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2015 DIGILAW 36 (KAR)

Managing Director Gulbarga Electricity Supply Company Ltd. , Gulbarga v. Mallappa

2015-01-06

L.NARAYANA SWAMY

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Order Order dated 15th June 2011 passed in Reference No.87 of 2010 by the Labour Court, Gulbarga has been challenged by the Managing Director, Gulbarga Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the GESCOM’ for short) and the prayer is for quashing the same. The services of respondent has been engaged by the petitioner as per agreement entered into in the year 2003 and the respondent has been engaged as Grama Vidyut Pratinidhiand he was paid remuneration as per the agreement. The services of the respondent have been terminated since he was on unauthorised absence for a period of two months on medical grounds. The said termination was challenged by the respondent before the Labour Court on the ground that he is a ‘workman’ under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The petitioner has taken a specific ground that the respondent does not fall under the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Act. Secondly, as per Article 12 of the agreement, the relief if any, is by means of negotiation and arbitration and does not give any jurisdiction to the Labour Court. Hence, the learned counsel submits to set aside the order passed by the Labour Court. In order to substantiate his submission, the learned counsel referred to the definition of Section 2(oo) of the Act, which excludes the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, in case, if the person is terminated on the ground of continuous ill-health. In the instant case also the respondent was on unauthorised absence and claimed that he was unwell and hence the petitioner, invoking the said provision, has terminated the services of the respondent. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-workman supports the order of the Labour Court. He submits that the respondent does not fall under exceptional clause of sub-Section (oo) of Section 2 of the Act. Secondly, the respondent was a workman for the purpose of sub-Section (s) of Section 2 of the Act; and as he is classified as workman, he shall not be terminated or retrenched from service unless following the procedure guaranteed to the workman. The coercive method of invoking the Articles of agreement entered into while engaging the services of the workman, shall not be the ground for imposing the punishment of dismissal or termination. The coercive method of invoking the Articles of agreement entered into while engaging the services of the workman, shall not be the ground for imposing the punishment of dismissal or termination. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of DEVINDER SINGH v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, SANAUR reported in JT 2011(5) SCC 333. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials placed before the Court. The petitioner, no doubt, falls under subsection (s) of Section 2 of the Act. Whatever may be the mode of engaging the services, be it by means of entering into an agreement, oral or written, but he is a workman for all practical purposes. When such being the case, while passing any orders adverse to his interest, the workman is to be given an opportunity to defend his case as provided under the Act. Since the respondent falls under subsection (s) of Section 2 of the Act, naturally he would not be available for coercive and arbitrary method of termination as provided under Section 2(oo) of the Act. When, a person has been working as per the agreement, what is required to be looked into is whether he has been arbitrarily punished or retrenched or removed from service and further if he is terminated or dismissed whether the safeguards, as provided under the provisions of the Act, have been complied with or not. These aspects are disputed in nature, and are rightly gone into by the Labour Court and a specific finding has been given that the action of the petitioner is not in consonance with the Act. When such a finding is given, I do not propose to interfere with the order. Accordingly the petition stands dismissed. It is made clear that as per order dated 31st October 2011, payment under Section 17B of the Act be made to the respondent forthwith.