JUDGMENT : V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. While the four writ appeals on hand arise out of a common order passed by the learned Judge, either setting aside the cancellation of a licence or issuing a direction to renew the licence for the conduct of the weekly goat market, the writ petition arises out of the proceedings initiated by Ettayapuram Special Village Panchayat under Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. 2. Heard Mrs. S. Srimathy, learned Counsel for the appellant in all the writ appeals and Mr. M. Ajmal Khan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent in the writ appeals who is also the petitioner in the writ petition. 3. For the purpose of convenience, we shall refer to the appellant in the appeals as the Panchayat and the rival party as the writ petitioner. 4. Claiming that his family has been conducting a weekly market for the purchase and sale of goats, every Saturday in the premises bearing Door Nos. 175, 176 and 177, Ward No. VI, Ettayapuram Town Panchayat for over 40 years, the writ petitioner applied for licence for the period from 01.04.1997 to 31.03.1998. This application was rejected by an order dated 27.02.1997. 5. The writ petitioner challenged the order of rejection of licence, in a writ petition in W.P. No. 4131 of 1997 on the file of this Court. By an order dated 02.09.1997, this Court quashed the order of the refusal to grant licence with a further direction to the Panchayat to issue a licence for conducting a private market. As a matter of fact, the writ petition was allowed with costs of Rs. 2,500/-, taking into account the attitude adopted by the Panchayat. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the order of this Court, dated 02.09.1997, in W.P. No. 4131 of 1997, reads as follows: "21. The further question that arises for consideration is, whether the Panchayat must be directed to reconsider its decision and thereafter pass appropriate orders. Normally that should be the Order of Court, and the Court cannot decide as to whether a person must be given a licence or not. The further question that arises for consideration is, whether the Panchayat must be directed to reconsider its decision and thereafter pass appropriate orders. Normally that should be the Order of Court, and the Court cannot decide as to whether a person must be given a licence or not. But having considered the attitude of the respondent-Panchayat, especially the argument of learned counsel for respondent, that what the Panchayat gives is only a charity by issuing a licence, and also the statement in the counter-affidavit, that if licence is given to petitioner, that will affect the business of the respondent-Panchayat, I do not think that even if an opportunity is given to the Panchayat to reconsider its decision, it will act fairly. When the respondent-Panchayat itself has ventured to do the same business and it does not want a competition in that field, the Court can expect that it will not act in accordance with law. 22. Under the above circumstances, I direct the respondent to issue a licence for conducting a private market in the property of the petitioner in Door Nos. 175 to 177 at Ward VI, in Ettayapuram Town Panchayat, within a period of 15 days from the date of this Order. Having considered the circumstances of the case, I feel that this is a fit case where the petitioner must also be awarded his costs. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed as indicated above, with costs. Advocate fee is quantified at Rs. 2,500/- (Two thousand five hundred). W.M.P. Nos. 6850 and 6851 of 1997 are dismissed." 6. The Panchayat preferred a writ appeal in W.A. No. 1169 of 1997, but the same was dismissed by an order dated 21.10.1997. 7. Thereafter, the writ petitioner submitted a fresh application on 19.11.1997, but the same was also rejected by the Panchayat by order dated 21.11.1997 forcing the writ petitioner to come up with a fresh petition in W.P. No. 18910 of 1997. 8. The said writ petition in W.P. No. 18910 of 1997 was also allowed by this Court by an order dated 27.10.1998, holding that the rejection of the request for licence was unjustified. 9. Again, the said order was taken up on appeal in W.A. No. 1535 of 1998. The said writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench, by an order dated 24.08.1999. The operative portion of the said order reads as follows: "5. 9. Again, the said order was taken up on appeal in W.A. No. 1535 of 1998. The said writ appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench, by an order dated 24.08.1999. The operative portion of the said order reads as follows: "5. We are unable to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. As the respondent was holding the impugned private market licence for nearly four decades and that apart the finding of the learned single Judge in the light of the report filed by the Advocate Commissioner that the respondent had complied with all the conditions for grant of licence and therefore the refusal to renew the licence is unsustainable in the light of the findings given by the learned single Judge. We find no merit in the present writ appeal. Hence, finding no good and sufficient reasons to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge, the present appeal is summarily dismissed with a direction to the appellant Town Panchayat to consider the request of the respondent for renewal of his private market licence. It is also made clear that this order will not stand in the way of the appellant Town Panchayat to impose conditions that are required under the provisions of the relevant Act and Rules for grant/renewal of private market licence and the respondent is directed to comply with such condition scrupulously. Connected C.M.P. No. 16911 of 1998 is also rejected." 10. It appears that as against the order of the Division Bench, a Special Leave Petition was filed in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 19090 of 1999 and the same was dismissed on 20.04.2000. 11. In the meantime, the writ petitioner filed a fresh application on 26.02.1999. It was also rejected and the rejection order was successfully challenged by the writ petitioner, in the third writ petition in W.P. No. 7092 of 1999. 12. When the writ petitioner, like Vikramathithya filed the fourth application in the year 2002, that was also rejected on 27.05.2002 and the same was challenged in the writ petition in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002. The writ petition was allowed again with costs of Rs. 2,500/-, recording the displeasure of the Court about the recalcitrant attitude of the Panchayat. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the order dated 31.03.2004, passed in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002, is extracted as follows: "9. The writ petition was allowed again with costs of Rs. 2,500/-, recording the displeasure of the Court about the recalcitrant attitude of the Panchayat. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the order dated 31.03.2004, passed in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002, is extracted as follows: "9. It is also to be noted that Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act empowers the Council to acquire the rights of any person to hold private market and such acquisition shall be made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, if the Panchayat wants to acquire the rights of the petitioner to hold the weekly market on Saturday, it has to take recourse in Section 267-A, if the circumstances so warrant. However, its action in refusing to renew the licence on the pretext that will give rise to law and order situation appears to be hollow, thoroughly illegal, capricious and arbitrary. It is obvious that the very fact that the petitioner has been fighting to exercise his right by filing several writ petitions in the High Court has apparently enraged the respondent, which seems to be sent upon in refusing the application filed by the petitioner for renewal on some pretext or the other. 10. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view in several orders passed by the High Court on earlier occasions the impugned proceedings dated 27.5.2002 is quashed and it is directed that the petitioner's application for renewal or fresh application for renewal should be considered in accordance with law and it should be borne in mind that the petitioner as the priority in right to hold the market on Saturdays and if the respondent is of the opinion that weekly market cannot be held at two different places on the very same day, the respondent would to well to shift its market to any other suitable day. Keeping in view the recalcitrant attitude of the respondent, I direct the respondent to pay a consolidated cost of Rs. 2,500/- to the petitioner. Pending application or the fresh application for renewal should be considered by the respondent in the light of the observations made within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 13. As against the aforesaid order, yet another writ appeal was filed in W.A. No. 3518 of 2004. 2,500/- to the petitioner. Pending application or the fresh application for renewal should be considered by the respondent in the light of the observations made within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 13. As against the aforesaid order, yet another writ appeal was filed in W.A. No. 3518 of 2004. But it was dismissed as withdrawn on 29.09.2004. 14. Since the writ petitioner succeeded in four rounds of litigations that took place in a period of seven years from 1997 to 2004, a collateral attempt was made to deprive the writ petitioner of his licence, when two residents of the area one of whom was a Panchayat Councilor joined together and filed a Public Interest Litigation in W.P(MD) No. 5070 of 2005 to direct the Panchayat to grant licence to the writ petitioner to conduct the private market on any day other than Saturday. But the said Public Interest Litigation was dismissed even at the admission stage on 21.07.2005. The said order was taken up on appeal to the Honourable Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20096 of 2005, but the Honourable Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition with the following observations: "The Special leave petitions are dismissed. However, we make it clear that any application for renewal of license by the respondent No. 2 made hereafter shall be considered by the Panchayat on its own merits uninfluenced by the judgment of the High Court impugned herein." 15. In the meantime, the Panchayat granted licence on 31.10.2005 to the writ petitioner, allowing him to conduct a weekly market on every Saturday in his own private property until March 2006. But within four weeks of the grant, the Panchayat cancelled the licence by an order dated 08.12.2005. 16. In the meantime, a contempt petition was filed in Contempt Petition No. 196 of 2005. In the contempt petition, the Panchayat was found guilty of willful disobedience of the order. It was only after such a finding was recorded, that the licence was granted on 31.10.2005. But without noticing the cancellation of licence, by the order dated 08.12.2005, pursuant to the Collector's order dated 06.12.2005, the contempt petition was allowed to be closed on 27.01.2006. In the contempt petition, the Panchayat was found guilty of willful disobedience of the order. It was only after such a finding was recorded, that the licence was granted on 31.10.2005. But without noticing the cancellation of licence, by the order dated 08.12.2005, pursuant to the Collector's order dated 06.12.2005, the contempt petition was allowed to be closed on 27.01.2006. Therefore after having claimed 99 steps in the game of 'snakes and ladders', the writ petitioner was brought to step 2 only to start the whole process of filing an application, getting it rejected and coming to Court with a writ petition. 17. This process started with an application on 27.02.2006. This application was rejected, as expected, on 24.03.2006. 18. Therefore the writ petitioner came up with three writ petitions in quick succession, first in W.P. No. 11405 of 2005, challenging the order of the Panchayat dated 08.12.2005 cancelling the licence granted on 31.10.2005; second in W.P(MD) No. 1059 of 2006 challenging the initiation of proceedings by the Panchayat for the acquisition of the rights to conduct the goat market under Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920; and the third in W.P.(MD) No. 3211 of 2006, challenging the order of rejection dated 24.03.2006, with reference to the application for the renewal of licence dated 27.02.2006. 19. During the pendency of the above three writ petitions, the writ petitioner filed a fresh application for the period 2007-2008 and the same was rejected by order dated 23.07.2007. Therefore this was challenged in W.P. (MD) No. 7093 of 2007. 20. Thus, the writ petitioner came up with four writ petitions, challenging one order of cancellation of licence earlier granted, two orders of refusal to renew licence and one order attempting to acquire the rights of the writ petitioner under Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. 21. All the four writ petitions were taken up together by the learned Judge and all of them were allowed by a common order dated 13.12.2011. It is against the said order that the Panchayat has come up with the above four writ appeals. 22. 21. All the four writ petitions were taken up together by the learned Judge and all of them were allowed by a common order dated 13.12.2011. It is against the said order that the Panchayat has come up with the above four writ appeals. 22. During the pendency off the above writ appeals, the Panchayat issued a fresh notification dated 26.03.2015, in terms of Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, seeking to acquire the rights that the writ petitioner claimed to have vested in him for the conduct of weekly goat market in his private property. This notification was challenged in W.P.(MD) No. 6548 of 2015. Therefore this writ petition was also tagged along with the writ appeals and all of them were taken up together for disposal. 23. The first contention of Mrs. S. Srimathy, learned Counsel for the Panchayat is that the writ petitioner cannot rely upon the orders passed in the previous writ petitions, as a very crucial legal aspect was omitted to be taken note of in the previous proceedings. According to the learned Counsel, the Panchayat in question was originally a Village Panchayat, which was later designated as Town Panchayat and subsequently it was made a Special Village Panchayat. The Village Panchayats in the State of Tamil Nadu are governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. But, the Town Panchayats and Municipalities are governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. Therefore the law that governed the Panchayat in question kept swinging from one to another and that therefore the nature of the provisions that should have been applied, were not taken note of. 24. The learned Counsel for the Panchayat submitted that insofar as the law governing the Municipalities and Panchayats is concerned, it should be divided into four periods of time. The first period was upto the year 1994, when the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 was enacted pursuant to the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, declaring the local bodies as independent units of local self-governments. The second period was from 1994 upto 2004 when the Town Panchayats were brought within the purview of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. The first period was upto the year 1994, when the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 was enacted pursuant to the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, declaring the local bodies as independent units of local self-governments. The second period was from 1994 upto 2004 when the Town Panchayats were brought within the purview of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. The third period commences from 14.06.2004 when 566 Town Panchayats were reclassified as Village Panchayats, as a consequence of which those Town Panchayats went out of the purview of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 and came to be governed by the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. The fourth period commences from 14.07.2006, when the Special Village Panchayats, such as the Panchayat in question again became the Town Panchayat. 25. In other words, the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the right of the writ petitioner to the grant of a licence should have been tested in the previous proceedings either with reference to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 or with reference to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, as the case may be, depending upon the period of licence applied for. If so applied, the Courts, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, could not have treated the writ petitioner as a person having a preexisting right before the advent of the Act. 26. In simple terms, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that this Court recorded a finding as though the writ petitioner had a pre-existing right, on the basis of expression 'already lawfully established' appearing in Section 262(3) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, without testing two factors, namely, (a) whether this Act was applicable at that time and (b) whether the writ petitioner had established a market even before the advent of 1920 Act. 27. But we do not agree with the above contention. While what the learned Counsel for the appellant contends, with regard to the different periods of operation and with regard to the application of the provisions of two different enactments may be correct, the inference that the learned Counsel wants to draw must flow out of the above provisions. Section 259 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, deals with public markets. Section 259 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, deals with public markets. Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, deals with the grant of licence for private markets. Under subsection (1) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, no person can open a new private market or continue to keep a private market unless he obtains from the Council, a licence to do so. This sub-section is actually couched in the negative language. Therefore the power with respect to the opening of a new private market is very clearly borne out by sub-section (1) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. 28. However, sub-section (3) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, gives us a small leverage for a private market already lawfully established. Sub-section (3) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 reads as follows: "Section 262(3). The council shall, as regards private markets already lawfully established and may, at its discretion as regards new private markets, grant the licence applied for subject to such regulations as to supervision and inspection and to such conditions as to sanitation, drainage, water supply, width of paths and ways, weights and measures to be used, and rents and fees to be charged in such market as the council may think proper; or the council may refuse to grant any such licence for any new private market. The council may, however, at any time, for breach of the conditions thereof, suspend or cancel any licence which has been granted under this section. The council may also modify the conditions of the licence to take effect from a specified date." 29. A careful look at sub-section (3) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, makes it clear that insofar as private markets already lawfully established are concerned, the Council has no discretion, but has to necessarily grant the licence. But, in other words, the Council has the discretion to grant licence subject to regulations as to supervision and inspection and also subject to such conditions as to sanitation, drainage etc. 30. But, in other words, the Council has the discretion to grant licence subject to regulations as to supervision and inspection and also subject to such conditions as to sanitation, drainage etc. 30. The contention that the words 'already lawfully established' appearing in sub-section (3) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, should be construed to mean the markets established before the advent of 1920 Act, may not really be correct. Whenever a statute wanted to exempt from its application, anything done before the advent of the Act, the statute always used the following expression namely, 'established immediately before the date of commencement of this Act'. Sub-section (3) of Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, does not use the words 'the Council shall as regards private markets already in existence as on the date of commencement of the Act'. Therefore to read the words 'already lawfully established' to mean 'the date of commencement of the Act' may not be proper. 31. Moreover, Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, as it stands today, was not what it was originally, when it was enacted in 1920. Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, in its present form was actually incorporated only by way of amendment under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1930. Therefore the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 32. Further, in the order passed by P.K. Misra, J. in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002, dated 31.03.2004, the very same contention revolving round Section 262(3) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, was raised. But the learned Judge rejected the same. This order attained finality when the writ appeal filed by the Panchayat in W.A. No. 3518 of 2004 was dismissed as withdrawn, on 29.09.2004. 33. Mrs. S. Srimathy, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 20096 of 2005, dated 18.10.2005, would actually neutralise the effect of the finding recorded by P.K. Misra, J. in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002. But the said contention may not be correct. 33. Mrs. S. Srimathy, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 20096 of 2005, dated 18.10.2005, would actually neutralise the effect of the finding recorded by P.K. Misra, J. in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002. But the said contention may not be correct. S.L.P.(Civil) No. 20096 of 2005 arose out of the dismissal of a Public Interest Litigation, where the objections raised by one of the Panchayat Councillors was not really to conduct of the private market but only to conduct of the private market on Saturdays. Therefore the order of the Honourable Supreme Court dated 18.10.2005 in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20096 of 2005, giving liberty to the Panchayat to decide the application for renewal of licence, on its own merit uninfluenced by the judgment of the High Court will not apply to the judgment of P.K. Misra, J. in the judgment in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002. We have already extracted the order of the Honourable Supreme Court dated 18.10.2005. It merely shows that the Panchayat can decide the application for grant of licence, uninfluenced by the judgment of the High Court impugned in the Special Leave Petition. What was impugned in the Special Leave Petition was only the judgment in the Public Interest Litigation. Merely because the Public Interest Litigation referred to the judgment of P.K. Misra, J. in W.P. No. 40814 of 2002, it cannot be stated that the order of the Honourable Supreme Court neutralised the effect of the judgment of P.K. Misra, J. 34. After having allowed the finding recorded on the legal question revolving around Section 262(3) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, recorded by P.K. Misra, J. to attain finality in the writ appeal that was filed and withdrawn, it is not open to the Panchayat to raise the very same issue in a collateral proceedings and that too, in Public Interest Litigation. Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted. 35. Yet another contention raised by the learned Counsel was to the effect that Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 and Section 148 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994, are not in pari materia. Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted. 35. Yet another contention raised by the learned Counsel was to the effect that Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 and Section 148 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994, are not in pari materia. In any case, we have taken that the case is governed by Section 262 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 and yet, we find that the interpretation to sub-section (3) given by P.K. Misra, J. has attained finality. Therefore, the said contention cannot also be upheld. 36. The next contention is that a person who got licence only for a period of four years under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, cannot take umbrage under Section 262(3) and claim that they will come within the purview of expression 'already lawfully established'. But this contention is also not acceptable. The very right of the writ petitioner to get a licence during those four years, according to the finding rendered by P.K. Misra, J. flowed out of Section 262(3) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. Therefore, the continuance of the same would not depend upon the fact that they enjoyed licence only for four years. If the writ petitioner is entitled to grant of licence as of right, as a person who had already established a private market, the same does not get curtailed by the mere fact that he got licence for four years. In fact, the writ petitioner has been fighting this litigation for the past 18 years. He has succeeded in four rounds of litigations. But, except certified copies of the orders in all the writ proceedings, the writ petitioner never get a licence except on one occasion which was also short-lived for a period not less than 45 days, viz. from 31.10.2005 to 08.12.2005. Actually, the writ petitioner could not get a licence except for the total period of two years despite succeeding in all legal proceedings. In such circumstances, this contention cannot also be accepted. 37. from 31.10.2005 to 08.12.2005. Actually, the writ petitioner could not get a licence except for the total period of two years despite succeeding in all legal proceedings. In such circumstances, this contention cannot also be accepted. 37. Coming to the last issue that relates to the right of the Panchayat to invoke Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, it is to be pointed out that Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, no doubt, confers rights upon the Municipal Council to acquire the rights of a person to hold a private market. Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, reads as follows: "Section 267-A. Acquisition of rights of private persons to hold private markets. - (1) A municipal council may acquire the rights of any person to hold a private market in any place and to levy fees therein. The acquisition shall be made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) and such rights shall be deemed to be land for the purpose of that Act. (2) On payment by the municipal council of the compensation awarded under the said Act in respect of such property and any other charges incurred in acquiring it, the rights of such person to hold a private market and to levy fees therein shall vest in the municipal council." 38. What sub-section (1) of Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, creates is a right to acquire some tangible rights by creating a legal fiction that those rights shall be deemed to be land for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. A right is to be distinguished from a power and the method of exercise of such power. The power to acquire under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is vested with the Government and the Collector. No power of acquisition is conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. What is vested is only a right and for the exercise of such a right, the Municipal Council may have to fall back upon the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No power of acquisition is conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. What is vested is only a right and for the exercise of such a right, the Municipal Council may have to fall back upon the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In other words, the procedure for acquisition that the Municipal Council is supposed to follow is to be traced only to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as no independent procedure is contemplated by Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. 39. Let us explain this position in a different manner for easy appreciation. Suppose Sub-section (1) of Section 267-A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, does not contain the second part namely, a reference to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 at all, then the consequence would be that Section 267-A(1) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920, would be ultra vires in view of the fact that the right conferred therein is not accompanied by any procedure or guidelines for the exercise of the right. In fact, the right conferred under sub-section (1), is unbridled and unguided. This vice is sought to be removed by making a reference to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, Section 267A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 cannot be read without any reference to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as any attempt to do so would destroy the very right created under Section 267A of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. 40. The consequence of the above is that if a Municipal Council wants to treat a particular right as equivalent to land, and if they want to acquire such a right, they may have to write to the Government asking them to initiate proceedings for the acquisition of such right under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. For instance, Section 70 of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, 1961, entitles the Housing Board to acquire any land or interest in a land, required for the purposes of the Act, in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. But, it is not the Housing Board that can actually initiate the proceedings. A Special Tahsildar is appointed by the Government and it is through him that notice and other procedures contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are followed. But, it is not the Housing Board that can actually initiate the proceedings. A Special Tahsildar is appointed by the Government and it is through him that notice and other procedures contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are followed. Therefore, the notice issued by the Municipal Council for acquiring the rights straight away may not be proper. It may be open to the Council to exercise the right conferred upon them, but only in a manner that is provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 41. One more hurdle for the Panchayat today is that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, stands repealed by Section 114(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act No. 30 of 2013, w.e.f. 01.01.2014). 42. Some arguments were advanced on the basis of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897, to which a reference is made in Section 114(2) of the Central Act 30 of 2013. But we do not think that we should now deal with the manner in which the Panchayat will exercise its right under Section 267-A(1) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920. We will cross the bridge when it comes. It may be open to the Panchayat to rely upon the very same Resolution dated 24.10.2005 for the acquisition of rights, but they should proceed in accordance with law. 43. In the result, "(i) the writ petition is allowed, setting aside the notice issued by the Panchayat. It will be open to the Panchayat to do whatever they can do on the basis of the same Resolution passed 10 years ago. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. (ii) all the writ appeals are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are dismissed."