JUDGMENT By the Court.—By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the two petitioners have assailed the legality and validity of the notifications dated 14.10.2010 as well as 27.12.2010 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) as well as Section 6(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the ‘Act’). The said notifications were issued for acquisition of an area 447.4526 hectare agricultural land situate in village Kherlibhav, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Budh Nagar for public purpose namely, planned development in district Gautam Budh Nagar through Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (respondent No. 3 herein). Petitioners claim that they are recorded co-tenure holders of plot No. 405 area 2.9570 hectare(hereinafter referred to as the ‘plot in dispute’), which was also subject-matter of impugned notifications. 2. At this stage, it may be pertinent to point out that notifications for acquisition of the land issued in 2010 were challenged by the petitioners by filing instant writ petition on 2.12.2013 after about 3 years. The Stamp Reporter has reported delay and laches of 2 years 264 days in presenting the petition. 3. We have heard Sri V.M. Zaidi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Pankaj Lal appearing for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, Sri Pradeep Kumar for respondent No. 3 and Sri Shakti Swarup Nigam who has made an application for impleadment of M/s. Supertech Township Pvt. Limited, which admittedly was allotted certain area of land under acquisition including the plot in dispute. 4. It is an admitted case between the parties that the allotment wsas made by the respondent No. 3 Development Authority in favour of M/s. Supertech Township Pvt. Limited on 1.8.2011 and lease deed was executed in its favour on 13.12.2011 of an area measuring 404041 sq. meter, which included the plot in dispute of the petitioners and possession was also delivered on 14.12.2011. 5. One of the ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the notification under Section 5A of the Act has been dispensed with mechanically without there being urgency in the matter and there being any material before the State Government to record its satisfaction with respect to the urgency and dispensation of inquiry contemplated under Section 5A of the Act. It is further submitted that in view of various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, every planned industrial development though may be public purpose but does not justify dispensation with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act and the right cannot be dislodged in a mechanical manner. It is further submitted that allotment of land to a private builder in itself demonstrates that there was no urgency in the matter so as to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 6. In reply, learned Standing Counsel referring to the averments made in the counter-affidavit submitted that there was sufficient material available before the State Government justifying invocation of urgency clause in the form of a report dated 18.8.2010 submitted by the Development Authority after survey to the effect that in order to maintain continuity of infrastructure services, there was urgency to acquire the plots in question, which were to be utilized for infrastructure like roads, sewage, education, medical facilities, trade and commerce, residences, which were necessary for speedy growth and development. He further pointed out that the State Government after considering the material placed before it and after being subjectively satisfied arrived at a conclusion that the urgency clause is liable to invoked and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act would unnecessarily delay the proceeding resulting in hampering the development. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that there has been considerable delay in challenging the notifications by the petitioners which in itself sufficient to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of laches. He further submitted that the notifications have been challenged after possession of the land was taken including the plot belonging to the petitioners and after the petitioners accepted the compensation. Before proceeding to analyze the rival contention advanced by learned counsel for the parties on merits of the legality and validity of the two notifications, we may consider the effect of delay and laches in filing the writ petition by the petitioners and the fact that challenge has been made after accepting the compensation. In paragraph 31 of the writ petition, the petitioners themselves have stated that they were forced to accept the compensation of their land. In paragraph 31 of the writ petition, the petitioners themselves have stated that they were forced to accept the compensation of their land. In paragraph 48 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 Development Authority, it has categorically been stated that the petitioners have accepted the compensation and the same was received by them under the agreement rules without any protest and after executing the agreement. There is no specific denial of the averments made in the counter-affidavit in this regard in the rejoinder-affidavit. Rather in paragraph 16 of the rejoinder-affidavit, it has been stated that merely accepting compensation in forced circumstances by the poor farmers does not disentitle them to approach the Court of law. Thus the petitioners have more or less admitted in their pleadings that not only possession of the land was taken but they also accepted the compensation for the same and it is only thereafter the instant writ petition has been filed challenging the notifications. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court had occasion to consider the effect of delay and laches in challenging the land acquisition notification in the case of Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1974 SC 2077 (1). It was observed in paragraph 11 of the said report as under : “11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the, notification even after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the, public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the, acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be, putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.” 8. The issue again came for for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Khullar and another v. Union of India and others, (2007) 5 SCC 231 . In paragraph 26 of the said reports, it was observed as under : “It will be noticed that the appellants filed the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceeding which was initiated in 1965 as late as on September 25, 1986, after the Award had been declared under Section 11 of the Act. The High Court, in our view, has rightly noticed that the acquisition was challenged almost 21 years after the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. Indeed the writ proceeding was initiated after the Award was declared. The High Court has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 , Tilockchand Motichan v. H.B. Munshi : AIR 1970 SC 898 ; Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. The State of Rajasthan and others: AIR 1974 SC 2085 ; Pt. Girharan Prasad Missir and another v. State of Bihar and another: (1980) 2 SCC 83 and H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and others: AIR 1984 SC 866 . Following the principles laid down therein the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches. In the facts and circumstances of the case no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. There was no good reason explaining the delay in moving the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is not necessary to refer to the large number of authorities on the subject since the law is so well-settled that there is no need for a further reiteration.” 9. There was no good reason explaining the delay in moving the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It is not necessary to refer to the large number of authorities on the subject since the law is so well-settled that there is no need for a further reiteration.” 9. In the case of Anand Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others, (2010) 11 SCC 242 , though the Apex Court found that there was no justification for invoking urgency clause and dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act yet in view of the fact that majority of the land holders had received compensation and huge amount was spent by the Development Authority on development work and barring the appellants therein and few others, all tenure holders have accepted the “takings” of their land. It is too late in the day to undo what has already been done and thus refused to interfere with the acquisition proceedings. 10. In the present case also, the total area under the acquisition notification is 447.4526 hectare out of which the petitioners owned a meagre area 2.9570 hectare of plot No. 405. The majority of the tenure holders have not challenged the acquisition proceedings and have accepted the compensation. Even the petitioners themselves after accepting the compensation and giving up possession have approached this Court after about two years. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners at this stage contended that the acquisition proceedings were challenged by the petitioners after having attained knowledge that the land acquired has been allotted by the respondent No. 3 - Development Authority to a private builder for development of residential units and thus the public purpose was defeated. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on the facts and certain observations of the Full Bench decision in the case of Gajraj Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(11) ADJ 1 . 12. It may be pertinent to mention that the judgmednt rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in Gajraj Singh (Supra) was subject-matter of consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (2015) 7 SCC 21 . 12. It may be pertinent to mention that the judgmednt rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in Gajraj Singh (Supra) was subject-matter of consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. and others, (2015) 7 SCC 21 . One of the contention advanced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard was that writ petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the acquisition after passing of the award and taking possession of the land in most of the cases, the landholders have even received compensation and therefore, these writ petitions were not maintainable and should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches inasmuch as the acquisition cannot be challenged after the award is passed and compensation is received. It was also submitted that the plea taken by writ petitioners that they fell aggrieved when they came to know that the land was allotted/sold to private builders was totally irrelevant and could not have been a ground to entertain the writ petition on merits. Analyzing the factual matrix of the case and the argument advanced, the Hon’ble Apex Court answered the issue in paragraph 36 onwards of the writ petition. Paragraphs 36 to 42 are reproduced as under : “36. We have bestowed our serious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for parties on both sides. No doubt, the High Court has held that it was wrong exercise in law on the part of the Government to invoke the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act which amounted to taking away the valuable right of the land owners. That is a finding on merit. However, it is subject to the caveat that the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein could be considered on merits and were not to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Such a contention was indeed taken by the respondents/authorities before the High Court. However, the same has been repelled. That is a finding on merit. However, it is subject to the caveat that the writ petitions filed by the appellants herein could be considered on merits and were not to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Such a contention was indeed taken by the respondents/authorities before the High Court. However, the same has been repelled. Primary reason given by the High Court in this behalf is that the delay was explained satisfactorily inasmuch as the land acquired for the purposes of industrial development was, at a later period of time, allotted to private builders for development of residential units and when this was done it came to the knowledge of the appellants. Aggrieved by this step taken by the Noida authorities, the appellants filed the writ petitions. 37. Thus, in nutshell, allotment of the land by the Noida authorities at a subsequent point of time has weighed with the High Court. In other words, it is clear that the appellants did not challenge the acquisition per se inasmuch as when the land was acquired even after invoking urgency provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the requirement of Section 5A of the Act, this position was accepted by the land owners. They even allowed the authorities to proceed further in passing the award and taking possession from many of these land owners and even paying compensation to them. It is a matter of record that before coming to the Court and filing the writ petitions, most of these appellants had received the compensation. They also sought reference under Section 18 of the Act for higher compensation. Physical possession of land of many of these appellants have also been taken. In many other cases, paper possession had been taken before filing of the writ petition. A great deal of argument was made as to whether such physical possession/paper possession should be treated as taking possession in the eyes of law, it would be a debatable point inasmuch as in various judgments, this Court has held that whenever there is large scale of acquisition and possession of large chunk of land belonging to number of persons is to be taken, paper possession would be a permissible mode, particularly when it is Abadi land. We are not going into this controversy since the ultimate outcome is not influenced by the aforesaid factor, as would be noticed in the later part of judgment. 38. However, what we highlight and reiterate is that these appellants were not aggrieved by the acquisition per se in the manner it was done by the respondents. As per their own case, they became aggrieved only when they found that land was not utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired namely industrial development but a large portion thereof was sought to be given away to the builders for development of the land as residential. The High Court, while accepting such a plea of the land owners on the ground of laches and delay, has referred to certain judgments which were relied upon before us as well and taken note of above. 39. This leads to an incidental issue as to whether development of land for residential purposes is impermissible and could have given a fresh cause of action to the land owners to approach the Court. 40. Here, we would like to refer to the judgment of this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta and others v. State of U.P. and others[9] which concerns the same Act viz. U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976. In that case, for Yamuna Express Project, the land was acquired setting it to be ‘public purpose’. The land was utilised for construction of Yamuna Expressway and along therewith development of the part of the land was undertaken for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes as well. It was accepted that construction of Yamuna Expressway was work of public importance. However, the utilisation of land for development of other purposes, namely, commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential etc. was challenged, as not amounting to acquisition for ‘public purpose’. There was another feature namely for the development of the land in the aforesaid manner Public Private Partnership (PPP) was formed and private parties were asked to undertake the development on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) basis. Such PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise of power in which private parties were involved. The challenge was repelled by this Court holding that acquisition of land along Yamuna Express for development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes was complimentary to creation of Expressway. Such PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise of power in which private parties were involved. The challenge was repelled by this Court holding that acquisition of land along Yamuna Express for development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes was complimentary to creation of Expressway. Such complimentary purpose was also treated as ‘public purpose’. It was also contended by the land owners that the acquisition was not for “public purpose” because: (a) its object was not covered by Section 3(f) of the Act, (b) it really fell not under Part II of the Act but under Part VII thereof as it virtually amounted to acquisition of land for the contractor Company J, (c) the compensation was coming wholly from J and not from the Government or YEIDA, (d) the acquisition for so-called interchange was not at all necessary and was a colourable exercise of power. They further contended that the application of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act was wholly unnecessary and therefore, the enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been dispensed with. All the aforesaid contentions were rejected. 41. Going by the dicta in the aforesaid judgment, it is contended by the authorities that merely because the part of the land is utilised for residential purpose, it cannot be said that the respondents-authorities have not adhered to the purpose for which the land is acquired. As per them, this would be complimentary purpose to the main purpose. 42. We have to keep in mind that in all these cases, after the land was acquired, which was of very large quantity and in big chunks, further steps were taken by passing the award, taking possession and paying compensation. In many cases, actual possession was taken and in rest of the cases, paper possession was taken where because of the land under Abadi, actual possession could not be taken on spot immediately. Fact remains that in many such cases where possession was taken, these land owners/appellants even received compensation. All these petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not be maintainable stricto sensu having regard to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Fact remains that in many such cases where possession was taken, these land owners/appellants even received compensation. All these petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not be maintainable stricto sensu having regard to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others[10] and the dictum of this judgment is followed consistently by this Court in various cases [See Murari and others v. Union of India and others[11], Ravi Khullar and another v. Union of India and others[12], Anand Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others[13]]” 13. After laying down the law, as aforesaid, considering the facts of Gajraj Singh (Supra) case and the view taken by the Full Bench, it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that discretion has been exercised by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition on merits and since such a discretion is exercised, no interference is required. It further went on to observe that it was equally possible to dismiss the writ petitions as the same was were filed belatedly after passing of the award and in most of the cases, possession was taken and compensation was paid. While refusing to interfere with the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, clearly directed in paragraph 50 as under : “However, we make it clear that directions of the High Court are given in the aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific background and, therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.” 14. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court when applied to the facts of the present case where there is considerable delay and laches in challenging the notifications and that too after possession was taken from the petitioners and compensation was paid, the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. Writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. 16. However, there shall be no order as to costs. ———————