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2015 DIGILAW 371 (UTT)

Neeraj Yadav v. Ganesh Maurya

2015-07-27

U.C.DHYANI

body2015
JUDGMENT : U.C. DHYANI, J. 1. By means of present Appeal from Order (A.O.) under Order 43 Rule 1 C.P.C. read with Section 104 C.P.C., the defendant/appellant has challenged the judgment and order dated 21.05.2015 passed by Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) 3rd, Dehradun in O.S. no. 188 of 2015, Ganesh Maurya v. Neeraj Yadav, whereby the trial court disposed of the interim injunction application of the respondent and directed both the parties to maintain status-quo over the suit property and not to create third party interest over the property in dispute. 2. The plaintiff (respondent herein) moved an application (paper no. 6C) before the court below with the prayer to direct the defendant (appellant herein) to restrain from interfering in the suit property, which is a piece of land. The defendant (appellant) contested the said application. There are two sale-deeds in respect of the property in question, one is in favour of the plaintiff and another is in favour of the defendant. Both sale-deeds were executed by one Mahima Nand Sundriyal. After considering the rival contentions, learned court below expressed its inability to find out as to which of the sale-deed executed by Mahima Nand Sundriyal is genuine and which of the sale-deed is false and fabricated. The court below came to a conclusion that the ownership as well as the possession of both the parties seems to be suspicious. Learned court below, therefore, directed the parties to maintain status-quo over the suit property and not to create any third party interest in respect of the said property during the pendency of the suit. 3. Aggrieved against the same, present A.O. has been filed by the defendant-appellant. 4. It is such a case in which both the plaintiff and the defendant claimed their ownership and possession on the basis of two different sale-deeds executed by one Mahima Nand Sundriyal. Surprisingly, both the sale-deeds are allegedly executed by Mahima Nand Sundriyal. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff's brother is a witness to the sale-deed executed in favour of the defendant. It is the observation of the trial court that the question as to whether Mahima Nand Sundriyal has, in fact, executed both the sale-deeds or whether someone impersonated Mahima Nand Sundriyal and executed a false and fabricated sale-deed shall be decided during the course of final hearing. It is the observation of the trial court that the question as to whether Mahima Nand Sundriyal has, in fact, executed both the sale-deeds or whether someone impersonated Mahima Nand Sundriyal and executed a false and fabricated sale-deed shall be decided during the course of final hearing. Admittedly, none of the parties claiming their ownership and possession has been recorded in the revenue records. The plaintiff's (respondent's) application for mutation has been dismissed in default and as per the statement of learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, the restoration application is pending. 5. The question is - whether the trial court was justified in directing the parties to maintain status-quo and not to create any third party interest in such a situation? 6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent referred to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashwinkumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel, (1999) 3 SCC 161 , wherein it was held: “13. Therefore, without going into the validity of the agreements executed by the owners in favour of the plaintiff or defendants 15 and 28, or the validity of the sale deed executed by defendants 15 and 28, we are of the view that the trial Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. The trial Court has given several reasons for the grant of temporary injunction and, in our view, the two reasons given by the High Court were, on the facts, not sufficient to warrant a remand. 14. It is, however, made clear that the findings relating to the rights of the parties, the title to the property or as to possession as given by the trial Court and as accepted by us are all tentative and will be subject to findings that may be arrived at by the trial Court in the suit after the evidence is led. In addition to the injunction granted by the trial Court, we direct the plaintiff to maintain status quo on spot and not to create 3rd party rights or make constructions on the property nor alter the nature of the property pending disposal of the suit.” 7. In addition to the injunction granted by the trial Court, we direct the plaintiff to maintain status quo on spot and not to create 3rd party rights or make constructions on the property nor alter the nature of the property pending disposal of the suit.” 7. The facts of the present case are distinguishable from the facts of Ashwinkumar K. Patel's case (supra), inasmuch as, in Ashwinkumar K. Patel's case the trial court came to conclusion that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, which is lacking in the instant case. In the present case, the court below has not said anything as to whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not. 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent thereafter cited a decision of this Court in Nauman Ahmad & others v. Mohd. Harun & another, 2014 (2) U.D. 629 to argue that the court below directed the parties to maintain status quo and not to create third party interest. The facts of Nauman Ahmad's case (supra) are also different from the present case, inasmuch as, in Nauman Ahmad's case, both the parties moved an application praying to restrain each other from interfering in the suit property, which is lacking in the instant case. Secondly, in Nauman Ahmad's case, learned counsel for the parties submitted before the High Court that the parties shall maintain status-quo qua possession and nature of the property as on date and shall not create third party interest over the property in dispute during the pendency of the suit, which is conspicuous by its absence in the instant A.O. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent then referred to a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Julien Educational Trust v. Sourendra Kumar Roy & others, (2010) 1 SCC 379 to say that having found a prima facie case in favour of the appellant-trust, Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the respondent-Sourendra Kumar Roy not to alienate or encumber the suit property or change the nature and character thereof till the disposal of the suit. In the instant case, the court below did not find a prima facie case either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant, which is distinguishing feature of the instant case from Julien Educational Trust's case. The High Court had also passed an ad-interim order of injunction against respondents no. In the instant case, the court below did not find a prima facie case either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant, which is distinguishing feature of the instant case from Julien Educational Trust's case. The High Court had also passed an ad-interim order of injunction against respondents no. 1 to 8 as is indicated in para 10 of Julien Educational Trust's decision. 10. The decision rendered by learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Sharanjit Singh v. Raghu Nath, 2013 (3) Law Herald 2543, although is in favour of the plaintiff-respondent with identical decision by the court below, but the distinguishing feature of Sharanjit Singh's case is that, at least the trial court was satisfied at the stage of disposal of application under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. that a prima facie case was made out in favour of the plaintiff. 11. In Kashi Math Samsthan & another v. Srimad Sudhindra Thirtha Swamy & another, AIR 2010 SC 296 , Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to held that: “13. It is well settled that in order to obtain an order of injunction, the party who seeks for grant of such injunction has to prove that he has made out a prima facie case to go for trial, the balance of convenience is also in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if injunction is not granted. But it is equally well settled that when a party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, question of considering the balance of convenience or irreparable loss and injury to the party concerned would not be material at all, that is to say, if that party fails to prove prima facie case to go for trial, it is not open to the Court to grant injunction in his favour even if, he has made out a case of balance of convenience being in his favour and would suffer irreparable loss and injury if no injunction order is granted.” 12. Likewise, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Triumphant Institute of Management Education Pvt. Ltd. v. Aspiring Mind Assessment Pvt. Ltd. & others, 2014 (3) CivCC 734 (Delhi) has observed in para 19 that: “19. Likewise, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Triumphant Institute of Management Education Pvt. Ltd. v. Aspiring Mind Assessment Pvt. Ltd. & others, 2014 (3) CivCC 734 (Delhi) has observed in para 19 that: “19. ………………………………………………………………………… ……………………… There is no dispute about the fact that the grant of an injunction is an equitable relief and before a party claims an equitable relief, he must show not only to the court that he has come to the court with clean hands but also that there has to be a complete disclosure of facts in the plaint. This duty is further enhanced on account of the fact where a prayer is made by the plaintiff for grant of an ex-parte ad interim injunction. The importance of full disclosure of facts or rather the consequences of concealment and suppression of material facts has been underscored by the courts repeatedly. ……… ………………………………………” 13. In D. Albert v. Lalitha & others, AIR 1989 Madras 73, Hon'ble Madras High Court has observed as below: “6. It is no doubt true that parties are well aware of the real state of things as they exist. But when they are fighting with each other, in a court of law, advancing cases diametrically opposed to each other, neither of them can be expected to meekly reconcile to the situation and stop interfering with the possession of the opposite party even if that is the real ‘status quo’. Invariably, the immediate consequence is that the party who is not in possession would attempt to get into possession by asserting that he had been in possession already and on the date of the ‘status quo’ order he was in possession with the result that there would be a clash between the parties leading to intervention by police and criminal proceedings. There is no justification whatever for a civil court driving the parties to criminal proceedings by passing an order of ‘status quo’ without indicating what the status quo is. This is nothing but a grave dereliction on the part of the civil Court of its duty to decide a disputed question of fact. The Court is bound to decide prima facie on the materials available, whether the plaintiff is in possession or the defendant is in possession. This is nothing but a grave dereliction on the part of the civil Court of its duty to decide a disputed question of fact. The Court is bound to decide prima facie on the materials available, whether the plaintiff is in possession or the defendant is in possession. Leaving the matter in doubt and ambiguity by passing an order of ‘status quo’ will result in more dangerous consequences than even deciding wrongly but clearly that one of the parties is in possession.” 14. The grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion by the Court. While exercising the discretion, the Court should apply the following tests: (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. 15. It is, therefore, clear that all the three recognized principles for obtaining the temporary injunction have to be fulfilled and only on the ground that the plaintiff has a prima facie debateable and argueable case, the temporary injunction cannot be granted. It should be borne in mind that an injunction is an equitable relief and as such granting of such relief is governed by well-known equitable principle. ‘Certain principles in equity’, says Justice Story in his book ‘Equity Jurisprudence’, ‘are well established, and dominate in the administration of justice in that field with as much certainty as do principles upon the law side, so to speak, of the Court. But mere precedents are of no avail except to illustrate the extent to which the principles have been applied. The text-writers disagree, in some respects, in the manner of stating this, but are in harmony in this: While new principles are not to be added to those long established for the government of equitable remedies, the rules, not the precedents, are to control. There is no vitality in precedents; there is in rules. They are susceptible of expansion along every line necessary to reach new conditions. The ingenuity of man in devising new forms of wrong cannot outstrip such development.’ 16. It is, therefore, clear that the court below has directed the parties to maintain status-quo over the property in question without holding that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. They are susceptible of expansion along every line necessary to reach new conditions. The ingenuity of man in devising new forms of wrong cannot outstrip such development.’ 16. It is, therefore, clear that the court below has directed the parties to maintain status-quo over the property in question without holding that the plaintiff has a prima facie case. It is a well settled law that the plaintiff has to stand on its own legs, if he has to succeed in decreeing a case and if he has to succeed in getting ad-interim injunction order in his favour. The court below has ignored this vital aspect of the matter and has not applied the aforesaid judgment rendered by Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court correctly. There is, therefore, no option before this Court, but to set aside the impugned judgment and to remit the matter before the court below for decision according to law. 17. The Appeal from Order is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the court below to decide the temporary injunction application afresh in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to both parties. 18. Learned counsel for the parties have assured this Court that the parties shall render all assistance to the court below in getting application under Order 39 Rule 1 C.P.C. and objections thereon decided within 30 days from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Parties are directed to appear before the court below on 03.08.2015. 19. Let certified copies of this order be supplied to learned counsel for the parties within three days from today on payment of usual charges.