ORDER : D. Hariparanthaman, J. The petitioner was employed as Conductor from 1986 onwards in the respondent Transport Corporation. While he was on duty, he sustained injuries in his right leg and subsequently, his right leg below knee was amputated. The Medical Officer of the Transport Corporation issued a certificate dated 25.11.1997 that the petitioner was not fit to work as Conductor. Thereafter, the respondent Corporation discharged the petitioner from service by order dated 13.02.1998 on medical grounds. Subsequently, the respondent Corporation issued an order dated 24.07.1998, providing him alternative employment. But, he was not paid the salary in the alternative employment, which he received earlier at the time of discharge as Conductor. 2. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that since the petitioner was provided alternative employment, nothing survives for adjudication in the writ petition. 3. I am not in agreement with the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondent Corporation. 4. The petitioner was discharged from service by an order dated 13.02.1998 on the ground that he was not fit to work as Conductor. The said conclusion was reached by the Corporation based on the certificate issued by its Medical Officer. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner's right leg below knee was amputated. Hence, obviously, he could not do the work of Conductor. 5. When the petitioner was found not fit to discharge the duty as Conductor by the Medical Officer in his Certificate dated 25.11.1997, the respondent Corporation ought to have provided him alternative employment, without discharging him from service by their order dated 13.02.1998. It is useful to extract Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, as under: "47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.-(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service; Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability; Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section." 6. As per Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, an employee shall not be discharged from service on a finding that he is unfit to hold the post due to medical reasons. On the other hand, he shall be provided any alternative employment, i.e., he cannot suffer due to non-employment, due to his unfitness on medical reasons. Hence, in all cases where the employees are discharged on the ground of unfitness and provided alternative employment subsequently, they are entitled to wages for the period of non-employment. It is a well settled principle. 7. In this context, it is useful to extract Paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhagwan Dass and another v. Punjab State Electricity Board, reported in 2008 (2) L.L.N. 1 : "17. From the materials brought before the Court by none other than the respondent-Board it is manifest that notwithstanding the clear and definite legislative mandate some officers of the Board took the view that it was not right to continue a blind, useless man on the Board's rolls and to pay him monthly salary in return of no service. They accordingly persuaded each other that the appellant had himself asked for retirement from service and, therefore, he was not entitled to the protection of the Act... 18. ... 19. We understand that the officers concerned were acting in what they believed to be the best interests of the Board. Still under the old mindset it would appear to them just not right that the Board should spend good money on someone who was no longer of any use. But they were quite wrong, seen from any angle. From the narrow point of view the officers were duty-bound to follow the law and it was not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled employee. But they were quite wrong, seen from any angle. From the narrow point of view the officers were duty-bound to follow the law and it was not open to them to allow their bias to defeat the lawful rights of the disabled employee. From the larger point of view the officers failed to realise that the disabled too are equal citizens of the country and have as much share in its resources as any other citizen. The denial of their rights would not only be unjust and unfair to them and their families but would create larger and graver problems for the society at large. What the law permits to them is no charity of largesse but their right as equal citizens of the country. 20. In light of the discussions made above, the action of the Board in terminating the service of the disabled employee (appellant 1) with effect from 21 March 1997 must be held to be bad and illegal. In view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Act, the appellant must be deemed to be in service and he would be entitled to all service benefits including annual increments and promotions, etc. till the date of his retirement. The amount of terminal benefits paid to him should be adjusted against the amount of his salary from 22 March 1997 till date. If any balance remains, that should be adjusted in easy monthly instalments from his future salary. The appellant shall continue in service till his date of superannuation according to the service records. He should be reinstated and all due payments, after adjustments as directed, should be made to him within six weeks from the date of presentation of a copy of the judgment before the Secretary of the Board." 8. In view of the discussions of the Apex Court, the respondent-Corporation is directed not to discharge any workman, who is found not suitable for the post due to the acquiring of disability, but to provide alternative employment with pay protection, as per Section 47 of the Act. Particularly in cases where workmen acquired disability during and out of employment and the same is very well known to the Corporation, the respondent Corporation has also moral responsibility besides the legal duty under Section 47 of the Act to provide alternative employment and the workmen shall be paid wages during the interregnum, if any. 9. Particularly in cases where workmen acquired disability during and out of employment and the same is very well known to the Corporation, the respondent Corporation has also moral responsibility besides the legal duty under Section 47 of the Act to provide alternative employment and the workmen shall be paid wages during the interregnum, if any. 9. Though the respondent Corporation provided alternative employment, the respondent Corporation failed to give pay protection to the petitioner and hence, he was treated as only a fresh entrant and he was also paid lesser scale of pay. In my view, the order dated 24.07.1998 giving alternative employment as a fresh entrant with a lesser scale of pay is liable to be interfered with. 10. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for counting the service from 13.02.1998, the date on which the petitioner was discharged from service till the petitioner was given alternative employment, for all purposes, except for actual payment of wages. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, if the service after the accident is counted till the petitioner was given alternative employment, for the purpose of fixing of pay, promotion, review, increment, pension etc., the petitioner would be satisfied. Therefore, according to him, the petitioner is not claiming any actual monetary benefit for the said period. 11. In these circumstances, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned orders dated 13.02.1998 and 24.07.1998 are quashed and the following directions are given: (a) The writ petitioner shall be continued in the alternative employment without any interruption and his pay as Conductor shall be protected as if he continued in service without any interruption in service. (b) It is reiterated that the petitioner shall be continued in the alternative employment as stated above, and the pay shall be protected and the service from 13.02.1998 till he was provided alternative employment shall be counted for all purposes, except for making actual monetary benefits. 12. However, there shall be no order as to costs.