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2015 DIGILAW 3586 (MAD)

State of Tamil Nadu v. V. Janakiraman

2015-11-02

N.KIRUBAKARAN, V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN

body2015
JUDGMENT : V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is filed by the State of Tamil Nadu, challenging the order passed by the learned Judge, allowing the writ petition filed by the original land owners seeking reconveyance of the land acquired. Heard Mr. K. Chellapandian, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/appellants and Mr. Veera Kathiravan, learned Counsel appearing for the land owners/respondents. 2. By a notification issued way-back in the year 1956 under G.O. Rt. No. 572 dated 25.05.1956, under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, lands of a total extent of 6.41 Acres was sought to be acquired by the Government, for industrial purposes. It was specifically for allotment to a Mill known as "Sree Meenakshi Mills Limited" 3. Ultimately, an award bearing No. 14/64 was passed on 29.07.1964, fixing the compensation payable for the acquired land, about which we are not concerned. The award attained finality and the amount awarded was also paid to the land owners. The possession of the land was admittedly handed over to the Industry namely Sree Meenakshi Mills Limited, under an agreement dated 19.11.1956, entered by the State Government with the said Mills. 4. After nearly about 50 years of the handing over of the land to the Mills, the original land owners suddenly woke up from the slumber and made a representation in 2006, under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the Act), on the ground that the lands were not utilized for the purpose for which they were acquired. One of the land owners, by name S. Akilanda Raman, the 2nd respondent herein, came up with a writ petition in W.P (MD) No. 1154 of 2007. Since the prayer in the said writ petition was of a limited nature, a learned Judge of this Court disposed of the said writ petition, by an order dated 13.02.2007, directing the Government to consider the representation of the petitioner and to pass orders. 5. At this juncture, it must be pointed out that there were two sets of lands acquired by the Government from various parties for the very same industrial purpose, for the benefit of very same Mills. One land was located in a village known Thirupparankundram and the other was located in a village by name Paravai, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 6. One land was located in a village known Thirupparankundram and the other was located in a village by name Paravai, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 6. Insofar as the land located in Thirupparankundram village is concerned, which was also acquired under the very same notification, the land owners made representations for reconveyance. The difference between the respondents herein and the land owners in that case was that they started making representations, from 1986 onwards. The contention that they raised was that the original Mills for whose benefit the land was acquired had been declared as a sick industrial company under Section 3(1)(o) of the Sick Industrial Company (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and that by a scheme of merger sanctioned by Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), the beneficiary Company had merged with Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Ltd. 7. The owners of the land in Thiruparrankun-dram village, succeeded before this Court, which resulted in the Government issuing two orders in G.O.(Ms)No. 163, Handlooms, Handicrafts, Textiles and Khadi (C2) Department, dated 01.11.2007 and G.O.Ms. No. 164, Handlooms, Handicrafts, Textiles and Khadi (C2) Department, dated 01.11.2007. By the first order, the Government ordered the forfeiture of the land in Thirupparankundram village from the Company as a measure of penalty. By the second order the Government directed the land to be handed over to the original owners in terms of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act. 8. Armed with those two G.Os., the respondents herein/land owners thought that the direction obtained by them in W.P(MD)No. 1154 of 2007 would bear them fruit. But, unfortunately it did not. Therefore, two of the respondents herein filed independent writ petitions in W.P(MD) No. 23296 of 2008 and W.P(MD)No. 24606 of 2008, seeking a mandamus to consider their request, in the light of the aforesaid G.Os. relating to Thirupparankundram land. Yet another owner also came up with another writ petition in W.P(MD)No. 11600 of 2008 seeking a Mandamus to grant him the benefit of reconveyance of the land in Paravai village on the same terms and conditions under which the land in Thirupparankundram was re-conveyed, under G.O.Ms. Nos. 163 and 164, dated 01.11.2007. 9. These three writ petitions filed by the owners, independently, were allowed with a limited direction to consider their request and pass orders. Nos. 163 and 164, dated 01.11.2007. 9. These three writ petitions filed by the owners, independently, were allowed with a limited direction to consider their request and pass orders. The Government considered the representations, gave opportunities of hearing to the land owners and eventually no orders were passed. Therefore, the land owners/the respondents herein joined together and came up with a fresh writ petition in W.P(MD) No. 14245 of 2011 seeking yet another Mandamus, to direct the Government to resume the lands and hand over the same to them. 10. The said writ petition was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court, by order dated 05.12.2014, with a positive mandamus directing the Government to resume the land in Survey No. 241/1 in Paravai Village, Madurai North Taluk, Madurai District and to reconvey the same to the respondents herein. Aggrieved by the said order, the State has come up with the above appeal. 11. At the outset, an objection is raised by Mr. Veera Kathiravan, learned counsel appearing for the land owners, regarding the maintainability of the appeal. It is his contention that once the lands were acquired for the benefit of an industry and once they have been handed-over to the industry, the Government cannot take-up the cause of such beneficiary and overreach the claims of the land owners. In other words, it is his contention that the Government is not entitled to take-up the cudgels on behalf of the beneficiary. 12. But, the aforesaid argument cannot be sustained atleast for two reasons. The first reason is that the present appeal arises out of an order of learned Single Judge passed in favour of the respondents. The respondents did not make the beneficiary as a party to the writ petition. They may not even be aware of the order passed by the learned Judge in the writ petition. 13. The second reason as to why we cannot accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Government, under the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into with the company, will have a right to resume the land and put it to another public purpose. This right of the Government subsists at all points of time. The Government cannot wash away its hands when a land is acquired for the benefit of an industry and such industrial undertaking fails. This right of the Government subsists at all points of time. The Government cannot wash away its hands when a land is acquired for the benefit of an industry and such industrial undertaking fails. As a matter of fact, there is a clause under Clause 3(d) of the Articles of Agreement entered into between the Government and the beneficiary on 19.11.1957 to the effect that in the event of the company being wound-up or in the event of the company's failure to perform its obligations under the agreement, the Government would have a right to resume the land. After resumption, Section 16 of the Act comes into play and it is open to the Government to put the land to any use other than the one for which the land was acquired. Therefore, on the ground that the beneficiary is keeping quiet, the rights of the Government cannot be taken away. 14. Having disposed of the preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ appeal, we shall now take-up the merits of the claim on the part of the respondents and as to how they have succeeded before the learned Single Judge. 15. As stated in the narration of facts in the preceding portion of this judgment, the acquisition commenced almost about 60 years ago, with the issue of Notification under Section 4(1), dated 25.05.1956. The award itself was dated 29.07.1964. The award amount has already been paid. Therefore, the land has vested with the Government. The Government had taken-over possession and also handed-over possession to the beneficiary. Once this is clear, then the rights of the land owners under Section 48-B are extremely limited, as pointed out atleast in three decisions of the Supreme Court. 16. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Keeravani Ammal, (2007) 9 SCC 255 , the Supreme Court pointed out that the provisions of Section 48-B of the Act are to be very strictly construed. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court indicated its mind with reference to the very validity of Section 48-B in that decision. 17. The decision in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Keeravani Ammal (supra) was followed in the Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran, (2010) 2 SCC 786 . As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court indicated its mind with reference to the very validity of Section 48-B in that decision. 17. The decision in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Keeravani Ammal (supra) was followed in the Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran, (2010) 2 SCC 786 . In paragraph 28 of the said decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that the question of reconveyance would arise only when the Government is satisfied that the acquired land cannot be used even for any other public purpose. More particularly, the Supreme Court indicted in paragraph 28 that once the acquired land had been transferred to another agency, the power under Section 48-B cannot be exercised. Paragraph 28 of the decision in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. L. Chandrasekaran (supra) reads as follows: "25. It need no emphasis that in exercise of power under Section 48-B of the Act, the Government can release the acquired land only till the same continues to vest in it and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose. To put it differently, if the acquired land has already been transferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercise power under Section 48-B of the Act and reconvey the same to the original owner. In any case, the Government cannot be compelled to reconvey the land to the original owner if the same can be utilised for any public purpose other than the one for which it was acquired." 18. The Supreme Court extracted the relevant portions of Keeravaniammal in its decision in L. Chandrasekaran. 19. The decision in L. Chandrasekaran was followed in yet another decision in Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. R. Sivasankara Mehta, (2011) 3 SCC 285. The Supreme Court extracted the relevant portions of Keeravaniammal in its decision in L. Chandrasekaran. 19. The decision in L. Chandrasekaran was followed in yet another decision in Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. R. Sivasankara Mehta, (2011) 3 SCC 285. In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that when the acquisition had been made way back in 1949 and the award had also been passed in 1962, the land owners could not have acquired any right in terms of the amendment introduced in 1995, inserting Section 48-B. In the last line of paragraph 10, the Supreme Court pointed out that even if the benefit of Section 48-B can be said, solely for the purpose of argument, to be available in 1995 to the land owners, the land owners would have no case, even then. 20. In paragraphs 11 and 13, the Supreme Court quoted with approval, the decision in L. Chandrasekaran and upheld the contentions of the Corporation for whose benefit the land was acquired, in the said case. 21. In the case on hand, several events have overtaken any right that the land owners, even if they are presumed to have any, under Section 48-B. Without taking note of all these, a simple direction for reconveyance, cannot be issued. 22. The sheet anchor of the case of the land owners is resumption of lands in Thirupparankundram village under G.O.Ms. No. 163 and 164, dated 01.11.2007. But, a careful look at those Government orders would show that the litigation started way back in 1986. As seen from G.O.Ms. No. 163, the lands covered by the said Government Order were also acquired in terms of a Notification almost of the same period. But in 1986, several land owners filed writ petitions seeking a declaration that the transfer of the land in favour of the mill was null and void on the ground that the lands were not utilised for the purpose for which they were acquired. That was at a time when Section 48-B had not been inserted into the statute book. 23. However, this Court disposed of the writ petitions filed by the original land owner R. Ponnuchamy Chettiar in W.P. No. 5311/1986, holding that though the prayer for declaration could not be granted, a direction to the Government for resumption of the land could be issued. 23. However, this Court disposed of the writ petitions filed by the original land owner R. Ponnuchamy Chettiar in W.P. No. 5311/1986, holding that though the prayer for declaration could not be granted, a direction to the Government for resumption of the land could be issued. In other words, the litigation with respect to the failure of the beneficiary company to utilise the acquired lands for the purpose for which they were acquired started in 1986 and this Court, in terms of the conditions stipulated in the agreement, directed the Government only to resume the lands. That resumption was also facilitated by the subsequent turn of events in which the beneficiary company was declared as a sick company and it merged with another company. 24. Thereafter, the legal heir of the original land owner, came up with a fresh writ petition in the year 2000, by taking advantage of the insertion of Section 48-B. At that time, he was armed with the order passed in the first writ petition filed by his father in W.P. No. 5311 of 1986. Therefore, this Court gave a direction to consider his claim. 25. The land owner's claim on the second occasion came to be challenged before this Court by way of writ petition in W.P. 17121 of 2000. The decisions, both on the first occasion and on the second occasion in W.P. Nos. 5311 - 5322 of 1986 and 17121 of 2000 became the subject matter of three writ appeals filed by the beneficiary company, namely, Sree Meenakshi Mills Limited, in W.A. Nos. 2234 and 2235 of 2002 and 1771 of 2001. In those writ appeals, the amalgamated entity by name Gujarat Heavy Chemicals Limited got impleaded. The writ appeals were disposed of by this Court with an observation that since the Government was considering the request of the land owners, both parties could be heard and a decision taken by the Government itself. It was only, in the light of such circumstances, where the Government was compelled by a mandamus issued in a writ petition filed in the year 1986, invoking the relevant clause in the agreement for the cancellation of the allotment, these two Government Orders in G.O.Ms. Nos. 163 and 164 came to be passed. Those two Government orders became the subject matter of writ petition in W.P. No. 36619 of 2007, filed by GHCL. Nos. 163 and 164 came to be passed. Those two Government orders became the subject matter of writ petition in W.P. No. 36619 of 2007, filed by GHCL. But, a learned Judge of this Court dismissed writ petition in W.P. No. 36619 of 2007, by an order dated 30.04.2008. The said order was also confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court, by a judgment reported in GHCI v. State of Tamil Nadu (2008) 7 MLJ 833 . 26. Therefore, the case that was before the Government while it passed orders in G.O.Ms. Nos. 163 and 164 or before this Court in the decision reported in GHCL v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), arose under completely different set of circumstances. The first distinction is that the litigation started there in 1986; whereas the litigation herein started in 2006. The second distinction is that in that case, the first order passed by this Court was only to resume the land in terms of the conditions contained in the agreement, executed with the beneficiary company, as there was no Section 48-B at that time. Public interest mandated such an order from this Court and after that order materialised, section 48-B came and the original owner who initiated the trigger point in 1986 became the beneficiary. 27. Moreover, there is one more reason as to why the respondents herein cannot compare themselves to the case covered by G.O.Ms. Nos. 163 and 164. It appears that the decisions of this Court in GHCL v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), arising out of G.O.Ms. Nos. 163 and 164, was taken-up on appeal to the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 7956 of 2009. The manner in which the Supreme Court dismissed the said civil appeal deserves to be noted. The Supreme Court recorded that there are some merits in the appeal filed by GHCL Limited. But, the Supreme Court expressed the view that the subsequent turn of events had overtaken any claim that the appellant therein could actually make. This was specifically recorded by the Supreme Court. The order passed by the Supreme in Civil Appeal No. 7956 of 2009 on 25.09.2014, arising out of G.O.Ms. No. 163 and 164 requires to be extracted. But, the Supreme Court expressed the view that the subsequent turn of events had overtaken any claim that the appellant therein could actually make. This was specifically recorded by the Supreme Court. The order passed by the Supreme in Civil Appeal No. 7956 of 2009 on 25.09.2014, arising out of G.O.Ms. No. 163 and 164 requires to be extracted. Hence it is extracted as follows: "Even if there is some merit in the Appeal, in our view, no interference is called for in the impugned order in view of the events that have taken place subsequent to the impugned order. 2. Respondent No. 6 has filed counter affidavit on her behalf and on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 and 7 (her sisters) stating therein that after the impugned order was passed by the High Court, the Government issued Patta in their favour and out of 96 cents which was reconveyed to them, 77 cents have been further sold by them vide different sale deeds to six parties, details of which are stated at page number 330 of the paper book. 3. Having regard to the above, we are satisfied that in view of the subsequent events, it is not a fit case for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India 4. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs." 28. Thereafter, two petitions for review were filed and those petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Hence, it is clear that there is no comparison between the proceedings relating to Thirupparankundram land and the proceedings relating to the present land. As we have pointed out earlier, the land owners, whose rights got extinguished long before the insertion of Section 48-B, cannot resurrect their claim from where they are buried to compel the Government with a positive mandamus to reconvey the land under Section 48-B. The very validity of Section 48-B was doubted by the Supreme Court in Keeravaniammal. It is true that validity has now been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Anti Corruption Movement, rep. by its General Secretary v. Chief Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (W.P. No. 10896 of 2013, dated 10.03.2015). That does not mean that Section 48-B confers an absolute right. It is true that validity has now been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Anti Corruption Movement, rep. by its General Secretary v. Chief Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (W.P. No. 10896 of 2013, dated 10.03.2015). That does not mean that Section 48-B confers an absolute right. With the increase in the value of the properties, there is clamour for using, misusing or abusing Section 48-B. Court cannot encourage such activities, by issuing positive mandamus. Hence this writ appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. We make it clear that what we have rejected is only the prayer of the land owners for reconveyance. But, insofar as the resumption of lands is concerned, the Government is empowered and also duty bound if the terms and conditions of the allotment are violated by the beneficiary company. Therefore, the Government may take appropriate action in that regard. No order as to costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.