JUDGMENT : 1. Although this matter is listed for hearing on I.A., it is taken up for final disposal with the consent of the learned advocates. 2. The petitioner Management has raised the challenge to the Government’s order, dated 14.8.2014 (Annexure-E) making the reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 3. Sri S.N. Murthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Somashekar for the petitioner submits that the impugned reference order is without the authority of law and without jurisdiction. He submits that the individual workmen have entered into the settlement with the petitioner Management. Therefore, it is only the individual workmen, who are competent to terminate the agreement. The second respondent Union has no locus standi to terminate the agreement. 4. His next submission is that the individual agreements are signed between April and October 2013. He submits that they cannot be terminated prematurely. He read out the provisions contained in Sections 2(p), 18(1) and 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (‘I.D. Act’ for short) to advance the submission that the settlement basically means the settlement arrived at between the employer and the workman and that such an agreement or settlement is binding on the parties to the agreement and that it cannot be terminated before the expiry of the period specified in the agreement and that even after the expiry of the agreement period the parties have to give two months’ notice of terminating the agreement. 5. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of BARAUNI REFINERY PRAGATISHEEL SHRAMIK PARISHAD v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 4 to raise the argument that during the operation of the settlement, a fresh charter of demands cannot be filed. 6. He has also relied on the Apex Court’s decision in the case of LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. D.J.BAHADUR AND OTHERS, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 315 wherein it is held that if notice had not been given, the door for raising an industrial dispute and fresh conditions of service would not have been legally open. 7. The learned Senior Counsel has also sought to draw support from the Apex Court’s decision in the case of NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS, reported in 2000-I-LLJ 247. The paragraph Nos.29 and 30 relied upon by him are as follows:- “29. 7. The learned Senior Counsel has also sought to draw support from the Apex Court’s decision in the case of NATIONAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS, reported in 2000-I-LLJ 247. The paragraph Nos.29 and 30 relied upon by him are as follows:- “29. Industrial Tribunal is the creation statute and it gets jurisdiction on the basis of reference. It cannot go into the question on validity of the reference. Question before the High Court was one of jurisdiction which it failed to consider. A tripartite settlement has been arrived at among the management, Labour Union and the Staff Union. When such a settlement is arrived at it is a package deal. In such a deal some demands may be left out. It is not those demands which are left out, should be specifically mentioned in the settlement. It is not the contention of Workers' Union that tripartite settlement is in any way mala fide. It has been contended by the Workers' Union that the settlement was not arrived at during the conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act and as such not binding on the members of the Workers' Union. This contention is without any basis as the recitals to the tripartite settlement clearly show that the settlement was arrived at during the conciliation proceedings. 30. State Government failed to give due consideration to the direction of the High Court in its judgment dated March 23, 1989. State Government also failed in its duty to bring to the notice of the High Court of its notification dated March 17, 1989 making the impugned reference. It appears to us that the reference had occasioned while the judgment had been reserved by the High Court. In any case it was expected of the State Government to bring to the notice of the High Court before making a reference its decision to make the reference. After the judgment had been announced and directions issued by the High Court to hear the appellant it was incumbent of the State Government, in the circumstances of the case, to recall the reference. It could not direct the appellant to raise its objection to reference before the Industrial Tribunal for which Industrial Tribunal certainly lacked jurisdiction. After the judgment had been announced and directions issued by the High Court to hear the appellant it was incumbent of the State Government, in the circumstances of the case, to recall the reference. It could not direct the appellant to raise its objection to reference before the Industrial Tribunal for which Industrial Tribunal certainly lacked jurisdiction. State Government before making the reference did not consider all the relevant considerations which would clothe it with the power to make the reference under Section 10 of the Act. We find substance in the submissions of Mr. Pai. Wholesale reference of all the disputes in the charter of demands of Workers' Union for adjudication was also bad inasmuch as many of such disputes were already the subject matter of tripartite settlement. This also shows non-application of mind by the State Government in making the reference. 8. Sri T.S. Anantharam, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 complains that the petitioner’s side has been raising the arguments without there being any corresponding foundations in the pleadings. He submits that, that the settlement cannot be terminated prematurely is not one of the grounds taken either in the conciliation proceedings or in the memorandum of the writ petition. He submits that if such a ground were to be taken before the Conciliation Officer, a point of reference could have been formulated on that count too. 9. Sri Anantharam submits that the individual workmen cannot enter into any settlement with the Management in respect of the general conditions of service. As per Section 2A of the I.D. Act, the individual workmen can enter into the settlement with the Management only in respect of discharge, dismissal and retrenchment. He brings to my notice the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of VIRUDHACHALAM P AND OTHERS v. MANAGEMENT OF LOTUS MILLS AND ANOTHER reported in (1998) 1 LLJ 389 for advancing the submission that individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial dispute as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. The general disputes or class disputes are to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining for which the individual workman by himself has no say. 10. The general disputes or class disputes are to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining for which the individual workman by himself has no say. 10. The learned counsel brings to my notice the Bombay High Court’s decision in this regard in the case of HINDUSTAN LEVER LIMITED v. HINDUSTAN LEVER EMPLOYEES’ UNION AND OTHERS reported in 1999-II-LLJ 804, wherein it is held that the dispute relating to the general class of workmen must necessarily be made with the Union; otherwise there is no settlement within the meaning of Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 9-A of the I.D. Act. Paragraph No.20 of the said decision is as follows:- “20. The view expressed in Ram Prasad Vishwakarama's case (supra) has been re-affirmed recently in P. Virudhachalam and Ors. v. Management of Lotus Mills and Anr. (1998-ILLJ-389) (SC). The question considered by the Apex Court was "Whether an individual workman, governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, can claim lay-off compensation under Section 25-C of the Act despite a settlement arrived at during conciliation proceeding under Section 12(3) of the Act by a Union of which he is not a member and when such settlement seeks to restrict the right of lay-off compensation payable to such workman as per the first proviso to Section 25C of the Act". This question was answered in the negative and in the course of discussion, the Apex Court observed in para 9 of the Judgment that in all negotiations based on collective bargaining, individual workman necessarily recedes in background. The reins of bargaining on his behalf are handed over to the union representing such workman. The unions espouse the common cause on behalf of all their members. Consequently, settlement arrived at by them with management would bind atleast their members and if such settlement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings, it would bind even non-members. It is further observed that individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service of an individual workman. It is further observed that individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service of an individual workman. Save and except the aforesaid class of disputes, which an individual workman can raise, rest of the industrial disputes including disputes pertaining to illegal lock-out, lay-off and lay-off compensation have to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining and they are disputes of general nature or class of disputes wherein individual workman by himself has no say. The relevant observations in para 9 of the Judgment may be reproduced: "9. It has to be kept in view that the Act is based on the principle of collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes and for maintaining industrial peace. Thus principle of industrial democracy is the bed-rock of the Act. The employer or a class of employers on the one hand and the accredited representatives of the workmen on the other are expected to resolve the industrial dispute amicably as far as possible by entering into the settlement outside the conciliation proceedings or if no settlement is reached and the dispute reaches conciliator even during conciliation proceedings. In all these negotiations based on collective bargaining individual workman necessarily recedes in background. The reins of bargaining on his behalf is handed over to the union representing such workman. The unions espouse the common cause on behalf of all their members. Consequently, settlement arrived at by them with management would bind at least their members and if such settlement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings, it would bind even non-members. Thus, settlements are the live wires under the Act for ensuring industrial peace and prosperity. Section 10(2) of the Act highlights this position by providing that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, for a reference of the dispute of a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal, the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party, shall make the reference accordingly. Individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with discharges, dismissals, retrenchments or otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. Individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with discharges, dismissals, retrenchments or otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. Save and except the aforesaid class of disputes, which an individual workman can raise, rest of the industrial disputes including disputes pertaining to illegal lock-out, lay-off and lay-off compensation have to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining and they are disputes of general nature or class of disputes wherein individual workman by himself has no say.” 11. He submits that if the petitioning Management’s plea is accepted, then the workmen would be prevented from raising any conciliation proceedings by the Management entering into the settlements with the individual workmen on all the 365 days and consequently one year would not be elapsing from the date of signing the agreement with the individual workmen. 12. He submits that the recording of evidence is already complete in the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. 13. The learned counsel has also relied on the Madras High Court’s decision in the case of TAMIL NADU COOPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION LTD., v. JOINT COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR AND OTHERS, reported in 2015-I-LLJ-589 (Mad) wherein it is held that the management cannot enter into any individual settlement with individual workmen under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act disregarding employees’ union. Further, it is held therein that if the Management is interested in finding a solution to the industrial dispute by negotiation and settlement, it shall do it only with the employees’ union. 14. He has also relied on another decision of the Madras High Court in the case of SOMASUNDARAM v. LIYAKAT ALI AND ANOTHER reported in 1998-II-LLJ 719 wherein it is held that the individual grievance against an employer cannot be an industrial dispute unless community of interest is established. 15. He also sought to draw support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of BOMBAY PORT TRUST EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS reported in 1999-I-LLJ 175 for contending that the Government cannot refuse to send the reference once it receives the report from the Conciliation Officer that the conciliation has failed. 16. 15. He also sought to draw support from the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of BOMBAY PORT TRUST EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS reported in 1999-I-LLJ 175 for contending that the Government cannot refuse to send the reference once it receives the report from the Conciliation Officer that the conciliation has failed. 16. In the course of rejoinder, Sri S.N. Murthy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the private settlement between the workmen and the Management is recognized by law. He submits that such an arrangement cannot be questioned by the employees’ union. It cannot contend that there is no settlement at all. He submits that the respondent Union is proceeding on a fallacious presumption that there has to be a dispute for arriving at a settlement. He submits that there can be a settlement without there being a dispute, when the relationship between the employer and the employee is cordial and harmonious. 17. Sri Shashidhar S. Karamadi, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent No.1 submits that the reference raised is proper and would pray for the dismissal of this petition. He submits that the issues which the petitioner is raising in this writ petition can be raised before the Industrial Tribunal. 18. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The question that falls for my consideration is whether the Government can make a reference of an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication on the failure of the conciliation during the subsistence of the agreement between the individual workmen and the Management? 19. As held by the Apex Court in Virudhachalam’s case (supra), the individual workmen have scant bargaining power; therefore their disputes have to be highlighted by their bargaining agents, namely, their unions. Individual workman comes into picture only in connection with a limited number of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the I.D. Act dealing with discharges, dismissals, retrenchments or otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. The remaining industrial disputes are of general nature and hence they are to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining. This considered judicial view is followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra). 20. The remaining industrial disputes are of general nature and hence they are to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining. This considered judicial view is followed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra). 20. The Madras High Court in the case of Tamil Nadu Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (supra) has this to say in the last part of paragraph No.19 and 24 (vii). “19. ………In these circumstances, the management cannot enter into any individual settlements with the individual workman under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act disregarding the Employees Union. If at all the petitioner management was interest in finding a solution to the industrial dispute in I.D.Nos.31 of 1958 and 70 of 1986 by negotiation and settlement, as per the scheme of the I.D. Act, the petitioner shall do it only with the Employees Union. The scheme of the Act provides only such a course. The course adopted by the management in entering into individual settlements with the individual workman under Section 18(1) of the I.D. Act is opposed to the very scheme of the I.D. Act and thus illegal. 24(vii). The individual has no role in the scheme of the I.D. Act and the right given to individual workman under Section 2A of the I.D. Act would not deter the collective bargaining power of the Union to enter into settlement agreeing to dispense with the services of some of the workmen in a package deal, which benefiting the entire workforce.” 21. I may usefully refer to the Orissa High Court’s judgment in the case of THE MANAGEMENT OF THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INSTITUTE OF FRESHWATER AQUACULTURE v. THE UNION OF INDIA reported in (2010) 124 FLR 984. Paragraph No.12 of the said judgment reads as follows: “12. It may be seen that settlements under the I.D. Act are divided into two categories, namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (ii) those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute, to all Ors. A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute, to all Ors. who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all Ors. who joined the establishment thereafter. Therefore, a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognized majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same. To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract. The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settlements reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employer or a minority union from scuttling the settlement. There is an underlying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on Ors. That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority…….” 22. As held by the Apex Court in the case of M/S. TATA CHEMICALS LTD. v. THE WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY CHEMICALS KAMDAR SANGH reported in (1978) 3 SCC 42 , a settlement not arrived at in conciliation proceedings is not binding on the workers under Section 18 of the I.D. Act even if it is made with the recognized majority union. Paragraph No.16 of the said decision is extracted here-in-below: “16. As the first two questions are inseparably linked up, we propose to deal with them together. Paragraph No.16 of the said decision is extracted here-in-below: “16. As the first two questions are inseparably linked up, we propose to deal with them together. Although, prima facie there seems to be considerable force in the Sangh’s stand that paras 2.3, 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the aforesaid agreement of December 14, 1973 arrived at between the Employees’ Union and the appellant Company related only to the special pay and did not cover the Sangh’s demand for variable dearness allowance linked to the Ahmedabad cost of living index, we do not consider it necessary to go into this question, as the said agreement not having been arrived at during the course of a conciliation proceedings, it could not, according to Section 18(1) of the Act bind any one other than the parties thereto. A fortiori, the fact that the Employees’ Union which had been duly recognized under the Code of Discipline arrived at the aforesaid agreement with the appellant Company could not operate as a legal impediment in the way of the Sangh (which was not a party to the agreement) to raise a demand or dispute with regard to the variable dearness allowance linked to Ahmedabad cost of living index or affect the validity of the reference by the Government or the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to go into the dispute. The conclusion that a minority union can validly raise an industrial dispute gains support from Section 2(k) of the Act which does not restrict the ambit of the definition of ‘industrial dispute’ to a dispute between an employer and a recognized majority union but takes within its wide sweep any dispute or difference between employer and workmen including a minority union of workmen which is connected with employment or terms of employment or conditions of labour of workmen as well as the observations made by this Court in Workmen v. M/s. Dharampal Premchand (Saughandhi).” 23. It is also helpful to refer to the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of WORKMEN v. JUDGE VIII INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL reported in (1999) 82 FLR 47 wherein it is held that a bipartite settlement is not binding on all the workmen; only a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding on all the workmen. 24. 24. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of WORKERS AND STAFF ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT SOAP FACTORY v. THE STATE OF MYSORE AND ANOTHER reported in 1971 LAB I.C.79 (Vol.4, C.N.14) is of immense value. The Division Bench has this to say in paragraph No.9: “9. That a private settlement does not operate as a bar against the making of a reference, but that settlement come to in the course of a conciliation proceedings or adjudication proceeding bars such a reference is a direct result of the legal position that when a dispute between the workers and the management is concluded by a settlement which binds all of them there is no longer in existence an industrial dispute which is capable of being referred by the Government under Section 10 of the Act. But when the dispute is reported to have been settled by the management with some of its workers but not with all of them, the questions which arise regarding its reference for adjudication under Sec. 10 of the Act are undoubtedly questions of expediency. That a dispute may still exist though in a mutilated form is a statable possibility………” 25. The combined reading of the provisions contained in Section 2(p) and 18 of the I.D. Act yields an inescapable conclusion that the management and individual workmen do not have the unfettered freedom to settle the industrial dispute as they please and clothe it with a binding effect on all the workmen or even on all member workmen of the Union. 26. It is the existence of an industrial dispute which clothes the appropriate Government with the power to make a reference. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended, the appropriate Government lacks the power to make the reference. 27. The Government does not exercise any adjudicatory function in the matter of making a reference under the I.D. Act. If it is prima facie satisfied as to the existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute, then it would be well within its rights to make a reference under the I.D. Act. 28. Thus answering the raised question in the affirmative, I dismiss this petition. No order as to costs.