ORDER : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. Petitioner is seeking for quashing of order dated 31.03.97, Annexure-G and order No. 122:PD:IRD:DA:7 dated 16.12.97, Annexure-K passed by appellate authority and to grant all consequential benefits including reinstatement of petitioner into service and continuity of service with full back wages and all other service benefits. 2. Facts in brief which has led to filing of this writ petition can be crystalised as under: Petitioner joined services of respondent-Bank as a Clerk in 1971 i.e., 24.01.1971 and over period of time came to be promoted. In the year 1995 he was working as Assistant Manager, Chamundipuram Branch, Mysuru. On 05.05.1995 a charge sheet came to be issued to petitioner (hereinafter referred to as charge sheeted officer and for brevity 'CSO') alleging five charges which was in substance that the CSO while functioning as a Manager at Srinagar Branch (Jamrau and Kashmir) had authorized debits to clearing suspense account consisting of several accounts as indicated in detail in the charge sheet knowing fully well that no instrument was presented in clearing and such instruments presented were returned unpaid and such instruments were yet to be realised at clearing house. It was also alleged that CSO acted in excess of power vested in him and on account of same it had resulted in seepage of income to the tune of Rs.1.26 lacs and chances of recovering said amount was remote. It was also alleged that in the process huge funds of the Bank were at grave risk particularly when there are no tangible assets available to Bank to fall back upon. These amongst other charges CSO was issued with charge sheet on 05.05.1995 Annexure-A. On 20.05.95 a supplementary charge sheet was issued alleging CSO had colluded with the then Assistant Manager of Srinagar Branch in favouring him illegally/unauthorisedly a debit of Rs. 5,228/- and there was falsification of records etc. Reply came to be submitted by CSO on 16.06.1995 which came to be considered by disciplinary authority and not being satisfied with the reply, disciplinary authority ordered for an enquiry being held vide order dated 09.09.1995 and appointing Presenting Officer also. 5,228/- and there was falsification of records etc. Reply came to be submitted by CSO on 16.06.1995 which came to be considered by disciplinary authority and not being satisfied with the reply, disciplinary authority ordered for an enquiry being held vide order dated 09.09.1995 and appointing Presenting Officer also. A preliminary enquiry was held and subsequently a detailed enquiry was made between the period 15.04.96 to 19.04.96 and on behalf of employer two witnesses came to be examined as MW-1 and MW-2 and on behalf of management 620 exhibits were marked as Exhibits MEX-1 to MEX-620 and on behalf of CSO Defence Assistant, Sri K.B. Shetty who was then Secretary of Officer Association cross examined management witnesses in extenso and CSO got himself examined. However, no witnesses were examined on his behalf. Enquiry officer after considering the material evidence available before him submitted a detailed report on 20.01.1997 whereunder it was held that charges leveled against petitioner were proved. Copy of enquiry report came to be forwarded to CSO by management along with a covering letter dated 29.01.1997 Annexure-E and on receipt of the same CSO submitted his representation on 07.03.1997 which came to be considered by disciplinary authority and not being satisfied with the reply given, disciplinary authority by order dated 31.03.1997. Annexure-G dismissed the petitioner from service. Appeal filed by petitioner did not yield any fruitful result in his favour and same also ended in a dismissal by appellate authority by order dated 16.12.1997 Annexure-K. On being pursued by way of a review, said review petition came to be dismissed by appellate authority vide order dated 12.05.1998 concluding thereunder that review is impermissible vide Annexure-M. Hence, petitioner has approached this court by present writ petition seeking for prayers noticed herein above. 3. Co-ordinate Bench of this court had allowed the writ petition by order dated 13.01.2006 by accepting the submission made by learned counsel appearing for petitioner namely on the ground that witnesses examined on behalf of Bank MW-1 and MW-2 were seniors in grade to the enquiry officer and as such the apprehension in the mind of delinquent that enquiry officer would not be able to take a different view than what was stated by witnesses who had conducted preliminary enquiry swayed in the mind of this court to hold that it is bias or in other words official bias by order dated 13.01.2006. Respondent-employer pursued this matter before Division Bench of this court in W.A. 374/2006 and Division Bench of this Court by order dated 22.05.2012 had affirmed the order passed by learned Single Judge. Matter was further carried in 'Civil Appeal No. 4406/2014 by respondent - Bank and the Hon'ble Apex Court by order dated 01.04.2014 allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to this Court by observing that learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench was in error in presuming that Enquiry Officer was biased and concluding of a domestic enquiry by an Officer even being junior to the Officer who conducted the investigation cannot be held to be official bias. It came to be held by the Hon'ble Apex Court while remanding the matter back to this Court to the following effect: "The appeal is allowed. No cost." 4. Perusal of grounds urged in writ petition would indicate that petitioner has raised effectively following five grounds: (i) Preliminary enquiry report and investigation reports were not made available to CSO and there was no opportunity available to petitioner to rebut its contents and hence enquiry proceedings is bad in law; (ii) Witnesses who deposed namely M.W. 1 and M.W. 2 are senior in rank to Enquiry Officer and as such, it cannot be presumed that Enquiry Officer who conducted enquiry would take a view contrary to these two witnesses namely M.W. 1 and M.W. 2 who had submitted preliminary enquiry report against petitioner and this amounts to official bias; (iii) Penalty imposed by rejection of reply submitted to enquiry report by Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority, are manifestly erroneous since there is non application of mind and as such, same is liable to be set aside; (iv) Enquiry is contrary to Regulations; and (v) There is disproportionality in imposing punishment on the petitioner. 5. Sri Abhilash Raju, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Bank would support the order passed by Disciplinary Authority, which came to be affirmed by Appellate Authority and would elaborate his resubmission by contending that report of Enquiry Officer came to be examined by Disciplinary Authority after taking into consideration reply given by CSO and after analyzing the entire material evidence available on record, had passed order of dismissal and there is no infirmity whatsoever, in said order. He would also contend that Appellate Authority on reappreciation of contentions raised, has come to a conclusion that there is no merit in the appeal and said finding recorded by Appellate Authority also does not suffer from any vices for being interfered with by exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. 6. In reply to contention raised in petition which relates to official bias he would submit that Hon'ble Apex Court while remanding the matter back to this Court has recorded a finding that no presumption can be drawn with regard to official bias and one which was raised by petitioner, as affirmed by Division Bench, came to be negatived by the Hon'ble Apex Court and as such, he would submit this ground is not available to petitioner for being urged yet again and even otherwise if bias is alleged, specific instances has to be enumerated by petitioner and said exercise having not been undertaken by petitioner and Enquiry Officer having not been impleaded, said ground is not available to petitioner for being urged. 7. In reply to prejudice being caused to petitioner on account of non furnishing of preliminary report is concerned, he would submit that said preliminary enquiry report was neither relied upon by management during the course of enquiry nor it was produced and marked as exhibit to enable the CSO to contend that copy of same ought to have been furnished to him and as such, no prejudice is caused to CSO in this regard. He would submit that even otherwise when prejudice is alleged by petitioner, the burden is on him to establish as to how non furnishing of a particular document/report/communication had prejudiced his right and in the absence of prejudice being proved, allegation of violation of principles of natural justice does not arise and in support of his contention, in this regard, he has relied upon the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment in W.A. No. 4599/2001 (SDE) dated 12.10.2004 in the case of SYNDICATE BANK vs. SRI A.M. SUGUNASUNDARAM. 8. 8. With regard to proportionality of punishment imposed he would contend that Disciplinary Authority has taken into consideration the fact that petitioner - CSO was working as an Assistant Manager which is a responsible position and by his act it had resulted in not only financial loss to respondent - Bank but had resulted in huge funds of Bank being exposed to grave risk particularly when there was no tangible security available to Bank to fall back upon for recovering the amounts. Hence, he prays for dismissal of writ petition. In support of his submission he has relied upon following judgments: i. (1996) 9 SCC 69 :- DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY CUM REGIONAL MANAGER AND OTHERS vs. NIKUNJA BIHARIPATNAIK ii. AIR 2006 SC 3542 :- SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. vs. VENKATESH GURURAO KURATI 9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for respondent and having perused the grounds urged in the writ petition, it would emerge from the records that in the first instance this Court had accepted the plea put forward by petitioner and had allowed the writ petition by order dated 13.01.2006, as already noticed hereinabove on the ground that there was official bias present in the circumstances of instant case since management had relied upon evidence of M.W. 1 and M.W. 2, who were management witnesses and who were senior in grade to Enquiry Officer, as a ground to set aside the order of dismissal passed by Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by Appellate Authority by reserving liberty to management to conduct a denova enquiry. This order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court came to be affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No. 374/2006 by order dated 22.05.2012. Matter came to be perused by Respondent - Bank by filing an appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court, which was numbered as C.A. No. 4406/2014. Hon'ble Apex Court as already observed hereinabove and at the cost of repetition, set aside the order passed by learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench, by holding that if Enquiry Officer is junior to the officer who conducted the investigation cannot be held to be official bias and setting aside the orders passed by this Court has remitted the matter back to this Court for being adjudicated on other aspects if respondent therein i.e., writ petitioner herein is in a position to raise. It has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "Upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that without impleading the enquiry officer by name or by designation, no bias could have been alleged. Merely on this ground that the witnesses were senior to enquiry officer, it was not open for the Court to presume that the enquiry officer was biased. If the enquiry officer is junior to the officer who conducted the investigation cannot be held to be official bias Further, the Court can held bias on fact only on hearing the parties particularly the person against whom bias is alleged and such finding can only be based on an evidence and not on presumption. The learned Single Judge and Division Bench having failed to appreciate the aforesaid facts, we have no other option to set aside the order dated 13.01.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 4973/1999 and the order dated 22.05.2012 passed by the Division Bench in W.A. No. 374/2006. The case is remitted to the learned Single Judge for decision of Writ Petition on other aspects if the respondent is in a position to raise. The appeal is allowed. No cost." Accordingly, grounds urged in the writ petition are being examined by this Court. 10. Insofar as official bias is concerned as rightly contended by Sri Abhilash Raju, learned counsel appearing for respondent - Bank, same has been laid to rest by the Hon'ble Apex Court itself. Even otherwise after the order passed by this Court came to be set aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court, no steps have been taken by petitioner to place on record any material to exhibit bias against the Enquiry Officer. He has not been impleaded as a party to these proceedings. That apart, neither in the reply given to charge sheet nor in the written submissions submitted to enquiry report before the Disciplinary Authority or in the grounds urged before the Appellate Authority assailing the order of Disciplinary Authority or before the reviewing authority, this ground was raised by the petitioner. For the first time before this Court, said ground of official bias has been raised by the petitioner. For the first time before this Court, said ground of official bias has been raised by the petitioner. As noticed hereinabove under identical circumstances the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of SYNDICATE BANK vs. A.M. SUGUNASUNDARAM in W.A. No. 4599/2001 disposed of on 12.10.2004 had an occasion to consider the similar contention and it was negatived. It has been held by Division Bench in said case as under: "7. It is fairly well settled by a catenna of decisions of Supreme Court and those of the High Courts that preliminary enquiry is conducted essentially for the disciplinary authority to form an opinion as to whether there is prima facie case to proceed against the delinquent. So long as the disciplinary authority does not make use of that report as the basis to punish the delinquent, there is no legal obligation for the disciplinary authority to disclose the contents of the preliminary enquiry report much less furnishing a copy of the same to the delinquent. Although the learned counsel for the delinquent has argued before us quite extensively, he was not in a position to convince us that the preliminary enquiry report prepared by the witness of the management is infact made as a basis to impose the disciplinary measure. Perhaps realising this threshold impediment in the argument, learned Counsel would submit that the preliminary enquiry report prepared by the witness should be regarded as statements of the witnesses and if it so regarded, in terms of regulation 6(10)(b)(iii), a copy of the statement ought to have been made available to the delinquent in advance, that is to say, three days prior to the date on which the witness of the delinquent was examined. This submission of the learned Counsel for the delinquent is not acceptable to us. By no stretch of imagination, the preliminary enquiry report can be regarded as a statement of the author of the report. It is trite that the management having framed certain charges against the delinquent, it is the onus of the disciplinary authority to discharge the same. In order to discharge that onus, the disciplinary authority has examined a witness on behalf of the management. Merely because that witness happens to be the author of the preliminary enquiry report, that fact itself would not be a justification for the Court to regard it as his statement. In order to discharge that onus, the disciplinary authority has examined a witness on behalf of the management. Merely because that witness happens to be the author of the preliminary enquiry report, that fact itself would not be a justification for the Court to regard it as his statement. Only the evidence adduced and documents produced by the disciplinary authority in the course of regular enquiry would together constitute the base for supporting the disciplinary action. Be that as it may, there is no need for us to dilate this aspect further. It is fairly conceded that the delinquent at no point of time during the course of enquiry either before the enquiry authority or before the disciplinary authority or before the appellate authority did not make any grievance against the non-supply of copy of the preliminary enquiry report. In fact, not even a ground is raised in the writ petition against the alleged non-supply of copy of the preliminary enquiry report. As could be seen from the judgment of the learned Single judge, only in the course of argument at the time of final hearing, this allegation was raised. Be that as it may, we are fully satisfied that non-supply of copy of the preliminary enquiry report has not resulted in any prejudice to the delinquent. In that view of the matter, we have no reason to differ from the opinion of the learned Single judge with regard to point number 2." 11. As already noticed hereinabove the Hon'ble Apex Court having held that merely because the witnesses were senior to Enquiry Officer, is not a ground for the Court to presume that Enquiry Officer was biased, had set aside the finding recorded by this Court of official bias and as such, law having been laid to rest by the Hon'ble Apex Court and there being no other additional material placed by petitioner before this Court to have a fresh look to the ground of bias, I do not find that contention raised in this regard is to be entertained and accordingly, it stands rejected. 12. 12. Insofar as the contention of petitioner that enquiry proceedings is vitiated on account of petitioner's right being prejudiced for want of non-furnishing of preliminary enquiry report since it formed the basis for Disciplinary Authority to initiate enquiry proceedings against petitioner and same having not been furnished, it had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice and as such, order of Disciplinary Authority as well as order of Appellate Authority is to be set aside, requires to be considered with utmost circumspection for reasons more than one. 13. Perusal of reply given to charge sheet as well as grounds urged in the appeal memorandum which was filed against Disciplinary Authority does not even remotely suggest of said plea having been raised by petitioner. Though it does not preclude the petitioner from raising said plea before this Court, it requires to be examined in the background as to whether non furnishing of said preliminary enquiry report had resulted in violation of principles of natural justice and thereby it has prejudiced the right of petitioner. Undisputedly, preliminary enquiry reports did not form the basis on which charge sheets were issued. M.W. 1 and M.W. 2 who are two official witnesses examined on behalf of management have collected the material and placed the same before the Disciplinary Authority to form an opinion as to whether enquiry proceedings are to be initiated or not. Said Disciplinary Authority on the basis of material available on record and on scrutiny of such material, has formed an enquiry to conduct a domestic enquiry against CSO and accordingly charge sheet came to be issued including issuance of supplementary charge sheet and enclosing therewith documents upon which the Bank intends to rely upon to prove the charges. Said documents which were produced by Bank were marked as Exs. MEX1A to MX620, copies of which have been furnished to CSO. In fact defence assistant, who appeared on behalf of CSO has extensively cross-examined management witnesses namely, M.W. 1 and M.W. 2. Said evidence which has been discussed in detail by the Disciplinary Authority also does not suggest about the fact of any suggestion having been made to witnesses about preliminary enquiry report forming basis for conducting domestic enquiry against petitioner. As such, contention of petitioner that non furnishing of preliminary enquiry report had resulted in great prejudice to petitioner, cannot be accepted. As such, contention of petitioner that non furnishing of preliminary enquiry report had resulted in great prejudice to petitioner, cannot be accepted. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs. ALOK KUMAR reported in (2010) 5 SCC 349 that important element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact and there should be such definite interference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from such default which relates to statutory violation and in conclusion it came to be held by Hon'ble Apex Court that merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice departmental enquiry cannot be set aside. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "89. The well-established canons controlling the field of bias in service jurisprudence can reasonably be extended to the element of prejudice as well in such matters. Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a subject matter of fact or there should be such definite interference of likelihood of prejudice flown from such default which relates to statutory violations. It will not be permissible to set aside the departmental enquiries in any of these classes merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice." 14. In the case of BURDWAN CENTRAL CO OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED AND ANOTHER vs. ASIM CHATTERJEE AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 2 SCC 641 their lordships of Apex Court have observed that in B. Karunakar's case that in the event of Inquiry Officer's report had not been furnished to the employee in the disciplinary proceedings, a copy of the same should have been made available to him to enable him to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him on account of non furnishing of report. It came to be further held that order of punishment should not be set aside mechanically on the ground that the copy of Inquiry report had not been supplied to the employee. 15. It came to be further held that order of punishment should not be set aside mechanically on the ground that the copy of Inquiry report had not been supplied to the employee. 15. Yet again the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CHAIRMAN GANGA YAMUNA GRAMIN BANK AND OTHERS vs. DEVI SAHAI reported in (2009) 2 SCC (L & S) 618 has held that until and unless the delinquent employee/CSO does not show as to how he was prejudiced on account of non supply of copy of enquiry proceedings, it cannot be held to be vitiated. 16. It is also to be noticed that Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SYNDICATE BANK & ORS. vs. VENKATESH GURURAO KURATI reported in AIR 2006 SC 3542 has held that non supply of document, on which the Enquiry Officer does not rely upon during the course of enquiry proceedings, would not be a ground available to CSO or delinquent employee to contend that principles of natural justice is violated. 17. Keeping these contours laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases referred to supra in mind, when the facts on hand are reexamined again it would not detain this court too long to reject the contention raised by petitioner. Firstly management or respondent-Bank has not relied upon the preliminary enquiry report or investigation report during the course of enquiry proceedings to prove the charges leveled against petitioner. Secondly, said investigation or preliminary enquiry report did not form part and parcel of documents relied upon by the management to substantiate the charges leveled against the CSO and last but not the least, petitioner has not been able to demonstrate as to how non furnishing of those investigation or preliminary enquiry report has prejudiced his right. For these myriad reasons, I am unable to accept the contention of petitioner that on account of non furnishing of investigation or preliminary enquiry reports, domestic enquiry is vitiated. Said contention stands rejected. 18. For these myriad reasons, I am unable to accept the contention of petitioner that on account of non furnishing of investigation or preliminary enquiry reports, domestic enquiry is vitiated. Said contention stands rejected. 18. Now turning my attention to the issue regarding proportionality of punishment imposed on petitioner is examined, it requires to be noticed at the threshold itself that until and unless strong and compelling reasons are made out by the CSO to establish that punishment imposed by Disciplinary Authority is shockingly disproportionate to the charges leveled, Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India would be loath in interfering with the order of Disciplinary Authority. In the instant case as noticed hereinabove, charges leveled against petitioner was serious and grave in nature. On account of petitioner's conduct, funds of public sector Bank was under stake, which has also resulted in financial loss to the Bank and as such, exercising its power, Disciplinary Authority has ordered for dismissal of petitioner from service. If an officer or an employee is allowed to act beyond his authority or beyond prescribed authority given to him, it would result in chaotic situation and the public funds, which are in the hands of employee, like that of CSO, would be at peril. As such, indiscipline in this regard requires to be curbed as otherwise functioning of institution itself would be in jeopardy. This view is also fortified by the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY CUM REGIONAL MANAGER AND OTHERS vs. NIKUNJA BIHARI PATNAIK reported in (1996) 9 SCC 69 , whereunder it has been held as under: "7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the Bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him, Breach of Regulation 3 is "misconduct" within the meaning of Regulation 24. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him, Breach of Regulation 3 is "misconduct" within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Enquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a Bank - for that matter, in the case of any other organization - every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organization/bank will disappear; the functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the Bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organization, more particularly, a Bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority - that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances - is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of Banks which deal with public funds. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of Banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organization and more particularly, a Bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and over-drawls allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit - huge profit, as the High Court characterizes it - they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterize them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge No. 9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that inspite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Enquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge No. 8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that inspite of reminders, the respondent did not submit "Control Returns" to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterized as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24." 19. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24." 19. Hence for these reasons, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by Disciplinary Authority as affirmed by Appellate Authority calling for interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER (i) Writ petition is hereby dismissed. (ii) Costs made easy. Rule discharged.