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Gujarat High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 357 (GUJ)

Ritaben Kamleshbhai Mehta v. State of Gujarat

2015-03-30

K.M.THAKER

body2015
Judgment K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Raval, learned Advocate for the petitioners and Ms. Pathak, learned A.G.P. for respondent who has appeared on advance service of copy of the petition. In view of the subject matter of the petition and having regard to the fact that starting point of the main issue and the dispute involved in present petition are (i) sale deed executed in March 2000 and (ii) the notice issued by respondent No. 3 in October 2003, learned counsel for the petitioners requested that the matters may be heard finally at admission stage. Learned AGP fairly submitted that since the relevant facts are not in dispute and essentially what is required to be considered and decided in this group of petitions are only legal issues, the respondents do not have any objection if the petitions are heard and decided finally at admission stage. 1.1 In view of the said request by learned advocate for the petitioners and the fair stand by learned AGP and with her consent the petitions are taken up for hearing and final decision however, so as to eliminate any technical objections, Rule is made returnable forthwith. Learned AGP has waived service of Rule. With consent of learned AGP the petitions are heard and decided finally. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the facts involved in group of these petitions are similar and common and the respondents are also common. Learned Counsel for petitioner further clarified that the date of the orders impugned in the petitions is also the same and the date of the respective documents in question are also same. The learned AGP confirmed the said submission. Learned Counsel for the petitioners and Learned AGP have advanced common submissions. In this view of the matter, the petitions are decided by common order. 3. The relevant details and the relief prayed for are derived (and considered) from Spl.C.A. No. 5422 of 2015. 4. The petitioners in Spl.C.A. No. 5422 of 2015 have prayed that: "10 (A) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21-10-2014 and the communication dated 23-1-2015 issued by the respondent No. 2. 4. The petitioners in Spl.C.A. No. 5422 of 2015 have prayed that: "10 (A) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21-10-2014 and the communication dated 23-1-2015 issued by the respondent No. 2. (B) The Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21-10-2014 as also communication dated 23-1-2015 and direct the respondent No. 2 to hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits and till such hearing is completed and orders are passed, stay recovery sought to be initiated vide notice dated 16-2-2015, issued by the respondent No. 3. (C) Pending final hearing and disposal of the petition, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the notice dated 16-2-2015 issued by the respondent No. 3. (D) The Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of Para 10(A) to 10(C) above." 5. So as to support and justify the relief prayed for the petitioners have averred and stated (in Spl.C.A. No. 5422 of 2015) that: "3.1. That, the petitioners purchased a small plot of land admeasuring 452 M. bearing Plot No. 8 and Survey No. 112 in village Nanamava of Rajkot City vide registered sale-deed dated 30-3-2000 registered as No. 2225 of 2000. On the same, the petitioners received a notice from the respondent No. 3 on 10-10-2003, to the effect that the said was undervalued, and therefore, additional duty of Rs. 1,34,550/-, over and above the stamp duty of Rs. 17,500/- already paid was required to be paid. That the petitioners had immediately replied to the said notice of the respondent No. 3 inter alia, raising disputes on merits. Annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-B is a copy of the reply of the petitioners. 3.2. That thereafter for a long period of time the issue had remained dormant, insofar as no notice of hearing was given to the petitioners. The petitioners had repeatedly, personally gone down to the office of the respondent No. 3, inquiring about the status of the dispute raised under the provisions of the act but did not receive any reply. 3.2. That thereafter for a long period of time the issue had remained dormant, insofar as no notice of hearing was given to the petitioners. The petitioners had repeatedly, personally gone down to the office of the respondent No. 3, inquiring about the status of the dispute raised under the provisions of the act but did not receive any reply. That thereafter, the 1st intimation given to the petitioners was in the year 2013 when the petitioners received a notice dated 21-11-2013 directing the petitioners to make submissions on 30-11-2013. 3.4. To the shock and surprise of the petitioners, without considering the evidence produced by the petitioners, a totally unreasoned non-speaking order was passed on 16-6-2014 by the respondent No. 3. The same was received by the petitioners on 19-6-2014. 3.5. The petitioners, accordingly met their legal representative with a view to prepare an appeal. The same could only be done in September, since prior thereto the petitioners had been traveling. Accordingly, after making the statutory deposit of 25% of deficit stamp duty, as provided for under the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act, on 6-9-2014, the petitioners preferred an appeal on 13-9-2014 under the bona fide impression that the last date of limitation period as envisaged under the provisions of the Act was 16-9-2014. The said appeal was received by the respondent No. 2 on 15-9-2014. 7. To the great shock and surprise of the petitioners, the petitioners received the order impugned dated 21-10-2014 rejecting the appeal of the petitioners on the ground that the said appeal was beyond the period of limitation of 90 days since the order impugned, passed by the respondent No. 3, was dated 16-6-2014 and the appeal was only received by the respondent No. 2 on 15-9-2014 that is 92 days after the date of the order of the respondent No. 3. The petitioners had immediately replied to such communication/order on 24-11-2014 submitting that the limitation period would count from the date of receipt of the order that is, 19-6-2014 and not from the date of the order itself, and therefore, the appeal was made within a period of 89 days and not beyond the period of limitation of 90 days as was stated in the communication/order of the respondent No. 2 dated 21-10-2014." 6. It emerges from the said details that the document i.e. sale-deed in question came to be executed in March, 2000. The document was submitted for registration and the said sale-deed was registered at Serial No. 2225 of 2000 with the respondent No. 3. Thereafter, somewhere in October, 2003 the respondent No. 3 issued Notice to the petitioner and conveyed that according to his office adequate stamp duty in respect of the document in question was not paid and that the property was undervalued and on proper valuation additional duty to the tune of Rs. 1,34,550/- is required to be paid. It appears that the petitioner filed reply to the said notice. It is alleged by the petitioner that any notice calling the petitioners for hearing and/or informing the date of hearing was never issued and served. It is further alleged that the petitioners had personally visited office of the respondent No. 3 and made inquiry about the status of the case. According to the petitioners for almost 10 years i.e. until November, 2013 nothing was heard from the respondents and then suddenly the petitioners received notice dated 21-11-2013 asking the petitioners to remain present for hearing on 30-11-2013. On the said date the hearing was adjourned and the next date of hearing i.e. 10-4-2014 was informed to the petitioner vide notice dated 26-3-2014. 6.1. The petitioners have claimed that the order in question i.e. the order dated 16-6-2014 was received by the petitioners on 19-6-2014. 6.2. The petitioners have further claimed that feeling aggrieved by the said order the petitioners decided to file revision application under Sec. 53 of the Act. It is further claimed that me provision under Sec. 53 prescribes that out of the adjudicated amount, amount @ 25% must be deposited by the person intending to file revision application against the disputed order and that therefore the petitioners deposited the amount @ 25% of the adjudicated amount, with the office of respondent No. 2, on 6-9-2014 and accordingly the petitioners complied the condition for filing and maintaining the appeals. 6.3. It is further claimed by the petitioners that the amount was deposited on 6-9-2014 and the petitioners' bona fide belief that upon complying the condition to deposit the amount the requirement of filing the application in prescribed time-limit stands complied. 6.3. It is further claimed by the petitioners that the amount was deposited on 6-9-2014 and the petitioners' bona fide belief that upon complying the condition to deposit the amount the requirement of filing the application in prescribed time-limit stands complied. It is also claimed by the petitioners that in spite of such bona fide belief the petitioners, filed (within prescribed limitation) the revision application against the orders in question on 13-9-2014. 6.4. The respondents have claimed that the said appeals i.e. memo of the appeals were received in the office of respondent No. 2 (i.e. the competent authority) on 15-9-2014. 6.5. The petitioners have claimed that though the revision applications were filed/submitted on 13-9-2014 (and even if the respondents' claim is to be believed, then also the condition related to limitation was complied inasmuch as the memo of applications were received in office or the authority on 15-9-2014) the respondents, issued and served the recovery notice dated 24-9-2014 informing the petitioners that if the adjudicated amounts are not paid then it will be recovered by way of land revenue. 6.6. The petitioners have further claimed that immediately thereafter the petitioners received the impugned communication/order dated 21-10-2014 informing the petitioners that the revision applications are not entertained and are rejected because the said applications have been filed after prescribed period of limitation expired (i.e. after 90 days). The petitioners are aggrieved by said order/s. Hence these petitions. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned A.G.P. and their rival submissions. I have also considered the material available on record. 7.1. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that actually the revision applications were filed on 13-9-2014, however even if 15-9-2014 is taken into account then also the respondents are not right and justified in dismissing the revision applications on the ground of delay. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned orders were received by the petitioners on 19-6-2014 and the applications came to be filed on 13-9-2014/15-9-2014, and that therefore, the respondents are not justified in treating the applications as barred by limitation and the order rejecting the applications on ground of delay is arbitrary, misconceived, unjust and unsustainable. 7.2. The petitions and the said contentions are vehemently opposed by Ms. Pathak, learned A.G.P.. 7.2. The petitions and the said contentions are vehemently opposed by Ms. Pathak, learned A.G.P.. Learned A.G.P. submitted that the applications were received on 15-9-2014, and that therefore, having regard to the date of the orders in question the applications were filed on 92nd day inasmuch as the orders in question came to be passed on 16-6-2014, and that therefore, the respondents are justified in holding that me applications are filed on 92nd day, and consequently they are barred by limitation. Learned A.G.P. submitted that according to Sec. 53 of Bombay Stamp Act the relevant date is the date of order, and that therefore, limitation is to be calculated from the date of the order and that the petitioners are not right in claiming that the applications have been filed within prescribed period of limitation. 7.3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would, respond to the said contention and would submit that the date of knowledge would be the relevant date, and consequently, me date of receipt of the order by the petitioners should be taken into account and the respondents are not justified in taking into account the date of the order. 8. The respondents have taken into account the date of the order (passed by respondent No. 3) i.e. 16-6-2014 as the starting point for calculating period of limitation and 15-9-2014 as the date of submission of revision applications. By taking said termini and calculating the period of limitation on the said premise, the respondents concluded that the revision applications were filed on 92nd day i.e. the submission of application was delayed by 2 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 90 days. 8.1. It appears that the petitioners opposed the said intimation/order by their letter dated 24-11-2014 and claimed that the revision applications were filed within prescribed time-limit and even if the date considered by the respondents i.e. 15-9-2014 is taken into account then also it would be 89th day and that therefore the revision applications cannot be said to have been filed after prescribed period of limitation. The respondent No. 2 ignored said submission and dismissed the applications. 9. So as to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to take into account provision under Sec. 53 of the Act. The said provision reads thus: "Sec. 53. The respondent No. 2 ignored said submission and dismissed the applications. 9. So as to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to take into account provision under Sec. 53 of the Act. The said provision reads thus: "Sec. 53. Control of and statement of case to Chief Controlling Revenue Authority:--(1) The powers exercisable by a Collector under Chapter III, Chapter IV and Chapter V and under clause (a) of the second proviso to Sec. 27 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority: [Provided that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not entertain an application made by a person under sub-sec. (1) unless (a) such application is presented [within a period of ninety days] from the date of order of the Collector. (b) such person deposits twenty-five percent of the amount of duty or as the case may be, amount of difference of duty payable by him in respect of subject-matter of the instrument for which application has been made]. (2) If any Collector, acting under Sec. 31, [Sec. 32A] Sec. 39 or Sec. 40, feels doubt as to the amount of duty with which any instrument is chargeable, he may draw up a statement of the case, and refer it, with his own opinion thereon, for the decision of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. (3) Such authority shall consider the case and send a copy of its decision to the Collector, who shall proceed to assess and charge the duty (if any) in conformity with such decision." 9.1. Similarly, it is also necessary to take into account certain relevant dates which have bearing on the rival contentions inasmuch as not only the date of the order and the date on which the petitioners filed the applications but the date on which the petitioners received the order and came into knowledge about the decision are also equally relevant and important. For sake of convenience the said details are summarized thus: 1 Date of he order 16-6-2014 2 Date when the petitioner received the order 19-6-2014 3 Date when the petitioner deposited 25% amount out of the adjudicated amount 6-9-2014 4 Date when the petitioner dispatched the applications/appeals to the officer of the appellant authority 10-9-2014 5 According to the date of first authorties order (16-6-2014) period of 90 days would expire on 14-9-2014 6 Whereas according to the date when the order was received by the petitioners period of 90 days would expire on 16-9-2014 7 Date on which competent authority’s office received the appeals – applications 15-9-2014 9.2. Thus, the revision application/appeal was filed/received in the office of the authority before 90 days from the date on which the order was served/communicated to the petitioner. 9.3. In light of the said facts and details learned A.G.P. relied on and emphasized clause (a) of first proviso of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 53 which provides, inter alia that "...such application is presented within a period of 90 days from the date of the Collector" and she claimed that the provision specifically mentions "...from the date of the order...." and that therefore the date when the order is passed/signed is the relevant date and it is only the said date which can be taken into account. According to learned A.G.P. in view of such specific provision any other date cannot be taken into account for the purpose of calculating limitation/delay and for deciding the issue as to whether the application is filed within prescribed period of limitation or not. 10. On examination of Sec. 53, it comes out that the legislature has not conferred to the competent authority power to condone delay. The said aspect is settled by virtue of the decision by Full Bench in the case between Jayminbhai N. Doshit v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2014 Guj. 220 (FB). 10.1. However the said decision cannot be read and construed to derive or usurp the power to restrict - rather artificially curtail - the time-limit allowed by the Act for filing revision application under Sec. 53. 10.2. If the said provision is construed in the manner adopted by the authority, then it will frustrate the object of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. 11. 10.2. If the said provision is construed in the manner adopted by the authority, then it will frustrate the object of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. 11. True it is that the Section employs the words 'from the date of order', however the said words are not to be construed in such a manner so as to reject, mechanically and without scrutiny, all applications which might have been filed after 90 days "from the date when the order is passed/signed" but before expiry of 90 days from the date when the order passed by first adjudicating authority is served, and before it is communicated to the concerned and affected person. 12. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to mention that in present case, it is not in dispute that the first adjudicating authority passed the order some time after the hearing was concluded. 12.1. It is not the case even of the department that the order was passed or pronounced in presence of the petitioner or his representative. 13. In this context, it is necessary to take into account the provision in the rules framed under the Act which prescribe the mode and manner of service of the order passed by the adjudicating authority. The said provision is relevant in both situation (viz. when the order is passed in presence of the concerned person as well as when it is not passed in his presence) becomes more relevant when the order is passed after the hearing and not in presence of the concerned and affected person or his representatives. The relevant provision under Rule 7 of Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules, 1984 reads thus: "7. Manner of service of notice under Rule 4: Any notice or order under these rules shall be served in the following manner, namely: (1) In the case of any company,.... (a).... (b).... (2) In the case of any firm,.... (a).... (b).... (3) In the case of a family.... Manner of service of notice under Rule 4: Any notice or order under these rules shall be served in the following manner, namely: (1) In the case of any company,.... (a).... (b).... (2) In the case of any firm,.... (a).... (b).... (3) In the case of a family.... (4) In the case of any individual person, the notice or order shall be served,-- (a) by delivering or tendering the notice or order to the person concerned or to his Advocate or authorized agent; or (b) by delivering or tendering the notice or order to some adult member of the family; or (c) by sending the notice or order to the person concerned by registered post with acknowledgment due; or (d) if none of the aforesaid modes of service is practicable, by affixing the notice or order in some conspicuous part of the last known place of residence or business of the person concerned." 13.1. The said provision prescribes the manner of service of any notice or order in case of an individual. 14. In light of the said provision it is relevant to mention that the respondents have also not disputed that the office of the first adjudicating authority had dispatched the order (dated 16-6-2014) on 19-6-2014. 15. In this view of the matter the respondents, in any case, cannot attribute "knowledge about the decision of the adjudicating authority" to the petitioner on any date prior to 19-6-2014 and it cannot be disputed or denied by the respondents that until 19-6-2014 the petitioner did not have any knowledge about the decision of the adjudicating authority and about the order (and its contents) 15.1. When the order is not passed in presence of the noticee/his representative, then the respondents are obliged to demonstrate knowledge about the adjudicating authority's decision to the petitioner inasmuch as until the petitioner gets the information about the decision and/or until he is conveyed the decision, the petitioner cannot be said to be aware about the decision i.e. as to whether the case is decided in his favour or against and that therefore he would not be in position to take any informed decision as to whether appeal proceedings against the decision should be taken out or not. 15.2. 15.2. A provision conferring statutory right and thereby providing a remedy against the order by adjudicating authority, either in form of appeal or revision application, should be construed to make the remedy effective and meaningful and cannot be interpreted and enforced in a manner which will curtail the scope of remedy and may virtually render it ornamental or truncated than what the legislature actually provided for. 15.3. The remedy of appeal or revision can be availed only if (and when) the person has knowledge about the order/decision (i.e. what, actually, is the decision and the reasons for the conclusion and decision by the authority) and not in absence of such knowledge. 16. Section 53 of the Act provides a forum and a remedy to the party who feels aggrieved by the order passed by adjudicating authority to challenge order and the said Section also attaches a condition viz. the application/appeal against the order must be filed before expiry of the prescribed period. 16.1. However, if the order is passed some time after the hearing is over and is not passed and pronounced in presence of the concerned party, then the concerned party would not be aware about the details of the decision-order and/or about the date on which the adjudicating authority passed the order. 16.2. When the person is not even aware that some decision is taken and order is passed and/or when the person is not aware about the actual decision i.e. contents of the order, he cannot effectively and meaningfully avail the remedy provided under the Act. Unless the person has the knowledge about the order the provisions/remedy will be meaningless. Therefore, the said provision i.e., Sec. 53 of the Act and more particularly the expression "from the date of the order" must be construed to make the provision and the remedy effective and meaningful and not in a manner which would restrict the period of said remedy's availability i.e. the period for which the remedy would be effectively available to the concerned and affected person. 17. In this view of the matter, the decision of the authority to take, as relevant date, the date of the order i.e. the date when the order was passed/signed (and not the date on which the order was served or communicated to the concerned person) cannot be sustained. 18. 17. In this view of the matter, the decision of the authority to take, as relevant date, the date of the order i.e. the date when the order was passed/signed (and not the date on which the order was served or communicated to the concerned person) cannot be sustained. 18. The impugned decision is contrary to the object of the provision and militates against the scheme of the Act and the Rules. 18.1. The said view and decision of the authority ignores that for real, practical and actual operation of Sec. 53 of the Act, relevant factor is "knowledge about the order". Therefore, the relevant date for finding the answer to the question viz. whether the application (revision) is filed before expiry of prescribed period of limitation (i.e. 90 days) or not, would be the date on which the order is served/communicated to the concerned person. 18.2. The expression "...from the date of the order...." should be construed and interpreted to make the provision under Sec. 53 of the Act meaningful and effective and not to render it redundant. 18.3. The object of the provision, can be achieved and maintained only when the said expression is read to mean "from the date of the knowledge about the order", meaning thereby, the date when the order is communicated. Any other construction will defeat the purpose and object of the provision. 19. In this context it would be appropriate at this stage to take into account observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case between D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, AIR 2003 SC 2502 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court, while considering provision under Sec. 48AA of Advocates Act, observed, inter alia, that: "9. So far as the commencement of period of limitation for filing the review petition is concerned, we are clearly of the opinion that the expression 'the date of that order' as occurring in Sec. 48AA has to be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge of the order to the review-petitioner. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. Where the law provides a remedy to a person, the provision has to be so construed in case of ambiguity as to make the availing of the remedy practical and the exercise of power conferred on the authority meaningful and effective. A construction which would render the provision nugatory ought to be avoided. True, the process of interpretation cannot be utilized for implanting a heart into a dead provision; however, the power to construe a provision of law can always be so exercised as to give throb to a sinking heart." 19.1. A profitable reference also may be made to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Housing Board Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association, 1995 (5) SCC 672 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court observed, inter alia, that: "8. Before considering the merits of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant it would be appropriate first to look into the relevant provisions relating to the limitation. Section 15 of the Act makes a provision for appeal and prescribes the limitation for the same. It reads as under: "15. Appeal:--Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of an order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed. Provided further that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there were sufficient cause for not finding it within that period." 11. From the scheme of the Act, it becomes apparent that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has, been enacted with object to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers, as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of their disputes and matters connected therewith. It is with this object in view that Rule 4(10) has also been made. It provides for communication of the order of the District Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified copy. It is with this object in view that Rule 4(10) has also been made. It provides for communication of the order of the District Forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified copy. If the rule itself enjoins a duty for communicating the order of the District Forum duly signed and dated to the parties free of charge, there will hardly be an occasion for the parties to make an application for obtaining a certified copy thereof. Thus, Sec. 15 of the Act cannot be read in isolation but it has to be read along with Rules 4(10) and 8(3) of the Rules and a combined reading of Sec. 15 and the Rules reproduced above gives an impression that the purpose, object and intention of these statutory provisions is to protect the interest of the parties before the District Forum by making it obligatory on the District Forum to provide a copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members of the Bench and the period of limitation prescribed with regard to the filing of an appeal shall be computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order in the manner laid down in sub-rule (10) of Rule 4. 12. In the facts and circumstances stated above, the date of pronouncement of the order in the open Court by itself cannot be the starting point for determining the period of limitation under Sec. 15 of the Act. It has also to be shown that the order of the District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated by the members of the District Forum constituting the Bench and the same was communicated to the parties free of change. That being so, it has to be appreciated that mere pronouncement of an order in the open Court will not be enough but under the scheme of the Rules a copy of the said order has also to be communicated to the parties affected by the said order so that the party adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the appellate or Higher Forums. In the absence of such communication of signed and dated order, the party adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so as to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or the Higher Forums." In the said decision in case of Housing Board Haryana, [ 1995 (5) SCC 672 ] Apex Court has considered the situation where the order is pronounced in the open Court and after considering such situation the Apex Court has observed and clarified that: "...die date of pronouncement of the order in the open Court by itself cannot be the starting point for determining the period of limitation under Sec. 15 of the Act. It has also to be shown that the order of me District Forum so pronounced was duly signed and dated by me members of the District Forum constituting me Bench and the same was communicated to the parties...." Of course, it can be claimed that the said observations are in light of Sec. 15 which was under consideration before the Apex Court. However, said distinction does not wipe out the legal position explained and settled by the Apex Court viz. communication of the order and its contents i.e. knowledge about the actual decision and the order is the relevant and material aspect for calculating period of limitation and deciding as to whether the particular application or appeal is filed within prescribed period of limitation or not. 19.2. Consequently, in the cases where the order is passed sometime after the hearing gets concluded and it is not passed or not pronounced in presence of the concerned party or his representative, the concerned party may not be able to file application within 90 days 'from the date of order' as the concerned party will come to know that any order is passed only when the concerned party is informed the decision of the first adjudicating authority or when copy of the order is served to him. 20. 20. In some case, it may so happen that at first glance, it may appear that an application is filed after expiry of prescribed period and is time-barred, however, if correct and just method for calculating period of limitation is adopted or if applicant is allowed to explain the facts and details, then the applicant may be able to explain and establish that the application is not hit by delay. It is true that the authority is not conferred the power to condone delay. However, the said restriction does not mean that the applicant should be deprived of the opportunity even to demonstrate that the application is filed before expiry of the prescribed period. Therefore, it is just, equitable and necessary to allow opportunity of hearing to the applicant so that the applicant i.e. person aggrieved by the order of the first adjudicating authority can demonstrate relevant details (e.g. the date on which the office of the first adjudicating authority dispatched the order and/or the date on which the applicant received the order) and demonstrate and establish before the authority that if the period of limitation is calculated in accordance with settled legal position then it would be noticed that application is filed before expiry of prescribed period of limitation and is not barred by limitation. Otherwise, in certain cases injustice may be caused, which may prove to be fatal for the applicant as it would result into premature demise of such application. Thus, though the provision does not confer power to condone delay, it is not proper for the authority to not even hear the applicant and consider relevant facts and details before taking decision about limitation and delay. 21. In the decision in case of State of Punjab v. Amor Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 , wherein the subject-matter for consideration by Hon'ble Apex Court was with reference to order of dismissal passed by the competent authority against the respondent. In the said case and in that context, Apex Court has observed, inter alia, that: "11. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th May, 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect as from the 3rd June, 1949 when it was actually passed. The first question which has been raised before us by Mr. Bishan Narain is that though the respondent came to know about the order of his dismissal for the first time on the 28th May, 1951, the said order must be deemed to have taken effect as from the 3rd June, 1949 when it was actually passed. The High Court has rejected this contention; but Mr. Bishan Narain contends that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous in law. We are not impressed by Mr. Bishan Narains' argument. It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may fell that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? These and other complications would inevitably arise, if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. These and other complications would inevitably arise, if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period; but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. When a public officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office; and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that an officer who is actually working and holding charge of his office, can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was plainly right in holding that the order of dismissal passed against the respondent on the 3rd June, 1949 could not be said to have taken effect until the respondent came to know about it on the 28th May 1951." 21.1. What emerges, on conjoint reading of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, is that for an order to become effective and operational, the order and decision should be informed to the concerned person and he should be aware about the decision of the authority and also about the direction. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court an authority may pass and sign an order and such order may be retained on file without communicating and forwarding it to the concerned person. The knowledge that an order is passed as well as knowledge about the actual decision and effect of the decision are imperative for calculating and enforcing the limitation prescribed (for filing application under Sec. 53 of the Act) by the Act. 22. The knowledge that an order is passed as well as knowledge about the actual decision and effect of the decision are imperative for calculating and enforcing the limitation prescribed (for filing application under Sec. 53 of the Act) by the Act. 22. Since, in spite of several decisions and directions by this Court the respondent authorities under the Act are adamantly refusing to take note of this position in law and in view of the fact that the revisional authority under the Act repeatedly and adamantly decides maintainability of revision applications under Sec. 53 of the Act and dismisses the application at threshold by taking into account the date on which the order is passed and signed and not by considering the date on which the order is communicated to and served to the concerned person and having regard to the fact that such orders are passed at threshold i.e. even without issuing notice and/or without granting opportunity to the applicant to explain relevant details/facts it is necessary to emphasis that it is the date on which the order is communicated and served to the concerned person or brought to his notice which is the relevant date and not the date on which the order is passed and signed by the first adjudicating authority. 22.1. The grievance of the petitioners in these cases is required to be considered and examined in light of above discussed position and the relevant facts and dates. 22.2. It would be appropriate to recall, while keeping in focus the above discussed position, that the first adjudicating authority passed the order in question on 16-6-2014. The said order was served to the petitioner on 19-6-2014. The petitioner dispatched the revision applications to the competent authority on 10-9-2014 which was received (according to the claim by the respondents) in the office of the respondents on 15-9-2014 and the petitioner deposited 25% of adjudicated amount on 6-9-2014. Thus, the amount required to be deposited in light of clause (B) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 was deposited by the petitioners even before the memo of applications were received in the office of revisional authority. 22.3. In this view of the matter, the period of limitation i.e. period of 90 days should have been calculated w.e.f. 19-6-2014. 22.4. Thus, the amount required to be deposited in light of clause (B) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 was deposited by the petitioners even before the memo of applications were received in the office of revisional authority. 22.3. In this view of the matter, the period of limitation i.e. period of 90 days should have been calculated w.e.f. 19-6-2014. 22.4. When the said relevant dates are taken into account in light of the above-quoted observations and decisions by Hon'ble Apex Court, then it becomes clear that the revisional authority has committed error in considering the revision applications filed by the petitioners as bared by limitation prescribed under the Act inasmuch as calculating the period on from 1st terminus to 2nd terminus i.e. from 19-6-2014 to 15-9-2014 it becomes clear that the revision applications are undisputedly filed before expiry of 90th day, and that therefore the revision applications filed by the petitioners could not have been treated as barred by period of limitation prescribed under the Act and consequently, the applications could not have been dismissed. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders deserve to be and are accordingly hereby set aside and the matters are remitted to the revisional authority for considering the revision applications on merits. 22.5. The authority shall take up the revision applications for hearing and appropriate decision. After intimating date of hearing of revision applications to the petitioner, revisional authority shall hear the petitioners, consider the submissions and the material on record and pass appropriate fresh orders on merits in accordance with law. 22.6. It is clarified that this Court has not entered into merits of the claim of the petitioners and this Court has also not expressed any opinion as regards merits of the case of the petitioners. 22.6. It is further clarified that the impugned order passed by the revisional authority is examined in light of the ground which is mentioned in the order i.e. period of limitation applicable in cases of applications filed by the petitioners, and that therefore, the authority will consider and decide the cases independently and in accordance with law and without being influenced by any previous orders and present order shall not be construed as expression of any view or opinion on merits of the case. With the aforesaid clarifications the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. With the aforesaid clarifications the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Accordingly, the petitions are disposed of. Petition Partly Allowed.