JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri Akhatar Abbas, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh,learned counsel for the opposite parties and perused the record. 2. Facts in brief of the present case as mentioned in the claim petition are that on 3.4.2003 at about 7.40 p.m., Kumari Shiwani D/o Suresh Kumar Sonkar while walking on the road side at Raibareli-Lucknow route, a bus having Registration No. UP70X9381 was dashed her due to rash and negligent driving as a result of which she died on the spot. 3. On the same day, FIR was lodged by the claimants registered as Case Crime No. 108 of 2003 under Sections 279, 304-A IPC at Police Station-Kotwali, Rae bareli, but due to agitation, bus number has wrongly been mentioned as 9183 in stead of UP70X/9381. 4. Further, while filing the claim petition, the claimants have categorically mentioned the above said facts and in the claim petition, bus number is mentioned as UP70X/9381 as well as specifically pleaded that accident took place at Raibareli-Lucknow route at about 7.40 p.m. on 3.4.2003 due to rash and negligent driving on the part of driver of said bus as a result of which Km. Shiwani who aged about 4 and 1/2 years died and compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- (rupees one lack and fifty thousand) has been awarded. In the said matter, appellant filed a written statement inter alia denying the fact that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of driver/Amar Singh of bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam Lko. 5. The Tribunal on the basis of evidence and material on record, allowed the claim petition No. 238/2006 by judgement and award dated 25.7.2007 thereby awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/-(Rs. one lakh fifty thousnad) alongwith simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. 6. Aggrieved the said Judgment, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant/U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. 7. Shri Akhatar Abbas, learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the impugned judgment submits that accident did not take place by the driver of bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the FIR in which bus number has been mentioned as 9183. 7. Shri Akhatar Abbas, learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the impugned judgment submits that accident did not take place by the driver of bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the FIR in which bus number has been mentioned as 9183. Accordingly, it has been submitted that once the identity of the bus is not established by any cogent evidence then it cannot be said that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam Lko. However, in spite of the said pleadings and evidence on record, the Tribunal has erred in holding that the accident took place by the bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the compensation awarded by the tribunal in the instant matter is contrary to the provisions in respect to the award of the compensation as provided in Second Scheduled of Motor Vehicle Act and against the settled proposition of law. So, the same is liable to be set aside. 9. Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents while supporting judgement and award submits that accident took place due to rash and negligence driving on the part of driver of bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. In this regard, specific pleading has been taken in the claim petition. 10. He further submits that the said facts have been provided by way of evidence given by P.W. 1/Suresh Kumar father of the deceased, P.W 2/Shyam Kumar, independent witness who in his examination, categorically stated that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of driver of of bus having registration No. UP70X9381. So, no benefit can be derived by the appellant on the ground that bus number has wrongly been mentioned in the F.I.R, as such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the records. 12. So, no benefit can be derived by the appellant on the ground that bus number has wrongly been mentioned in the F.I.R, as such, there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal and appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and going through the records. 12. The first and foremost question which is to be considered in the present case is whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of Bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. having registration No. UP70X9381 or not. 13. From the perusal of the record, the position which emerges out is that in order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, the Tribunal has framed two issues and issue No. 1 is to the effect that whether accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the said bus. 14. On the basis of the material on record and taking into consideration the evidence given by independent witness/Shri Shyam Kumar, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of Bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. having registration No. UP70X9381. 15. Thus, keeping in view the above said facts as well as law laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of N. K. V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and others, (1980) SCC 457, held as under : “Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the Courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their ‘neighbour’. Indeed, the State must seriously consider nofault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposalof accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 16. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Laxmibai (Smt.) v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corpn., Bangalore, 2001 (19) LCD 1294, held as under : “The Tribunal found that the respondent did not produce copies of the longsheet and control charts to show that the bus in question was not plied on that road on the date of the accident and the said bus was not involved. Thus on a proper appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal was quite justified in recording a finding that the said bus was involved in the accident. But we find that the approach of the High Court was wrong in appreciating the evidence in as much as it was technical and thrust was on niceties. Thus on a proper appreciation of evidence, the Tribunal was quite justified in recording a finding that the said bus was involved in the accident. But we find that the approach of the High Court was wrong in appreciating the evidence in as much as it was technical and thrust was on niceties. When there were both oral and documentary evidence supporting the case of the appellant, which was accepted by the Tribunal, in our view, the High Court Clearly committed an error in reversing the judgment and award of the Tribunal particularly when the respondent withheld the documentary evidence in its possession. The High Court agreed with the Tribunal as far as quantum of compensation is concerned. Hence, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment Consequently, we set aside the same and restore the judgment and award of the Tribunal The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.” 17. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Raj Pratap Singh and another, 1994 ACJ 317 , held as under : “Learned counsel for the appellant (F.A.F.O. No. 527 of 1985) urged that there is no evidence to prove that the U.P.S.R.T.C. Owns any bus bearing No. UTB 2378, which is said to have caused the accident in question and the compensation should not have been awarded as against the appellant. In this regard, one has always to keep in mind whether the actual accident took place on the said date, time and place or not, which led to the death of the deceased and secondly, whether the number of the bus recorded and relied by the claimant was true or not. Sometimes, it may be when the accident takes place at the place and time and on the date by a particular vehicle, but may miss to correctly record the number of vehicle. If such number is wrongly recorded it would deprive the claimant of the benefit and entitlement under the Act. One may broadly record the accident whether by a bus, by a truck, by a jeep, by a car and if otherwise on evidence it is possible to conclude that the accident did take place with such vehicle as described but only if there is an error in recording the number of the vehicle then that by itself should not disentitle the claimant of his legitimate claim. However, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize the evidence on record in such cases with special care for drawing an inference that irrespective of the incorrect recording of the number, the accident did take place from the vehicle belonging to the proprietor or owner of a particular make. To the same effect is the observation in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC), in which it is held : “Accidents Claims Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes.” In this regard, the Tribunal has scrutinised the statements of PW 1. Ram Kishore Jaiswar, Ex M.L.A., P.W.2, Sri Ram who was a teacher in Junior High Schools, PW3, Ravindra Kumar Singh, uncle of the deceased and PW5, Raj Pratap Singh, father of the deceased. On the basis of the said testimony it recorded that it shows that the accident took place by the U.P. Roadways bus which came from the workshop at 5.30 p.m. on 11th May, 1982, inside the Roadways Bus Station campus, which was being driven by Baikunth Nath Pandey. However, their evidence further shows that the said Roadways bus was numbered as UTB 2378. On scrutinising the evidence of the respondent and even recording of the statement of Baikunth Nath Pandey, DW1, it was found that even the said driver mentioned the bus which was driven at that time was numbered as UTY 2378. Thus, the difference in recording ws only in the third letter, viz., ‘B’ was recorded for ‘Y’. It is on scrutinizing the evidence both of the claimant and respondent the Tribunal found that the evidence on the record clearly indicated and proved that the accident in question did take place on 11th May, 1982, at 5.30 p.m. in the campus of U.P. Roadways bus which was driven by Baikunth Nath Pandey. It is on scrutinizing the evidence both of the claimant and respondent the Tribunal found that the evidence on the record clearly indicated and proved that the accident in question did take place on 11th May, 1982, at 5.30 p.m. in the campus of U.P. Roadways bus which was driven by Baikunth Nath Pandey. We do not find that the finding recorded calls for any interference as we have observed above and on the facts of this case merely on wrong recording of the letter ‘B’ for the letter ‘Y’ if other evidence is proved on the record that would disentitle the claim of the amount he is entitled to under the said Act. Hence, contention of the appellant is unsustainable. Apart from this, there is no other sustainable ground raised by the appellant, which calls for any interference with the impugned judgment and decree. Hence, the appeal of U.P.S.R.T.C. Fails.” 18. As well as by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Bimla Devi and others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 , held as under : “Some discrepancies in the evidences of the claimant’s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.” 19. Accordingly, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant is that as in the F.I.R., the bus number is mentioned as 9183, so it cannot be said that the accident took place by bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. and the said fact has not been proved by any cogent evidence, has got no force4. Accordingly, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant is that as in the F.I.R., the bus number is mentioned as 9183, so it cannot be said that the accident took place by bus which belongs to U.P.Rajya Sadak Parivahan Nigam, Lko. and the said fact has not been proved by any cogent evidence, has got no force4. Further, the said argument is misconceived in view of the law as laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Kusum Lata and others v. Satbir and others, 2011 AIR SCW 1593, held as under : “This Court is unable to appreciate the aforesaid approach of the Tribunal and the High Court. This Court is of the opinion that when a person is seeing that his brother, being knocked down by a speeding vehicle, was suffering in pain and was in need of immediate medical attention, that person is obviously under a traumatic condition. His first attempt will be to take his brother to a hospital or to a doctor. It is but natural for such a person not to be conscious of the presence of any person in the vicinity especially when Dheeraj did not stop at the spot after the accident and gave a chase to the offending vehicle. Under such mental strain if the brother of the victim forgot to take down the number of the offending vehicle it was also not unnatural.” 20. As well as by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shiv Murti Singh v. Nawab Khan, 2014 (32) LCD 1553, has held as under : “In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and others, (1980) 3 SCC 457 , Hon’ble Apex Court while observing that acquittal in a criminal case will not defeat the accident claim held that the requirement of culpable rashness under Section 304A of I.P.C.is more drastic than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. (11) In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Dutta and others, (2011)10 SCC 509 , a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out certain underlying principles and propositions for deciding claim petitions under the Act. Some of them as relevant to the facts of present case are : 1. (11) In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Dutta and others, (2011)10 SCC 509 , a three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out certain underlying principles and propositions for deciding claim petitions under the Act. Some of them as relevant to the facts of present case are : 1. The rules of the pleadings in principle do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo moto initiated by the Tribunal. 2. That, though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in adversarial litigation. 3. The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of the matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. 4. The Tribunal while passing the award makes a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident after due enquiry in accordance to the statute. (12) In Bimla Devi and others v. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, (2009)13 SCC 530 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a motor accident claim petition is required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touch stone of preponderance of probability and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (13) In Dulcina Fernandes and others v. Joaguim Xavier Cruz and another, (2013) 31 LCD 2432, Hon’ble Supreme Court following the dictum laid down by it in Shila Dutta and Bimla Devi’s Cases (Supra) held that the rules of pleadings do not strictly apply to motor accident claim cases and that the plea of negligence is required to be decided by the Tribunal on the touch stone of preponderance of probability and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.” 21. Sofaras argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that the compensation awarded to the appellant due to death of Km. Sofaras argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that the compensation awarded to the appellant due to death of Km. Shiwani in an accident took place on 3.4.2003 is contrary to the provisions of Second Schedule of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and has also got no force in view of the law as laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Puttamma and others v. K.L. Narayana Reddy and another, AIR 2014 SC 706 , wherein paragraph No. 56 held as under : “The Central Government was bestowed with duties to amend the Second Schedule in view of Section 163A(3), but it failed to dos so fro 19 years in spite of repeated observations of this Court. For the reasons recorded above, we deem it proper to issue specific direction to the Central Government through the Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to make the proper amendments to the Second Schedule table keeping in view the present cost of living, subject to amendment of Second Schedule as proposed or may be made by the Parliament. Accordingly, we direct the Central Government to do so immediately. Till such amendment is made by the Central Government in exercise of power vested under sub-section (3) of Section 163A of the Act, 1988 or amendment is made by the Parliament, we hold and direct that for children upto the age of 5 years shall be entitled for fixed compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh) and persons more than 5 years of age shall be entitled for fixed compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- (rupees one lakh and fifty thousand) or the amount may be determined in terms of Second Schedule whichever is higher. Such amount is to be paid if any application is filed under Section 163A of the Act, 1988.” 22. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal. Thus, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. ——————