JUDGMENT K.M. Joseph, C.J. (Oral) These appeals being connected, we are disposing of the same by this common judgment. 2. An appeal is a creature of a statute. Consent cannot confer jurisdiction, where there is none. With these brief prefatory observations, we pass on to the question, which falls for our consideration. 3. These Special Appeals are sought to be maintained under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules (Allahabad). The said Rule, undoubtedly, would govern the fate of these appeals. We, therefore, deem it necessary to extract the same as under: “5. Special appeal. – An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award - (a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.” 4. The question is, whether the appeals before us are maintainable within the four corners of the aforesaid provision. At this juncture, we must pass on to the consideration of the facts involved in these cases. 5. Special Appeal No. 66 of 2014 is sought to be maintained against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court. The writ petition being WPMS No. 919 of 2007, from which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellants seeking the following reliefs: “i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 3.8.2007 passed by respondent no. 5 annexed as Annexure No. 25 to the writ petition. The writ petition being WPMS No. 919 of 2007, from which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellants seeking the following reliefs: “i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 3.8.2007 passed by respondent no. 5 annexed as Annexure No. 25 to the writ petition. (ii) Issue an appropriate direction to the court of respondent no. 5 to allow the petitioners’ application dated 2.6.2007. (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings of Case No. 22/87 (Under P.P. Act) of 2006 “State V/s Intezar & others” presently pending before the court of respondent no. 5.” The order impugned was passed by the fifth respondent. The fifth respondent, in turn, is the Prescribed Authority under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “U.P. Public Premises Act”). Case No. 22/87 of 2006, in which the impugned order was passed, is a proceeding under the U.P. Public Premises Act. The learned Single Judge, after consideration of the matter on merits, dismissed the writ petition and it is, hence, that this appeal is sought to be maintained. More of the facts and the statutory provisions governing the case will follow in the course of this judgment. 6. Special Appeal No. 644 of 2014 is filed by the respondent in the writ petition being WPMS No. 954 of 2012, which was filed by the State of Uttarakhand and the Executive Engineer challenging the Award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar, in Adjudication Case in favour of the appellant. The writ petition involved the following prayer: “I. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the award dated 05/04/2011 (Anneuxre-1 to the writ petition) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Haridwar in Adjudication Case No. 59 of 2009 (Old Adjudication Case No. 71 of 2004) in favour of the respondent no. 1 Sru Sukhpal.” The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment, has taken the view that he found no ground to take a contrary view to the view taken by the Labour Court. 1 Sru Sukhpal.” The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment, has taken the view that he found no ground to take a contrary view to the view taken by the Labour Court. But, thereafter, in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge perceived the delay of 22 years in the matter, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction that the Award will stand modified to the extent that, instead of reinstating the workman, the workman shall be paid one-time compensation of Rs. 2 lacs. 7. Special Appeal No. 643 of 2014 is also filed by the respondent in the writ petition being WPMS No. 1327 of 2013, which was filed by the State of Uttarakhand and the Executive Engineer. Writ Petition (MS) No. 1327 of 2013 also involved the following prayer: “I. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari thereby quashing the impugned award dated 23-06-2011 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court Haridwar in Adjudication Case No. 271 of 2009 (Old Adjudication No. 88 of 2004) namely Narendra Kumar Vs. Adhishashi Abhiyanta, Nirman Khand-1, Lok Nirman Vibhag, District Haridwar, and the Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari thereby quashing the order dated 22.09.2012 passed by the Learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar passed in Misc. case No. 10/2012, Adhishashi Abhiyanta, Nirman Khand-1, Lok Nirman Vibhag, District Haridwar Vs. Narendra Kumar (Annexure no. 6).” Therein also, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter on similar lines, namely, he proceeded to award compensation in lieu of direction for reinstatement. 8. As far as Special Appeal No. 211 of 2015 is concerned, the writ petition being WPMS No. 3797 of 2001, from which this appeal arises, was filed by the appellant seeking the following prayer: “i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgments dated 29.1.2000 and 24.10.1996 passed by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively (ANNEXURES-7 & 5 to the writ petition) as well as the auction proceedings dated 2.1.1996 in respect to the plot nos. 138, 139, 74 situated in village Sankat, Pergana Nanak Matta, District Udham Singh Nagar.” Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 are the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner, Kumaun Division, respectively. 1 and 2 respectively (ANNEXURES-7 & 5 to the writ petition) as well as the auction proceedings dated 2.1.1996 in respect to the plot nos. 138, 139, 74 situated in village Sankat, Pergana Nanak Matta, District Udham Singh Nagar.” Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 are the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner, Kumaun Division, respectively. It was a case, where recovery proceedings were taken against the properties of the petitioner and, finally, the matter reached the hands of respondent Nos. 1 & 2, who came to pass the judgments, as they had been described in the prayer portion, dated 29.01.2000 and 24.10.1996. The judgment seems to be described as judgment passed in the revision before the first respondent. 9. Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General, questioned the maintainability of Special Appeal No. 66 of 2014. Thereupon, these appeals, which involved similar issues, were clubbed together. 10. We have heard Mr. M.C. Pant and Mr. Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Special Appeal Nos. 643 of 2014 and 644 of 2014. We have also heard Mr. Siddhartha Sah, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Special Appeal No. 66 of 2014. Besides, we have also heard Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the State. Special Appeal No. 66 of 2014 11. Mr. Siddhartha Sah, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that an appeal is maintainable against a judgment of a learned Single Judge in the matter. He would submit that the impugned order is passed by a Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Public Premises Act. It is not a court of law. He would submit that the writ petition was sought to be maintained under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, every effort should be made by the Court to ascertain whether the appeal could be maintained treating it as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection, he drew our attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram & others vs. Radhikabai & another, reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 401. He would submit that there is no lis, which is to be decided by the Prescribed Authority. He would submit that it cannot be treated as a Tribunal. There is no naming of the Prescribed Authority as a Tribunal in the U.P. Public Premises Act. He would submit that there is no lis, which is to be decided by the Prescribed Authority. He would submit that it cannot be treated as a Tribunal. There is no naming of the Prescribed Authority as a Tribunal in the U.P. Public Premises Act. He would only submit that the question that is decided by the Prescribed Authority is as to whether the person concerned is an unauthorised occupant. It is merely a statutory authority and, therefore, there is no question of treating it as a court. In this connection, he drew our attention to Section 3 of the U.P. Public Premises Act, which reads as follows: “3. Appointment of Prescribed Authority. – The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, - (a) appoint such persons, being the Gazetted Officers of the State Government or officers of equivalent rank or the corporate authority, as it thinks fit, to be prescribed authorities for the purposes of this Act; and (b) defined the local limits which, or the categories of public premises in respect of which, the prescribed authorities shall exercise the powers conferred, and perform the duties imposed, on prescribed authorities by or under this Act.” 12. He also drew our attention to Section 8, which provides as follows: “8. Powers of Prescribed Authority. – The Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act 5 of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely – (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) any other matter which may be prescribed.” 13. We also deem it necessary, in the context of this discussion, to refer to Sections 10, 15 and 17, which read as under: “10. Finality of orders. We also deem it necessary, in the context of this discussion, to refer to Sections 10, 15 and 17, which read as under: “10. Finality of orders. – Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by a Prescribed Authority or Appellate Officer under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. 15. Bar of jurisdiction. – No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under sub-section (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the corporate authority under sub-section (5) of Section 9 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs.” 17. Government or corporate authority to be party. – (1) The State Government or the corporate authority, as the case may be, shall be a party to every proceeding under the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the State Government or the corporate authority, as the case may be, shall have a right to produce evidence and cross-examine witnesses and to prefer an appeal under Section 9 against an order of the Prescribed Authority refusing to make an order of eviction under Section 5 or to make an order under Section 7 requiring a person to pay rent or damages.” 14. Besides, it is also apposite that we refer to the definition of the word “corporate authority” in Section 2(a), which reads as under: “(a) “Corporate Authority” means any company, local authority, corporation or society referred to in Clause (e) of this section.” 15. Sections 2(b) and 2(e) define the words “premises” and “public premises” respectively. Besides, it is also apposite that we refer to the definition of the word “corporate authority” in Section 2(a), which reads as under: “(a) “Corporate Authority” means any company, local authority, corporation or society referred to in Clause (e) of this section.” 15. Sections 2(b) and 2(e) define the words “premises” and “public premises” respectively. We deem it relevant to refer to the same as under: “2(b) “Premises” means any land (including any forest land or trees standing thereon or covered by water or a road maintained by the State Government or land appurtenant to such road) or any building or part of a building and includes – (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building; and (ii) any fittings or fixtures affixed to or any furniture supplied with such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include land which for the time being is held by a tenure holder under any law relating to land tenures. 2(e) “Public premises” means any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State Government and includes any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of – (i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government; or (ii) any local authority; or (iii) any Corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) owned or controlled by the State Government; or (iv) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the governing body whereof consists, under the rules or regulations of the society, wholly of public officers or nominees of the State Government, or both; and also includes – (i) Nazul land or any other premises entrusted to the management of a local authority (including any building built with Government funds on land belonging to the State Government after the entrustment of the land to that local authority, not being land vested in or entrusted to the management of a Gaon Sabha or any other local authority under any law relating to land tenures); (ii) any premises acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with the consent of the State Government for a company (as defined in that Act) and held by that company under an agreement executed under Section 41 of that Act providing for re-entry by the State Government in certain conditions; but does not include, the Public Premises which are under the Administrative control of the Estate Department and which are occupied by, - (a) a Minister of the Government of Uttar Pradesh or a person given rank of a minister; (b) a Member of Parliament, a Member of Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council of Uttar Pradesh; (c) a non-Government organization, whether incorporated or registered or not; (d) a political party not recognized by the Election Commission of India; (e) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a trust registered under the Indian Trusts Act, 1888 or any Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act or any employees’ association or any body of persons, whether incorporated or not; (f) any outfit or frontal or other organization of a Political Party, whether recognized or not; (g) any person who is not government servant, or who is allotted the Public Premises by virtue of his being office bearer or representative of a Society, Trust or any body of persons, whether incorporated or not.” 16. Rule 5 is a fairly long and seemingly cumbersome provision; but, we would think that it is not incapable to glean its true meaning and ambit on a proper reading of the Rule. We would think that the Rule provides for an appeal from a judgment of a learned Single Judge except in the following contingencies, i.e. an appeal will not lie from a judgment of a learned Single Judge to the Division Bench under Rule 5 if,: (i) it is a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order passed by a court subject to the superintendence of the court; (ii) the judgment is passed in respect of an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; (iii) the judgment is passed in the exercise of its power of superintendence; (iv) an appeal is sought to be maintained against a judgment of a Single Judge, which is pronounced in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; (v) an appeal is sought to be maintained against a judgment of a Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award – (a) of a Tribunal, court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or Authority, which is made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act. We may clarify that the words “any such Act” would appear to us to refer to the Acts, which are indicated in clause (a), which means any Uttar Pradesh Act or any Central Act, which, in turn, must be with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, there is a long list of exclusions from the appellate jurisdiction, which would, otherwise, be available against a judgment of a learned Single Judge, as enumerated by us. 17. Therefore, there is a long list of exclusions from the appellate jurisdiction, which would, otherwise, be available against a judgment of a learned Single Judge, as enumerated by us. 17. Coming to the provisions, which would appear to us to be apposite and relevant in regard to Special Appeal No. 66 of 2014, we would think that the appeal would not be maintainable in view of the fact that Rule 5 excludes a judgment of a learned Single Judge rendered in a writ petition under Article 226 or Article 227 in respect of a judgment, order or award of a Tribunal or a court, inter alia. There is no dispute that the U.P. Public Premises Act, which is an Act passed by the Uttar Pradesh Legislature in the year 1972 and which admittedly continues to apply in the State of Uttarakhand by virtue of the provisions of the U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, is an Act relating to matters enumerated in the State List or, at any rate, in the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Therefore, the only question, which would fall for our consideration, is whether the Prescribed Authority is a court or, at least, a Tribunal. 18. We repel the contention of Mr. Siddhartha Sah based on the availability of a right of appeal under the Letters Patent in many cases, where, while an appeal is not provided against a judgment rendered under Article 227, an appeal can be maintained in a writ petition filed under Article 226. Very often, writ petitions are purported to be filed under Article 226 and Article 227. We would think that an inquiry on those lines, suggested by the counsel for the appellants Mr. Siddhartha Sah, stands obviated by the clear provisions in Rule 5, which rule-out an appeal when the petition is filed under Article 226 or Article 227 in respect of a decision in the form of a judgment or order or award of a Tribunal or a court. Therefore, we must focus on the issue as to whether the Prescribed Authority is a court or, at least, a Tribunal. 19. In this context, we must examine the law on the point as settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, we must focus on the issue as to whether the Prescribed Authority is a court or, at least, a Tribunal. 19. In this context, we must examine the law on the point as settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. We would think that the first decision on this issue can be found in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala reported in AIR 1961 SC 1669. That was a case, which involved the question as to whether a decision taken by the authority under Section 111 of the Companies Act would qualify as that of a court or Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. 20. The said judgment has been referred to by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, reported in (2010) 11 SCC 1 . We deem it appropriate to refer to paras 38 to 45 of the said judgment as under: “38. The term ‘Courts’ refers to places where justice is administered or refers to Judges who exercise judicial functions. Courts are established by the state for administration of justice that is for exercise of the judicial power of the state to maintain and uphold the rights, to punish wrongs and to adjudicate upon disputes. Tribunals on the other hand are special alternative institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence by or under a statute to decide disputes arising with reference to that particular statute, or to determine controversies arising out of any administrative law. Courts refer to Civil Courts, Criminal Courts and High Courts. Tribunals can be either private Tribunals (Arbitral Tribunals), or Tribunals constituted under the Constitution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule) or Tribunals authorized by the Constitution (Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A and Tribunals for other matters under Article 323-B) or Statutory Tribunals which are created under a statute (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunals and Consumer Fora). Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory Tribunals have Judicial and Technical Members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc). 39. This court had attempted to point out the difference between Court and Tribunal in several decisions. Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory Tribunals have Judicial and Technical Members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc). 39. This court had attempted to point out the difference between Court and Tribunal in several decisions. We may refer a few of them. 40. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, (1962) 2 SCR 339, Hidayatullah J., succinctly explained the difference between the Courts and the Tribunals, thus: “30. … All Tribunals are not courts, though all courts are Tribunals. The word “courts” is used to designate those Tribunals which are set up in an organized state for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of juridical power of the state to maintain and uphold rights and to punish “wrongs”. Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed. … 31. When rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party can go and commence a querela before the ordinary Civil Courts. These Courts which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the judicial power of the State, and their authority is derived from the Constitution or some Act of Legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their numbers may be increased or decreased, but they are almost always permanent and go under the compendious name of “Courts of Civil Judicature”. There can thus be no doubt that the Central Government does not come within this class. 32. With the growth of civilization and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative Tribunals have come into existence. These Tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evidence on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of “Courts” in Articles 136, 227, or 228 or in Articles 233 to 237 or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not Tribunals other than such Courts. This is the reason for using both the expressions in Articles 136 and 227. By “courts” is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by “Tribunals”, those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before Tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. … 33. In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a Tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by law from their jurisdiction. The word “judicial”, be it noted, is itself capable of two meanings. They were admirably stated by Lopes, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 (CA), in these words: (QB p. 452) ‘… The word “judicial” has two meanings. The word “judicial”, be it noted, is itself capable of two meanings. They were admirably stated by Lopes, L.J. in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society Ltd. v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 (CA), in these words: (QB p. 452) ‘… The word “judicial” has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a judge or by justices in court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in court, but in respect of which it is necessary to being to bear a judicial mind - that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration.’ That an officer is required to decide matters before him “judicially” in the second sense does not make him a Court or even a Tribunal, because that only establishes that he is following a standard of conduct, and is free from bias or interest. 34. Courts and tribunals act ‘judicially’ in both senses, and in the term ‘court’ are included the ordinary and permanent Tribunals and in the term ‘tribunal’ are included all others, which are not so included”. (emphasis supplied) 41. In Jaswant Sugar Mills vs. Laxmi Chand, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 242, this Court observed that in order to be a Tribunal, a body or authority must, besides being under a duty to act judicially, should be invested with the judicial power of the state. 42. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. P. N. Sharma, (1965) 2 SCR 366 , another Constitution Bench of this Court explained the position of Tribunals thus: “7. …The expression ‘court’ in the context denotes a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the State’s inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These courts can be described as ordinary courts of civil judicature. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These courts can be described as ordinary courts of civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. 8. In every State there are administrative bodies or authorities which are required to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner and their decisions are described as administrative decisions. In reaching their administrative decisions, administrative bodies can and often do take into consideration questions of policy. It is not unlikely that even in this process of reaching administrative decisions, the administrative bodies or authorities are required to act fairly and objectively and would in many cases have to follow the principles of natural justice; but the authority to reach decision conferred on such administrative bodies is clearly distinct and separate from the judicial power conferred on courts, and the decisions pronounced by administrative bodies are similarly distinct and separate in character from judicial decision pronounced by courts. 9. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the court one common characteristic; both the courts and the Tribunals are ‘constituted by the state and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions’. (Vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh - 1955 (1) SCR 267 ). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the Tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the Tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. The procedure which the Tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but the approach adopted by both the courts and the Tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of courts, so in the case of Tribunals, it is the State’s inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State’s inherent judicial function which they discharge.” (emphasis supplied) 43. In Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, a Constitution Bench reiterated the above position and added the following : “99. Where there is a lis – an affirmation by one party and denial by another – and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a court”. 44. In S.P. Sampath Kumar vs. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124 , this Court expressed the view that the Parliament can without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine make effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review. 45. Though both Courts and Tribunals exercise judicial power and discharge similar functions, there are certain well-recognised differences between courts and Tribunals. They are: (i) Courts are established by the State and are entrusted with the State’s inherent judicial power for administration of justice in general. Tribunals are established under a statute to adjudicate upon disputes arising under the said statute, or disputes of a specified nature. Therefore, all courts are Tribunals. But all Tribunals are not courts. (ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or can have a combination of a Judicial Member and a Technical Member who is an ‘expert’ in the field to which the Tribunal relates. Some highly specialized fact-finding Tribunals may have only Technical Members, but they are rare and are exceptions. (ii) Courts are exclusively manned by Judges. Tribunals can have a Judge as the sole member, or can have a combination of a Judicial Member and a Technical Member who is an ‘expert’ in the field to which the Tribunal relates. Some highly specialized fact-finding Tribunals may have only Technical Members, but they are rare and are exceptions. (iii) While courts are governed by detailed statutory procedural rules, in particular the Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act, requiring an elaborate procedure in decision making, Tribunals generally regulate their own procedure applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only where it is required, and without being restricted by the strict rules of the Evidence Act.” 21. We also deem it appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Arun Shourie, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 344 . In the said case, the question, which arose, was whether contempt was committed on the basis of certain observations made in regard to the commission of inquiry, which consisted of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court. Therein, the court, inter alia, proceeded to hold as follows: “22. As is seen from above, the Commission has the powers of civil court for the limited purpose as set out in that Section. It is also treated as a civil court for the purposes of Section 5(4). The proceedings before the Commission are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Penal Code. But the real issues are: whether the above provisions particularly and the 1952 Act generally would bring the Commission comprising of a sitting Supreme Court Judge within the meaning of “Court” under Section 2(c)(i)? Whether the proceedings before the Commission are judicial proceedings for the purposes of Section 2(c)(ii)? Whether the functioning of such Commission is part of the administration of justice within the meaning of Section 2(c)(iii)? 23. We do not have any doubt that functions of the Commission appointed under the 1952 Act are not like a body discharging judicial functions or judicial power. The Commission appointed under the 1952 Act in our view is not a Court and making the inquiry or determination of facts by the Commission is not of judicial character. 24. 23. We do not have any doubt that functions of the Commission appointed under the 1952 Act are not like a body discharging judicial functions or judicial power. The Commission appointed under the 1952 Act in our view is not a Court and making the inquiry or determination of facts by the Commission is not of judicial character. 24. Sections 19 and 20 of the Penal Code define the words “Judge” and the “Court of Justice” as under: “19. ‘Judge’. - The word “Judge” denotes not only every person who is officially designated as a Judge, but also every person, who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment. 20. ‘Court of Justice’. - The words “Court of Justice” denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially.” 25. Though the 1971 Act does not define the term ‘Court’ but in our opinion, the ‘Court’ under that Act means the authority which has the legal power to give a judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive. The Court is an institution which has power to regulate legal rights by the delivery of definitive judgments, and to enforce its orders by legal sanctions and if its procedure is judicial in character in such matters as the taking of evidence and the administration of oath, then it is a court. The Commission constituted under the 1952 Act does not meet these pre-eminent tests of a Court. 26. The Commission constituted under the 1952 Act does not meet these pre-eminent tests of a Court. 26. According to Stephen (Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, 6th Edn., page 383) in every Court, there must be at least three constituent parts – the ‘actor’, ‘reus’ and ‘judex’: the ‘actor’, who complains of an injury done; the ‘reus’ or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction; and the ‘judex’ or judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact and to determine the law arising upon the fact and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and by its officers to apply the remedy.” Therefore, the decision thereon turned on the recommendatory nature of the proceedings of the commission of inquiry and the fact that it did not adjudicate. There was no finality to the recommendations, which may or may not be accepted. 22. We also deem it necessary to refer to a very recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2374 of 2015 (Sh. Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.), 2015(3) UAD 129. Therein, the issues, which arose for consideration, have been culled-out in para 3 as under: (i) In what context the phrase ‘original jurisdiction’ appearing in Clause 15 of the Letters Patens should be construed, that is, by taking into consideration the plain meaning of the same as the Court’s power to hear and decide the matter before any other court and review the same; or should it be construed in the context with the power of the Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is always original. (ii) Assuming the words “to issue to any person or authority” as contained in Article 226 of the Constitution are interpreted so as to include the tribunal or the Court, then in such circumstances, would it be the correct proposition of law to say that appellate tribunal is not amenable to a writ of certiorari and the only remedy available to the litigant to challenge the order passed by an appellate tribunal is under Article 227 of the Constitution and, ancillary one, when a petition assails an order of the tribunal, be it a tribunal of first instance or an appellate tribunal, should it be necessarily treated as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in every case or it would depend upon facts of each case, more particularly the grounds of challenge and the nature of order passed. (iii) Whether in a petition for issue of a writ of Certiorari under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the tribunal/Court whose order is impugned in a petition must be a party to the petition so that the writ sought from the Court can be issued against the tribunal/Court, but if the petition is for the relief under Article 227 only, then the tribunal/Court whose order is under assail need not be a party-respondent on the reasoning that by entertaining a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises its power of superintendence which is analogous to the revisional jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Apex Court, we notice, proceeded to decide the issues by holding that it is not necessary to implead the Tribunal or a court or authority, which is not expected to defend its own orders, and the authority would become a necessary party only if it is capable or expected to defend its orders. We only notice the following discussion: 34. As we notice, the decisions rendered in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), Udit Narain Singh (supra) and Savitri Devi (supra) have to be properly understood. In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger Bench was dealing with a case that arose from Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and expressed the view how it is a proper party. As we notice, the decisions rendered in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), Udit Narain Singh (supra) and Savitri Devi (supra) have to be properly understood. In Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), the larger Bench was dealing with a case that arose from Election Tribunal which had ceased to exist and expressed the view how it is a proper party. In Udit Narain Singh (supra), the Court was really dwelling upon the controversy with regard to the impleadment of parties in whose favour orders had been passed and in that context observed that tribunal is a necessary party. In Savitri Devi (supra), the Court took exception to courts and tribunals being made parties. It is apposite to note here that proposition laid down in each case has to be understood in proper perspective. Civil courts, which decide matters, are courts in the strictest sense of the term. Neither the court nor the Presiding Officer defends the order before the superior court it does not contest. If the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction, as the case may be, calls for the records, the same can always be called for by the High court without the Court or the Presiding Officer being impleaded as a party. Similarly, with the passage of time there have been many a tribunal which only adjudicate and they have nothing to do with the lis. We may cite few examples; the tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Custom, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, the Sales Tax Tribunal and such others. Every adjudicating authority may be nomenclatured as a tribunal but the said authority(ies) are different that pure and simple adjudicating authorities and that is why they are called the authorities. An Income Tax Commissioner, whatever rank he may be holding, when he adjudicates, he has to be made a party, for he can defend his order. He is entitled to contest. There are many authorities under many a statute. Therefore, the proposition that can safely be culled out is that the authorities or the tribunals, who in law are entitled to defend the orders passed by them, are necessary parties and if they are not arrayed as parties, the writ petition can be treated to be not maintainable or the court may grant liberty to implead them as parties in exercise of its discretion. There are tribunals which are not at all required to defend their own order, and in that case such tribunals need not be arrayed as parties. To give another example:- in certain enactments, the District Judges function as Election Tribunals from whose orders a revision or a writ may lie depending upon the provisions in the Act. In such a situation, the superior court, that is the High Court, even if required to call for the records, the District Judge need not be a party. Thus, in essence, when a tribunal or authority is required to defend its own order, it is to be made a party failing which the proceeding before the High Court would be regarded as not maintainable. 35. We have stated in the beginning that three issues arise despite the High Court framing number of issues and answering it at various levels. It is to be borne in mind how the jurisdiction under the letters patent appeal is to be exercised cannot exhaustively be stated. It will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straight-jacket formula for the same. Needless to say, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by this Court and some of the judgments that have been referred to in Radhey Shyam (supra). 36. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to summarise our conclusions as follows:- (A) Whether a letters patent appeal would lie against the order passed by the learned Single Judge that has travelled to him from the other tribunals or authorities, would depend upon many a facet. The Court fee payable on a petition to make it under Article 226 or Article 227 or both, would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court. (B) The order passed by the civil court is only amenable to be scrutinized by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is different from Article 226 of the Constitution and as per the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam (supra), no writ can be issued against the order passed by the civil court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable. (C) The writ petition can be held to be not maintainable if a tribunal or authority that is required to defend the impugned order has not been arrayed as a party, as it is a necessary party. (D) Tribunal being or not being party in a writ petition is not determinative of the maintainability of a letters patent appeal.” 23. We would think that nothing turns on the nomenclature, which is attached to the authority. An authority may be a Tribunal even if it is not described as a Tribunal. What is important is its functions; the trappings, which are attached to it; the procedure, which it is expected to adopt; and the duty to decide a lis finally. 24. We are not impressed by the contention of Mr. Siddhartha Sah that there is no lis to be decided in a proceeding under the U.P. Public Premises Act. In this context, we would think that the scheme of the Act is that the U.P. Public Premises Act is intended to apply to lands belonging to the Government or to the corporate authority. That is to say, the land may either belong to the Government or to a corporate authority as defined in Section 2(a). As is clear from the provision of Section 2(e), apart from the Government; a company, local authority, corporation or society, referred to in clause (e) of Section 2, could take the benefit of the U.P. Public Premises Act. The fact that there is a lis is made clear from the mandate of Section 17, which commands that the State Government or the corporate authority is to be made a party to every proceeding under the provisions of this Act. We also would profitably refer to Section 8, which provides that the Prescribed Authority as also the Appellate Officer would, for the purpose of holding an inquiry or for the purpose of an appeal, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to summoning and enforcing attendance of a person and examining him on oath; requiring the discovery and production of documents; and any other matter, which may be prescribed. Section 10, in unambiguous words, proclaims that every order passed by the Prescribed Authority or an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Section 10, in unambiguous words, proclaims that every order passed by the Prescribed Authority or an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. It is also important to notice the bar of jurisdiction of a court, which is engrafted in Section 15. This means that the State has conferred its judicial powers upon the Prescribed Authority in regard to the duty to conduct the inquiry, which cannot be partaken by any court. There is an exclusion of jurisdiction of the courts in regard to the matters, which fall within the purview of the authority of the Prescribed Authority. Therefore, the U.P. Public Premises Act is exhaustive and it provides for the authority to exclude unauthorised occupants from properties of the State or a corporate authority as defined in the Act only upon the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority is to consist of gazetted officers or officers of equal rank or the corporate authority. Section 4 provides for the procedure, which involves issuance of notice to the person concerned. The persons concerned can adduce evidence. There would be right to cross-examination, obviously. Documentary evidence can be adduced. It is, after sifting the material, that the authority would pronounce its verdict. The verdict can be challenged in a statutory appeal before the District Court. This is the scheme of the U.P. Public Premises Act. 25. In the scheme of the U.P. Public Premises Act that we have referred to, we are left with no manner of doubt that, while we may not be justified in describing it as a court, it would be a Tribunal. The reason why we would fall short of describing it as a court is that, while some of the powers are available to it as are provided in Section 10, which we have adverted to; all the powers of the civil court are not available to it. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the distinction between a court and a Tribunal would lie in the number of trappings, which are available to a particular body. When a body is invested with all or most of the trappings, it may become a court. In this case, we would think that the Prescribed Authority would not qualify to be a court as such. When a body is invested with all or most of the trappings, it may become a court. In this case, we would think that the Prescribed Authority would not qualify to be a court as such. But, at the same time, we would also think that we could not possibly describe it as an administrative body. The distinction would be, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that an administrative body would take a decision more based on policy considerations than in accordance with law; whereas the Prescribed Authority, under the U.P. Public Premises Act, is enjoined upon to consider all the contentions raised by the parties, sift the evidence adduced before it and take a decision in accordance with law. Very important property rights of parties fall to be decided by the Prescribed Authority. Having regard to the conspectus of all facts and on an overview of the provisions, which we have already adverted to, we are of the view that the Prescribed Authority would be a Tribunal. The fact that it is not described as a Tribunal would not advance the case of the appellants. If it is a Tribunal, then, we are left with no choice, in view of the clear words of Rule 5, which is the fountainhead of any intra-court appeal in this Court; to hold that the appeal would not lie being against an order of the Tribunal. In this case, in fact, the decision of the Prescribed Authority is not a final decision. What happened was that a question was raised regarding the maintainability of the proceedings. A decision was taken by the Tribunal regarding the maintainability. The learned Single Judge also found that the proceedings are maintainable. Nonetheless, even though it does not amount to final disposal of the matter, it still is a decision of the Tribunal made in exercise of jurisdiction under a UP Act falling under the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. All ingredients stand satisfied for excluding this appeal from the appellate powers available under Rule 5. 26. Consequently, the appeal must fail for the sole reason that it is not maintainable. We must not be treated as having pronounced on the merits of the matter. Special Appeal Nos. 643 of 2014 & 644 of 2014: 27. Regarding these appeals, the fate cannot be any different. 26. Consequently, the appeal must fail for the sole reason that it is not maintainable. We must not be treated as having pronounced on the merits of the matter. Special Appeal Nos. 643 of 2014 & 644 of 2014: 27. Regarding these appeals, the fate cannot be any different. The writ petitions were filed, be it under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the Awards. The writ petitioner was the State of Uttarakhand. No doubt, the learned Single Judge did not find a ground to interfere with the Awards, but proceeded to take note of the delay and substituted a judgment of compensation in place of reinstatement. But that is on the merits of the matter, which we cannot go into unless and until we find that the appeals are maintainable. 28. We would think that the appeals are not maintainable for the reason that it is a clear case, where, be it under Article 226 or Article 227, the appeal is sought to be maintained against what can be described either as an Award or an order of the Labour Court. If the Labour Court cannot be described as a court, it will certainly be a Tribunal for the reason of the tests, which have been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court, namely, the authority to decide a lis with trappings, which are not fully available as would make it a court, but, nonetheless, sufficient number of trappings so as to make it a Tribunal. We are, undoubtedly, of the view that it would be a case of writ petitions being sought to be maintained either under Article 226 or Article 227 against the Awards of a Tribunal. This is expressly barred from the purview of the appellate jurisdiction. 29. An attempt was made by Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate, to wriggle out of this situation by pointing out that, under Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an Award would lie in a moribund position for a period of 30 days and only when it is accepted and it is published that it becomes enforceable. The argument of Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate, to wriggle out of this situation by pointing out that, under Section 6 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an Award would lie in a moribund position for a period of 30 days and only when it is accepted and it is published that it becomes enforceable. The argument of Mr. Pankaj Miglani is that, having regard to clause (b), which forms the last part of Rule 5, in view of the fact that the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act bars any appeal or revision against the Award, therefore, it would have the effect on the provision of clause (a), under which, a petition under Article 226 or Article 227 against an Award of a Tribunal would not lie. In other words, insofar as under the Act, the Award cannot be challenged in appellate or revisional jurisdiction till the Award becomes final after expiry of 30 days with publication of the Award, a petition under Article 227 will lie and, after the Award is made enforceable, a petition will not lie under Article 227, but it will lie only under Article 226. We are of the clear view that this argument cannot stand the test of scrutiny. What clauses (a) & (b), which form the latter part of Rule 5, contemplate is mutually exclusive exclusion of the appellate jurisdiction. What clause (a) deals with is exclusion of a judgment, order or award of a Tribunal, court or statutory Arbitrator in respect of an act, which is as described therein. Clause (b) deals with a completely different situation, namely, the rule maker intended to exclude the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a judgment of a learned Single Judge by way of an intra-court appeal in regard to a decision of a Government or officer or authority, which is made or even purported to be made in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any Act, which is described in clause (a). Only to the extent of borrowing the Acts, which is referred to in clause (a), there is commonality between clauses (a) and (b). Only to the extent of borrowing the Acts, which is referred to in clause (a), there is commonality between clauses (a) and (b). Otherwise, clause (a) is directed against an intra-court appeal, where the Single Judge has dealt with the matter under Article 226 or Article 227 in regard to proceeding before a Tribunal, court or statutory Arbitrator; whereas, clause (b) is directed against proceeding of an officer of the Government, Government itself or an authority in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under an Act, which is described in clause (a). Therefore, we would think that there is no merit in the said contention. 30. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the appellants, would contend that the learned Single Judge should not have awarded compensation after finding no merit in the writ petitions. We would think, that pertains to the merits of the matter. He referred us to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of The Notified Area Committee vs. Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar, reported in (1970) 0 AIR (All) 561. Therein, the court in paragraph 14 has held as follows: “14. Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of Rules of Court now provides for a special appeal from the judgment, of a single Judge in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Evidently Rule 5 is a reproduction of Cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, and not a new provision. A Single Judge hearing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction. His order deciding the petition is generally a judgment. So an appeal will lie from his judgment before a Bench of two Judges under Rule 5.” We would think that the said dicta cannot be imported in for dealing with the facts of this case. 31. He also referred us to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Durga Nagpal vs. Committee of Management, Patronage Institute of Management Studies and others, reported in (2013) 3 UPLBEC 2419 . That was a case, which arose from an appeal filed against an order passed in an application for modification in not discharging person alleged to be a contemnor. The court took the view that the appeal is maintainable. The court, inter alia, held as follows: “14. In one other case reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 , V.M. Manohar Prasad. Vs. The court took the view that the appeal is maintainable. The court, inter alia, held as follows: “14. In one other case reported in (2004) 13 SCC 610 , V.M. Manohar Prasad. Vs. N. Ratnam Raju and another, their lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the settled proposition of law that in a contempt proceeding no further direction could be issued by the Court. In case it is found that there is violation of order passed by the Court, the Court may punish the contemnor otherwise, notice of contempt is to be discharged. The Contempt Judge cannot supplement the impugned order by his own order, to quote relevant portion of para-7 of the judgment in the case (supra) as under:- “7. … Secondly, it is submitted that the Contempt Court had no jurisdiction to issue any direction providing any substantive relief to the petitioners moving the contempt petition. In support of this contention reliance has been placed upon decisions of this Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Notified Area Council v. Bishnu C. Bhoi. There is no doubt about the position under the law that in contempt proceedings no further directions could be issued by the court. In case it is found that there is violation of the order passed by the court the court may punish the contemnor otherwise notice of contempt is to be discharged. An order passed in the contempt petition, could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting relief.” 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that in case direction given by the Court is without jurisdiction, then appeal shall lie to a Court normally exercising appellate jurisdiction, to quote relevant portion (supra) para 8:- 8. The learned counsel for the employees in some of the appeals, submit that the Division Bench has held that no appeal would lie against the order of the Contempt Judge since no one was punished for contempt. We find the argument to be fallacious. If a direction is given by a court without jurisdiction, against such order an appeal would lie to a court normally exercising the appellate jurisdiction. We find the argument to be fallacious. If a direction is given by a court without jurisdiction, against such order an appeal would lie to a court normally exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Secondly, this ground loses importance in view of the fact that in some of the matters the authorities and the State have filed appeals directly against the order passed by the learned Judge disposing of contempt matter, directing the authorities and the State Government to sanction the posts. No such direction could be given in contempt proceedings.” 16. A Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in 2002 (20) LCD 287, M/s. Gokul Dairy and others. Vs. State of U.P. and others, held that where a contempt proceeding is initiated by Single Judge without having jurisdiction conferred by Chief Justice, it shall amount to an extent of action taken without jurisdiction and in such situation, special appeal shall lie under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.” There, the court, apparently, took the view that, once the contempt proceeding was dropped and the contempt was discharged, it was not open for the contempt court to review its own order. The court also referred to Article 215 of the Constitution. We are of the view that it may not be apposite to refer to the said judgment in support of the appellants’ contentions. Special Appeal No. 211 of 2015: 32. This appeal is sought to be maintained against the decisions of respondent Nos. 1 & 2. The decisions have been rendered under a UP Act, namely, the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The orders are themselves described by the appellant as passed in revisional and appellate jurisdiction. We would think that the said appeal would stand barred by clause (b), which is the last part of Rule 5. Therefore, we think that the said appeal is also not maintainable. 33. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed by reason of the fact that they are not maintainable only. We make it clear that we have not pronounced on the merits of the cases. There will be no order as to costs. 34. Appellants in Special Appeal Nos. Therefore, we think that the said appeal is also not maintainable. 33. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed by reason of the fact that they are not maintainable only. We make it clear that we have not pronounced on the merits of the cases. There will be no order as to costs. 34. Appellants in Special Appeal Nos. 66 of 2014, 643 of 2014 and 644 of 2014 request for issuance of a certificate of appeal under Article 134A of the Constitution of India, as, according to them, interpretation of Rule 5 raise a substantial question of law of general importance. We would think that the appellants should be granted a certificate of appeal in regard to the question relating to Rule 5, even though Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General opposed the grant of certificate. The Office will issue such a certificate.