JUDGMENT : S. Nagamuthu, J. 1. The respondents 2 to 5 are the accused Nos. 1 to 4 in S.C. No. 23 of 2012 on the file of the learned IVth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 stood charged for the offence under Section 302 IPC and the accused 3 and 4 stood charged for the offence under Section 302 r/w 114 IPC. By judgment dated 06.08.2012, the trial Court acquitted all the four accused. The appellant is the father of the deceased. He has come up with this appeal challenging the acquittal of the respondents 2 to 5. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows; (a) The land comprised in Survey No. 395/2, situated at Siththar Sillage in Tirunelveli District, was originally owned by one Mr. Shahul Hameed. The accused 1 to 4 were the cultivating tenants under Mr. Shahul Hameed. The accused 1 to 4 did not pay rent to their landlord for about 10 years. Therefore, the landlord viz., Mr. Shahul Hameed decided to sell the said property. The deceased in this case was one Mr. Iyyapillai and P.W. 1 in this case is the father of the deceased. P.W. 1 purchased the said property from its original owner by means of a registered sale deed, dated 26.03.2010. This was not to the liking of the accused 1 to 4. On account of the same, there developed enmity between the two families. This is stated to be the motive for the alleged occurrence. (b) It is further alleged that on 10.10.2010, PW 1 was transplanting crops on the said land. P.Ws. 2 and 3 were also present along with him, involving in the said work. P.W. 3 was actually plowing the land by means of a Tractor. At about 2.30 p.m. the deceased came to the said field bringing lunch for them. After being there for half an hour, at about 3.00 p.m. the deceased started proceeding towards his house. Suddenly, all the accused appeared there. The accused 1 and 2 cut the deceased and the accused 3 and 4 were standing at a distance watching as to whether any person was going to the rescue of the deceased. The deceased fell down sustaining serious injuries. P.Ws. Suddenly, all the accused appeared there. The accused 1 and 2 cut the deceased and the accused 3 and 4 were standing at a distance watching as to whether any person was going to the rescue of the deceased. The deceased fell down sustaining serious injuries. P.Ws. 1 to 3 rushed towards the said place and on seeing that, all the four accused fled away from the scene of occurrence. The deceased died instantaneously. (c) P.W. 1, immediately, proceeded to Gangaikondan Police Station. P.W. 12, the then Inspector of Police, Gangaikondam Police Station received the said complaint of PW 1 under Ex. P. 1 and registered a case in Crime No. 100 of 2010 under Section 302r/w 114 r/w 34 IPC. The time of registration of the case was 4.00 p.m. Ex. P. 9 is the FIR. He forwarded both the documents to the Court. Then, he proceeded to the place of occurrence and prepared an observation mahazar and a rough sketch at the place of occurrence in the presence of P.W. 5 and another witness. He recovered bloodstained earth and sample earth from the place of occurrence under mahazar in the presence of the same witnesses. Since there was likelihood of law and order problem on account of the above occurrence, P.W. 12 did not conduct inquest on the spot. Instead, he shifted the body to the mortuary at Tirunelveli Medical College Hospital. On 11.10.2010, he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased between 7.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. at the mortuary of the hospital. Ex. P. 11 is the inquest report. Then, he forwarded the body for postmortem. (d) P.W. 11 - Dr. Selvamurugan conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased on 11.10.2010 at 10.15 a.m. He found the following injuries: 1) An oblique of heavy cut injury of size 12 x 2 cm x bone deep over right temporal region, it lies 2 cm above right ear. It cuts underlying soft tissue and right temporalis muscles. 2) An oblique gapping heavy cut injury of size 8 x 3 x 4 cm over back of upper part of neck. It cuts underlying soft tissues. 3) A horizontal gapping heavy cut injury of size 10 x 2 x 3 cm over upper part of front of neck. It cuts underlying soft tissues. 2) An oblique gapping heavy cut injury of size 8 x 3 x 4 cm over back of upper part of neck. It cuts underlying soft tissues. 3) A horizontal gapping heavy cut injury of size 10 x 2 x 3 cm over upper part of front of neck. It cuts underlying soft tissues. 4) A horizontal gapping heavy cut injury of size 12 x 2 x 7 cm over front of middle of neck. It lies 3 cm below injury No. 3. It cuts underlying soft tissue, vessels, thyroid cartilage and 5th cervical vertebra. 5) A horizontal gapping heavy cut injury of size 12 x 2 x 7 cm lies 2 cm below injury No. 4. It cuts underlying soft tissue thyroid cartilage and 6th cervical vertebra. 6) A horizontal gapping heavy cut injury of size 12 x 2 x 2 cm seen over left side of neck. It lies 2 cm below left ear. It cuts underlying soft tissues. 7) An oblique gapping heavy cut injury of size 4 x 1 x 1 cm seen over outer aspect of middle of right upper arm. 8) An oblique gapping heavy cut injury of size 12 x 4 x 7 cm over outer aspect and back of lower part of right upper arm. It lies 2 cm above right elbow. It cuts underlying soft tissue, bone and vessels. 9) An oblique gapping heavy cut injury of size 13 x 3 x 4 cm over lower part of front of right thigh. It cuts underlying soft tissue and right femur in its lower end? Ex. P. 8 is the Postmortem Certificate. According to him, the deceased would appear to have died of shock and haemorrhage due to heavy cut injuries to the neck. (e) In the course of the investigation, P.W. 12 came to know that the accused 1 & 2 surrendered before the learned Judicial Magistrate at Kovilpatti. On 13.10.2010, on the orders of the learned Magistrate, he took custody of both the accused. While in custody on 18.10.2010, in the presence of P.W. 8 and another witness, the second accused gave a voluntary confession at 10.00 a.m. In the said statement, he disclosed the place where he had hidden the two aruvals. On 13.10.2010, on the orders of the learned Magistrate, he took custody of both the accused. While in custody on 18.10.2010, in the presence of P.W. 8 and another witness, the second accused gave a voluntary confession at 10.00 a.m. In the said statement, he disclosed the place where he had hidden the two aruvals. In pursuance of the same, he took P.W. 12 and P.W. 8 and another witness to the said place and from a bush, he took out two aruvals (M.O. 1 series) and produced the same. P.W. 12 recovered the same in the presence of the same witnesses under mahazar. On returning to the Police Station, he forwarded the accused to the Court for judicial remand and also handed over the material objects to the Court. He made a request to the Court to forward the material objects for chemical examination. Ex. P. 14 is the report of the Analyst, which revealed that the human blood was found on all the material objects, except aruvals. P.W. 12 collected the medical records and examined the Doctors and rest of the witnesses. On completing the investigation, he laid charge sheet against all the four accused. (f) Based on the above materials, the trial Court framed the charges, as detailed in the first paragraph of this judgment. The accused denied the same. In order to prove the case, on the side of the prosecution, as many as 12 witnesses were examined and 15 documents and 9 material objects were marked. (g) Out of the said witnesses, P.W. 1 is the father of the deceased and P.W. 2 is the brother of P.W. 1. P.W. 3 was the driver under P.W. 1. These three witnesses claimed to have witnessed the entire occurrence. They have spoken vividly about the same. According to them, the accused 1 and 2 indiscriminately cut the deceased and the accused 3 and 4 were standing at a distance watching the arrival of anybody to the rescue of the deceased. P.W. 1 has spoken about the complaint made by him as well. P.W. 4 is the photographer, who took photograph of the dead body at the place of occurrence and the surrounding places. The photographs taken by him have been marked as M.O. 6. P.W. 1 has spoken about the complaint made by him as well. P.W. 4 is the photographer, who took photograph of the dead body at the place of occurrence and the surrounding places. The photographs taken by him have been marked as M.O. 6. P.W. 5 has spoken about the preparation of the observation mahazar and rough sketch, and also the recovery of the bloodstained earth and sample earth from the place of occurrence by P.W. 12. P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 have spoken about the ownership of the land in question and the fact that the accused 1 to 4 were their tenants. P.W. 8 - the Village Administrative Officer has spoken about the confession said to have been given by the second accused while in Police custody and the recovery of two aruvals (M.O. 1 series) on the information furnished by him. P.W. 9 is the Special Sub Inspector of Police, who has stated that on the direction of the Inspector of Police, he carried the dead body from the place of occurrence to the mortuary at the Government Hospital, Tirunelveli. P.W. 10 is the another Special Sub Inspector of Police, who carried the FIR from the Police Station to the house of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Tirunelveli. According to him, it was handed over to the learned Magistrate at 9.30 p.m. P.W. 11 has spoken about the postmortem conducted by him and his final opinion regarding the cause of death. P.W. 12 has spoken about the investigation done and the final report filed. (h) When the above incriminating materials were put to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., they denied the same as false. However, they did not choose to examine any witness on their side. They marked Exs. D. 1 to D. 4 as defence documents on their side. The defence of the accused was a total denial. (k) Having considered all the above materials, the trial Court has acquitted all the accused. That is how, aggrieved by the said acquittal, the appellant is before this Court with this appeal. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the reasons stated by the trial Court for acquitting the accused are not at all tenable and thus, the judgment of the trial Court is perverse. That is how, aggrieved by the said acquittal, the appellant is before this Court with this appeal. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the reasons stated by the trial Court for acquitting the accused are not at all tenable and thus, the judgment of the trial Court is perverse. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the reasons recorded by the trial Court for acquitting the accused, about which we would make reference during the further discussion in this judgment. He would further submit that the evidences of P.Ws. 1 to 3 are quite natural, cogent and convincing. He would also submit that the presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 at the place of occurrence cannot be doubted. One of the reasons stated by the trial Court is that there was no sign of any plowing on the land, where the deceased was cut and there was also no sign of transplantation of crops. Referring to these reasoning of the trial Court, the learned counsel would submit that in the photograph taken at the place of occurrence, the tractor, which was driven by P.W. 3, is found. He would further submit that P.W. 3 was actually plowing in a nearby field which is also owned by P.W. 1 and P.Ws. 1 and 2 were in their field looking after the agricultural operations. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 cannot be disbelieved and the veracity of these witnesses also cannot be doubted. The learned counsel would further submit that there is no delay in preferring the complaint, which also goes to assure the truthfulness of the allegation made in Ex. P. 1, complaint. The learned counsel would next submit that the trial Court, without appreciating these evidences in their proper perspective, acquitted all the accused. Therefore, according to him, the judgment of the trial Court is liable to be interfered with and the accused are liable to the convicted and sentenced accordingly. 3. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would support the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. But, he has no explanation to offer as to why the State has not made any appeal against acquittal, if the State is of the opinion that the acquittal is an unmerited one. However, Mr. 3. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would support the said argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. But, he has no explanation to offer as to why the State has not made any appeal against acquittal, if the State is of the opinion that the acquittal is an unmerited one. However, Mr. Mayilvahana Rajendran argued very eloquently supporting the argument of Mr. Jayarhuthran, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. He would submit that the contradictions pointed out by the trial Court are immaterial and the reasons stated by the trial Court are not tenable. Thus, he would also pray for reversal of the judgment of the trial Court. 4. The learned counsel for the accused would, vehemently, oppose this appeal. The learned counsel would point out that the presumption of innocence gets further strengthened by the acquittal recorded by the trial Court. In this case, according to the learned counsel, there are no reasons to take a different view from the view taken by the trial Court. The very presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 cannot be believed at all. The trial Court has given cogent reasons for disbelieving the evidences of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and their credibility. The learned counsel would next point out that though it is stated that P.Ws. 1 to 3 were present at the scene of occurrence, because they were involved in transplantation of crops, the evidence on record would clinchingly go to prove that there was no such transplantation of crops going on the property in question at all. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 at the place of occurrence is doubtful. He would further submit that so far as the presence of the Tractor is concerned, though a Tractor is seen in the photograph at a far away place, from the place where the dead body was found, it cannot go to automatically support the case of the prosecution that P.W. 3 was plowing the field as there is no symptom of plowing any where. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the accused would next submit that P.W. 1 is a rowdy element, who had been detained even under the Goonds Act and he was an accused in a murder case and also in some other criminal cases, as admitted by him during cross examination. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the accused would next submit that P.W. 1 is a rowdy element, who had been detained even under the Goonds Act and he was an accused in a murder case and also in some other criminal cases, as admitted by him during cross examination. P.W. 2 is the brother of P.W. 1, against whom also there were criminal cases. P.W. 3 claims to be the driver of P.W. 1. The learned counsel wound point out that P.Ws. 1 to 3 are not new to the Court proceedings or to the functioning of the Police Station. In this case, it is alleged that the FIR was registered at 4.00 p.m. and the same reached the hands of the learned Magistrate at 9.30 p.m. Absolutely, there is no explanation for the said delay. The learned counsel would submit that going by this enormous and unexplained delay and going by the evidences of P.Ws. 1 and 2, it can be inferred that the FIR itself is a concocted document. The learned counsel would further submit that though some of the reasons stated by the trial Court may not appear to be reasonable, on that score, the acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be interfered with, because there are other reasons stated by the trial Court, which are so cogent and convincing. 6. The learned counsel for the accused would further submit that there is no explanation as to why the inquest was not held on the spot by the investigating officer. The learned counsel would further submit that when the judgment of the trial Court is on merits, there are no reasons for this Court to interfere with the same. Lastly, he would submit that in the event, if it is possible for this Court to arrive at a different conclusion on appreciating the evidences of P.Ws. 1 to 3, the same cannot be substituted in the place of the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, unless the reasons stated by the trial Court are totally baseless and the judgment is perverse. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have considered the above submissions. 8. Admittedly, P.Ws. 1 to 3 are chance witnesses to the occurrence. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have considered the above submissions. 8. Admittedly, P.Ws. 1 to 3 are chance witnesses to the occurrence. It is in evidence that P.W. 1 is the father of the deceased and P.W. 2 is the brother of P.W. 1 and P.W. 3 claims to be the driver of P.W. 1. The occurrence has not taken place near any habitation. It had taken place in the field, which was far away from the habitation. Thus, it has been clearly established that P.Ws. 1 to 3 are the chance witnesses, interested witnesses and also inimical witnesses. Their presence at the place of occurrence was by chance, even according to the prosecution. It is too well settled that if it is claimed by a witness that his presence at the place of occurrence was by chance, the reason for his being present at the place of occurrence at the crucial moment should be satisfactorily explained to the Court. Here in this case, the reason stated by P.Ws. 1 to 3 is that there was transplantation of crops going on in the land in question and for this purpose, they were present at the place of occurrence. They have further stated that at about 2.30 p.m., the deceased came to the field bringing lunch for them and within half an hour, thereafter, he left the field and he started leaving the field. It was, at that time, according to P.Ws. 1 to 3, the occurrence had taken place. But, as pointed out by the trial Court, absolutely, there is no evidence that there was any transplantation of crops going on the land in question. Even the photograph, which has been marked as M.O. 6 would go to show that there was no transplantation of crops going on either at the place of occurrence or near the same. The trial Court has given much weightage for the same to say that the presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 cannot be believed. We do not find any reason to take a different view. But, for their work of transplantation of crops, they had no business at the place of occurrence at the crucial time. When the transplantation itself is not proved by any evidence, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, in our considered view, the presence of P.Ws. We do not find any reason to take a different view. But, for their work of transplantation of crops, they had no business at the place of occurrence at the crucial time. When the transplantation itself is not proved by any evidence, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, in our considered view, the presence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is doubtful. 9. It is in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 that A3 and A4 did not have any overt act at all in the occurrence. It is not as though all the four accused came together. Even the trial Court did not find any prima facie material from the Police report to frame a charge for common intention. There was also no material to frame a charge for abutment. The trial Court had framed charges against the accused 3 and 4 only under Section 302 r/w 114IPC. In the absence of any sharing of common intention and in the absence of any inducement by the accused 3 and 4 to the accused 1 and 2 to commit murder, it is not understandable as to how it could even be remotely inferred the accused 3 and 4 were waiting elsewhere watching the arrival of somebody else to the rescue of the deceased. This is a mere surmise. Absolutely, there is no evidence against the accused 3 and 4 at all. 10. Now, it is crystal clear that P.W. 1 with all his familiarity with the Police Station and the legal system on account of his acquaintance with the Court proceedings, etc., due to his involvement in many cases, including a murder case, there is every possibility for him to concoct the FIR to accuse as many people as possible. It is very obvious that the implication of the accused 3 and 4 has been made by such an attempt. Now, it is alleged that the FIR was registered at 4.00 p.m. on the day of the occurrence. The distance between the Police Station and the house of the Magistrate is hardly 17 kilometers, about which there is no dispute. It is very obvious that the implication of the accused 3 and 4 has been made by such an attempt. Now, it is alleged that the FIR was registered at 4.00 p.m. on the day of the occurrence. The distance between the Police Station and the house of the Magistrate is hardly 17 kilometers, about which there is no dispute. But, the FIR had reached the hands of the learned Magistrate only at 9.30 p.m. P.W. 10 - the Special Sub Inspector of Police, who carried the FIR from the Police Station to the house of the learned Magistrate, would say that he went to the house of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I Tirunelveli and since he was not available, he went to the house of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. II, Tirunelveli. It is not as though the houses of these two Magistrates were at a far off at two different places. At any rate, the FIR, to reach the hands of the learned Magistrate, would not have taken five hours. Thus, the delay, in our considered view, is enormous and the same has not been explained away by the prosecution. The delay in preferring the FIR or the delay in forwarding the FIR assumes much importance in a case where there are multiple number of accused. Here, in this case, there is no evidence against the accused 3 and 4 and still, they were added as accused, even in the FIR. The same would go to show that every attempt has been made to concoct an FIR to implicate as many number of persons as possible as accused. In this background, the delay assumes importance and from out of the delay, in our considered view, the case of the prosecution becomes more doubtful. 11. P.Ws. 1 and 2 are not the men of good character. P.W. 1 has admitted during cross-examination that he was an accused in a murder case and there were many more cases against him and he was even detained under the Goondas Act by the Government by way of preventive detention. Such a man, quite naturally, would have lot of enemies. Therefore, P.W. 1's son (deceased), because of the enmity, somebody would have murdered, which would not have been noticed by anybody at all. Such a man, quite naturally, would have lot of enemies. Therefore, P.W. 1's son (deceased), because of the enmity, somebody would have murdered, which would not have been noticed by anybody at all. To come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts against all the accused, the trial Court has given cogent reasons except few reasons which are not tenable. As we have already pointed out, the enormous delay in forwarding the FIR to the Court, which has not been explained away and the conduct of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and the doubt regarding their very presence are the main reasons stated by the trial Court for acquitting the accused. 12. There is yet another reason to disbelieve the evidences of P.Ws. 1 to 3. The enmity was between the accused party and P.W. 1. The deceased was an young boy against whom the accused had no grudge at all. Had it been true that P.W. 1 was present at the place of occurrence, certainly, going by the natural human conduct, his enemies viz., the accused would have made attempt to attack him also. But, it is not in evidence that any such attempt was made by the accused to attack P.W. 1 or P.W. 2. There is no reason for the accused to attack the deceased leaving behind their actual enemies viz., P.W. 1. This also creates doubt in the case of the prosecution which has also been duly appreciated by the trial Court. 13. The trial Court has given yet another reason which, in our considered view, is not tenable. The trial Court has stated that one Mr. Velu was done to death subsequent to this occurrence as a retaliation to the killing of the deceased in this case. The trial Court has stated that if really, these accused had committed the murder of the deceased in this case, then, there would have been no reason for the prosecution party to kill Mr. Velu. The trial Court has further assumed that the very fact that Mr. Velu was killed by the prosecution party would go to indicate that Mr. Velu would have involved in this murder and not the accused. Velu. The trial Court has further assumed that the very fact that Mr. Velu was killed by the prosecution party would go to indicate that Mr. Velu would have involved in this murder and not the accused. This reasoning of the trial Court, in our considered view, is not at all tenable and in fact, we have no hesitation to call this approach of the trial Court as an imprudent approach. But, this is only one of the reasons stated by the trial Court and not the only reason. Therefore, on that ground, the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court cannot be interfered with. 14. Yet another reason stated by the trial Court is that the prosecution had failed to prove the purchase of the land in question by P.W. 1. The trial Court had given finding that the original sale deed in favour of P.W. 1 had not been proved in evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the document is very much available with him and the same can be received as additional evidence. Of-course, it is true that under Section 391 Cr.P.C., this Court is empowered to receive any evidence from either party as additional evidence in order to find out the truth and to do justice to the parties. But, for any reason, if the said document is received, we have to afford opportunity to the accused to either accept or to challenge the said document produced and to state their case in respect of the said document and ultimately, we may have to afford opportunity to the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to explain about the said incriminating evidence. Without following this established procedure, we cannot straightaway look into the document in question, as it is requested by the learned counsel for the appellant and use the same against the accused. In our considered view, for any reason, if we use the said document, without there being proof for the same and without there being opportunity afforded to the accused, it would be violative of the fair procedure contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, nothing would prevent this Court from receiving the said document in evidence by following the said established procedure. At the same time, nothing would prevent this Court from receiving the said document in evidence by following the said established procedure. But, in this case, in our considered view, the said course need not be adopted, because even in the absence of production of document and even if we are prepared to accept the case of the prosecution that the land in question had been purchased by P.W. 1, that would only go to prove the motive. In a case, where there are eyewitnesses to the occurrence motive plays a least role. Therefore, we are of the view that the reasoning stated by the trial Court that the accused are entitled for acquittal also on the ground that the original sale deed had not been produced, is not acceptable to us and therefore, this reasoning stated by the trial Court is rejected. Again, we have to state that on this ground also, the judgment of acquittal cannot be interfered with, because, as we have already pointed out, the trial Court has given enormous other reasons which are so cogent and convincing justifying the acquittal. 15. The learned counsel would place reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanpal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras 2009 Criminal Law Journal 4647. That was also a case of appeal against acquittal before the High Court at the instance of the State. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with as to how the appellate Court is to approach an appeal against acquittal and how the evidence let in is to be appreciated and the conclusion to be arrived at. As a matter of fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken pains to trace the number of judgments on the said issue right from Sheo Swamp v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 Privy Council 227. After having made thorough survey of many judgments from the year 1934 to 2008, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up the principles which emerged from the discussion in paragraph No. 41 of the judgment as follows; "41. The following principles emerged from the cases above: 1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused processed this presumption when he was before the trial Court. The trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The following principles emerged from the cases above: 1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused processed this presumption when he was before the trial Court. The trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate Court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law, but the Appellate Court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial Court. 3. The appellate Court should always keep in mind that the trial Court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. The trial Court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 4. The appellate Court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial Court's acquittal if it has 'very substantial and compelling reasons' for doing so. 5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction? the High Courts/appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused." 16. Applying the said yardstick stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgment, when we look into the facts of the instant case and when we appreciate the evidence let in by the prosecution, we have no hesitation at all that the trial Court was right in acquitting the accused. Assuming that on certain points there are two views possible, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, unless the view taken by the trial Court is found to be perverse and totally untenable, it is not permissible for this Court to substitute its view in the place of the view taken by the trial Court. 17. In view of all the above, we are of the view that the judgment of the trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference at the hands of this Court. In the result, this Criminal Appeal fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected M.P. (MD). No. 1 of 2013 is also dismissed.