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2015 DIGILAW 373 (ALL)

Babu Singh v. Shatrughan Singh

2015-02-24

ABHINAVA UPADHYA

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JUDGMENT Abhinava Upadhya, J. 1. This is a defendant's revision by which the order of the trial court, purported to have been passed under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C., allowing the amendment in the plaint by order dated 8.1.2015 has been challenged. A Suit No. 967 of 2012 was filed by the respondents plaintiffs for permanent injunction. By the amendment, the suit for permanent injunction was converted into the suit for specific performance. The court below considering that the amendment is necessary for proper disposal of the suit by imposing a cost of Rs. 600/- allowed the amendment. 2. Shri Neeraj Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the revisionist submits that in view of proviso, after amendment in C.P.C. under Order 6, Rule 17 such amendment could not have been allowed after one and half years of the filing of the suit. Secondly, he submits that no reason has been given while allowing the amendment and has relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, reported in (2004) 5 SCC 568 : AIR 2004 SC 1794 ) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that the reason is heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjective by objective and, therefore, any order being passed without assigning any reason is not a valid order. 3. Shri Manish Tandon, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs submits that initially an agreement to sell was executed on 1.1.2012 and at the time of agreement to sell certain amount specified in the plaint was given to the defendants. He submits that in spite of the agreement to sell the plaintiffs learnt that the defendants are going to sell the property in question and, therefore, a suit for permanent injunction was filed. Refuting the allegations the revisionists/defendants filed written statement. In the written statement it was claimed that the agreement to sell was valid for one year and up to 31st of December, 2012. The plaintiffs ought to have deposited the money and sale deed executed as in the agreement time was the essence and the plaintiffs failing to do so, the said agreement became non enforceable. 4. Shri Manish Tandon further submits that upon such an assertion of the defendants upon their refusal to execute the sale deed an amendment has been brought for specific performance. 4. Shri Manish Tandon further submits that upon such an assertion of the defendants upon their refusal to execute the sale deed an amendment has been brought for specific performance. He further submits that the suit for specific performance can be filed within three years as prescribed by Article 54 to Schedule I Part 2 of the Limitation Act, which reads as follows: "Article 54 Description of suit: For specific performance of a contract. Period of Limitation: Three years Time from which period begins to run: The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." 5. Therefore, in view of Article 54, it is submitted that to avoid multiplicity of suit by filing a separate suit for specific performance the amendment in the present suit was justified and has rightly been allowed. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the revisionists and the respondents. 7. The decision relied upon by Shri Neeraj Agrawal in the case of State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar ( AIR 2004 SC 1794 ) (supra) is a case with regard to leave to appeal against acquittal and in the said case it was found that reason ought to have been recorded to enable the parties to know as to what prompted the court to reject such leave and has gone on to hold that it is impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision unless it is speaking and reasoned. There cannot be any dispute with the preposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but in the present case the amendment application has been allowed by which the suit for permanent injunction has been allowed to be converted into suit for specific performance. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the revisionists that the respondents/plaintiffs were well within their right to institute a suit for specific performance as the said amendment has been filed within the limitation prescribed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act, but he submits that the court below without assigning any reason has merely allowed the application upon imposing a cost of Rs. 600/- and, therefore, the order impugned dated 8.1.2015 could not be sustained. 8. 600/- and, therefore, the order impugned dated 8.1.2015 could not be sustained. 8. So far as the impugned order is concerned, it clearly recites that the amendment is necessary for the proper disposal of the suit and, therefore, it cannot be said that the amendment has been allowed without assigning any reason. That apart to avoid the multiplicity of suit as the plaintiffs could have filed a separate suit for specific performance, if the amendment has been allowed, it cannot be said that any prejudice can be caused to the defendants/revisionists. 9. So far as the application being filed with delay and the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. is concerned, the Article 54 to the Schedule of the Limitation Act provides that a suit can be filed for specific performance within three years from the date fixed for performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. In the present case from the date of performance or even from the date the applicants/defendants refused to execute the sale deed, as has been mentioned in paragraph 16 of the written statement, the suit was sell within time. Therefore, the proviso to Rule 17 of Order 16 will have no application. 10. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the view that here is no error in the order of the court below dated 8.1.2015 by allowing the amendment. The revision is misconceived and it is, accordingly, dismissed.