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2015 DIGILAW 372 (CAL)

Asha Murarka v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation

2015-04-24

DEBANGSU BASAK

body2015
JUDGMENT : Debangsu Basak, J. 1. The writ petitioners have challenged the Orders dated March 27, 2012 and July 11, 2012 passed by the Corporation authorities refusing to grant 25 per cent and stating that the flat of the writ petitioners has been assessed on the date of the completion certificate. According to the writ petitioners they did not receive the Order dated March 27, 2012 and that the reasons given in the Order dated July 11, 2012 are contrary to the provisions of Sections 171(5) and 178(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The writ petitioners claim that they are entitled to receive rebate as provided under Section 171(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The writ petitioners also claim that they should be assessed for the quarter following the receipt of the completion certificate. 2. Mr. N.K. Poodar learned Senior Advocate for the writ petitioners submit that, the writ petitioners are not challenging the annual valuation for the relevant quarter. The writ petitioners being entitled to rebate in accordance with Section 171(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 must be given such rebate. The writ petitioners have purchased a flat. The completion certificate of such flat is dated December 31, 2005. Referring to Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980 it is submitted that, a newly constructed building becomes assessable for property tax from the quarter following the date of issue of the occupancy certificate. The writ petitioners did not receive the occupancy certificate dated December 31, 2005 on the same day. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that, the occupancy certificate dated December 31, 2005 has been served upon the writ petitioners on the date of the occupancy certificate. The words "the date of issue" has to be read to mean "served". On the interpretation of the word "issued" Mr. Poddar relies upon 1975 Volume 99 Income Tax Reports page 581 (SC) (Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Kundan Lal Behari Lal). 3. Mr. Poddar points out that, the present petition is the second writ petition filed by the writ petitioners. On the earlier writ petition by an Order dated February 2, 2010 the demand raised by the corporation was set aside and the matter was remanded to the corporation for fresh valuation in accordance with law. Mr. 3. Mr. Poddar points out that, the present petition is the second writ petition filed by the writ petitioners. On the earlier writ petition by an Order dated February 2, 2010 the demand raised by the corporation was set aside and the matter was remanded to the corporation for fresh valuation in accordance with law. Mr. Poddar refers to the communication of the corporation dated July 11, 2012 which has rejected the prayer for rebate on two grounds. The first ground for rejection is that rebate is allowed in respect of building and not in respect of a single unit of assessment under Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980. The second ground for rejection recorded in the letter dated July 11, 2012 is that the assessment has been done on the date of the completion certificate and not the date of the possession letter. He contends that both the grounds of rejection are not tenable in law. 4. Mr. Poddar submits that Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980 has to be construed liberally and in favour of the beneficiaries thereof. The proviso to the sub-section has to be read so as not to restrict the beneficial effect of the meaning of the section. He contends that, the word "only" has to be read so as to advance the beneficial intention of the legislature ingrained therein. 5. Mr. Poddar referring to All India Reporter 1963 Supreme Court page 1192 (Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. The Nagpur Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd.) and 40 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 818 (Cal) (The Corporation of Calcutta v. Moti Chand Chowdhury & Ors.) submits that a flat would come within the definition of a building as given in the Act of 1980. Relying on 84 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 162 (Cal) (Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. v. Commissioner, Corporation of Calcutta & Ors.) Mr. Poddar submits that a flat should be assessed as a separate unit for property tax purposes. 6. In support of the proposition that a beneficial legislation ought to be construed liberally he relies upon 1992 Volume 196 Income Tax Reports page 188 (SC) (Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), 1999 Volume 239 Income Tax Reports page 775 (SC) (Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax). 6. In support of the proposition that a beneficial legislation ought to be construed liberally he relies upon 1992 Volume 196 Income Tax Reports page 188 (SC) (Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), 1999 Volume 239 Income Tax Reports page 775 (SC) (Mysore Minerals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax). On the principles applicable for interpretation of a statute, he relies upon 1997 Volume 226 Income Tax Reports page 625 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd.), 1981 Volume 131 Income Tax Reports page 597 (Varghese (K.P.) v. Income-tax Officer), 1994 Volume 208 Income Tax Reports page 649 (SC) (C.W.S. (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), 2001 Volume 247 Income Tax Reports page 192 (SC) (K. Govindan & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax), All India Reporter 1997 Supreme Court page 2239 (Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors.) and All India Reporter 1997 Supreme Court page 1006 (Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain). 7. Mr. Poddar contends that, the date given on the completion certificate cannot be the date of the "issue" of the completion certificate unless it is demonstrated that the assessee has been served with the completion certificate on the date given on the completion certificate. The date of issue of a completion certificate must hold to be the date on which the completion certificate has been received by the assessee. Any other interpretation of the word "issue" would lead to absurdity. In support of such proposition he relies upon 2008 Volume 7 Supreme Court Cases page 502 (SC) (Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. & Ors.), 2008 Volume 301 Income Tax Reports page 309 (SC) (R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax), 2006 Volume 5 Supreme Court Cases page 745 (SC) (A.N. Roy, Commissioner of Police & Anr. v. Suresh Sham Singh), 1992 Volume 198 Income Tax Reports page 486 (Kar) (Dr. Sattur's Sushrushalaya Nurshing Home & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.) and 1991 Volume 187 Income Tax Reports page 741 (SC) (Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.). 8. With regard to the purpose of a proviso given in the sub-section, Mr. Poddar relies upon 1965 Volume 55 Income Tax Reports page 741 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ajax Products Ltd.) and 1985 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases page 591 (SC) (S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.). 8. With regard to the purpose of a proviso given in the sub-section, Mr. Poddar relies upon 1965 Volume 55 Income Tax Reports page 741 (SC) (Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ajax Products Ltd.) and 1985 Volume 1 Supreme Court Cases page 591 (SC) (S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. v. V.R. Pattabiraman & Ors.). 9. The Corporation authorities are represented. It is submitted on behalf of the Corporation authorities that, the hearing notice is a proposal for the annual valuation. The writ petitioners have issued an objection letter dated December 26, 2011. It is contended that Section 178(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 cannot be construed in the manner as suggested on behalf of the writ petitioners. I have considered the respective contentions of the rival parties and the materials made available on record. 10. The writ petitioners have come into occupation of a residential flat lying and situate on the 3rd Floor of Premises No. 107E, Block 'F', New Alipore, Kolkata -700053. It is a newly constructed building. The writ petitioners were issued a completion/occupancy certificate which is dated December 31, 2005. The writ petitioners were handed over possession of such newly constructed residential flat on February 11, 2006. The writ petitioners claim that since the writ petitioners had come into possession only on February 11, 2006, they are not liable to pay property tax prior to the first quarter of 2006-2007 in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 178 of the Act of 1980. The writ petitioners also claim that they are entitled to the benefit of rebate of 25 per cent under Section 171(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. 11. The writ petitioners are assessees of property tax in respect of a residential flat situates on the third floor of Premises No. 107E, Block-F, New Alipore, Kolkata- 700053. The writ petitioners had made an application for mutation with the Corporation authorities. The writ petitioners were served with a hearing notice proposing to fix annual value of such flat with effect from the third quarter 2004-2005. The hearing Officer had fixed the annual value. The rate card dated September 22, 2009 was issued to the writ petitioner. Such rate card was set aside by this Hon'ble Court in W.P. No. 35 of 2010 by an Order dated February 2, 2010. The hearing Officer had fixed the annual value. The rate card dated September 22, 2009 was issued to the writ petitioner. Such rate card was set aside by this Hon'ble Court in W.P. No. 35 of 2010 by an Order dated February 2, 2010. The matter was remanded to the Corporation authorities by such order. The Corporation authorities were directed to determine the valuation afresh. The Hearing Officer of the Corporation authorities took up the hearing for fixation of annual valuation. 12. The writ petitioners claim that an Order dated March 27, 2012 was passed by the Hearing Officer. The writ petitioners claim that they were not served with such order. The Corporation authorities have used an affidavit in these proceedings. The Corporation authorities have also not disclosed the Order dated March 27, 2012. Such order of the Hearing Officer not being produced by the Corporation authorities despite the averment of the writ petitioners that they did not receive a copy of such order, such Order dated March 27, 2012 is quashed. 13. The writ petitioners had requested the Corporation authorities for issuance of property tax bills after making necessary amendments to such bills in light of the provisions of Sections 171 and 178 of the Act of 1980. The Corporation authorities by the impugned Order dated July 11, 2012 rejected the pleas of the writ petitioners. According to the Corporation authorities the writ petitioners are not entitled to 25 per cent rebate as the writ petitioners enjoy a flat at the premises concerned. According to the Corporation authorities such rebate is allowed in respect of a building in so far it is a single unit of assessment under Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980. With regard to the benefit under Section 178(5) of the Act of 1980 is concerned, the Corporation authorities stated that they have assessed the flat on the date of completion certificate and not on the date of the possession letter. 14. In course of hearing, it has been submitted on behalf of the writ petitioners that they are not questioning the annual valuation of the flat concerned. The writ petitioners have limited the scope of the writ petition to the issue as to rebate of 25 per cent under Section 171(5) and the commencement of liability under Section 178(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. 15. The writ petitioners have limited the scope of the writ petition to the issue as to rebate of 25 per cent under Section 171(5) and the commencement of liability under Section 178(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. 15. It is contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that a flat in a building should be considered as a separate unit for the purpose of assessment of property keeping in view the ground realities and the definition "building" as obtaining in the Act of 1980. 16. In Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra) the definition of a building in City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 was considered. Noting the definition of building given in the Act of 1948 it has been held that such definition is an inclusive definition and contains inherent indication that a part of a building would be a building for the purposes of imposition of liability to pay rates and assessment of such liability. 17. The provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 came up for consideration in Moti Chand Chowdhury & Ors. (supra). It has considered the definition of building given in Section 3(7) of the Act of 1951 and has held that a building must include part of a building. 18. That the Kolkata Municipal Corporation must value the units of different flats in a multi-storied building and apportion the valuation of each flat treating each flat as a separate unit has been held in Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (supra). 19. The word "building" is defined in Section 2(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The same is as follows:- "(5) "building" means a structure constructed for whatsoever purpose and of whatsoever materials and includes the foundation, plinth, walls, floors, roofs, chimneys, fixed platforms, verandas, balcony, cornice or projection or part of a building or anything affixed thereto or any wall (other than a boundary wall less than three meters in height) enclosing or intended to enclose any land, signs and outdoor display structures but does not include a tent, samiana or tarpaulin shelter." 20. The definition of building appearing in the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is an inclusive definition and allows an interpretation that a part of the building could be a building for the purposes of imposition of liability to pay rates and taxes and assessment of liability to pay thereof. The definition of building appearing in the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 is an inclusive definition and allows an interpretation that a part of the building could be a building for the purposes of imposition of liability to pay rates and taxes and assessment of liability to pay thereof. In fact, the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities have assessed property tax payable by the occupants occupying a part of the building. The writ petitioners are the owners of a particular flat. They can be assessed for property tax by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authorities as independent assessees in respect of the flat owned by them in the entire building standing on the premises concerned. For the purpose of assessment of property tax, the area occupied and/or owned by the writ petitioners would be considered as a building within the meaning of definition of building given in Section 2(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. 21. Applying the ratio of Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the flat of the writ petitioners is to be considered as a separate unit. The writ petitioners contend that if any benefit is conferred by a provision of a statute imposing tax, the same should be interpreted in a manner to allow such benefit to be availed by the maximum number of the members of the public as possible. 22. In Bajaj Tempo Ltd. (supra) it has held that a provision in a taxing statute granting incentives for promoting growth and development should be construed liberally. Similar view has been expressed in Mysore Minerals Ltd. (supra). Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Varghese (K.P.) (supra), C.W.S. (India) Ltd. & Ors. (supra), K. Govindan & Sons (supra), Jagdish Singh (supra) and Sultana Begum (supra) deal with the principles for interpretation of a statute. After reviewing the authorities cited before it, Sultana Begum (supra) is of the following view:- "On a conspectus of the case law indicated above, the following principles are clearly discernible: (1) It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash between two Sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. (2) The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (3) It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an Act, which cannot be recoiled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of "harmonious construction". (4) The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a "dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction. (5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose." 23. In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. & Ors. (supra), R & B Falcon (A) Pty. Ltd. (supra), A.N. Roy, Commissioner of Police & Anr. (supra), Dr. Sattur's Sushrushalaya Nurshing Home & Anr. (supra) and Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company & Ors. (supra) it has been held that in construing a provision of an Act, a situation giving rise to anomaly and absurdity must be avoided. 24. Ajax Products Ltd. (supra) and S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. (supra) deals with the function of a proviso in a section. In Ajax Products Ltd. (supra) it has been held as follows:- "The function of a proviso has been considered by this court in Commissioner of income-tax v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. It is neatly summarised in the headnote thus: "The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily, it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment, 'It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso.' Therefore, it is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment." There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment. So construed, we have already stated earlier that result that flows from such a construction." 25. In S. Sundaram Pillai & Ors. (supra) it has been held as follows:- "30. Sarathi in "Interpretation of Statutes" at pages 294295 has collected the following principles in regard to a proviso: (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. (b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. (c) Whether the proviso is directly repugnant to a section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the section as the proviso speaks the later intention of the makers. (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be used as a guide to its interpretation; but when it is clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words of which there is not trace in the section. (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section. (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except for compelling reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings it into general harmony with the terms of section should prevail. (i) When a proviso is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to the earlier one. (j) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision." Sub-section (5) of Section 171 of the Act of 1980 is as follows:- "(5) Where a newly constructed building is used exclusively for residential purposes, a rebate of twenty-five per cent in the property tax as determined under sub-section (2) shall be allowed for the first three years from the quarter following the date of issue of initial the occupancy certificate under the provisions of this Act: Provided that such rebate shall not be allowed for old buildings which have been redeveloped through alterations or additions: Provided further that such rebate shall be allowed in respect of such building in so far as it is a single unit of assessment under this Chapter." 26. There are two provisos in sub-section (5) of Section 171 of the Act of 1980. The first proviso mandates that no rebate shall be allowed for old buildings which have been redeveloped through alterations or additions. The fact of this case does not demonstrate that an old building has been redeveloped through alterations or additions. A new building is under consideration in this case. The first proviso to Section 178(5) of the Act of 1980 therefore has no manner of application in the fact of this case. The second proviso of Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980 mandates a rebate to be allowed in respect of such building in so far as it is a single unit of assessment under Chapter XII of the Act of 1980. The second proviso is to be read in the context of the main section. The second proviso as any other proviso is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment. Sub-section (5) of Section 171 of the Act of 1980 speaks of a newly constructed building used exclusively for residential purpose to be entitled to a rebate of 25 per cent in the property tax for the first three years from the quarter following the date of issue of the occupancy certificate. Applying the ratio of Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. Applying the ratio of Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the flat occupied by the petitioner is to be considered as a separate unit or a "newly constructed building" within the meaning of Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980. This is amplified by the second proviso to Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980. The second proviso mandates rebate in respect of such building in so far as it is a single unit of assessment under Chapter XII of the Act of 1980. 27. The writ petitioners therefore satisfy the conditions laid down in sub-section (5) of Section 171 of the Act of 1980. The writ petitioners therefore are entitled to a rebate of 25 per cent in the property tax as laid down in Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980. The first ground of refusal under Section 171(5) of the Act of 1980 recorded in the impugned communication is, therefore, perverse. 28. The next ground of refusal that, the assessment of the flat has to be made on the date of the completion certificate and not the date of possession letter, requires consideration. 29. Sub-section (5) of Section 178 of the Act of 1980 lays down that, a newly constructed building would become assessable for property tax from the quarter following the date of issue of the occupancy certificate. The proviso to sub-section (5) has no manner of application as it is not the case of the parties that the writ petitioners have occupied the flats prior to issuance of the completion certificate. 30. The completion certificate is dated December 31, 2005. There is no material on record to establish that the completion certificate was served upon the writ petitioners on December 31, 2005 itself. On the contrary, it is stated in the writ petition that the completion certificate dated December 31, 2005 was served upon the developer in January 2006. This fact has not been denied in the affidavit-in-opposition used on behalf of the Corporation authorities. Therefore, the completion certificate was served in January 2006 and not on the date appearing in the completion certificate. 31. The point of contention is the meaning of the words "the date of issue" used in Section 171(5) and Section 178(5) of the Act of 1980. In the facts of the case, what would be the date of issue of the initial occupancy certificate? 31. The point of contention is the meaning of the words "the date of issue" used in Section 171(5) and Section 178(5) of the Act of 1980. In the facts of the case, what would be the date of issue of the initial occupancy certificate? The occupancy certificate is dated December 31, 2005. According to the writ petitioners the date of issue of the completion certificate should be read to mean the date on which the completion certificate has been served on the writ petitioners and not the date of the issue appearing on the completion certificate. 32. In Kundan Lal Behari Lal (supra) the word "issued" occurring in Section 18(2) of the Wealth Tax Act came up for consideration. It has been held that the word "issued" should be read to mean "served". 33. In Kundan Lal Behari Lal (supra) and Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra) it has been noted that the legislature uses the words "issued" and "served" interchangeably and that they are used to convey the same idea. Under the provisions of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 a person cannot legally enter into possession and occupy a new building until a completion certificate in respect thereof has been issued in favour of the occupant. Viewed in such context, issuance of an occupancy certificate would mean the receipt of the occupancy certificate by the occupier for the occupier to know that a occupancy certificate has been issued in favour of the occupier by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. In fact, sub-section (5) of Section 178 of the Act of 1980 withdraws the benefit given to a person who comes to occupy a building prior to the issuance of the occupancy certificate. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 178 of the Act of 1980 allows the Corporation authorities to assess tax of the building from the quarter following the date of its occupation when such building has been occupied before the issuance of the occupancy certificate. In the instant case, the writ petitioners have come into possession of the flat in question subsequent to the receipt of the completion certificate. The writ petitioners have come into possession on February 11, 2006. The completion certificate had been served upon the developer in January 2006. These facts have not been denied in the affidavit-in-opposition by the Corporation. In the instant case, the writ petitioners have come into possession of the flat in question subsequent to the receipt of the completion certificate. The writ petitioners have come into possession on February 11, 2006. The completion certificate had been served upon the developer in January 2006. These facts have not been denied in the affidavit-in-opposition by the Corporation. Therefore, under Section 178(5) of the Act of 1980 the flat in question would become assessable from the quarter following January 2006 since the occupancy certificate was received by the developer in January 2006. 34. Sections 171(5) and 178(5) of the Act of 1980 allow benefits to assessees. Since the legislature has granted benefits to the assessees in the form of rebate under Section 171(5) and relaxation in the period of assessment under Section 178(5), these beneficial provisions of the Act of 1980 have to be construed so as to allow the benefits to these tax provisions to be made available to the maximum number of persons that may be found eligible thereto. The word "building" used in Sections 171(5) and 178(5) should be read in the context of the definition of "building" given in Section 2(5) of the Act of 1980. The word "building" should also be construed in view of the ratio laid down in Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (supra). A flat in a building should be construed as a separate unit for the purpose of assessment of property tax of a building within the meaning of Section 171(5) and 178(5) of the Act of 1980. Multi-storied buildings are divided into flats or units. If one is to accept the second reason for rejection of the conferment of benefits under these sections of the Act of 1980 as made out in the communication of the corporation dated July 11, 2012 that, the rebate under Section 171(5) cannot be given to a flat in a building, the same would do violence to the concept of building as enunciated in Lake Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. (supra) and the definition of building under Section 2(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. A flat comes within the definition of building given in Section 2(5) of the Act of 1980. Consequently, a flat would also come within the meaning of building used in Sections 171(5) and 178(5) of the Act of 1980. (supra) and the definition of building under Section 2(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. A flat comes within the definition of building given in Section 2(5) of the Act of 1980. Consequently, a flat would also come within the meaning of building used in Sections 171(5) and 178(5) of the Act of 1980. Such an interpretation would be harmonious, and would not lead to an absurdity or an abnormality. This interpretation would also extend the benefit of Sections 171(5) and 178(5) of the Act of 1980 to the individual flat owners, who, in my view, these provisions are intended to benefit. 35. In view of the discussions above W.P. No. 814 of 2012 is allowed. The orders impugned herein are quashed. The tax bills raised on the basis of the quashed impugned orders are set aside. The Corporation authorities are however at liberty to raise fresh bills for property tax in view of the observations made herein for the relevant period. 36. W.P. No. 814 of 2012 is allowed. No order as to costs.