Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 3626 (ALL)

Janak Dulari Devi v. Collector Basti

2015-11-20

ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA

body2015
JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar Mishra, J. Heard Sri W.H. Khan learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.M. Asthana for the respondent no. 3. 2. The petition has been filed challenging the orders dated 24.06.2015 passed by the Collector and the orders dated 26.06.2014 and 01.10.2014 passed by the Naib Tehsildar in proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the dispute wherein pertains to Plot no. 1500 (Old no. 1065) having an area of 5455 hectares situated in Village-Narkhuhi, Pargana-Rasoolpur, Tehsil-Bhanpur, District-Basti. 3. The respondent no. 3 filed an application under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act claiming mutation on the ground that he was auction purchaser of the land in question which was auctioned for realization of a loan taken by Ashok Kumar son of the petitioner. 4. In these proceedings the petitioner filed an objection claiming to be the owner in possession of the plot in question. It was alleged that Ashok Kumar had no right to mortgage the plot for the loan taken by him. 5. The mutation application appears to have been dismissed for default on 08.03.2010. The respondent no. 3 filed a restoration application on 21.06.2010. The petitioner filed an objection thereto on the ground that it was belated, having been filed three and a half months after the case was dismissed for default, while the restoration application should have been filed within a period of 15 days in view of Section 200 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. 6. The restoration application filed by the contesting respondents was allowed, against which a revision was filed which was dismissed holding it to be directed against an interlocutory order. The petitioner therefore, filed a Writ Petition no. 33740 of 2013 which was allowed on 17.06.2013 and the matter was remanded back to the revisonal court for consideration afresh. 7. After remand, the revisional court vide order dated 19.10.2013 allowed the revision, set aside the order allowing the restoration application and remanded the matter back for fresh orders being passed on the restoration. 8. The petitioner thereafter, appears to have filed a Writ Petition no. 30556 of 2013 challenging the remand order. This writ petition was disposed of on 28.05.2014 with a direction that the restoration application itself be decided within a period of two months. 9. On 19.06.2014 the contesting respondent no. 8. The petitioner thereafter, appears to have filed a Writ Petition no. 30556 of 2013 challenging the remand order. This writ petition was disposed of on 28.05.2014 with a direction that the restoration application itself be decided within a period of two months. 9. On 19.06.2014 the contesting respondent no. 3 filed an application for amendment of the restoration application dated 21.06.2012. The petitioner filed his objection to the amendment application. The Naib Tehsildar by his order dated 26.06.2014 allowed the amendment application, against which the petitioner preferred a revision, being Revision no. 39. 10. During pendency of the revision, the Naib Tehsildar by his order dated 01.10.2014 allowed the restoration application of the respondents. 11. Against this order allowing the restoration, the petitioner preferred a revision, numbered as Revision no. 40. 12. The petitioner also filed a writ petition before this court which was disposed of vide order dated 12.11.2014 with a direction that the revisions filed by the petitioner be disposed of within a month. 13. The aforesaid revisions being Revision nos. 39 and 40 filed by the petitioner were dismissed by two separate orders passed on 24.06.2015. As a result of the two revisional orders, the amendment permitted by the Naib Tehsildar stands affirmed as also the order whereby the restoration application filed by the respondent no. 3 has been allowed. 14. The petitioner has therefore, challenged these two revisional orders as also the order dated 26.06.2014 of the Naib Tehsildar whereby the amendment application was allowed and the order dated 01.10.2014 whereby the restoration application was allowed and the order of dismissal for default dated 08.03.2010 was set aside. 15. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that both the revisions were dismissed by non speaking orders despite directions of this court contained in the order dated 17.06.2013 passed in Writ Petition no. 33740 of 2013. A perusal of this order reveals that the High Court had passed this remand order on the ground that the orders challenged therein were cryptic. 16. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that Revision nos. 39 and 40 should have been decided separately and on different dates. Revision no. 39 was directed against the order of the Naib Tehsildar whereby the application seeking amendment in the restoration application had been allowed. 16. The second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that Revision nos. 39 and 40 should have been decided separately and on different dates. Revision no. 39 was directed against the order of the Naib Tehsildar whereby the application seeking amendment in the restoration application had been allowed. This revision should have been decided first and it was only thereafter that Revision no.40 which was directed against the order of the Naib Tehsildar allowing the restoration application should have been considered and decided. The very fact that both the revisions have been decided on the same date, although by separate orders, shows that the court was determined to dismiss both the revisions. 17. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the restoration application was belated. There was no cogent explanation for the delay. Even the order allowing the amendment application was illegal inasmuch as the amendment was sought after a gap of four years. 18. It is lastly submitted that the order impugned in Revision no. 40 was not an interlocutory order and therefore, the revision has wrongly and illegally been dismissed holding the order allowing the restoration application, to be interlocutory in nature. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that the petitioner has no reason to be aggrieved by the orders impugned. By these orders a mutation application has merely been restored to its original number. The mutation case is yet to be decided. The courts below have fixed a date for evidence of the parties. The petitioner therefore, still has every opportunity to have her say in the proceedings under Section 34 for mutation which stand revived. He further submits that the writ petition has been filed only to delay the matter. In fact, the petitioner has been approaching this court by means of writ petitions at every stage and has managed to install the proceedings for more than four years. He therefore, prays that the writ petition be dismissed summarily. 20. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 21. At the very very out set, it would be relevant to note that the proceedings wherefrom the instant writ petition arises, are proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. These proceedings are summary in nature and have only fiscal connotations. 21. At the very very out set, it would be relevant to note that the proceedings wherefrom the instant writ petition arises, are proceedings under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. These proceedings are summary in nature and have only fiscal connotations. The orders passed in such proceedings do not determine the title of the parties. Even the findings returned therein do not bind the courts in regular title proceedings. The submissions made by the counsel for the parties are liable to be considered and adjudicated upon in this extremely background. 22. I have perused the impugned orders. 23. These orders have been passed for cogent reasons and therefore, I do not find any merit in the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the orders are non speaking orders. 24. Even the second submission that Revision no. 39 should have been decided earlier and only thereafter, the Revision no. 40 should have been heard and decided by an order passed on a subsequent date, is without substance. 25. This court is only required to examine as to whether the orders have been passed upon consideration of the relevant facts and after considering the submissions made by the parties. The date and time of decision, in my considered opinion is of little consequence. 26. In my considered opinion, the revisional court has adverted to all aspects of the matter and has passed a reasoned and speaking order in both the revisions, I therefore, do not find any illegality which would warrant interference therein. 27. The submissions that are being made for challenging these orders are highly technical. I do not find any justification, for interfering on technicalities with orders which do not determine the title of the parties and therefore, in my considered opinion no serious prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by the impugned orders. 28. There is force in the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents that the mutation case stands revived and has to be decided on its merits on the basis of the submissions and the evidence that may be brought on record. I therefore, refuse to interfere with the impugned orders. 29. It is for the same reason that I do not regard the submission that the delay in filing the restoration application had not been condoned for cogent reasons, to be a ground for interference. I therefore, refuse to interfere with the impugned orders. 29. It is for the same reason that I do not regard the submission that the delay in filing the restoration application had not been condoned for cogent reasons, to be a ground for interference. The question of condonation of delay is relevant only when on account of expiry of the period of limitation, a valuable right has accrued in favour of the parties. The settled law in this regard is that where on account of the expiry of the period of limitation, substantial rights have accrued by a party, these rights should not be lightly taken away and therefore, there should be a proper and justifiable explanation for the delay before such rights can be negatived. 30. As already noticed herein above, the proceedings from which this writ petition arises are summary proceedings which do not determine the title of any of the parties therein. Since the title of the parties is not being determined, it cannot be said that any valuable rights have accrued in favour of the parties by expiry of the period of limitation for filing the restoration application and for this reason alone the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is repelled. 31. Even otherwise, in my considered opinion, substantial justice has been done between the parties. The primary dispute between them is yet to be decided. This decision has to be taken after hearing the parties and on the basis of the evidence that may be brought on record by them. For this reason this court is constrained to hold that the petitioner has not suffered any irreparable injury by the impugned order. 32. I therefore, refuse to exercise my equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the impugned orders. 33. Before parting with the case, it is necessary to refer to the case law cited on behalf of the petitioner wherein it has been held that law of limitation has to be applied in all its rigour, even if it causes inconvenience to a party. 34. On the contrary it is equally well settled that the question of condonation of delay is purely discretionary and once a court has exercised its direction and condoned the delay, the order should not be lightly interfered by the superior courts. 35. 34. On the contrary it is equally well settled that the question of condonation of delay is purely discretionary and once a court has exercised its direction and condoned the delay, the order should not be lightly interfered by the superior courts. 35. I, therefore, find that the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit under the various judgments cited. Accordingly and in view of the above, this writ petition is dismissed.