Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal preferred against the judgment and order passed on 31.10.1998 by Judge of the Special Court, Akola constituted under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 thereby convicting the present appellants of the offence of milling or manufacturing oil from the oil seeds and dealing in the oil without possessing millers licence and also a dealers licence, which was a contravention of clause 3 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Oilseeds and Oils (Dealers and Millers) Licensing Order, 1977 (in short, "Licensing Order, 1977"). 2. Briefly stated, prosecution case is as under: (i) The appellants were the partners of Kedia Dal and Oil Mills, engaged in the business of extracting oil from the Sunflower oil seeds and also dealing in that oil. The premises of Kedia Dal and Oil Mill, Akola were raided on 21.7.1989 by the Inspecting Officer, Food Supply Department, Akola together with Supply Inspector and it was found that the appellants were manufacturing oil from the oil seeds and also dealing in the oil without possessing the licence as required under clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977. It was also found that all the appellants, being the partners of the said firm, were responsible for the acts and omissions done by the partners including the firm. Since the appellant could not produce any licence for carrying on such business by the firm, the F.I.R. was registered for contravention of clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977. After completion of the investigation, a charge sheet came to be filed against all the appellants before the Special Court constituted under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 at Akola. (ii) On merits of the case, the learned Special Judge found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of contravention of clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977 and, therefore, convicted all the appellants of the said offence and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and also to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- each, together with default sentence of one month. 3. Not being satisfied with the judgment and order, the appellants are before this Court in this present appeal. 4. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.4 Shrikrishna Kedia died and, therefore, his appeal stood abated. 5. I have heard Mr. A.S. Manohar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. 3. Not being satisfied with the judgment and order, the appellants are before this Court in this present appeal. 4. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.4 Shrikrishna Kedia died and, therefore, his appeal stood abated. 5. I have heard Mr. A.S. Manohar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.M. Bhagde, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and order and also the record of the case. 6. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution evidence shows that the appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 were not the managing partners, who were incharge of the firm and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business and that the deceased appellant No.4 (accused No.4) had admitted that it was him only, who was incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. Therefore, he submits that all the appellants i.e. accused Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 could not have been convicted of the offence of contravention of clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977 through the principle of vicarious liability. In support, he places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Sham Sunder and others vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1990(1) Mah.L.R. 696. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State although submits that the inspecting officer, PW 1, Ratanlal's evidence is sufficient to show that even the other partners were the managing partners of the said firm. I do not think that a bald statement of inspecting officer would be enough to rope in the present appellants in this crime. Evidence of the Investigating Officer, shows that that except for filing of the charge sheet on the basis of report of the raiding officer, he had done nothing in this case and, therefore, only because somebody makes a statement before the Court that other partners too were the managing partners would not be enough. Some evidence in the nature of role being performed by other partners in the day to day affairs of the said firm should have been brought on record. That evidence is not available in this case. Some evidence in the nature of role being performed by other partners in the day to day affairs of the said firm should have been brought on record. That evidence is not available in this case. On the contrary, the deceased appellant No.4 (accused No.4) in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. had admitted that he was only looking after the business of the said firm and that other partners were the nominal partners and that they were made partners only because they were members of the joint family of the deceased appellant No.4. Although, learned Additional Public Prosecutor states that the role of the remaining partners as managing partners of the said firm could be inferred, I beg to differ with him for the reason that absolutely no material for drawing of such an inference has been brought on record by the prosecution. With such evidence being present on record, it cannot be said that other partners-appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5, were actually looking after day to day affairs of the said firm and were incharge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business. 8. In the case of Sham Sunder, the Hon'ble Apex Court while interpreting Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which deals with affairs of the company, has laid down that in order to fasten criminal liability upon the partners of a firm on the basis of the principle of vicarious liability, what is important is that the person should be entrusted with the business of the firm and should be responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business and then alone, he could be prosecuted for the offence complained of. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court as appearing in paragraph 7, are reproduced as under : "From explanation to Section 10 it will be seen that the company includes a firm and other association of persons. Section 10 provides that the person shall be deemed to be guilty of contravention of an order made under Section 3 if he was incharge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. Section 10 provides that the person shall be deemed to be guilty of contravention of an order made under Section 3 if he was incharge of and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. What is of importance to note is, that the person who was entrusted with the business of the firm and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business, could alone be prosecuted for the offence complained of." 9. From the evidence discussed in the earlier paragraph, it has been seen that no relevant material has been brought on record by the prosecution to enable the Court to conclude that other partners-appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 were entrusted with the business of the firm and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business. Therefore, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 law in Sham Sunder case would be squarely applicable to this case and no criminal liability vicariously can be fastened upon them and, therefore, on this ground alone, these appellants could be found to be not guilty of the offence with which they have been charged herein. 10. Even otherwise, the prosecution has not brought on record any document or extract of relevant register to prove its contention that on the date of the raid, the appellants were carrying on business of extraction of the oil from the oil seeds and also dealing in the oil without possessing requisite licence. Clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977 makes it mandatory for a person carrying on business as a wholesale dealer or a dealer to obtain a licence in that regard from the Licensing Authority. According to PW 1, PW 4-Prakash Deshmukh-raiding officer, the appellants firm did possess Millers licence. He, however, states that the appellants firm did not possess the dealers licence on the date of the raid and this fact was stated by him, after verification of the office record. PW 1 Ratanlal, however, states that the appellants firm on the date of the raid possessed requisite licence and that he and the raiding officer PW 4 Prakash Deshmukh were knowing this fact. PW 1 Ratanlal, however, states that the appellants firm on the date of the raid possessed requisite licence and that he and the raiding officer PW 4 Prakash Deshmukh were knowing this fact. Thus, on record there are two versions in respect of possession of the licence by the appellant and, therefore, it was the duty of the prosecution to produce on record extract of relevant register to prove assertion of PW 4-Prakash Deshmukh that although the appellants on the date of the raid, possessed millers licence, did not possess dealer's licence. The offence committed by the appellants is technical in nature. It is about contravention of clause 3 which requires carrying on oil business by a person only under a licence issued in that behalf by the concerned Licenceing Authority. Therefore, question of license assumes importance. When two versions about licence are available in the prosecution evidence, it falls upon the prosecution to clear the doubt arising from the two versions and in this case, this doubt could have been cleared only by producing on record copy of the concerned millars licence or the extract of the relevant register. Such evidence having not been brought on record by the prosecution, on this count also, I find that the appellant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 could not have been held to be guilty of the offence of contravention of clause 3 of the Licensing Order, 1977. 11. The aforesaid aspects of the case emerging from the prosecution evidence have not been at all considered by the learned Special Judge and, therefore, I find that the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained in law. 12. In the result, this appeal deserves to be allowed. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 31.10.1998, in E.C. Case No.6/1990, passed by Judge of the Special Court, Akola are hereby quashed and set aside. 14. The appellants are acquitted of the offence of contravention of clause 3 of the Maharashtra Scheduled Oilseeds and Oils (Dealers and Millers) Licensing Order, 1977. 15. Fine amounts be refunded to them. 16. Their bail bonds stand discharged.