JUDGMENT : Both, the Management of Tractors and Farms Equipments Ltd., (“TAFE” for short), and the workman, Mr. Umesh, are aggrieved by the judgment dated 9th January 2012, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No.15743/2011 c/w. Writ Petition No.33701/2011. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by TAFE, and partly modified the award dated 29.12.2010 in favour of the workman. By the same impugned judgment since the learned Judge has denied the backwages to the workman, Mr. Umesh, the workman is he is equally aggrieved. Therefore, both the management and the workman have filed two separate Writ Appeals viz., W.A.Nos.621-622/2012 between the Management of Tractors and Farms Equipments Ltd., & Mr. Umesh, and Writ Appeal No.1422/2012 between Mr. Umesh and M/s. Tractors and Farms Equipments Ltd., Since both these appeals emanate from the same impugned judgment, they are being decided together by this common judgment by this Court. 2. The facts of the case are being taken from Writ Appeal No.621-622/2012: in a nutshell, the facts of the case are that on 28.12.1991, Mr. Umesh joined the services of the appellant-company as an Operator. Initially he was placed as Trainee by the appellant; thereafter, put on probation; subsequently, confirmed on the port of the Operator. From 1991 till 1995, he continued to work in the appellant-company at its Doddaballapura plant. However, by order dated 31.10.1995, he was transferred from Doddaballur plant to Shivamogga. At Shivamogga, he was transferred to Dealer-cum-Service Centre. However, for reasons best known him, he did not report to the transferred place. When the appellant sent reminders to him and directed him to immediately join the place of his transfer, he advanced flimsy and incredulous reasons. Since he disobeyed the orders of the employer, on 8.12.1995, he was served with a charge-sheet for his serious acts of misconduct under Clause 22 (1), 22(13), 22(14), 22(63) of the Certified Standing Order of the company. Since the explanation submitted by the respondent was not satisfactory, a full fledged domestic enquiry was conducted. Mr. Umesh did participate fully in the said domestic enquiry. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the charges as per Clause 22 (1) and 22(14) of the Standing Order. Consequently, Mr. Umesh was issued a second show cause notice. He submitted his reply. Mr. Umesh did participate fully in the said domestic enquiry. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the charges as per Clause 22 (1) and 22(14) of the Standing Order. Consequently, Mr. Umesh was issued a second show cause notice. He submitted his reply. Since the reply was not satisfactory, by order dated 31.10.1998, he was dismissed from service. 3. Mr. Umesh raised a dispute under Section 10(4A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short I.D. Act’) before the Prl. Labour Court, Bangalore, which was registered as I.D.No.7/1999. In the dispute, he had challenged the dismissal order dated 31.10.1998. Even prior to his having raised an labour dispute, a charter of demands was pending before the learned Labour Court in Reference No.27/1996 between the workers union, and the appellant. Therefore, the appellant filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act viz., Misc. Application No.19/1998, seeking approval of dismissal of Mr. Umesh from the service. However, as Mr. Umesh had raised an labour dispute under Section 10 (4A) of the I.D.Act, before the Prl. Labour Court, the appellant withdrew its application filed Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. Therefore, Mr. Umesh raised a plea before the learned Labour Court on the ground that the domestic enquiry was not conducted properly, and since the company has withdrawn its application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act, he should be reinstated automatically. 4. After hearing both the parties, on 29.10.2012, the learned Labour Court passed its award: the learned Labour Court set aside the dismissal order dated 31.10.1998, but in lieu of reinstatement and probable backwages, probable continuity of service and probable monetary benefits, it directed the Management to make a payment of global compensation of Rs.3 lakhs to the Mr. Umesh within three months from the date of award being published in the official Gazette, and in default, the award was to carry an interest of 6% p.a. from the date of default, till the entire recovery of the compensation amount. 5. Since both the Management and Mr. Umesh were aggrieved by the said award, they filed two different writ petitions before this Court viz., Writ Petition15743/2011 and Writ Petition No.33701/2011 respectively. By judgment dated 9th January 2012, the learned Single Judge decided both the writ petitions by a common judgment. 5. Since both the Management and Mr. Umesh were aggrieved by the said award, they filed two different writ petitions before this Court viz., Writ Petition15743/2011 and Writ Petition No.33701/2011 respectively. By judgment dated 9th January 2012, the learned Single Judge decided both the writ petitions by a common judgment. While the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed buy the Management, he partly allowed the writ petition filed by Mr. Umesh. The learned Single Judge has upheld the part of the award setting aside the dismissal order, but has modified the part of the award granting lumpsum compensation of Rs.3 lakhs to Mr. Umesh. Instead, the learned Single Judge has directed that Mr. Umesh shall be reinstated, but without backwages, but with continuity of service and consequential benefits. Since both the Management and Mr. Umesh are aggrieved by the said order, they have filed the present appeals before this Court. 6. Mr. K. Kasturi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant, has vehemently argued that both the learned Labour Court and the learned Single Judge have erred in relying upon the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and others ( 2002 (1) LLJ 834 ). According to him, the said case is distinguishable from the present one on the factual matrix. For, in the said case, the application filed under Section 33 (2) (b) of the I.D. Act was not withdrawn by the Bank. However, in the present case, since a larger dispute was already pending under Section 10(4A) of the I.D. Act, since the learned Labour Court was required to thoroughly consider the validity of the domestic enquiry, and the legality of the dismissal order, the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act had become redundant. Therefore, the appellant was justified in withdrawing the said application. But, mere withdrawal of the said application does not entitle the workman to an automatic reinstatement. Secondly, once the application was withdrawn, there was no order of refusal of such an application on merit. Therefore, the order of dismissal does not become void or inoperative. Hence, the learned Labour Court and the learned Single Judge were not justified in directing either payment of compensation or reinstating the workman respectively. Secondly, once the application was withdrawn, there was no order of refusal of such an application on merit. Therefore, the order of dismissal does not become void or inoperative. Hence, the learned Labour Court and the learned Single Judge were not justified in directing either payment of compensation or reinstating the workman respectively. Thirdly, relying on the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another –vs. Satya Prakash (2013) 9 SCC 232 ) he has contended that once the learned Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the dismissal order was sustainable and had dismissed the complaint filed by the workman, it could not have taken recourse to the fact that the compliance of Section 33 (2)(b) proviso of I.D. Act was not met. Therefore, in the present case, even if compliance of Section 33 (2)(b) of I.D. Act was not made by the appellant, even then the learned Judge could not have directed reinstatement of the workman. Fourthly, much water has flown and judicial thinking has changed with regard to illegal termination/dismissal of a workman from service, with regard to payment of backwages, and with regard to payment of compensation in lieu of reinstatement and backwages. The learned Senior Counsel has emphasized on the fact that Mr. Umesh was appointed on 28.12.1991, had worked with the appellant only for four years till 1995, and thereafter, he had abstained from rendering any service to the appellant. From 1995 till 2012, Mr. Umesh has not rendered any service to the appellant. Since he has not rendered any service, the Labour Court was certainly justified in directing payment of a lumpsum compensation to him. However, while relying on the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), the learned Single Judge has erroneously directed Mr. Umesh’s reinstatement. Hence, the impugned judgment needs to be interfered with. 7. On the other hand, Mr. K. Subba Rao, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, has canvassed the following submissions before this Court; firstly, the decision in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), being Constitutional Bench judgment, holds the field even if the facts may not be similar between the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), and the present case. Nonetheless, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principles established by Hon’ble Supreme Court are binding on all other Courts. Nonetheless, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principles established by Hon’ble Supreme Court are binding on all other Courts. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was certainly justified in relying on the said case in directing the reinstatement of the workman. Secondly, despite the fact that the learned Labour Court had noticed the judgment in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), it had erred in not directing the reinstatement of the workman, and had committed an illegality by directing payment of a lumpsum compensation to Mr. Umesh. Considering the error committed by the learned Labour Court, the learned Single Judge was certainly justified in directing his reinstatement. However, the learned Single Judge was not justified in depriving the workman of his backwages. Therefore, according to Mr. K. Subba Rao, the learned Senior Counsel, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside to the limited extent that the learned Single Judge has deprived the workman of his rightful backwages. Lastly, that the case of Satya Prakash (supra) does not come in the rescue of the appellant because in the said case, the Labour Court had clearly held that the dismissal order was justified, as the misconduct has been committed by Satyaprakash immediately after joining the service. But, notwithstanding its finding that the dismissal order was justified, but taking refuge under the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), the learned Labour Court had directed that Satyaprakash be reinstated. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that once the dismissal order is upheld by the Labour Court, even if the provision of Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act has not been complied with, even then the learned Labour Court would not be justified in directing reinstatement of the workman. However, the present case is distinguishable from Satya Prakash’s case (supra) on factual matrix. 8. In rejoinder, Mr. K. Kasturi, learned Senior Counsel has relied on the case of Collector Singh –vs. L.M.L. Limited, Kanpur (2015) 2 SCC 410 ) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited –vs. Bhurumal (2014) 7 SCC 177 ) in order to support his contention that when it comes to reinstatement of a workman, after many years, the judicial thinking has changed over the past decade. Instead of directing the reinstatement of the workman, the workman is directed to be paid a lumpsum amount by the Management. Instead of directing the reinstatement of the workman, the workman is directed to be paid a lumpsum amount by the Management. Therefore, he has insisted that perhaps a lumpsum amount should be paid to the workman in order to do complete justice to both the parties. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and examined the record. 10. Undoubtedly, the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), holds the field even today. The Constitution Bench was seized of the issue that “if the approval was not granted under Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act, whether the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed or from the date of non-approval of the order of dismissal and failure to make claim under Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act would not render the order of dismissal inoperative?” 11. Relying on its earlier decision in the case of P.H. Kalyani –vs. Air France, Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1756 ) the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “ the proviso to Section 33 (2)(b) contemplates three things mentioned therein, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of wages, and (iii) making of an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction so that the employer when he takes the action under Section 33 (2) by dismissing or discharging an employee, should immediately pay him or offer to pay him wages for one month and also make an application to the Tribunal for approval at the same time.” The Hon’ble Apex Court also observed that, “order of dismissal/discharge being incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained, cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and employee and that if the approval is not accorded by the Tribunal, the employer would be bound to treat the respondent as its employee and paying his full wages for the period even though the employer may subsequently proceed to terminate the services of the respondent”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also pointed out that “proviso to Section 33 (2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also pointed out that “proviso to Section 33 (2)(b) affords protection to a workman to safeguard his interest and it is a shield against victimization and unfair labour practice by the employer during the pendency of industrial dispute when the relationship between them are already strained. An employer cannot be permitted to use the provision of section 33 (2)(b) to ease out a workman without complying with the conditions contained in the said proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be unconnected with the already pending industrial dispute. The protection afforded to a workman under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer without complying with the requirements of the said proviso is not void or inoperative, the employer may with impunity discharge or dismiss a workman” The Apex Court further held that, “where an application is made under Section 33 (2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to be examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33 (2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement.” The Apex Court has further laid down as under : “The view that when no application is made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no order of refusal of such application on merit and as such the order of dismissal or discharge does not become void or inoperative unless such an order is set aside under Section 33A, cannot be accepted. In our view, not making an application under Section 33 (2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing an application once made before any order is made thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the proviso to Section 33 (2)(B). An employer who does not make an application under Section 33 (2)(b) or withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by relieving him of the statutory obligation created on him to make such an application.” 12. The relevant paras of the judgment quoted above clearly answer the contentions raised by Mr. K. Kasturi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant: firstly, the filing of an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act is mandatory. Its withdrawal by the appellant does not lead to the conclusion that there is no order of refusal of such application on merit. In fact, since the mandatory provision has not been followed, since the order of dismissal is incomplete and inchoate order until it is approved by the Labour Court under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act, the learned Single Judge was certainly justified in relying on the judgment of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s case (supra). 13. Of course, Mr. Kasturi, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the case of Satya Prakash in order to plead that the learned Labour Court should not have considered the applicability of an application under Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act. Thus, the approach of both the learned Labour Court and of the learned Single Judge is flawed. However, the case of Satya Prakash (supra) is distinguishable from the present case. Thus, the approach of both the learned Labour Court and of the learned Single Judge is flawed. However, the case of Satya Prakash (supra) is distinguishable from the present case. For, in the case of Satya Prakash (supra), the learned Labour Court had confirmed the charge of misconduct on the basis of which the dismissal order was passed. However, considering the fact that there was no compliance with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act, the learned Labour Court directed the reinstatement of Satya Prakash. However, in the present case, the Labour Court is of the opinion that the domestic enquiry was not carried out in accordance with law. Therefore, the dismissal order was illegal. Considering this positive conclusion, and considering the impact of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank’s (supra), but also balancing the interest of Management, the learned Labour Court directed that only lumpsum compensation should be paid to Mr. Umesh. Therefore, the Apex Court concluded in the case of Satya Prakash (supra) that once having come to the conclusion that the charges are made out, and the dismissal order is valid, there was no need for the learned Labour Court to consider noncompliance of Section 33 (2)(b) of the I.D. Act. Such a conclusion is, obviously, not applicable to the present case. Hence, the case is distinguishable from factual matrix. 14. In fact, the moot questions before this Court are “whether noncompliance with Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act would lead to an automatic reinstatement of the worker, especially when the worker has not rendered his service to the employer for over decades?. Or whether in such circumstance, the worker should be granted a lumpsum compensation in lieu of his reinstatement or not? 15. This Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that the economic realities of this country are changing at a rapid pace. Keeping in mind the changes in the economic reality, the judicial thinking is also transforming itself: whereas, earlier the judicial thinking was that in case the dismissal or termination is an illegal one, the workman would be entitled to and should be reinstated forthwith. Keeping in mind the changes in the economic reality, the judicial thinking is also transforming itself: whereas, earlier the judicial thinking was that in case the dismissal or termination is an illegal one, the workman would be entitled to and should be reinstated forthwith. But the recent trend in judicial thinking as recorded in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal –vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and others (2010) 6 SCC 773 ), is that in case the employee has not worked over a period of years for the employer, instead of reinstating the employee, he should be granted only a lumpsum compensation in lieu of reinstatement. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court seized with the facts of daily rated workers who were dismissed from the service illegally 25 years back, and had hardly worked for two to three years for the employer. In such circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that, instead of reinstating them, it would be in the interest of justice that a lumpsum compensation is paid to them. Similarly in the present case, Mr. Umesh had worked for the appellant only for four years, and has not worked for the appellant for about 20 years. Thus, applying the ratio of Santhosh Kumar’s case (supra), this Court is of the opinion that instead of reinstating Mr. Umesh, it would be in the interest of justice that a lumpsum should be paid to him. 16. In the present case, admittedly Mr. Umesh, had working only for four years for the appellant. After his transfer in 1995, he had stopped working for the appellant for reasons best known to him. Thus, from 1995 till present i.e., for two decades, Mr. Umesh, has not worked for the appellant. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned Single Judge was certainly not justified in directing that Mr. Umesh should be reinstated, although without any backwages. However, considering the fact that on his part, the workman has not produced any evidence to show that he was unemployed from 1995 till present, obviously he must have been employed. But considering the high rate of inflation, the ends of justice would be met if the lumpsum compensation were increased from Rs.3 lakhs to Rs.6 lakhs. Hence, for the reasons stated above, this Court dismisses the appeal filed by Mr. But considering the high rate of inflation, the ends of justice would be met if the lumpsum compensation were increased from Rs.3 lakhs to Rs.6 lakhs. Hence, for the reasons stated above, this Court dismisses the appeal filed by Mr. Umesh viz., in Writ Appeal No.1422/2012, and partly allows the appeal filed by the Management viz., Writ Appeal Nos.621-622/2012, and directs the appellant to pay a lumpsum compensation of Rs.6 lakhs within a period of three months to Mr. Umesh, failing which, the said amount shall carry an interest of 9% p.a. from the date of this judgment till the date of full and final payment to Mr. Umesh.