JUDGMENT Hon’ble Yashwant Varma, J.—Unfazed, undaunted and not chastened by the dismissal of their writ petition against the order of termination dated 1.8.2005, dismissal of an intra Court Appeal, rejection of the Special Leave Petition by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, subsequent dismissal of a review petition by the Apex Court as well as a Curative Petition these 35 petitioners have approached this Court seeking the following reliefs: “(i) issue a writ order or direction of suitable nature commanding the Respondents for reconsideration on the dispute arising out of selection/appointment and termination of the petitioners on the substantive class III Post of clerks in District Judgeship Baghpat in view of the changed circumstances and the facts brought fore in the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Hon’ble High Court. (ii) issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders of termination of the petitioners dated 1.8.2005 passed by the Respondent No. 2 and further to reinstate the petitioners on their respective class III posts in District judgeship with all the consequential benefits of continuation of service. (iii) any other writ, order or direction as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case; (iv) award costs of the writ petition throughout to the petitioners.” 2. Admittedly the sole ground which emboldens these petitioners to approach this Court yet again are the findings returned and recorded in an Enquiry Report submitted in proceedings taken against the then District Judge, Baghpat, which was subsequently accepted by the Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on 23.4.2013. 3. But first a brief resume of the undisputed facts: a recruitment process for filling of Class-III posts in the District Judgeship, Baghpat was undertaken in the year 2000. The advertisement issued by the then District Judge, Baghpat stated that there were 10 vacancies, in the Class-III cadre which were liable to be filled. The advertisement further stated that the vacancies were likely to increase or decrease. The petitioners participated in the said selection process and the names of the petitioner Nos. 1 to 7 find place at Serial Nos. 11, 12 and 14 to 18, the names of the petitioner Nos. 8 to 29 find place at Serial Nos. 21 to 42 and the names of the petitioners Nos. 30 to 35 at serial Nos. 45 to 47 and at serial Nos. 1 to 7 find place at Serial Nos. 11, 12 and 14 to 18, the names of the petitioner Nos. 8 to 29 find place at Serial Nos. 21 to 42 and the names of the petitioners Nos. 30 to 35 at serial Nos. 45 to 47 and at serial Nos. 49, 50 and 51. This occurred on account of the District Judge preparing a select list of 73 candidates against the advertised 10 vacancies. It subsequently, transpires that the petitioners were issued letters of appointment pursuant to which they joined on class-III post of Clerks in the judgeship concerned. It is then to be noted that the select list referred to above was expiring on 5.4.2000, and accordingly the District Judge by his order dated 4.4.2001, extended the life of the select list up to 5.4.2002. In the meanwhile, this Court on its administrative side appears to have called for an explanation from the District Judge for explaining the extension of life of the select list beyond the period of one year. It appears that upon receipt of the said notice, the District Judge passed an order terminating the services of 19 employees who were appointed after the expiry of one year of the select list dated 5.4.2000. 4. This led to litigation being instituted before this Court by the aforesaid 19 employees and this Court while initially entertaining their writ petitions passed orders staying their orders of termination. Against the aforesaid interim order obtained by the 19 employees, special appeal came to be filed by the District Judge, Baghpat and the Appellate Court disposed of the appeal as well as the writ petition by its judgment and order dated 31.5.2005. This Court in the aforesaid special appeal categorically held that the appointments affected by the District Judge, Baghpat were illegal and against the provisions of the statutory rules and also recorded that the District Judge could not have offered appointment or made selections over and above the 10 vacancies advertised. It however, noticed that the orders of termination had been made in violation of the principles of natural justice and accordingly while quashing the termination orders passed the following directions: “(a) The decision in respect of the respondent-petitioners shall be taken by a speaking and reasoned order as per directions contained hereinabove by the District Judge, Baghpat. It however, noticed that the orders of termination had been made in violation of the principles of natural justice and accordingly while quashing the termination orders passed the following directions: “(a) The decision in respect of the respondent-petitioners shall be taken by a speaking and reasoned order as per directions contained hereinabove by the District Judge, Baghpat. (b) The District Judge shall withdraw all such similar termination orders in respect of such class-III employees whose appointments were pursuant to the selections dated 5.4.2000, including those which are under challenge in various writ petitions before the High Court, and thereafter shall proceed to take a decision in the matter afresh after giving opportunity to the concerned employees in the same way as in the case of the respondents herein. This exercise shall be completed within one month and compliance report shall be submitted immediately thereafter. The appeal as well as the Writ petition giving rise to this appeal are allowed and stand disposed off finally in accordance with directions contained herein above. No order as to costs.” 5. In compliance with the aforesaid directions of this Court all the 19 employees who had petitioned this Court as well as the petitioners herein were put to notice requiring them to show-cause as to why their appointments be not cancelled and their services terminated. It becomes pertinent to point out here that although the petitioners were all offered appointment within one year of the framing of the select list, they had been appointed on alleged vacancies in excess of the 10 vacancies which had been advertised. 6. The District Judge, Baghpat after receiving a response from the petitioners herein ultimately terminated their services by an order dated 1.8.2005. The order of termination recorded that the appointment of the petitioners had been made in excess of the 10 vacancies advertised and, therefore, their appointments were void ab initio and accordingly proceeded to terminate their services of course noting that the same was being affected without attaching any stigma on the character of the petitioners and without any disability for future employment. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, the petitioners preferred Writ Petition No. 57365/2005, Mahesh Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others. This writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court by judgment and order dated 21.10.2005. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, the petitioners preferred Writ Petition No. 57365/2005, Mahesh Kumar and others v. State of U.P. and others. This writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of this Court by judgment and order dated 21.10.2005. It would be apposite here to refer to the following observations contained in the said judgment. “Admittedly, only 10 posts for the appointment of clerks was sanctioned which was advertised. Therefore, only 10 persons could be appointed on the post of clerks. Since no further posts were available, no further appointment could be made over and above the notified posts. The contention of the Petitioners that since the advertisement indicated that the posts could be increased, the appointments so issued were perfectly valid, is patently misconceived. No foundation has been laid by the Petitioners in the writ petition to the effect that more posts were created beyond the 10 notified posts during the selection process or that vacancies occurred during that period. The fact that there existed only 10 posts of clerk is clear from the report of the Administrative Judge, who had clearly indicated that after the creation of the Judgeship of Baghpat, only 10 posts of clerk were sanctioned in the scale of Rs. 3050-4590 and, therefore, only 10 persons could have been appointed. In the present case, the Petitioners were appointed beyond the notified sanctioned strength. The Petitioners appointment was void ab initio. After the appointment of 10 persons, the select list came to an end and could not be used any further. Consequently, the appointment of the Petitioner being illegal, from the very inception, cannot be permitted to continue. In my opinion, no humanitarian approach can be adopted. Since the appointments of the petitioners were illegal, such illegality cannot be allowed to continue. The law must take its course. Consequently, the order passed by the District Judge terminating the services of the Petitioner does not suffer from any error of law. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.” 8. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioners preferred an intra-Court appeal which came to be registered as Special Appeal No. 1467/2005. This Special Appeal too was dismissed on 1.11.2006. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.” 8. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioners preferred an intra-Court appeal which came to be registered as Special Appeal No. 1467/2005. This Special Appeal too was dismissed on 1.11.2006. In the said Special Appeal the Court made the following observations, while dismissing the said appeal: “However, we reiterate that the findings recorded by the learned Single judge that the creation of vacancies was artificial and the appointments were made against posts, which were of higher pay-scales as well as future vacancies and, therefore, the appointments over and above the notified vacancies are void. The manner in which the vacancies were created was also a novel method adopted by the then District Judge which was nothing else but a clear fraudulent act in violation of the statutes referable to the controversy. On the facts as brought on record, it is evident that the appellants were appointed by a dubious method, throwing over on road, all established canons of law and service jurisprudence and, therefore, the appointments were invalid at their very inception. The appointments were without jurisdiction. The District Judge had neither any authority to create any such vacancies nor had he any jurisdiction to make any such appointments against the vacancies on the higher grade; which could be filled up only by promotions.” 9. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgments of this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 886/2007. This Special Leave Petition came to be dismissed by the Apex Court on 11.7.2012 in the following terms: “Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petition are dismissed in terms of the signed order. No costs.” 10. It thereafter transpires that the curative and review petitions filed by the petitioners herein also came to be dismissed by the Supreme Court of India on 27.8.2013 in the following terms: “We have gone through the curative petition and the relevant documents. In our opinion, no case is made out within the parameters indicated in the decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, 2002 (4) SCC 388 . Hence the Curative Petition is dismissed.” The litigation inter-parties came to rest here. 11. In our opinion, no case is made out within the parameters indicated in the decision of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, 2002 (4) SCC 388 . Hence the Curative Petition is dismissed.” The litigation inter-parties came to rest here. 11. It however, transpires that in light of the observations made by this Court while dismissing the special appeals aforementioned, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the then District Judge, pursuant to a resolution dated 20.5.2004, of the Administrative Committee of this Court. As a consequence to the said resolution, the said District Judge, was issued a charge-sheet wherein as many as 6 charges were levelled against him. However, for our purposes, only charge Nos. 1 and 3 are relevant and they are being extracted hereunder : “Charge No. 1: That you, while posted as District Judge, Baghpat got prepared on 5.4.2000 a select list of 74 candidates for appointment to the post of Class III employee and 12 candidates for the post of Stenographer in the judgeship, against just 10 posts and 4 posts respectively, advertised by you on 23.12.1999, in violation of all rules and propriety and the guidelines issued by the High Court from time to time for extraneous consideration, and appointed a total of 51 candidates within one year of the preparation of the select list and you thereby failed to maintain absolutely integrity and complete devotion to duty and thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Charge No. 3: That you, while posted as District Judge, Baghpat without having any authority so to do on 4.4.2001, extended the life of the select list dated 5.4.2000 issued by you, for extraneous consideration and appointed as many as 19 candidates of expired select list during the period from 18.5.2001 to 18.2.2002, against all norms and properly, in violation of specific directions issued by the High Court, and you thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.” 12. In this departmental enquiry registered as Departmental Enquiry No. 7/2004, an Enquiry Report dated 1.2.2013, was submitted by an Hon’ble Judge of this Court in which the then District Judge, was exonerated of Charge Nos. In this departmental enquiry registered as Departmental Enquiry No. 7/2004, an Enquiry Report dated 1.2.2013, was submitted by an Hon’ble Judge of this Court in which the then District Judge, was exonerated of Charge Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 whereas Charge No. 3 was found to be proved against him. 13. For our purposes, it would be relevant to notice the following findings recorded by the Enquiry Judge insofar as Charge No. 1 is concerned: “Thus, it is clear that though only 10 posts were advertised on 23.12.1999 but on the date of the select list, i.e. 5.4.2000, there were 43 vacancies and during the existence of the select list for one year, in all 51 persons were appointed from the select list. Sri Srivastava had submitted that on 6.4.2000 there were 52 vacancies and 20 employees from Meerut were working and, therefore 32 appointments were made from the select list in the lowest pay-scale. He also stated that during one year from the publication of the select list, 29 vacancies occurred on account of transfer of employees to parent judgeship, other judgeship and creation of posts. Thus, the preparation of the select list of 74 person cannot be said to be bad keeping in view the number of the posts vacant on the date of the publication of the select list, i.e. 5.4.2000. The advertisement specifically stated that the number of posts might increase decrease. Further, I find that the District Judge, vide his letter dated 1.5.2000 sent the select list of Class III which was placed vice office note dated 11.7.2000 (at page 149) before the then Administrative Judge (Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.H.A. Raza) who approved the select list. There is no evidence on record to the contrary to prove otherwise. Thus, the charge No. 1 is not proved against the officer.” 14. Insofar as Charge No. 3 is concerned, the Enquiry Judge held as under: “However, the Full Bench in the case of Dhirendra Kumar Srivatava (supra) in paragraph 17 of its report after considering the relevant Rules has held that the life of the select list will expire after one year from the date of its preparation. Insofar as Charge No. 3 is concerned, the Enquiry Judge held as under: “However, the Full Bench in the case of Dhirendra Kumar Srivatava (supra) in paragraph 17 of its report after considering the relevant Rules has held that the life of the select list will expire after one year from the date of its preparation. Thus, I find that Sri Srivastava has acted in violation of the law laid down in the aforesaid case and acted illegally in extending the life of the select list beyond one year and making appointment of 19 persons from the expired select list which came to an end on 5.4.2001. Thus, the charge No. 3 is proved against the officer and he is found guilty thereunder.” 15. The above Enquiry Report was accepted by the Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on 23.4.2013 in the following terms: “Resolved that the enquiry report dated 1.2.2013 submitted by Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.K. Agarwal, Enquiry Judge, in departmental enquiry No. 07 of 2004 against Sri S.C. Srivastava, the then District & Sessions Judge, Baghpat be accepted. Considering the nature of the findings and the fact that the officer has retired in 2004, it is resolved to drop the matter. No further action is required.” 16. The petitioners herein appear to have obtained the above information with respect to the Enquiry Report and the Resolution of the Administrative Committee of this Court under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 in February, 2014. It is the receipt of the above information and their understanding of the import of the findings contained in the said Enquiry Report that has led them to institute this writ petition. 17. The Court at the admission stage has heard Shri K.M. Asthana for the petitioners and Shri Samir Sharma for the contesting respondents. The primary issue which was raised at this stage was the maintainability of the present writ petition consequent to the conclusion of the litigation inter-parties in 2005, and the learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissions to this aspect of the matter only. It is in the above background that this Court is called upon to rule on this issue. 18. It is in the above background that this Court is called upon to rule on this issue. 18. Shri K.M. Asthana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the earlier litigation between the parties would not stand in the way of the maintainability of the present writ petition. He submits that despite the dismissal of the writ petition by the Single Judge on 21.10.2005 and its affirmance by the Division Bench dismissing the intra-Court appeal, the same did not result in closure of the controversy. He submits that the aforesaid judgments did not merge in the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dated 11.7.2012, in view of the fact that the Special Leave Petition and the Civil Appeals were not entertained and were dismissed in limine. He further submits that since the Special Leave Petition had been dismissed without assigning any reason, the judgement of this Court rendered upon the writ petition as well as the special appeal did not stand merged and it was, therefore, open to the petitioners to institute the present writ petition. 19. Shri K.M. Asthana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has further submitted that in any view of the matter, the cause for institution of the present writ petition stems from the findings recorded by the Inquiry Judge in his report dated 1.2.2013, which was accepted by the Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on 23.4.2013. He would submit that consequent to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Judge in respect of the Charge Nos. 1 and 3, the entire controversy was liable to be revisited by this Court. 20. The fulcrum upon which the submissions advanced by Shri K.M. Asthana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, rested was the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala and another, (2006) 6 SCC 359. He has further placed reliance upon the subsequent judgements of the Apex Court following the above decision and has invited the attention of this Court to the judgements rendered by the Apex Court in Gandhara Palo v. The Revenue Divisional Officer and another, JT (2011) 3 SC 518 and Sri Ram Builders v. State of M.P. and others, JT 2014 (6) SC 134. He has also relied upon a judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India and others v. Abhilesh Kumar Singh, 2013 (6) ADJ 214 . 21. Seeking to draw sustenance from the above judgements Shri K.M. Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioners has sought to urge for the consideration of this Court that the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by a non-speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger and it does not amount to a declaration of the law by the Apex Court. He submits that consequent to the dismissal of the special leave petition, principles of res judicata would have no application and that the order of dismissal would only mean that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion in granting leave to file an appeal. He submits that since the dismissal of the special leave petition by a non-speaking order does not operate as a binding precedent, it would not take away the jurisdiction of a co-equal Bench to adjudicate on the same points on merits. 22. Opposing the maintainability of the writ petition, Shri Samir Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that all the judgements which have been relied upon by Shri Asthana, learned counsel for the petitioners, related to cases where the question in issue was whether a review application would be maintainable despite the dismissal of a special leave petition by the Apex Court. He submits that the doctrine of merger may not be attracted to the order of the Apex Court dismissing the special leave petition and the curative petition, but it would surely apply to the judgement of the Single Judge rendered inter-parties and affirmed by the Division Bench in special appeal. He further submitted that on the principles of public policy as well as the rules of this Court, this writ petition is clearly not maintainable. Elaborating his submissions, Shri Samir Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has contended that it is apparent that the reliefs against termination which is sought in the present writ petition is identical to that claimed in the earlier writ petition preferred before this Court. He would submit, therefore, that this being a second writ petition is clearly not maintainable. 23. He would submit, therefore, that this being a second writ petition is clearly not maintainable. 23. Shri Sharma, has then taken the Court through the various charges which were levelled against the petitioners and submits that insofar as Charge No. 1 is concerned, it is apparent that the essence of the charges levelled against the then District Judge, Baghpat was of having exercised powers for “extraneous considerations”. He then submitted that it is on this aspect that the Inquiry Officer has ruled and found that the action of the District Judge, Baghpat was not tainted by any extraneous considerations. He has further submitted that the petitioners have lost sight of the fact that Charge No. 3 which also related to the selection in question has been found to be proved by the Enquiry Judge himself. In view of the above facts, Shri Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would contend that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 24. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the submissions raised by the parties, this Court is compelled to remind itself of the basic ethos underlining the principles of res judicata. The principle is primarily referable to two age old maxims (a) reipublicae ut sit finis litium and (b) nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. 25. The above rules which pervade, regulate all realms of jurisprudence mean that public policy and necessity mandate and make it the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that no individual should be vexed twice for the same cause. In terms of this doctrine, a judgement rendered inter-parties rules conclusively on the rights asserted and must stand irrevocably closed by such determination. This principle in essence mandates that a claim or demand which is put to litigation and which passes into a final judgement is swallowed up by the same. The judgement rendered inter-parties extinguishes the original cause of action and which thereafter cannot be litigated upon. 26. Today, this principle of finality which stands imposed upon all judicial decisions pronounced by a Court forms part of the rule of law. For the above purpose, it would be correct to hold that the only exception to the doctrine of res judicata is fraud and that too because fraud renders any judgement, decree or order a nullity and non est in the eye of law. For the above purpose, it would be correct to hold that the only exception to the doctrine of res judicata is fraud and that too because fraud renders any judgement, decree or order a nullity and non est in the eye of law. The Court places reliance upon what the Supreme Court of India held in R. Unnikrishan v. V.K. Mahanudevan, (2014) 4 SCC 434 . “19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by Courts that are competent to deal with the subject-matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 , where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words : (AIR p.1462, paras 9 & 11) “9....It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. * * * 11.....The binding character of judgments pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.” 20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res judicata is also fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 65 , this Court observed: (AIR p.72, para 23) “23.There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as ‘res judicata’ between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as ‘res judicata’.” 23. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as ‘res judicata’.” 23. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 , this Court held that for the application of the rule of resjudicata, the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgement. The matter in issue if one purely of fact decided in the earlier proceedings by a competent Court must in any subsequent litigation between the same parties be recorded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. That is true even in regard to mixed questions of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties which cannot be revised or reopened in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. Having said that we must add that the only exception to the doctrine of res judicata is “fraud” that vitiates the decision and renders it a nullity. This Court has in more than one decision held that fraud renders any judgment, decree or order a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. In A.V Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P., [ (2007) 4 SCC 221 ], “fraud” was defined by this Court in the following words: (SCC pp.231-32, para 26) “26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss [and cost] of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.” 27. From the facts noticed hereinabove, it is clear that the rights of the petitioners in so far as their services in the judgeship were concerned and in so far as it related to the validity of the termination affected by the District Judge, Baghpat, stood authoritatively pronounced upon when the Single Judge of this Court rendered judgement on 21.10.2015. From the facts noticed hereinabove, it is clear that the rights of the petitioners in so far as their services in the judgeship were concerned and in so far as it related to the validity of the termination affected by the District Judge, Baghpat, stood authoritatively pronounced upon when the Single Judge of this Court rendered judgement on 21.10.2015. This judgement of the Single Judge stood merged in the order of the Division Bench passed on 1.11.2006, passed upon the special appeal preferred by the petitioners. The mere fact that the special leave petition taken against the aforesaid judgements came to be dismissed by a non-speaking order did not denude them of finality. The only result which followed consequent to the dismissal of the special leave petition by a non-speaking order by the Apex Court was that the two judgements rendered by this Court did not merge in the order of the Apex Court. But that did not mean that the cause of action upon which the petitioners sued did not stand authoritatively ruled upon, swallowed by and subsumed in the judgements of this Court. In fact, upon the two judgements being rendered by this Court, the cause of action on which the petitioners instituted the litigation came to be finally laid to rest by these two judgements. They conclusively determined the rights of parties and the entire controversy attained a quietus. This judgement rendered inter-parties by this Court has attained finality inasmuch as further challenge to it did not meet with success and it, therefore, cannot be revisited, reopened or reviewed under the circumstances set-up in this writ petition. 28. It becomes necessary to deal with the primary submissions canvassed by Shri Asthana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and which sought to draw sustenance from the judgement of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed (supra). 29. Shri K.M. Asthana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed great reliance on paragraphs 34 and 44 of the aforesaid reported judgement. What is laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 34 is that where a special leave petition is dismissed by the Court, the judgement of the High Court does not merge in the said order and the aggrieved party is, therefore, not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was available and he could pursue it. What is laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 34 is that where a special leave petition is dismissed by the Court, the judgement of the High Court does not merge in the said order and the aggrieved party is, therefore, not deprived of any statutory right of review, if it was available and he could pursue it. In paragraph 44, of the report the Supreme Court of India holds that an order refusing special leave to appeal be it a speaking or a non-speaking order in either case does not attract the doctrine of merger. It has been held that an order refusing special leave to appeal does not substitute in place of the order under challenge and all that can be deduced from the said circumstance is that the Supreme Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution of India. It is this line of reasoning and this principle of law which has been consistently followed in the various other judgements cited by Shri Asthana. 30. This Court, however, finds that neither Kunhayammed (supra) nor any other subsequent judgement of the Apex Court has held that a judgement which was rendered inter-parties would cease to bind them merely on account of the fact that the special leave petition was dismissed. To put it differently, accepting the submissions made by Shri Asthana would mean that in every case where a special leave petition taken against a judgement of a High Court is dismissed, the principle of finality of adjudication would not apply and that it would be open to the parties to the judgement of the High Court to re-agitate the same issues. This Court is of the firm opinion that such is not the law declared by the Apex Court and, therefore, this limb of the submission advanced by Shri K.M. Asthana, is liable to be and is accordingly rejected. 31. Coming then to the arguments of Shri Asthana that the entire controversy inter-parties is liable to be revisited in light what has been recorded by the Enquiry Judge in his report referred to above, let it be at the outset stated without reservation that a judgement rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be reopened on the findings returned by an Enquiry Judge conducting a Departmental Enquiry. The acceptance of such a proposition would be against all known norms of jurisprudence. An Enquiry Officer conducting an in house enquiry pursuant to a charge-sheet issued to an employee is enjoined to go into the facts and record whether the charge levelled against the employee stands proved or not. The primary objective of such proceedings are to enable the Disciplinary Authority to form an opinion with regard to the suitability of the employee and to impose upon him any punishment that may be warranted. Considering the fact that this enquiry is informal in character, the Enquiry Officer is not bound by the strict rules of evidence and is not obliged to return a finding of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. His function and role are confined to the above. In fact his report itself could form subject-matter of judicial scrutiny and review by this Court. The contention advanced by Sri Asthana on the strength of this report perhaps looses sight of the nature of the prior litigation between the parties. The previous litigation between the parties was instituted, tried before a Constitutional Court whose power of judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Neither findings of fact recorded in such an enquiry nor the conclusions on law bind this Court or eclipse its judgments. 32. In any view of the matter, this Court finds that charge No. 1 as framed against the then District Judge related to him having made appointments in excess of the vacancies advertised for extraneous considerations. The judgement rendered by this Court inter-parties did not hold against the petitioners on the ground of them having been appointed for extraneous considerations. The judgement of this Court rendered inter-parties, rested upon an interpretation of the statutory rules applicable while coming to the conclusion that the appointments of the petitioners were illegal. This Court further finds that what appears to have weighed with the Inquiry Judge to a great extent was the fact that the select list prepared by the District Judge, Baghpat had been approved by the then Administrative Judge of this Court and it was in the aforesaid circumstances that he proceeded to hold that Charge No. 1 did not stand proved. 33. 33. While Shri Samir Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also relied upon the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer in respect of Charge No. 3, suffice it to say that the said charge is really not in issue in the present case inasmuch as the appointment of the petitioners were made within the life of the select list and not after it had expired. A collateral challenge like the present one surely cannot be permitted inasmuch as the same would clearly open the doors to chaos and oppression. The principle of the rule of law evolved over the centuries is in fact aimed at preventing such anarchy and it is for this reason that great sanctity stands attracted to the finality of a judgement rendered inter-parties. In fact, considering a similar controversy with regard to a collateral challenge laid by the petitioners assailing an order of termination, the Supreme Court of India was pleased to hold as under in Union of India v. S.P. Sharma, (2014) 6 SCC 351 . “80. In M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 733 : AIR 2011 SC 1113 , this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. The main object of the doctrine is to promote a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the Court on the issues which have become final between the parties. The doctrine is based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if the appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. 81. Thus, the principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such anarchy. 82. 81. Thus, the principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such anarchy. 82. In a country governed by the rule of law, the finality of a judgement is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgement and it is not permissible for the parties to reopen the concluded judgements of the Court as it would not only tantamount to merely an abuse of the process of the Court but would have far-reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice. It would also nullify the doctrine of stare decisis, a well-established valuable principle of precedent which cannot be departed from unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The judgements of the Court and particularly of the Apex Court of a country cannot and should not be unsettled lightly.” 34. The present writ petition, in the opinion of this Court is clearly in abuse of the process of the Court and seeks to reopen issues which had attained finality and quietus consequent to the judgements rendered by this Court inter-parties and for the said reasons and those set forth hereinbefore clearly lacks all merit. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ——————