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2015 DIGILAW 360 (GAU)

Rajendra Prasad Bora v. Lohit Prakash Dutta

2015-03-24

SUMAN SHYAM

body2015
JUDGMENT : Suman Shyam, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as well as Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Retainer Counsel, CBI. This Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order dated 08.07.2011 passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar in Money Execution Case No. 3/2001 disposing of Petition No. 1599/2001 dated 09.07.2001 filed by the petitioners/judgment debtors under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure raising objection to the sale of immovable property under attachment. 2. The brief factual matrix of the case may be noticed as follows. The respondent No. 1 as plaintiff had instituted Money Suit No. 23/1992 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Sibsagar against M/S Rajashree Publication Pvt. Ltd. i.e. the defendant No. 5 therein, the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the vernacular Daily "Ajir Batori" for damages and compensation on account of publishing a defamatory news item concerning the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 in the aforesaid newspaper. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 had also been impleaded as defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in the said Money Suit in their capacity as owners/directors of M/S Rajashree Publication Pvt. Ltd. The aforesaid suit filed by the respondent No. 1 was decreed ex parte on 30.12.2000 whereby the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sibsagar had passed a decree for realization of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs) jointly and severally from the defendants therein together with interest calculated at the rate of 18% per annum on the decretal amount from the date of institution of the suit till recovery. The decree dated 30.12.2000 was put to execution by filing Money Execution Case No. 3/2001 before the competent Court at Sibsagar whereby the decretal amount was shown as Rs. 25,76,225.00 which included the amount of Rs. 10,00,000.00 being the principal amount besides the interest component as decreed by the Court. The decretal amount was to be recovered by selling the landed property, plants and machineries, spares and other articles of the Parijat Cinema Hall owned by the petitioners. The land in question involved in the execution proceeding was 3 Bigha 3 Kathas covered by Dag No. 172, P.P. No. 11 of Nitaipukhuri, Mouza Rasaigaon, Demow, Sibssagar. 3. The decretal amount was to be recovered by selling the landed property, plants and machineries, spares and other articles of the Parijat Cinema Hall owned by the petitioners. The land in question involved in the execution proceeding was 3 Bigha 3 Kathas covered by Dag No. 172, P.P. No. 11 of Nitaipukhuri, Mouza Rasaigaon, Demow, Sibssagar. 3. On 14.03.2001 the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application under Order XXI Rule 54 CPC praying for an order from the Executing Court prohibiting the judgment debtors/petitioners herein from transferring or charging the said property in any manner. The said prayer made by the decree holder/respondent No. 1 was allowed by the Executing Court. Since warrant of attachment issued by the Executing Court had returned unexecuted, hence, the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application before the Executing Court with a prayer for publication of notice in the local newspaper under Order XXI Rule 54 CPC which was allowed on 02.06.2001. Thereafter, on 20.06.2001 another application was filed by the decree holder/respondent No. 1 under Order XXI Rule 66(3) CPC praying for issuance of a proclamation for sale in respect of the attached property by public auction which prayer was allowed by the Executing Court. 4. At that stage, the judgment debtor/petitioners herein approached the Executing Court by filing a petition bearing No. 1599/2001 dated 09.07.2001 under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC praying for stay of sale of the attached property, inter alia, on the ground that the suit property has already been attached by an order dated 16.09.1996 passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati in Misc. Case No. 775(K)/96. In the said application the petitioners/judgment debtors had also raised an objection regarding the estimated valuation of the attached property which, according to them, have been fraudulently shown as Rs. 20,42,725.00 although the market value of the property was much higher than that. The petitioners/judgment debtors have further contended that the property under attachment is their personal property and the same does not belong to the defendant/Judgment debtor No. 5 Company. As such, the said property cannot be put to execution for realizing the decretal dues. 20,42,725.00 although the market value of the property was much higher than that. The petitioners/judgment debtors have further contended that the property under attachment is their personal property and the same does not belong to the defendant/Judgment debtor No. 5 Company. As such, the said property cannot be put to execution for realizing the decretal dues. On the basis of the said application made by the petitioners/judgment debtors the sale of the attached property was stayed by the Executing Court until disposal of the Petition No. 1599/2001 and the judgment debtors/petitioners were also directed to furnish security bond against the decretal amount. In the meantime, the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application bearing No. 1353/2002 for taking steps for attachment of other properties of the judgment debtor over and above the property that has already been attached earlier. It is the case of the petitioners/judgment debtors that in view of the prayer made by the decree holder/respondent No. 1, as aforesaid, hearing on the application No. 1599/2001 filed by the petitioners/judgment debtors was deemed unnecessary and the next date was fixed on 15.05.2002 for execution of the warrant of attachment as prayed for by the decree holder/respondent No. 1. 5. On 15.05.2002 the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed a petition before the Executing Court with a prayer to transmit the decree to the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Guwahati for execution of the same by the said Court on the ground that since the property within the jurisdiction of the Sibsagar Court has been already attached under the order passed by the District Judge, Kamrup at the instance of the CBI, the execution proceeding now could be gainfully proceeded only under the competent court having jurisdiction at Guwahati. 6. Based on such prayer of the decree holder/respondent No. 1, Money Execution Case No. 21/2002 was registered in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Guwahati. However, later on, the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application stating that he would like to execute the decree in the original Court at Sibsagar and accordingly the said prayer of the decree holder/respondent No. 1 was granted. 7. On 31.07.2004 the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application before the Executing Court at Sibsagar for sale of the attached property. 7. On 31.07.2004 the decree holder/respondent No. 1 filed an application before the Executing Court at Sibsagar for sale of the attached property. In the said application, it has further been mentioned that the petitioners/judgment debtors have already transferred a part of the attached property in violation of the order of attachment and as such a prayer was made to proceed with the sale of remaining part of the attached property. By order dated 06.08.2004 the Executing Court allowed the prayer of the decree holder/respondent No. 1 for sale of the attached property by way of public auction with the help of the Nazir. Accordingly, by the order dated 07.08.2004 passed by the Executing Court the prayer of the decree holder/respondent No. 1 for publishing notice of sale in the local newspaper was allowed. Thereafter, a public auction was held wherein the attached landed property was put to sale. According to the report submitted by the Nazir, there were as many as nine bidders who had participated in the bid. The highest bid amount for the land and building was Rs. 14 Lacs and the bidder No. 1 was Smt. Gita Duara who had submitted her bid for 1 Bigha 1 Katha area of land along with the building of Parijat Cinema Hall and the 8 other bidders had submitted a bid for the remaining 3 Kathas 13 Lechas of land. 25% of the bid money was already deposited and further 15 days time was prayed for to pay the balance bid amount. Situated at thus, the decree holder/respondent No. 1 had filed an application praying for payment of the deposited bid amount directly to him. By an order dated 16.11.2004 the learned District Judge, Sibsagar passed an order in terms of the prayer made by the decree holder/respondent No. 1 based on the earlier order dated 19.10.2004 passed by the Executing Court taking cognizance of the report submitted by the Nazir. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned orders dated 06.08.2004, 19.10.2004 as well as 16.11.2004 the petitioners had approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 315/2005. 8. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned orders dated 06.08.2004, 19.10.2004 as well as 16.11.2004 the petitioners had approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 315/2005. By the judgment and order dated 26.10.2009 this Court, after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, disposed of the said Writ Petition by setting aside the aforementioned orders impugned thereat with a direction to the Executing Court to dispose of the Petition No. 1599/2001 by affording proper opportunity of being heard to the parties. The aforesaid petition bearing No. 1599/2001 was eventually disposed of by the order dated 08.07.2011 which has been impugned in the present Revision Petition. 9. Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel, submits that as per Clause 3 of "The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 1944)" (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1944) an order of attachment of the properties of a person who is believed to have committed any "scheduled offence" can be passed by the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, on an application made by the State Government or as the case may be, the Central Government. He submits that as per Clause 10 of the Ordinance of 1944 the duration of attachment, unless it is withdrawn in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance, would continue to remain in force in the manner provided in the said clause. Mr. Dutta further submits that in the instant case by an order dated 16.09.1996 the learned District Judge, Kamrup had passed an interim order under the Ordinance of 1944 attaching the properties belonging to the petitioners including those immoveable properties which had been put to attachment and sale in execution of the decree in Money Execution Case No. 3/2001. Mr. Dutta submits that although the order dated 16.09.1996 was an interim order made for a limited period, yet by the subsequent order dated 29.04.1998 the order of attachment passed on 16.09.1996 was extended for another one year on the prayer of the prosecution (CBI). Mr. Dutta submits that although the order dated 16.09.1996 was an interim order made for a limited period, yet by the subsequent order dated 29.04.1998 the order of attachment passed on 16.09.1996 was extended for another one year on the prayer of the prosecution (CBI). It is also submitted that during the currency of the order dated 29.04.1998 charge sheet was filed before the Special Court and, therefore, as per Clause 10(b) of the Ordinance of 1944, the said order of attachment stood automatically extended by operation of law until such time that an order was passed by the District Judge in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance after termination of the criminal proceeding. 10. Relying upon the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance Mr. Dutta further submits that the immoveable property which has been put to attachment and sale in execution of the decree in question was admittedly included in the schedule of property which was put to attachment by the order dated 16.09.1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Kamrup in connection with Misc. Case No. 775 (K)/96 and the said attachment has evidently not been revoked till date. In such view of the matter, the Executing Court was beyond its competence and jurisdiction to attach and/or to put the same to auction sale, such immovable properties having been already attached by a court of higher grade i.e. Court of District Judge. Mr. Dutta, while referring to Section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure, submits that since the immoveable property under attachment by the Executing Court has already been attached by a court of higher grade and having regard to the fact that the aforementioned development has already been brought to the notice of the Executing Court at Sibsagar by the petitioners, hence, the Executing Court could not have proceeded any further against such property belonging to the petitioners in execution of the decree in question. Such being the position, the learned Court below committed manifest error in law in rejecting the Petition bearing No. 1599/2001 under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC filed by the petitioners by the judgment and order dated 08.07.2011. 11. To buttress his argument Mr. Such being the position, the learned Court below committed manifest error in law in rejecting the Petition bearing No. 1599/2001 under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC filed by the petitioners by the judgment and order dated 08.07.2011. 11. To buttress his argument Mr. Dutta has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1965 Assam and Nagaland 21 [Prafulla Chandra Bezbaruah v. Calcutta Credit Corporation & Anr.] to submit that as per the mandate of Section 63 CPC the Court attaching the property first in point of time would alone have the jurisdiction and competence to deal with such property to the exclusion of other Courts. Mr. Dutta has also relied upon another decision of the Patna High Court reported in AIR 1921 Patna 140 in the case of [Ramdhari Lal & Ors. v. Nathu Ram] to submit that the Court attaching the property subsequently would be precluded from proceeding with the same due to the bar created by Section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. By relying upon a judgment and decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hansraj Moolji v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1957 SC 497 Mr. Dutta submits that the Ordinance of 1944 is a perpetual Ordinance which is holding the field till date. As such, having regard to the provisions contained in Clause 14 of the Ordinance imposing bar on proceedings in respect of properties that are attached/forfeited under the Ordinance, he submits that the Executing Court would not have the authority or jurisdiction to permit the attachment and sale of the landed property in Parijat Cinema Hall belonging to the petitioner. 13. Mr. Dutta further submits that under Section 5(6) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the Special Judge, Assam would have the same powers as that of the District Judge. Such being the position the order of the District Judge dated 16.09.1996 ought to be treated as that having been passed by the Special Judge, Assam having jurisdiction throughout the territory of the State of Assam. 14. Per contra, Mr. G N. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, submits that the petition filed by the petitioners/judgment debtors under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC was not maintainable in law as well as in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Sahewalla submits that the order dated 16.09.1996 passed in Misc. 14. Per contra, Mr. G N. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, submits that the petition filed by the petitioners/judgment debtors under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC was not maintainable in law as well as in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Sahewalla submits that the order dated 16.09.1996 passed in Misc. Case No. 775(K)/96 by the District Judge, Kamrup under the provisions of the Ordinance of 1944 is merely an order passed in the records. The said order has not been carried into effect in accordance with the provisions of Clause 7 of the Ordinance of 1944 particularly in respect of the immoveable property in the form of Parijat Cinema Hall which is located in the district of Sibsagar. Therefore, submits Mr. Sahewalla, there is no valid attachment of the property in question insofar as the order passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Kamrup is concerned qua the immovable property situated in Sivasagar district. 15. Mr. Sahewalla further submits that the provisions of Section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable only when property is attached in execution of decrees by several Courts. In the instant case the order of attachment passed by the District Judge, Kamrup, even if assumed to be valid in the eye of law, is not an order of attachment passed in execution of a decree. In such view of the matter, Section 63 would have no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Sahewalla submits that Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the procedure required to be followed by the Court for attachment of property which is situated outsides the district. In the instant case, the process indicated under Section 136 CPC has not been followed and therefore there was no valid attachment of the immoveable property of the judgment debtor/petitioner situated within the territorial bounds of Sibsagar district 16. To buttress his argument Mr. Sahewalla has referred to the judgment and decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Mohit Bhargava v. Bharat Bhushan Bhargava & Ors., reported in (2007)4 SCC 795 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt in details as to how a valid attachment can be made outside the territorial jurisdiction. Mr. To buttress his argument Mr. Sahewalla has referred to the judgment and decision of the Apex Court reported in the case of Mohit Bhargava v. Bharat Bhushan Bhargava & Ors., reported in (2007)4 SCC 795 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt in details as to how a valid attachment can be made outside the territorial jurisdiction. Mr. Sahewalla further submits that taking advantage of the fact that there was no effective attachment of the immoveable properties belonging to the petitioners/judgment debtors, the petitioner No. 1 himself has transferred 3 Kathas of land to one Prabin Gogoi vide Sale Deed No. 917 dated 13.08.2002, 1 Katha 10 Lechas of land to one Ajit Dutta vide Sale Deed No. 1033 and another 2 Kathas of land to one Bharati Borgohain vide Sale Deed No. 916. Thus, submits Mr. Sahewalla, the petitioners/judgment debtors were themselves aware that there was no valid attachment in respect of their immoveable property located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Kamrup at Guwahati. However, despite being aware of the same the petitioners/judgment debtors have deliberately taken such an untenable plea only to frustrate the decree passed in favour of the respondent No. 1/decree holder by adopting dilatory tactics. Mr. Sahewalla has further submitted that even if it is assumed that the attachment order passed by the District Judge, Kamrup was valid in the eye of law even in that case the same would not vitiate the steps taken by the Executing Court in view of sub-section (2) of Section 63. That apart, submits Mr. Sahewalla, Section 73 of the CPC permits rateable distribution of the proceeds of execution/sale amongst the decree holders and therefore in any event the steps taken by the Executing Court cannot be faulted with in the eye of law. 17. In support of his argument Mr. Sahewalla relied upon the following judgments: "The Bombay High Court in the case of Ramchandra Yasvant Singarpur v. Digambar Teziram Pardeseu reported in AIR 1960 Bombay 230, wherein it has been held as per Section 73 of the CPC rateable distribution of the purchase money of another decree holder is permissible. 17. In support of his argument Mr. Sahewalla relied upon the following judgments: "The Bombay High Court in the case of Ramchandra Yasvant Singarpur v. Digambar Teziram Pardeseu reported in AIR 1960 Bombay 230, wherein it has been held as per Section 73 of the CPC rateable distribution of the purchase money of another decree holder is permissible. In the case of Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1937 Calcutta 55 as well as AIR 1936 Calcutta 723 and judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 298 it has been held that there is no bar to the same property being sold in execution of the decree obtained subsequently in another suit. Decision of the Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1980 Delhi 283 and Madras High Court reported in AIR 1957 Madras 159 was also relied upon by Mr. Sahewalla in support of his arguments." 18. Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2, CBI, supports the stand taken by the petitioners to the extent the same relates to the validity of order of attachment made by the District Judge, Kamrup is concerned. Placing reliance on Section84 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Mr. Choudhury submits that the order of attachment is valid in the eye of law and the CBI is interested to enforce the same by taking recourse to such legal process that may be available under the law. He submits that the order of attachment in terms of the order dated 16.09.1996 passed by the District Judge, Kamrup is absolute in the eye of law and the said property cannot be dealt with by the Executing Court at Sibsagar. 19. I have considered the rival submissions made by and on behalf of the parties and have also perused the materials on record. There is no dispute among the parties that the core question that would arise for adjudication by this Court in the present proceeding is that in view of the order of attachment dated 16.09.1996 passed by the District Judge, Kamrup, as extended subsequently attaching the immoveable property owned by the petitioners, whether the Executing Court at Sibsagar could have proceeded against the same immoveable property by attaching the same and putting the attached properties to auction sale in execution of a decree? 20. 20. At the very outset, it may be necessary to refer to Section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:-- "63. Property attached in execution of decrees of several Courts.-- (1) Where property not in the custody of any Court is under attachment in execution of decrees of more Courts than one, the Court which shall receive or realize such property and shall determine any claim thereto and any objection to the attachment thereof shall be the Court of highest grade, or, where there is no difference in grade between such Courts, the Court under whose decree the property was first attached. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees." From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is apparent that the said provision would be applicable if and only if property is under attachment in execution of decrees of more Courts than one. In the instant case, the attachment order passed by the District Judge, Kamrup on 16.09.1996 is not a order of attachment in execution of a decree of a Court. Such being the position Section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure would have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. Having held as above, the other question that is confronting this Court is as to whether even dehors the provision of Section 63 of the CPC, once a Court of superior grade has attached certain property by following process of law, can another Court be permitted to deal with the property by putting the same under attachment and sale in execution of a decree? Any attempt to answer the said question must have to necessarily be preceded with the determination as to whether the attachment made by the superior Court or the Court of first instance was a valid one. 22. As per Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 it is clear that the power to put a property under attachment under the Ordinance of 1944 has been conferred upon the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person accused of any scheduled offence ordinarily resides. Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 is reproduced herein below:-- "3. Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 is reproduced herein below:-- "3. Application for attachment of property:-- (1) Where the [State Government or as the case may be, the Central Government] has reason to believe that any person has committed (whether after the commencement of this Ordinance or not) any scheduled offence the [State Government may, whether or not any Court has taken cognizance of the offence, authorize the making of an application to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, for attachment, under this Ordinance, of the money or other property which the [State Government, or as the case may be, the Central Government] believes the said person to have procured by means of the offence, or if such money or property cannot for any reason be attached, of other property of the said person of value as nearly as may be equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or other property. [Amended by A.O. 1950 & again by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988] (2) The provisions of Order XXVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to proceedings for an order of attachment under this Ordinance as they apply to suits by the [Government]. (3) An application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief that the said person has committed any scheduled offence is founded, and the amount of money or value of other property believed to have been procured by means of the offence. The application shall also furnish-- [Added by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988] (a)any information available as to the location for the time being of any such money or other property and shall, if necessary, give particulars, including the estimated value of other property of the said person; (b)the names and addresses of any other person believed to have or to be likely to claim any interest or title in the property of the said person." In the instant case, the order of attachment had been passed by the learned District Judge, Kamrup who would naturally have territorial jurisdiction within the local limits of Kamrup district and not beyond. Therefore, the said order of attachment dated 16.09.1996 would have to be carried out into effect as per law so as to have any application over such immoveable properties situated beyond the local limit of territorial jurisdiction of the District Judge, Kamrup. 23. Clause 7 of the Ordinance of 1944 lays down the manner in which an order of attachment of property under the Ordinance is required to be carried into effect. Clause 7 of the Ordinance is quoted herein below:-- "7. Execution of orders of attachment:-- An order of attachment of property under this Ordinance shall be carried into effect so far as may be practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the attachment of property in execution of a decree." Further, Clause 10 of the Ordinance of 1944 relates to the duration of attachment which is quoted herein below:-- "10. duration of attachment:-- An order of attachment of property under this Ordinance shall, unless it is withdrawn either in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance, continue in force: (a) Where no Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence at the time when the order is applied for, [one year] from the date of the order under sub-section (1) of Section 4 or sub-section (2) of Section 6 as the case may be, unless cognizance of such offence is in the meantime so taken or unless the District Judge on application by the agent of the [State Government or as the case may be, the Central Government] thinks it proper and just that the period should be extended and passes an order accordingly; or [Amended by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988] (b) Where a Court has taken cognizance of the alleged scheduled offence whether, before or after the time when the order was applied for until orders as passed by the District Judge in accordance with the previsions of this Ordinance after the termination of the criminal proceedings." Therefore, in view of the aforesaid provision contained in the Ordinance of 1944, the order of learned District Judge, Kamrup dated 16.09.1996 ought to have been carried into effect by the applicant (CBI) by taking recourse to the process delineated under Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted herein below for ready reference: "136. Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted herein below for ready reference: "136. Procedure where person to be arrested or property to be attached to outside district-- (1) Where an application is made that any person shall be arrested or that any property shall be affected under any provision of this Code not relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such property is situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send to the District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person or properly resides or is situate a copy of the warrant or order, together with the probable amount of the costs of the arrest or attachment. (2) The District Court shall, on receipt of such copy and warrant, cause the arrest or attachment to be made by its own officers, or by a Court subordinate to itself, and shall inform the Court which issued or made such warrant or order of the arrest or attachment. (3) The Court making an arrest under this Section shall send the person arrested to the Court by which the warrant of arrest was issued, unless he shows cause to the satisfaction of the former Court why he should not be sent to the latter Court, or unless he furnishes sufficient security for his appearance before the latter Court, or for satisfying any decree that may be passed against him by that Court, in either of which cases the Court making the arrest shall release him. (4) Where a person to be arrested or movable property to be attached under this section is within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal or at Madras or at Bombay, the copy of the warrant of arrest or of the order of attachment, and the probable amount of the costs of the arrest or attachment, shall be sent to the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta, Madras [or Bombay], as the case may be, and that Court, on receipt of the copy and amount, shall proceed as if it were the District Court." 24. From a perusal of the record nothing is discernible to show that any attempt has been made by the CBI to carry into effect the order of attachment qua the property i.e. Parijat Cinema Hall located in the district of Sibsagar. On a pointed query made by this Court, Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Retainer Counsel, CBI, in all fairness, has submitted that there is nothing on record to show that his client had taken any steps to carry out the order of attachment qua the property of the petitioners located in the district of Sibsagar. 25. The argument made by Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioners, relying upon Section 5(6) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to contend that the Special Judge, Assam (CBI) having been conferred with the same powers that of a District Judge and therefore, the order of attachment dated 16.09.1996 would have force and effect throughout the State of Assam is also not acceptable on account of the fact that the power to attach property under the Ordinance of 1944 has been explicitly conferred upon the District Judge. At the time when the Ordinance of 1944 was promulgated, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was not even in existence. Therefore, to extend the provision of Clause 3 of the Ordinance of 1944 so as to include the Special Judge, Assam under the Act of 1988, as suggested by Mr. Dutta, would be wholly contrary to the scheme of the Ordinance of 1944. The said argument, therefore, stands rejected. 26. Referring to Clause 14 of the Ordinance of 1944, Mr. Dutta has assiduously argued that once the CBI Court is in seisin of the attached properties, no other suit or legal proceeding would be maintainable in the eye of law involving the same property. Clause 14 of the Ordinance is quoted herein below for ready reference. "14. 26. Referring to Clause 14 of the Ordinance of 1944, Mr. Dutta has assiduously argued that once the CBI Court is in seisin of the attached properties, no other suit or legal proceeding would be maintainable in the eye of law involving the same property. Clause 14 of the Ordinance is quoted herein below for ready reference. "14. Bar to other proceedings:-- Save as provided in Section 11 and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law.- (a) no suit or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable in any Court-- (i) in respect of any property ordered to be forfeited under Section 13 or which has been taken in recovery of fine in pursuance of any order under that section, or (ii) while any other property is attached under this Ordinance, in respect of such other property by any person upon whom a notice has been served under Section 4 or Section 6 or who has been made an objection under sub-section (4) of Section 4; and (b) no Court shall, in any legal proceedings or otherwise pass any decree or order, other than a final decree in a suit by a person not being a person referred to in clause (a) which shall have the effect of nullifying or affecting in any way any subsisting order of attachment of property under this Ordinance, or the right of the District Judge to hold security in lieu of any such order of attachment." 27. Once it is held that there was no valid attachment qua the immovable properties located at Sibsagar under the order passed by the District Judge, Kamrup, there would be no bar for the Court to proceed with such property, which is the subject matter of execution proceeding bearing Money Execution Case No. 3/2001. Therefore, the question as to whether the Executing Court could proceed to the said immoveable property notwithstanding the order dated 16.09.1996 need not detain this Court and the said question can be left open to be decided in an appropriate case. In view of the determination as made herein before, it is held that Section 63 of the CPC or for that matter Clause 14 of the Ordinance of 1944 will not have any application in the facts and circumstances of this case. In view of the determination as made herein before, it is held that Section 63 of the CPC or for that matter Clause 14 of the Ordinance of 1944 will not have any application in the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, it is held that the Revision Petition is devoid of any merit and the same would stand dismissed However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost.