JUDGMENT Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present petitions are filed by the respective petitioners for the prayer inter alia that appropriate writ, order or direction may be issued quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 23-10-2012 passed by respondent No. 3 - Corporation at Annexure-N and also quash and set aside the notification issued by respondent No. 1 - State dated 2-7-2012 on the grounds stated in the memo of petition. It is further prayed with regard to the interim relief for implementing the Draft Town Planning Scheme No. 62 (Dindoli-Bhestan-Bhedwad) in respect of Plot of the petitioners of both the petitions, i.e. Block No. 505 situated at village Dindoli, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat. Heard learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar for the petitioners. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar referred to the papers at length and submitted that as stated in detail in the written submissions, his main submissions are that the objections have not been considered as per order passed earlier in Special Civil Application No. 18812 of 2011 referred to in Special Civil Application No. 834 of 2014. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the objections or the representations of the petitioners should have been considered whereas the same have not been considered. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the contentions have been raised that the proposed T.P. Scheme is inconsistent with the development plan. He pointedly referred to the Map at Annexure-C referring to the Block No. 505. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the petitioners have no objection with the final development plan where the road is passing through the corner of Block No. 505 and they would not have any objection. However, the alignment in the road is changed in the Draft Town Planning Scheme which is causing prejudice to the petitioners. For that purpose, learned Counsel Shri Majmudar referred to the papers including Annexure-I. He submitted that the objections could have been considered with regard to the suggestions for variation. It was submitted that no variation could be made in the final development plan without following the procedure prescribed under Sec. 19 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the Draft T.P. Scheme is not in consonance with the development plan. He submitted that these objections have not been considered.
It was submitted that no variation could be made in the final development plan without following the procedure prescribed under Sec. 19 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the Draft T.P. Scheme is not in consonance with the development plan. He submitted that these objections have not been considered. Further, it was submitted that the procedure as required for the purpose of deciding the T.P. Scheme has not been followed. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar emphasized that the act should be done in the manner prescribed in the statute. He submitted that Special Civil Application No. 18812 of 2011 preferred by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 16085 of 2012 was disposed of by the High Court directing the respondent No. 3-Corporation to give the opportunity of hearing as observed in the judgment reported in 1985 (2) GLR 883, M/s. Babubhai & Co. v. State of Gujarat. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar has also referred to the provisions of T.P. Scheme read with Rules 17, 18 and 26 of the Town Planning Rules. He submitted that there is a open adjoining land, and therefore, it could have been considered. However, in order to favour few people, the alignment is changed. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar also referred to the provisions of Secs. 40, 47 and 19 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. He emphasized Sec. 40 read with Rule 17 and submitted that the individual notices as contemplated in this Rule are not served to the petitioners. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the Rule provide for the public notice as well as notice to each individual owner of the land and this point raised in the objection has not been considered. 2. Learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar submitted that though alternate accommodation by way of flat is provided, it is not suitable and acceptable to the petitioners. He submitted that the petitioners are required to pay additional amount also, and therefore, it cannot be said to be justified. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the impugned order has not considered the objections raised by the petitioners as it is silent though the High Court in the order in Special Civil Application No. 18812 of 2011 dated 5-9-2012 has specifically directed to decide the objection.
Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the impugned order has not considered the objections raised by the petitioners as it is silent though the High Court in the order in Special Civil Application No. 18812 of 2011 dated 5-9-2012 has specifically directed to decide the objection. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar further submitted that the T.P. Scheme is bad per se as it is without considering the development plan, and therefore, it is in violation of Sec. 40 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act as there is no consultation with the Chief Town Planning Officer. 3. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the objections of the petitioners are lying with the Town Planning Officer and the Town Planning Officer in exercise of the powers is required to consider such objections as per Rule 26 read with Sec. 52 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act. He therefore submitted that if the impugned order is allowed to remain leading to eviction or taking away of the land of the petitioners, then the procedure under Sec. 26 of the Gujarat Town Planning Act is denied. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar submitted that the impugned order is in violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 300A of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar strenuously submitted that though it may not be a fundamental right but the right to property is an important right which has now been considered as a human right. He also submitted that the provisions of Sec. 48(A)(2) of the Gujarat Town Planning Act also required to be considered as it would protect the right of the petitioners. He therefore submitted that the present petitions may be allowed. 4. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel Shri Majmudar has referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 1985 (2) GLR 883, M.S. Babubhai & Co. v. State of Gujarat, and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2012 SC 2043 , Girish Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, (Paragraphs 63 and 68). Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2013 SC 565 , Tukaram Kana Joshi Through Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C. (Paragraph 7) and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2008 (4) SCC 144 : [2008 (2) GLR 1531 (SC)], Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat.
He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2008 (12) SCC 401 (Paragraphs 33 and 36), Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation. He therefore submitted that the present petitions may be allowed. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Prashant G. Desai appearing with learned Advocate Shri Dhaval G. Nanavati for respondent No. 3 - Corporation has referred to the background of the facts and tried to submit that the contentions are misconceived. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai pointedly referred to the background and contended that this is a fresh round of litigation for the same purpose. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Prashant Desai also referred to the impugned order and submitted that as stated in the said order, the objections have been considered and merely because every detail is not stated, it cannot be said that the opportunity has been denied. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai submitted that pursuant to the direction of the High Court in Spl. C.A. No. 18812 of 2011, when the objections have been considered after providing an opportunity of hearing and admittedly when the petitioners have given their written submissions or the objections, no grievance could be made on the ground of principles of natural justice that the opportunity is denied. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai submitted that sufficient opportunity has been granted and as stated in the order, the petitioners cannot make a grievance for the land in question as the entire land is not taken away and only portion of the land would go in the T.P. Scheme for the purpose of road, which is a public purpose. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai therefore submitted that the contentions which have been raised that the objections are not considered is thoroughly misconceived. He submitted that the alternate accommodation or the land cannot be offered and still the offer has been made for alternate accommodation of the flat which is not being accepted by the petitioners. He therefore submitted that the Petitioners can have recourse for compensation in accordance with law, but when the scheme has been approved by the State Government as stated in detail in the affidavit-in-reply, this Court may not entertain any such petition. 6.
He therefore submitted that the Petitioners can have recourse for compensation in accordance with law, but when the scheme has been approved by the State Government as stated in detail in the affidavit-in-reply, this Court may not entertain any such petition. 6. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Prashant G. Desai submitted that in fact as provided in Rule 17, the notice or individual notice is required to be given to the owner of the land. He submitted that the petitioners have failed to establish their title, and therefore, they cannot make any grievance. Further, learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai submitted that the public notice is sufficient in compliance with the rules of natural justice as sufficient opportunity is given to the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai emphasized that in any case the petitioners have submitted their written objections as stated in the impugned order which have been considered, and therefore, the grievance of the petitioners that their representations or objections are not considered may not be accepted particularly when it is another round of litigation, which is only to stall the further implementation of the scheme. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Desai submitted that it is well settled that normally the Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226 would not entertain such petitions with regard to the T.P. Scheme which would be treated as law once it is accepted by the State Government. He pointedly referred to the observations made by the Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court in a judgment reported in 1989 (2) GLR 1176 , Kashiben Wd/o. Pitamber Devchand v. State of Gujarat. Similarly, he referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2008 (12) SCC 401 : [2009 (1) GLR 1 (SC)] - Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation: "33. We are, however, not unmindful of the fact that a statute of town planning ex-facie is not a statute for acquisition of a property. An owner of a plot is asked to part therewith only for providing for better facilities of which he would also be a beneficiary. Every step taken by the State does not involve application of the doctrine of eminent domain. 36.
An owner of a plot is asked to part therewith only for providing for better facilities of which he would also be a beneficiary. Every step taken by the State does not involve application of the doctrine of eminent domain. 36. When a statute makes an elaborate provision as regards the formalities required to be undergone at every stage by the local authority, the State Government and other authorities concerned in preparing and making the final town planning scheme, the same should be considered to be exhaustively (sic. exhaustive)." 7. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Prashant Desai appearing with learned Advocate Shri Dhaval Nanavati referred to the papers and submitted that in fact the petitioners who have made encroachment on the public road were issued notices under Sec. 260 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as the "B.P.M.C. Act"), and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners are not aware or the opportunity has been denied. In fact, they have also been given notices under Sec. 260 of the B.P.M.C. Act. 8. In rejoinder, learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar referred to the papers and tried to submit that the procedure is not followed which has denied the opportunity. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar has tried to submit that the State Government has not even contested by filing a reply and the respondent No. 3 - Corporation is merely an implementing agency, and therefore, since the State which is obliged to exercise the power under the Gujarat Town Planning Act has not controverted, the averments and the allegations in the petitions, and therefore, they remained un-controverted. Learned Counsel Shri Majmudar therefore submitted that the petition may be allowed. 9. In view of the rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present petition can be entertained. 10. As discussed hereinabove, the learned Advocate for the petitioners seems to have joined an issue with regard to the development plan contending that the T.P. Scheme is not in conformity with the development plan. It is required to be mentioned that though learned Advocate Shri S.P. Majmudar has stated that the petitioners have no objection with the development plan, however the alignment of the road as per the draft scheme is causing prejudice, which he desire that could be changed.
It is required to be mentioned that though learned Advocate Shri S.P. Majmudar has stated that the petitioners have no objection with the development plan, however the alignment of the road as per the draft scheme is causing prejudice, which he desire that could be changed. However, in effect, what he is suggesting is the change of the T.P. Scheme on the ground that the road is passing through the land in the T.P. Scheme. 11. The first aspect about the plan and the submission that the T.P. Scheme is not in conformity with the development plan require a little close scrutiny. As per the Scheme of the Gujarat Town Planning Act as stated the development plan is the broader outline with regard to the development of the area which may include a T.P. Scheme or more than one T.P. Scheme. Thereafter, subject to the procedure as laid down in detail after inviting the orders and hearing the persons affected is prepared and finalized which itself becomes the Act or part of the Act. The variance of the Scheme is therefore not readily accepted and the purpose and the detailed procedure in the Act clearly refers to the detailed procedure like inviting the objections and consideration of the same by the authority. Therefore, it refers to the specific T.P. Scheme with a minute detail with regard to the implementation of the Scheme and the objections raised by the persons concerned. Therefore, there may be various objections or the grievance which are considered before finalizing. However, it may not be possible to accept the objections on the ground of inconvenience considering the appropriate object of the T.P. Scheme which is sought to be achieved for the purpose of fulfilling the development plan. In other words, the development plan referred to the macro planning whereas the T.P. Scheme has reference to micro-planning or the outline with regard to the proposed scheme of the development. It is at this stage as provided in the Act read with the Rules, the objections are invited and are considered in compliance of the rules of natural justice. Therefore, once the scheme is approved and finalized it hardly calls for any interference by the Court under Art. 226.
It is at this stage as provided in the Act read with the Rules, the objections are invited and are considered in compliance of the rules of natural justice. Therefore, once the scheme is approved and finalized it hardly calls for any interference by the Court under Art. 226. However, a useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court reported in the case Kashiben Wd/o. Pitamber Devchand v. State of Gujarat, 1989 (2) GLR 1176 where the Hon'ble Division Bench has observed: "A draft scheme or any scheme prepared under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 can be processed further and finalised by virtue of Sec. 124 of the Gujarat Act - Once a final scheme is prepared it must be deemed to be part of the Act - The original owner loses all rights over the land, he is liable to be evicted, and he has no locus standi to file a writ petition." The Hon'ble Division Bench has therefore considered the provisions of Bombay Town Planning Act vis-a-vis Gujarat Town Planning Act. However, referring to the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court reported in 1977 GLR 549 (FB) - Saiyed Mohamad v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, it has also been clearly observed that once the land vests with the authority concerned as per the scheme, the scheme has become a legislative measure under which the rights of the parties have totally ceased to occupy the property and the power of eviction in such a context would be in the nature of an administrative power. It is required to be mentioned that before the scheme is finalized, however the care has been taken to provide an opportunity of raising an objection which could be considered. In fact Chapter-V of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules, 1979 include the publication of declaration and Rule 17 provide for meeting of the owners and framing of the tentative proposals. Section 44 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act referred to the contents of the draft scheme and Sec. 48 refers to the power of the State Government to sanction draft scheme. Section 47 referred to the objections to draft scheme to be considered.
Section 44 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act referred to the contents of the draft scheme and Sec. 48 refers to the power of the State Government to sanction draft scheme. Section 47 referred to the objections to draft scheme to be considered. It provides that any person affected by such a scheme communicate in writing with regard to his objection and it is considered before finalizing the scheme. At that stage therefore while exercising the power for the sanction of the draft scheme and considering the objections the Government is required to strike a balance between the individual right and the public purpose. Therefore, the doctrine of proportionality is attracted in such cases. In the facts, of the case of the petitioners, the scheme has been sanctioned in exercise of powers under Sec. 48(2) of the Act. The affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the Corporation refers to this aspect when it has been specifically averred and contended: "I submit that under the provision of Sec. 41(1) of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, 1976 (for short "the Act"), Surat Municipal Corporation declared its intention to make town planning scheme No. 62 (Dindoli-Bhedwad-Bhestan) and after following the procedure under Sec. 42and after considering the objections and suggestions the Corporation submitted the said draft scheme to the State Government for sanction under Sec. 48(1) of the Act and the said draft scheme was sanctioned by the State Government by Notification dated 2-7-2012. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-I is the copy of Notification dated 2-7-2012 to this affidavit. I submit that the State Government by Notification dated 16-7-2012 appointed the Town Planning Officer under Sec. 50 of the Act." Again it has been clearly observed referring to the submission that the T.P. Scheme is not in consonance with the draft development plan. It has been observed in the affidavit-in-reply: "I submit that 45 meters road is passing through the said land which was in revised sanctioned development plan of 2004. I submit that said 45 meters road is practically a Ring Road of about 25 kilo-meters and while making the Town Planning Scheme No. 62 the said development plan road was shown as town planning scheme road looking to the physical situation on the site and the said road was made as town planning road in consonance with the development plan to the major extent.
I submit that the development plan is macro-level planning while town planning scheme is a micro-level planning." Further, in the affidavit-in-reply, it is further observed: "I submit that the petitioner was having Block No. 505 which became O.P. No. 144 - A and 144 - B admeasuring 71 and 10580 sq. meters respectively, against which the petitioner is given final Plot No. 144 in the draft scheme sad measuring 7141 sq. meters. I submit that the owners and occupiers of the said plot have made illegal construction, as submitted hereinabove, and therefore, the Corporation was obliged to give notice under Sec. 260(1) to the owners and occupiers. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-II is the copy of Notice under Sec. 260(1)." Further in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the affidavit-in-reply, it has also been specifically contended that: "I submit that the State Government sanctioned the draft scheme No. 62, and therefore, the notice was given under Sec. 68 read with Rule 33 as per the provision of Sec. 48(A) of the said Act for taking possession of the area which is going in town planning road and a show-cause notice was given on 7-8-2012 for making representation against the said show-cause notice. I submit that the petitioners filed their reply to the said show-cause notice on 10-8-2012 and contended that since no compensation is given in respect of the area going in the town planning scheme road, the possession should not be taken. The persons interested were called for personal hearing on 30-8-2012 and on 30-8-2012 they requested to take into consideration the reply given on 10-8-2012. I submit that on 3-9-2012 the persons interested give in writing that they should be given another plot in lieu of area going in town planning road in Town Planning Scheme No. 62. Meanwhile this Hon'ble Court passed an order on 5-9-2012 and as per the directed in the said order, reasoned order was passed by the Corporation. Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-V is the copy of order passed by the Corporation." 12. This gives the background for the appreciation of the submissions made by the learned Counsel with reference to the scheme as well as of the Act and the Rules as well as procedure followed giving an opportunity to the petitioners.
Annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-V is the copy of order passed by the Corporation." 12. This gives the background for the appreciation of the submissions made by the learned Counsel with reference to the scheme as well as of the Act and the Rules as well as procedure followed giving an opportunity to the petitioners. Thus, it is evident that as per the order passed in the earlier round of litigation before the High Court, the opportunity was given and the reasoned order is passed. However, learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar has tried to submit that the impugned order at Annexure-N dated 23-10-2012 cannot be said to be a reasoned order, however, it requires a closure scrutiny. In the said order though it is stated that it is vague and it does not refer to the specific contention or the objection, it cannot be disputed that the specific reference is made to the issue involved and with reference to the provisions of the Act, it has been clearly stated that the draft scheme has been approved by the State for which the notification has been issued, and therefore, the land in question would vest with the authority (Surat Municipal Corporation). Further, the order also refers to the opportunity which has been given and admittedly as stated above, the petitioners have made the representation. Therefore, the submissions made by learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar that it cannot be said to be a reasoned order or principles of natural justice are violated, has no merit. 13. The another facet of the submissions referring to Rule 17 that the individual notice as contemplated under Rule 17 has not been issued to the petitioners who are the owners, is also misconceived. The notice is required to be served to the owners of the land which is included in the Town Planning Scheme. It refers to public notice as well as individual notice to every owner for the purpose of inviting objections and also to elicit public opinion under Sec. 42. Though, the submission has been made that the individual notice has not been issued, in fact the public notice which has been issued would serve the purpose or rather the public notice is issued to public at large to invite objections or to make suggestions. The individual notice which is said to have been issued is out of abundant caution to individual owners.
The individual notice which is said to have been issued is out of abundant caution to individual owners. At this stage, it is also required to be considered that the learned Senior Counsel Shri Prashant G. Desai with much emphasis has stated that let the petitioners point out that their names appear in the record as the owner of the individual notice as required to be issued to the owners only. Meaning thereby, unless the petitioners show that their names appear as owner, they cannot make a grievance. However, assuming without admitting that the petitioners are the owners, it can hardly be said that the petitioners had no opportunity of making representations and/or rather admittedly they had made the representations which would be sufficient in compliance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, as it has been observed time and again, the rules of natural justice do not apply in abstract and it has to be considered with background of the facts and the Courts have therefore evolved the doctrine of prejudice. A useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2000 (7) SCC 529 in the case of Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, wherein it has been observed: "The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, 1984 (1) SCC 43 , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved." It is required to be noted that the Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75) has also stated as follows: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice.
472-75) has also stated as follows: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." Therefore, having regard to the judicial pronouncement, where the Courts have evolved the aforesaid doctrine of prejudice to ascertain whether the breach of natural justice has caused or is likely to cause any prejudice, even if there is some lapse in compliance with the rules of natural justice. Therefore, it refers to a situation where the person complaining of violation of rules of natural justice is required to show any prejudice caused to him. 14. It refers to the situation where the person complaining of the violation of rules of natural justice is required to show any prejudice caused to him. In the facts of the case the petitioners cannot say that any prejudice is caused to them. Therefore, the submissions made by learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar with much emphasis on this aspect about the individual notice having not been served, and therefore, it is in violation of principles of natural justice has no merit. One more aspect which is required to be considered is that the allotment of the flat was made to the petitioners but as stated by learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar that as it was not suitable, and therefore, the petitioners had not given the option for the same. This has another aspect with regard to the allotment of the another land or the compensation. The issue involved in the present case is with regard to the purported exercise of power and the scheme under which the land is covered. Section 48(A) referred to vesting of land in appropriate authority. It provide: "(1) Where the draft scheme has been sanctioned by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 48, (hereinafter in this Section, referred to as 'the sanctioned draft scheme') all lands required by the appropriate authority for the purposes specified in clauses (c), (f), (g) or (h) of sub-sec.
It provide: "(1) Where the draft scheme has been sanctioned by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 48, (hereinafter in this Section, referred to as 'the sanctioned draft scheme') all lands required by the appropriate authority for the purposes specified in clauses (c), (f), (g) or (h) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 40 shall vest absolutely in the appropriate authority free from all encumbrances." Thus, the provisions of Sec. 48(A) clinches the issue that the land in question would vest in the authority after the draft scheme has been approved by the State Government. As stated in the affidavit-in-reply, the draft scheme has been approved by the State Government, and therefore, the submissions cannot be accepted. Again, before the scheme can be finalized under Sec. 52, it is required to give the notice following the procedure under Rule 26 and the representation could be made. A useful reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation, 2008 (12) SCC 401 : [2009 (1) GLR 1 (SC)], which has been referred to by both the sides. The Hon'ble Apex Court has discussed with regard to the provisions of this very Act and the procedure which is required to be followed. The Hon'ble Apex Court referring to this very issue with regard to the service of the special notice has made the observations and the issue was kept open though it was observed that the appellant is not entitled to any relief even if it was obligatory to serve a special notice. In the case before the Hon'ble Apex Court, it was the tenant who had made a grievance, and therefore, referring to Rules 21 and 26, the observations have been made that the person interested could make the representation whereas Rule 17 as stated above refers to the owners of the land who would have the opportunity. Thus, the scheme of the Act and the Rules take sufficient care that the opportunity is granted.
Thus, the scheme of the Act and the Rules take sufficient care that the opportunity is granted. In any case, as observed when the public notice is also issued for the same purpose, the underlying object or the purpose is to give a notice to the public at large and the person interested to make his suggestions or objections and the individual notice is by way of additional opportunity, but it would not make the action or the procedure invalid. If such an interpretation is made that even though public notice is issued and the private or the special notice-is not served, it would make the entire procedure invalid, then the very object of the public notice as referred to in the statute is redundant and frustrated. Therefore, the underlying object of the statute has to be considered and when the statute provides for the public notice as sufficient notice and when the legislature has also provided for a public notice, it cannot be interpreted in a manner which frustrate or negate the very provision of the statute. A useful reference can also be made to the judgment of this Court (Coram: A.R. Dave, J.) reported in 2004 (3) GLH 675 - Jethabhai Mepabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, wherein it has been observed that in the process of town planning, some one is bound to be badly affected and the variation in the scheme cannot be readily accepted. Again a reference is made to the doctrine of proportionality that the balance has to be struck between the individual claim and the right of the society. It is observed: "The doctrine of proportionality itself provides that in the process of striking the balance, for betterment of the society at large, if a person has to suffer, it cannot be said that the said doctrine has been violated." Therefore, the individual may have a recourse including the compensation, and therefore, the contention made by learned Counsel Shri S.P. Majmudar cannot be accepted. Both the petitions therefore deserve to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. FURTHER ORDER: After the orders were pronounced, learned Advocate Shri Majmudar has requested for stay of the operation of the order for four weeks to enable the petitioners to approach the higher forum. Learned A.G.P. Shri R.A. Rindani states that reasonable time may be granted.
Notice is discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. FURTHER ORDER: After the orders were pronounced, learned Advocate Shri Majmudar has requested for stay of the operation of the order for four weeks to enable the petitioners to approach the higher forum. Learned A.G.P. Shri R.A. Rindani states that reasonable time may be granted. In the circumstances, the request is granted. The operation of the order is stayed till 30-4-2015.