wherein a copy of the Suit No.MPS 161 of 2003, Rajendra Kumar Misra vs. Smt. Richa Misra was filed and in para 3 of the pliant, it was stated that when she came to her in-laws' place she told her husband that she was having affair with one boy and this was told on the first night and she was also admitted that she has physical relations with the said boy and when after relationship came to light, the marriage has been arranged by her mother and father with Rajendra Kumar Misra. The appellant also filed a copy of the application moved by the husband of Richa Misra to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad dated 30.4.2003. The aforesaid documents were rejected by the trial court by saying that they are photostat copies and, therefore, they cannot be taken into consideration. In this regard, counsel for the appellant has drawn the attention of the Court towards Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, which reads as under :- " 14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.-- A Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be other relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)." 26. Section of 14 of the Family Courts Act in its very clear terms provides that the Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute. The important words which have been used are "whether or not the same would be other relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act." In view of the aforesaid provision, the rejection of documentary evidence on the ground that they are photostat copies by the trial court cannot be accepted. 27. The important words which have been used are "whether or not the same would be other relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act." In view of the aforesaid provision, the rejection of documentary evidence on the ground that they are photostat copies by the trial court cannot be accepted. 27. In support of his contention, counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision rendered by this Court in the case of Anurag Bajpai vs. Smt. Indira Bajpai, 2013 (101) ALR 94, wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court after considering the issue in question, held in paragraphs 21 and 23 of the judgment as under :- "21. For proper appreciation of evidence on record supporting allegation of cruelty and desertion first of all the court below has not accepted the documents as admissible in evidence on the ground that they were the photo copies. It further held that even if the said documents are considered they do not constitute cruelty. In our considered view, in matrimonial dispute strict adherence to the laws of evidence is not required as the court below is neither holding a trial for establishing offences nor is trying to determine question of title. All that is required is any material which can substantiate the allegation, especially when the document sought to be read in evidence have not been denied by the opposite party, the same cannot be ignored only because it is inadmissible in evidence as per the provisions of Evidence Act. 23. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the court below can look into any material which may not specifically be admissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. Therefore, in our considered view, that court below was not right in not accepting paper nos. 21-Ga to 30-Ga filed by the plaintiff. ......................" 28. The finding recorded by the trial court in respect of the aforesaid rejection of the photostat copies was patently illegal and against the law and the same was required to be considered for the purposes of the proving the relations between the husband and Richa Misra and also for the purposes of understanding the character of Richa Misra. The aforesaid documents go to indicate that Richa Misra was also having litigation with her husband and her husband also disclosed that he was told by her that she was having affair with one boy. The aforesaid documents go to indicate that Richa Misra was also having litigation with her husband and her husband also disclosed that he was told by her that she was having affair with one boy. This itself is a proof of the fact that Richa Misra was a lady of easy virtue. 29. The appellant has also filed a copy of the salary certificate of Richa Misra as document no.G16/21, but the trial court proceeded to reject the same by saying that it was a photostat copy. The said document indicates that salary of Richa Misra was enhanced from Rs.2,500/- to Rs.19,000/-. The finding of the trial court that the said fact is not proved as the document being a photostat copy, cannot be taken into consideration, which may be sufficient to establish the intimacy of the respondent with Richa Misra. 30. The fourth point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that evidence of the appellant was discarded by the trial court solely on the ground that there was no pleading in the written statement in regard to the incident of 2.10.2002, wherein it was stated that the respondent was found at the house of Richa Misra after the appellant went there on receiving an anonymous telephone call and knocked the door of the one room set of Richa Misra. The trial court did not find favour with the aforesaid incident though it is submitted on behalf of the appellant's counsel that the evidence and the pleading are altogether different things. The pleading is statement of fact and the evidence is referred to prove those facts. The evidence is not required to be stated as fact. There was clear averment in the written statement in regard to illicit relation of the respondent with Richa Misra and in order to prove the said fact, the incident was narrated. On the contrary, the trial court proceeded to rely upon the statement of the respondent and on that basis, it was found that cruelty has been committed. Similar was the position wherein the statement of the respondent was accepted to be a cruelty as the trial court held that the institution of proceedings under Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. making allegations to the higher officers of the police and getting the news printed in the paper to malign the image of the respondent amounted to cruelty. 31. Similar was the position wherein the statement of the respondent was accepted to be a cruelty as the trial court held that the institution of proceedings under Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. making allegations to the higher officers of the police and getting the news printed in the paper to malign the image of the respondent amounted to cruelty. 31. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that all this evidence which was led during the course of hearing has been accepted in respect of the husband, whereas the illicit relations alleged in respect of Richa Misra has been discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. The trial court was not right in rejecting the evidence of the appellant as the appellant has proved the fact of illicit relations of the respondent with Richa Misra by narrating the incident of 2.10.2002 in her statement. He has refereed to Order VI Rule 1 CPC in this regard, which deals with material facts and evidence. The evidence of father of the respondent was rejected by saying that he was an interested witness, therefore, his evidence cannot be taken into consideration, whereas the evidence of mother of the respondent, who was residing along with the respondent and she gave a statement against the appellant in respect of cruelty and illicit relation of the appellant with her father-in-law has been accepted. He, therefore, submits that if the trial court rejected the evidence of father-in-law, then the evidence of mother-in-law of the appellant was also liable to be rejected on the same grounds. 32. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that allegation of illicit relation of the respondent with his bhabhi is not proved from the evidence on record. To substantiate the argument, he has stated that the list of witnesses was filed before the trial court under Order 16 of the CPC in which name of the bhabhi of the respondent appeared at serial no.2 as witness, but bhabhi was never produced in evidence to prove the allegation of illicit relation made against her. A person against whom allegation of adultery was made and is a family member and is living in the house, he or she is the best person to prove the allegation of adultery against him or her. A person against whom allegation of adultery was made and is a family member and is living in the house, he or she is the best person to prove the allegation of adultery against him or her. In absence of any evidence coming forward on the part of the respondent, the evidence led by the appellant in this regard has to be considered. The allegation in the plaint was made that as a result of illicit relation against bhabhi, she started living separately from the house of the respondent in the year 2000, whereas in the written statement, the appellant has categorically stated that she was having good relations with her co-sister (bhabhi of the respondent) and even at present also she is having good relations with her co-sister and it was because of the family problem and on the advise of the family Guruji Sri J.K. Singh, she started living separately in her own house i.e. 8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow and this decision was taken by her under compelling circumstances as the daughter of the co-sister Km. Annu Sachan eloped with one Shailendra Yadav and went to Varanasi with him and on an FIR being lodged by the co-sister, she was recovered from Varanasi on 14.1.2000 and Shailendra Yadav was arrested and sent to jail. Km. Geeta, sister of the respondent also lodged an FIR against the respondent for her illegal confinement and ultimately she was married with one Amit Arya. The respondent had to get bailed out as he was arrested as the FIR was lodged against the father of the respondent by younger sister Km. Geeta and after leaving the house, she started to live in the hostel and on 5.3.2000 she was married to Amit Arya. The aforesaid two incidents created a turmoil in the family and living of the family together became impossible and so the family Guruji advised the bhabhi of the respondent to live separately in her own house. 33. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the specific denial of the allegation of illicit relations with bhabhi was not required to be made in view of the that there was specific statement on record to indicate that she was having good relations with her co-sister and the circumstances under which she had to left the house have been explained in the written statement as well in the statement of the appellant. He, therefore, contended that there is no specific denial in the written statement about the illicit relations with bhabhi, has got no force. In order to prove that appellant was having good relations with her co-sister, the appellant instructed her children to send letters on the address of her aunt (co-sister of the appellant) as the letters which were being received in the hospital, were not being handed over to the appellant, as a result thereof the letters were sent on the address of the bhabhi of the respondent at House No.8/212, Indira Nagar, Lucknow and from there the letters were handed over to the appellant. Three letters have been placed on record in the form of evidence and they have been proved in accordance with law. So the above circumstances go to indicate that the allegation of illicit relation with bhabhi of the respondent was only a cooked up allegation in order to give colour to the misconduct of the respondent, which he has entered by having illicit relation with Richa Misra with whom he has ultimately married and is living along with her, which is evident from the affidavit filed during the pendency of the appeal on 19.6.2006. 34. The factum of cruelty with children has also not been taken as a ground to grant divorce. But it is to be noted that the statement of the children was never recorded. The interim custody of the children was given by means of order dated 11.1.2005. The order was reserved on 5.1.2005 and the case was fixed for 11.1.2005 and on 11.1.2005 an order for interim custody was passed, but at 3 PM it was ordered that the appellant was not ready to receive the custody of the children and the children also did not want to go along with the appellant and proceeded to reject the application. On the same day i.e. 11.1.2005 an application was moved by the appellant stating therein that the appellant was at Ghatampur (Kanpur) and it was not possible for her to take the custody of the children in such a short notice and a request was made that the case be fixed for tomorrow or for day-after-tomorrow so that the appellant may come and receive the custody of the children, but no orders were passed on the said application. The appellant's counsel thereafter moved an application on 12.1.2005. The appellant's counsel thereafter moved an application on 12.1.2005. It is to be noted that in the order dated 11.1.2005 the trial court has mentioned that three children were present, whereas only two children were present, which shows the casual approach of the trial court in dealing with the case. The application dated 12.1.2005 was again rejected by the trial court making a mention therein that the custody has been refused to be taken by the appellant. How the appellant could have taken the custody of the children on the same day when she was not present nor any document indicates her presence nor the order passed by the trial court indicates that the appellant was present. So in these circumstances, the cruelty in respect of children which has been mentioned, is a farce and the same is not made out and neither any such cruelty can be inferred from the evidence on record in respect of the children. 35. The fifth point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that general allegations have been made in respect of illicit relations of respondent with lady doctors and lady employees of the hospital, but neither any of the lady doctor or employee has been produced. The allegations in respect of Dr. Aparna Sharma has not been pleaded in the plaint and neither she was produced to prove the allegation of illicit relation made against her. Under what circumstances Dr. Aparna Sharma resigned and what circumstances compelled her to leave the job from the hospital have been explained by the appellant in a proper manner in her evidence, wherein she has stated that Dr. Aparna Sharma wanted to complete her Postgraduate Course and, therefore, she had to left the job under compulsion. 36. In absence of any lady employee or lady doctor being produced in evidence, the allegation of illicit relation or the allegation of ill treatment to the employees is not established from the evidence on record. 37. The sixth point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that in para 27 of the pliant cause of action has been mentioned in regard to two incidents of 14.7.2002 and 16.7.2002. 37. The sixth point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that in para 27 of the pliant cause of action has been mentioned in regard to two incidents of 14.7.2002 and 16.7.2002. Apart from it, no other incident has been mentioned and so it is submitted that any other incident which gave rise to the cause of action to the present proceedings, cannot be taken into consideration and neither the same form the basis for decreeing the divorce suit. When the respondent has specifically relied upon two incidents, then he can not go beyond those two incidents. In para 27 of the pliant, it has been alleged that the appellant treated the respondent with cruelty in public place. In order to prove the aforesaid fact, respondent has stated in his statement that on 14.7.2002 the ISO team came to the hospital for inspection and the appellant misbehaved with the respondent before the ISO team. She uttered absurd words to the respondent and this was repeated by her all throughout the day, but in the latter part of the statement, it has been stated that on 14.7.2002 at about 2-3 PM the appellant left the house and she came back in the evening. In the statement of the respondent it has come that apart from appellant and the respondent, one maid servant and his mother were present during the said incident. 38. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that if the appellant misbehaved with the respondent before the ISO team, then the ISO certificate could not have been granted to the hospital. He has also submitted that in para 17 of the plain it has been stated that on the date when the ISO team came for inspection, the appellant shouted loudly in the hospital and abused and made an attempt to beat the employees and the respondent in presence of the ISO team, but in spite of this specific pleading, nothing sort of evidence has been stated by the respondent and it has only been said that the appellant misbehaved and used harsh words to the respondent. This discrepancy in the statement itself goes to indicate that the respondent is not speaking truth before the court. This discrepancy in the statement itself goes to indicate that the respondent is not speaking truth before the court. In respect of incident of 14.7.2002, the statement of mother of the respondent is very much material, who has stated that there was some quarreling and when she sent the Maid (Aaya) to call the appellant, then she said I am sitting in Room No.4 and I will not come and thereafter she went away and returned in the night. Learned counsel for the appellant states that if the appellant was sitting in the room, then where was the occasion for any altercation or quarreling with the respondent before the ISO team. After the grant of ISO certificate, a function was organized in the Geneses Club, Lucknow on 16.7.2002. The trial court has accepted the said incident as amounted to cruelty as the appellant misbehaved with the respondent as she made an attempt to beat thrice the respondent before the friends and relatives as stated in para 18 of the plaint. The statement of respondent also goes to indicate that the appellant made allegations of illicit relations upon him and she misbehaved with him before the guests, but if we look into the statement of Keshkali (P.W.-3) which itself goes to indicate that the appellant did not enter into the venue and she was reluctant to go in the function and she reached the venue late and did not enter the venue. She was asked some food and after taking food outside the venue, she came back alone in the car. The specific statement of Keshkali (P.W.-3), mother of the respondent, goes to indicate that though the appellant reached the venue late, but she did not enter the venue where the function was taking place, so in these circumstances, the statement of respondent that appellant misbehaved with him, can not be believed and appears to be a concocted story set up by the respondent. 39. The two cause of actions as alleged in the pliant, in these circumstances and considering the evidence on record, can not be said to be proved. The trial court could not have gone beyond these two cause of actions pleaded in the plaint. 39. The two cause of actions as alleged in the pliant, in these circumstances and considering the evidence on record, can not be said to be proved. The trial court could not have gone beyond these two cause of actions pleaded in the plaint. Both the incidents, which have been alleged as stated above, do not inspire confidence and it appears that the allegations have been cooked up for the purposes of litigation as the respondent was having illicit relations with Richa Misra and so to cover up the aforesaid misconduct, the respondent made allegations in the plaint against the appellant in respect of illicit relation with bhabhi, lady employees and doctors of the hospital and with Dr. Aparna Sharma. The general allegations which have been made in the plaint, have neither been proved nor any lady Doctor, employee, Nurse has been produced to prove the allegations of illicit relations made by the appellant against them. 40. The respondent has not made any allegation of illicit relation of the appellant with father-in-law in the plaint, but during the pendency of the proceedings, an affidavit was filed by Keshkali, mother of the respondent stating therein that the appellant was having illicit relation with father-in-law. The father-in-law who found that his son was not behaving properly and was having illicit relation with Richa Misra, which was told to him by his son as well as by the appellant and when the respondent tried to seek divorce on mutual consent, he was reprimanded by his father. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that when injunction order was passed against the appellant and she was compelled to leave the house of the respondent on 7.12.2002, the appellant was left with no option but to leave the house and stayed at Khairabad, District Sitapur. 41. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that when injunction order was passed against the appellant and she was compelled to leave the house of the respondent on 7.12.2002, the appellant was left with no option but to leave the house and stayed at Khairabad, District Sitapur. 41. In this regard, Radhey Shyam Sachan, father of the respondent (D.W.-2), who was 76 years of age at the time of statement, has stated that on 14.12.2002 the appellant went to her relatives house and he went to Sitapur and stayed at his friend's house for the security purposes of the appellant and after making arrangements for rented house to the appellant at Khairabad, he came to the Old Age Home, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow and thereafter started living at his ancestral house and this was done by him only under protest as his son was not adhering to the moral life and was insisting to marry Richa Misra with whom he was having illicit relations. The distance between Sitapur and Khairabad is 10 Kms. If there would have been any question of illicit relation between the appellant and the father-in-law, then the father-in-law could have stayed along with the appellant rather than avoiding to live with the appellant and staying separately at a distance of 10 Kms. and thereafter came back to the Old Age Home, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. The evidence of Radhey Shyam Sachan (D.W.-2) could not have been rejected by saying that he is an interested witness. In family disputes of this nature, everybody is an interested witness and it is the family members who are the best persons to give evidence in respect of minute instances, which took place in the family everyday. The statement of Radhey Shyam Sachan (D.W.-2) itself goes to indicate that he tried to emphasize his son, but since his son did not agree, in protest he left the house to live separately. Not only this which was the end of the matter, but the respondent got a suit for maintenance filed against his father through her mother. The father of the respondent has also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rites under Section 9 of the Act against his wife and ultimately the proceedings terminated and nothing happened. Not only this which was the end of the matter, but the respondent got a suit for maintenance filed against his father through her mother. The father of the respondent has also filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rites under Section 9 of the Act against his wife and ultimately the proceedings terminated and nothing happened. The father is still living separately as he was unable to accept the immoral life which the respondent was living and had to leave the house. The father also requested his wife to come along with him, but she stayed back along with his son. At this stage of life when one is about 76 years of age and the other is one or two years less, the leaning of the mother would be towards the son rather than the husband as after certain stage in life, the love and affection towards the son is much more in comparison to the husband. 42. The appellant in her statement has specifically stated that Richa Misra was lodged an FIR against her and her father-in-law in which the appellant had to approach this Court and her arrest was stayed by this Court, but even then the police of Police Station Ghazipur was harassing her, so she moved an application for her security to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow and to the Women Protection Organization. 43. The next point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the Allahabad High Court Rules (for short 'the Rules') have been framed under the Hindu Marriage Act and Rule 6 of the said Rules provides as Under :- "6. Necessary parties.--(a) In every petition for divorce or judicial separation on the ground that the respondent is living in adultery or has committed adultery1 with any person, the petitioner shall make the alleged adulterer or adulteress a co-respondent to the petition unless he or she is excused by the Court from doing so on any of the following grounds : (i) that the name of such person is unknown to the petitioner although he has made due efforts for discovery; (ii) that such person is dead; (iii) that the respondent if a woman is leading the life of a prostitute and that the petitioner knows of no person with whom adultery has been committed; or (iv) any other reason that the Court considers sufficient. (b) In every petition under Section s 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act, the petitioner shall make "the other wife" mentioned in that section a co-respondent. (c) In every petition under Section 11 of the Act on the ground that the condition in Section 5(1) is contravened, the petitioner shall make the spouse alleged to be living at the time of the marriage a co-respondent. (d) If a petitioner does not make the alleged adulterer or adulteress, a correspondent, he shall at the time of presenting the petition file a separate application supported by an affidavit giving the reasons." In view of the provisions contained in Rule 6 of the Rules, the appellant moved an application for impleading Richa Misra as a party. Notice was sent to Richa Misra to which she replied by stating that everything is false and she has filed a defamation suit against the appellant and did not appear in the Court though in paras 48 to 54 of the written statement allegations have been made against her in respect of adultery. 44. In Rule 13 of the Rules, it is provided that where the written statement of the respondent alleges adultery by the petitioner with a named man or woman, a certified copy of such statement or such material portion thereof containing such allegations shall be served on such man or woman accompanied by a notice that such person is entitled within the time therein specified to apply for leave to intervene in the case. In spite of notice issued to Richa Misra, she did not turn up in the court to deny the allegations of adultery made against her in the written statement. It is also to be noted here that no notice in respect of defamation suit, which is alleged to be filed by Richa Misra, was served upon the appellant up till now. In these circumstances, it is stated that adverse inference has to be drawn against Richa Misra and the allegation of illicit relation against her must be deemed to be proved. 45. In these circumstances, it is stated that adverse inference has to be drawn against Richa Misra and the allegation of illicit relation against her must be deemed to be proved. 45. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court has not passed any order for impleadment of Richa Misra, with whom allegation of adultery has been made by the appellant in the written statement nor she has impleaded as a party in the divorce suit, therefore, the suit was not maintainable and was bad for non-joinder of parties in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Udai Narain Bajpai vs. Smt. Kusum Bajpai, AIR 1975 Allahabad 94. In para 12 of the judgment, it has been held as under :- " 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the decision in AIR 1942 All 223 (supra) for the purpose of contending that till such time as the appellant's application for amendment of his petition by addition of the alleged adulterers as co-respondents was made, it was not in accordance with law and not maintainable. It was urged that till the co-respondents were impleaded it was not open to the court either frame issues in the petition or admit evidence on Issue No.5 and consequently the framing of the issues by the trial Court as well as the finding on Issue No.5 are without jurisdiction. There is force in this contention which must be accepted (emphasis applied)." 46. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that these Rules are not applicable as the definition clause provides the court mean the court mentioned in Section 3(b) of the Act. Section 3(b) of the Act defines the Court as "district court" in any area for which there is a city civil court, that court, and in any other area the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. He, therefore, submits that the rules, which have been framed under the Hindu Marriage Act are not applicable under the Family Courts Act as the Family Courts have been established in consultation with the High Court to deal with the cases arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act. Under the Family Courts Act, establishment of the Court has been indicated and in the definition clause the word 'Court' has not been defined. Under the Family Courts Act, establishment of the Court has been indicated and in the definition clause the word 'Court' has not been defined. In the definition clause it has been provided that the "Family Court" means a Family Court established under Section 3. When the matters arising under the Hindu Marriage Act are to be decided and adjudicated in the Family Court, then for the purposes of deciding the cases under the Family Courts Act, this Act has been framed. 47. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act deals with the jurisdiction, which provides that subject to the other provisions of this Court, a Family Court shall ---- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of sits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. 48. In view of the aforesaid provision in the Act itself, the power of the civil court is to be exercised by the Family Court and as such the Rules framed under the Hindu Marriage Act will be applicable for deciding the cases arising under the Hindu Marriage Act and for the purposes of the Act, the city civil court is defined under the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, the meaning will not be an hurdle for applicability of the rules framed under the Hindu Marriage Act for deciding the disputes arising therein. 49. Therefore, the meaning will not be an hurdle for applicability of the rules framed under the Hindu Marriage Act for deciding the disputes arising therein. 49. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that argument of learned counsel for the respondent that there is no denial of allegation of illicit relation made by the appellant with bhabhi of the respondent in para 22 of the plaint, can not be accepted and he submits that there was no need to deny the allegations made in para 22 of the plaint, but rather on the contrary, the appellant has stated that she was having good relations with her co-sister (bhabhi of the respondent) and she had explained the circumstances under which her co-sister had to leave the house of the respondent in the form of two marriages against the wishes of the parents; one by the younger sister of the respondent Km. Geeta and the other by the niece of the respondent Km. Annu Sachan and with the intervention of family Guruji, she started living separately in her own house. Learned counsel has also submitted that had the relations with the bhabhi would have been of such nature, then the appellant could have never told to her daughter to sent the letter on the address of her aunt (co-sister of the appellant) and those letters were duly received by the appellant, which were placed on record as evidence to prove that the said letters were received on the address of the bhabhi of the respondent. 50. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is still having good terms with the children and they are also affectionate to her, but the aforesaid fact can not be disclosed by the appellant as it will affect the life of the children and their studies will be stopped. One daughter is preparing for IAS and the other is preparing for CAT examination and the son is studying in Manipal University in the second year of MBBS and this requires huge investment which the appellant cannot afford being a lady of meager income and, therefore, it can not be said that the appellant has no care for the children or that the children are not having love and affection for their mother. The children are very much in contact with the appellant and they are having continuous contact with her. 51. The last point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that the remarriage has been admitted by the respondent with Richa Misra. The allegation of adultery could not be found to be proved at the relevant time on account of the fact that the evidence of the appellant was rejected on technical ground and also that no direct evidence could be produced in regard to illicit relationship. But now the marriage has been admitted, therefore, the relationship between the respondent and Richa Misra has to be inferred and as contemplated under Section 14(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, a presumption has to be drawn in regard to illicit relationship with Rich Misra by the respondent. The respondent could have argued otherwise provided he was not married to Richa Misra, but on his own admission he has stated that he has married to Richa Misra on 19.6.2006. The peculiar thing to note here is that up till 2007, a statement was made before the court and an affidavit was also filed, wherein remarriage was denied. The denial of remarriage on 19.9.2007 persuaded the Court to pass a restraint order that the respondent will not remarry. 52. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that some interpolation has been made in the affidavit dated 12.7.2006 and one sentence has been added in handwriting without the signature of the deponent or of the counsel or of the Oath Commissioner. 53. We find that if the entire affidavit is read, then from paragraph 3 and onwards the correction which has been made is in sequence to the averment which has been made and it is not that all of sudden certain change has been made with a view to deny the marriage. In para 3 of the affidavit, it has been mentioned that the respondent has not mentioned the date of knowledge of alleged marriage nor the source of information has been disclosed. If the factum of remarriage was in the knowledge of the appellant, then she ought to have stated in the affidavit filed along with the application for condonation of delay on 4.7.2006 as the said affidavit was sworn on 4.7.2006. If the factum of remarriage was in the knowledge of the appellant, then she ought to have stated in the affidavit filed along with the application for condonation of delay on 4.7.2006 as the said affidavit was sworn on 4.7.2006. The entire averment has been made in regard to remarriage, but it has been tried to demolish on the ground that the source of information has not been disclosed and the affidavit has been filed on the personal knowledge etc. etc. The party organized at the residence of the respondent has been admitted and the card annexed along with the affidavit also goes to indicate that there was House Warming Ceremony and Bhagwat Geeta on 26.6.2006 at 8 PM. The sequence of events mentioned in paras 3 and 4 of the affidavit leads to only one conclusion that marriage was specifically denied by the respondent. The correction made in the affidavit also contains the initial of Oath Commissioner. The question of interpolation could have been presumed had there been no initial of the Oath Commissioner. In para 4 of the affidavit, it has again been submitted that the appellant has filed false affidavit and she may be punished for filing false affidavit and she was trying to mislead the Court. It was also said that purgery proceedings for filing of false affidavit be also initiated against her. So in these circumstances, the argument of counsel for the respondent is misconceived and can not be accepted. 54. The aforesaid argument has been advanced to only get rid of the affidavit filed before this Court on 12.7.2006 as it has been stated by the respondent's counsel that the respondent has remarried on 19.6.2006. In order to overcome the contempt proceedings, the aforesaid argument has been advanced as an application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC was moved by the appellant on 17.10.2011 for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondent with the allegation that the respondent has contacted the second marriage in spite of the interim order passed by this Court on 19.9.2007. It is thereafter that the aforesaid stand was changed in reply to the averments made in the application and prior to that at any point of time the respondent is retracted from the statement made. 55. It is thereafter that the aforesaid stand was changed in reply to the averments made in the application and prior to that at any point of time the respondent is retracted from the statement made. 55. Counsel for the appellant has not been able to find out any fault in the marriage certificate, which has been placed on record by the respondent. The marriage certificate has not been challenged by the appellant on any ground. It has also not been said as to whether the marriage has been solemnized on back date or that the certificate has been issued by way of manipulation. The certificate which has been placed on record by the respondent goes to indicate that the marriage has been solemnized before the Marriage Officer, Barabanki on 19.9.2006, but it is to be noteworthy to mention here that the Shekhar Hospital is situated at Lucknow and the parties are residing in Lucknow and what was the occasion to go to Barabanki for getting their marriage registered. In the city of Lucknow the marriage could have been registered under the Special Marriage Act or before the Sub-Registrar, Lucknow. It appears that the parties approached the Marriage Officer at Barabanki to suit their own convenience and in order to avoid any unprecedented situation from the side of the appellant and it was a better option for them according to their choice and meets. 56. Since we are not finding any argument advanced on behalf of the appellant in regard to the validity of the marriage certificate, the application under order 39 Rule 2A CPC is rejected. 57. Counsel for the respondent has put forward an argument in regard to the irretrievable breakdown of marriage and it has been submitted by him that the parties are living separately for about 13 years i.e. from the date of passing of the injunction order on 7.12.2002 and the respondent has remarried to Richa Misra, who is having a girl aged about 14 years from her earlier husband, and in case the appeal is allowed, then their future would put in dark as they are living together since long and the appellant has not been in contact nor there has been physical relations between the parties for the last so many years. Moreover, the respondent can not live with appellant in the wake of allegations made against each other and after such a long drawn litigation between the parties. He has also submitted that living with the appellant is impossible and, therefore, the appeal may be dismissed and the marriage may be declared as null and void on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 58. In what situation the breakdown of the marriage has been presumed. The appellant has given a statement even before the trial court on 3.5.2003 that she wants to live along with the respondent, but the respondent refused to live along with her. Again statement of the appellant was recorded before this Court on 8.10.2013 in which she has stated that she was ready to live along her husband even at the cost of second marriage, but the respondent has not come forward to accept the offer given by the appellant and allow her to live along with him. That being the position, the Court has to consider as to whether the irretrievable breakdown of marriage on these facts can be granted by this Court or this power is to be exercised by the apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The irretrievable breakdown of marriage has to be considered in the light of the evidence on record and the conduct of the parties. The conduct of the parties goes to indicate that the appellant was reinstated in service in the year 2001 at Khairabad, District Sitapur and she started daily up and down from Sitapur to Lucknow. On 14.12.2002 when she came back, she was handed over a copy of the injunction order passed by the trial court and she was restrained to enter into the house, then she was having no other way and compelled to go to her relatives place. All the belongings of the appellant remained with the respondent when she was turned out from the house on the basis of the injunction order of the trial court and her jewelery, cash, insurance policies, fixed deposit receipts, clothes etc. remained with the respondent and she did not take them and neither demanded the same from her husband as she knew that ultimately she has to live along with her husband. remained with the respondent and she did not take them and neither demanded the same from her husband as she knew that ultimately she has to live along with her husband. The appellant has never wanted to live separately from her husband, but on account of the misconduct committed by the husband, the appellant was deprived from living with the husband as he obtained an injunction order against her. In the background of the aforesaid facts, whether there was irretrievable breakdown of marriage or not, is to be considered in the light of the law propounded by the apex Court in the following cases :- 59. In the case of Darshan Gupta vs. Radhika Gupta, 2013 (100) ALR 710, the apex Court considered the question of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and relying upon the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, (2009) 6 SCC 379 , held in para 39 of the judgement as under :- "39. At the present juncture, it is questionable as to whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so, is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju Sharma, (2009) 6 SCC 379 , wherein this Court has held as under:- "10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant has stated that this Court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. In our opinion, those cases have not taken into consideration the legal position which we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents. A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. 12. If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be aJdding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent. 12. If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be aJdding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the Courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 13. Had both parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13 -B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce." In this behalf, it would also be relevant to refer to another judgment rendered by this Court in Gurbax Singh vs. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC Paragraph 20 of the cited judgment is relevant to the issue, and is accordingly being extracted hereunder:- "20. Finally, a feeble argument was made that both the appellant and respondent were living separately from 2002 and it would be impossible for their reunion, hence this Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, their marriage may be dissolved in the interest of both parties. Though, on a rare occasion, this Court has granted the extraordinary relief dehors to the grounds mentioned in Section 13 in view of the fact that the issue has been referred to a larger Bench about permissibility of such course at present, we are not inclined to accede to the request of the appellant. If there is any change of law or additional ground included in Section 13 by the act of Parliament, the appellant is free to avail the same at the appropriate time." Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of this case (which are being highlighted while dealing with the appellant's next contention), we cannot persuade ourselves to grant a decree of divorce, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, for the simple reason that the breakdown is only from the side of the husband. The wife - Radhika Gupta has consistently maintained, that she was intensely concerned with her future relationship with her husband, and that, her greatest and paramount desire was to rejoin her husband, and to live with him normally in a matrimonial relationship, once again. Since in the present case, the respondent does not consent to the severance of matrimonial ties, it may not be possible for us to accede to the instant prayer, made at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant." 60. In the aforesaid case also the apex Court took the view that grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be enlarged to a ground of divorce on irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In para 40 of the aforesaid judgment, it has further been held as under :- " Since we were not agreeable with the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the plea of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, learned counsel sought the same relief, for the same reasons, by imploring us to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and to annul the marriage between the parties, as a matter of doing complete justice between the parties. Doing justice between the parties is clearly a constitutional obligation. This Court has been bestowed with the discretion "... to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it...". The concept of justice, however, varies depending on the interest of the party. On most occasions, it is advisable to adjudicate matters in consonance with law. Whenever it is possible to do so, on the touchstone of the courts conscience, the determination rendered would simultaneously result in doing justice between the parties. All the same, since we have been called upon to annul the marriage between Darshan Gupta and his wife Radhika Gupta in order to do complete justice to the parties, we have ventured to thoughtfully examine the matter from instant perspective as well." 61. The apex Court after considering the entire material on record, denied the divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage finding that the wife was ready to live along with the husband. 62. The apex Court after considering the entire material on record, denied the divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage finding that the wife was ready to live along with the husband. 62. In the case of Savitri Pandey (supra) the apex Court took into consideration the identical position, where the appellant therein solemnized the second marriage on 29.5.1997 as there was no interim order. The apex Court taking into consideration the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the second marriage has taken place during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the marriage may be dissolved. In the case in hand, no child was born out of the wedlock of the respondent with Richa Misra, but a girl was born out of the wedlock of Richa Misra with her earlier husband. Even at the cost of second marriage, the apex Court refused to dissolve the marriage. In paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the judgment, the apex Court held as under :- "15. To appreciate such a submission some facts have to be noticed and the interests of public and society to be borne in mind. It appears that the marriage between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce vide the judgment and decree of the Family Court dated 8.7.1996. The respondent-husband filed appeal against the judgment and decree on 19.1.1997. As no stay was granted, the appellant solemnised the second marriage on 29.5.1997, admittedly, during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. There is no denial of the fact that right of at least one appeal is a recognised right under all systems of civilised legal jurisprudence. If despite the pendency of the appeal, the appellant chose to solemnise the second marriage, the adventure is deemed to have been undertaken at her own risk and the ultimate consequences arising of the judgment in the appeal pending in the High Court. No person can be permitted to flout the course of justice by his or her overt and covert acts. The facts of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinct having no proximity with the facts of the present case. No person can be permitted to flout the course of justice by his or her overt and covert acts. The facts of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinct having no proximity with the facts of the present case. In all the cases relied upon by the appellant and referred to hereinabove, the marriage between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent in terms of application under Section 13 B of the Act. This Court while allowing the applications filed under Section 13 B took into consideration the circumstances of each case and granted the relief on the basis of compromise. Almost in all cases the other side was duly compensated by the grant of lumpsum amount and permanent provision regarding maintenance. 16. This Court in Ms.Jorden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra [ AIR 1985 SC 935 ] suggested for a complete reform of law of marriage and to make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste. The Court observed: "It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. .... There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situation in which couples like the present have found themselves. Marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved only on the averments made by one of the parties that as the marriage between them has broken down, no useful purpose would be served to keep it alive. The legislature, in its wisdom, despite observation of this Court has not thought it proper to provide for dissolution of the marriage on such averments. There may be cases where, on facts, it is found that as the marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of commission and omission of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. There may be cases where, on facts, it is found that as the marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of commission and omission of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. This Court in V. Bhagat v. Mrs.D.Bhagat [ AIR 1994 SC 710 ] held that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself to dissolve it. 17. As already held, the appellant herself is trying to take advantage of her own wrong and in the circumstances of the case, the marriage between the parties cannot be held to have become dead for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolving the marriage." 63. In the case of Chetan Dass (supra) while considering the similar issue, the apex Court held as under :- "As observed earlier, the learned counsel for the appellant has merely stressed for grant of relief on the ground that the marriage has completely failed and has irretrievably broken. In connection with this submission, it may be observed that it all depends on the facts and circumstances of the case as to in which case it would be appropriate to grant the relief as prayed. Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by Statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changed social order. It is sought to be controlled in the interest of the individuals as well as in broader perspective, for regulating matrimonial norms for making of a well knit, healthy and not a disturbed and porous society. Institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of irretrievably broken marriage as a straight jacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case." 64. Institution of marriage occupies an important place and role to play in the society, in general. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to apply any submission of irretrievably broken marriage as a straight jacket formula for grant of relief of divorce. This aspect has to be considered in the background of the other facts and circumstances of the case." 64. In the aforesaid case, the apex Court also replied to the same effect that if the wife is still prepared to live even at this stage of her life with the husband, but with a condition that the respondent disassociates himself from Sosamma Thomas. The apex Court in paragraph 19 of the Judgment held as under :- "19. In this case, we also find that the respondent is still prepared to live even at this stage of her life with the appellant but rightly on the condition that the appellant disassociates himself from Sosamma Thomas. There has been no cause of grievance or any allegation of objectionable behaviour by any one except the meek plea put forward by the husband that she was dissatisfied with the living conditions at Kirawad and she wanted him to live in Vijaynangar. Such allegations have been found to be incorrect. She also lived in Ganganagar. Had only living in Kirawad been the problem, there was no occasion for her to be dissatisfied in living in Sriganganagar, at least none has been indicated by the appellant." 65. To the same effect are the cases rendered by the apex Court in the cases of Gaurav Nagpal vs. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42 , Shyam Sunder Kohli v. Sushma Kohli, AIR 2004 SC 5111 , Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415 and V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710 . 66. Learned Single Judge while deciding the similar controversy in the case of Brajesh Kumar (supra) also ruled in para 43 of the judgment that the irretrievable breakdown of marriage can be passed only by the apex Court view of the special jurisdiction conferred on it under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and nor by the High Court or courts subordinate to it. A party who himself is wrong, cannot take advantage of his wrong and approach the Court to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground that the parties have been living separately for a considerable period of time " 43. Sum and substance of the above discussion is that a decree for dissolution of marriage by divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage can be passed only by the Apex Court in view of special jurisdiction conferred on it under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and not by High Court or Courts subordinate to it. A party who himself is wrong, cannot take advantage of his wrong and approach the Court to grant a decree of dissolution on the ground that the parties have been living separately for a considerable period of time." 67. In the case of Anil Kumar Jain (supra) the apex Court while dealing with the identical matter held as under :- "19. The various decisions referred to above merely indicate that the Supreme Court can in special circumstances pass appropriate orders to do justice to the parties in a given fact situation by invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, but in normal circumstances the provisions of the statute have to be given effect to. The law as explained in Smt. Sureshta Devi's case (supra) still holds good, though with certain variations as far as the Supreme Court is concerned and that too in the light of Article 142 of the Constitution." 68. The case laws relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in the light of the law enunciated herein above is to be considered. 69. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred and tried to distinguish the case rendered in the case of Parveen Mehra vs. Inderjit Mehra, (2002) 5 SCC 706 by drawing the attention of the Court towards para 11 of the judgement, wherein the wife filed an intra court appeal before the Division Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same vide order dated 8.8.2000. The husband in the said case did not suffer from any disability or he tried to take advantage of any wrong on his part. 70. The husband in the said case did not suffer from any disability or he tried to take advantage of any wrong on his part. 70. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the case in hand is on different footing as the respondent has tried to take advantage of his own wrong and, therefore, the said case would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 71. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is of Ashok Hurra vs. Rupa Bipin Zaveri, (1997) 4 SCC 226 and is in respect of dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, to which counsel for the appellant has submitted that the aforesaid case arose under Section 13 -B of the Hindu Marriage Act on the basis of mutual consent. In the said case, the wife initially has given the consent for divorce on mutual consent, but later on it was withdrawn after 18 months, which was objected by the husband. The apex Court was persuaded by the fact that the consent given for divorce should not be withdrawn after a period of 18 months and in the meantime the husband has remarried. So these circumstances, the apex Court came to the conclusion that there was irretrievable breakdown of marriage, whereas here in the case in hand, the facts are altogether different and the husband has rather obtained an injunction order on 7.12.2002 restraining the wife from entering into the house and the wife has continuously made a statement on 3.5.2003 and on 8.10.2013 to live along with the husband. Therefore, this case is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 72. The third case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is Sujata Uday Patil vs. Uday Madhukar Patil, (2006) 13 SCC 272 . In the said case the facts were that the decree of divorce was granted by the learned District Judge, which was affirmed by the High Court and the apex Court also affirmed the decree finding that the husband has married again and a child was born from the second wife. The wife was also found to have cruelty by disassociating herself from cohabitation with the husband. The divorce decree was granted by the learned District Judge on 12.11.2002 and the husband married one Manisha Patil on 11.1.2003. The wife was also found to have cruelty by disassociating herself from cohabitation with the husband. The divorce decree was granted by the learned District Judge on 12.11.2002 and the husband married one Manisha Patil on 11.1.2003. So in the said case, all the three courts i.e trial court, appellate court and the High Court granted divorce, but in the case in hand, it is only the trial court, which has dissolved the marriage and no such extenuating fact has been brought on record to indicate that irretrievable breakdown of marriage has taken place on account of the conduct of the appellant. The ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available only to a party who acts in normal circumstances, whereas the respondent in the present case did not allow the appellant to enter into the house by means of an injunction order and thereafter does not allow the proceedings to be decided till 2006. An appeal was filed against the said judgement and the appeal is pending in this Court since 2006 and could not be decided for various reasons. The appellant can not be said to be on fault in not pursuing the matter as she has all along pursued to get the case to be decided, but on one pretext or the other, the case was adjourned and could not be decided. The Court proceedings have taken a long time. Whether the appellant can be blamed for the same or the appellant can be denied the union with her husband only on account of the fact that since 2006 the appellant is living separately and there has been irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The irretrievable breakdown of marriage is to be considered in the background of the aforesaid facts. In our opinion, it appears that no party should suffer for the fault of the Court and if the Court proceedings have prolonged on account of certain reasons, then in such circumstances, it cannot be said that there has been irretrievable breakdown of marriage except the fact that a female child born to Richa Misra is not born out of the wedlock of respondent and Richa Misra, but from her earlier husband. 73. 73. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the learned trial court has not properly appreciated the facts and evidence on record and has reached to a wrong conclusion in decreeing the suit. The trial court has failed to appreciate the case laws placed by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant, so the judgement of the trial court can not be sustained as per the discussions above. 74. For the reasons indicated herein above, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgement and decree dated 21.2.2006 passed by the trial court and restore the marriage dated 15.2.1989 solemnized between the appellant with respondent.