1. By this application, filed under section 389 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('the Cr.PC'), the petitioner, who has been convicted and sentenced by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Assam, Additional CBI Court No. 2, Chandmari, Guwahati, in Special Case No. 162 of 2004, has prayed for stay of the conviction, awarded against the petitioner. 2. We have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner and Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned Sr. Retainer Counsel, CBI. 3. The petitioner faced trial in connection with the said case for the charges under sections 120(B)/420/471 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC') and under section 13(2) read with section 13(l)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act ('P.C. Act'). 4. The allegations, made against the petitioner, were that the petitioner, in violation of the normal policy, participated in the meeting of the Tender Committee, held for selection of supplier of vehicle for use in Nagaon Telecom District and managed to allot the work order in favour of his brother and sister. 5. During the trial, prosecution examined as many as 37 witnesses. The accused petitioner also examined himself as DW1. Considering the evidence, on record, the learned Special Judge (CBI), Assam, Additional CBI Court No. 2, Chandmari, Guwahati, held the petitioner and his brother Sri Biswajit Das guilty of the offences, charged against them and accordingly, convicted the petitioner and his said brother. 6. The learned trial Judge sentenced the petitioner to suffer RI for 1 year and pay fine of Rs. 1,000 for his conviction under section 420, IPC and RI for 6 months and fine of Rs. 1,000 for his conviction under section 471, IPC, RI for 1 year and fine of Rs. 1,000 for his conviction under section 120(B), IPC. The petitioner has also been sentenced to suffer RI for 1 year and pay fine of Rs. 1,000 for his conviction under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. It was also directed that all the sentences shall run concurrently. 7. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the petitioner, as appellant, has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 235/2014 and this court, after hearing both the parties, admitted the appeal for hearing and stayed the operation of the impugned sentence, till disposal of the appeal. 8. It was also directed that all the sentences shall run concurrently. 7. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the petitioner, as appellant, has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 235/2014 and this court, after hearing both the parties, admitted the appeal for hearing and stayed the operation of the impugned sentence, till disposal of the appeal. 8. The petitioner, by filing this petition, has prayed for stay of the conviction on the ground that in the event of absence of stay order in respect of the conviction, the service career of the petitioner, who has been serving as Additional General Manager, BSNL, Nagaon, under the Department of Telecom, would be at stake. 9. The respondent has resisted the said prayer by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. In the said affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent has contended that the petitioner, not being a politician public servant, is not entitled to get any stay order in respect of the conviction for corruption charge. 10. In the said affidavit-in-opposition, it has been stated that the petitioner had unilaterally changed the departmental policy of hiring vehicles for BSNL, Nagaon, immediately after joining there as TDM with a mala fide intention for securing pecuniary advantage in favour of his brother and that the trial court has convicted him for the offences, charged against him. It has also been contended that there is no sufficient reason for stay of the conviction. 11. Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner has submitted that in view of pendency of the appeal, preferred against the impugned conviction and sentence, if the conviction is not stayed, then the authority, in exercise of powers under section 19 of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965, may take action affecting the service career of the petitioner. 12. Referring to the decision, held in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India and Others, (2023) 7 SCC 653, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, in appropriate cases, the conviction can be stayed and that the present one is a fit case requiring stay of the conviction. 13. Refuting the said argument, advanced by the learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner, Mr. 13. Refuting the said argument, advanced by the learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner, Mr. P.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Retainer Counsel, CBI, has submitted that the present case being a case for misconduct and corruption on the part of public servant, the ratio laid down in the case of Lily Thomas (supra) will not be applicable. 14. The learned senior retainer counsel for the CBI has submitted that there is nothing, on record, to show that the authority concerned has initiated any action following the said conviction and as such, the grounds cited by the petitioner are not tenable in the eye of law. It is also submitted by the learned Senior Retainer Counsel, CBI, that if a public servant is found guilty of corruption by a Judicial Court, he is to be treated as corrupt until the conviction is set aside by a appropriate court of law. In view of the above, it is submitted that the petitioner being convicted by the Special Court, CBI, under the Indian Penal-Code as well as the Prevention of Corruption Act, on the basis of the evidence, on-record, is to be treated as guilty till he is exonerated by a superior court. It is also submitted that, the impugned sentence being kept in abeyance till disposal of the appeal, the petitioner, who has been convicted on corruption charge, is not entitled to get any stay in respect of the order of conviction. 15. In support of his contention, the learned Sr. Retainer Counsel, CB1, has relied on the following decisions: (i) Stale of Maharastra v. Gajanan and Another, (2003) 12 SCC 432 ; (ii) Union of India v. Atar Singh and Another, (2003) 12 SCC 434; (iii) Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673 ; (iv) Navjot Singh Sidhu v. Stale of Punjab and Another, (2007) 2 SCC 574 ; (v) State of Maharashtra v. Balakrishna Dattarya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384 ; and (vi) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Roshal Lal Saini, (2012) 12 SC 390. 16. Having heard the learned counsel, appearing for both the parties, I find that the petitioner has been convicted by a court of law, for committing the offences under sections 120(B)/420/471, IPC and under sections 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) P.C. Act and accordingly, the petitioner has been sentenced, as indicated above. 17. 16. Having heard the learned counsel, appearing for both the parties, I find that the petitioner has been convicted by a court of law, for committing the offences under sections 120(B)/420/471, IPC and under sections 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) P.C. Act and accordingly, the petitioner has been sentenced, as indicated above. 17. While admitting the connected appeal, the operation of the sentence has been stayed till disposal of the appeal. Now, the question is whether the impugned conviction is to be stayed till disposal of the appeal. There is no dispute that the charges, brought against the petitioner relate to misconduct and corruption by a public servant. It has been alleged that the petitioner committed the said, offences for securing pecuniary benefit in favour of his brother and sister, who participated in the tender process for supply of vehicles for Nagaon Telecom District. In the said Selection Committee, the petitioner, as alleged, being a public servant, by violating the departmental circular and policy, changed the relevant policy decision and thus, abused his official position for awarding the contract to his own brother, who was the accused No. 2. The said allegation relates to misconduct and corruption on the part of a public servant. 18. In the case of Lily Thomas (supra), writ petitions were filed before the hon'ble Supreme Court as Public Interest Litigations for declaring section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (‘RP Act, 1951’) as ultra vires the Constitution on the ground that Parliament lacked the legislative powers to enact the said sub-section. In support of the said provision, submission was that if a sitting Member of Parliament or the State Legislature suffers from a frivolous conviction by the trial Court for an offence given under sections 8(1), (2) or (3) of the RP Act, 1951, he will be remediless and will suffer immense hardship as he would stand disqualified on account of such conviction in the absence of Section 8(4) of the RP Act, 1951. The said provision was brought with a view to save the sitting Members of Parliament and State Legislature, who have already been convicted of any offences mentioned in sections 8(1), (2) and (3) of the R.P. Act, 1951 and who have filed appeals or revisions, which are pending, from disqualification. The said provision was brought with a view to save the sitting Members of Parliament and State Legislature, who have already been convicted of any offences mentioned in sections 8(1), (2) and (3) of the R.P. Act, 1951 and who have filed appeals or revisions, which are pending, from disqualification. The hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appellate court in exercise of its power under section 389(1) of the Code can also stay the order of conviction and the High Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, can also stay the conviction if the power was not to be found in section 398(1) of the Code. 19. While allowing the said writ petition and declaring the section 8(4) of R.P. Act, 1951 as ultra vires, the Supreme Court referred to a three-judge Bench decision, rendered in the case of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (1995) 2 SCC 523. In the case of Rama Narang, it was held that an appeal being against both the conviction and sentence, the appellate court, in exercise of its powers under section 389(1) of the Code, can stay the conviction and the High Court also, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, can stay the conviction if the power is not to be found in section 389(1) of the Code. In deciding the case of Lily Thomas (supra), the Supreme Court referred to the following observation made in the case of Ravikant S. Patil (supra): “15. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction.” The said writ petitions involved the question of disqualification of silting Members of Parliament and State Legislature and the decision related to disqualification of the political public servant. But the present case, involves the question, regarding misconduct and corruption on the part of public servant. Hence, the decision held in the case of Lily Thomas (supra) will not help this petitioner. 20. In the case of K.C. Sareen ((supra), the Supreme Court, referred to a the following observation, made in the case of Rama Narang (supra), observed: “In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under section 389(1) of the Code could be invoked. In such situations the b attention of the appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequences which are likely to fall to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under section 389(1) it is under an obligation to support its order for reasons to be recorded by it in writing. If the attention of the court is not invited to this specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction how can it be expected to assign reasons relevant thereto? No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the court; he cannot suppress the precise purpose for which he seeks suspension of the conviction and obtain a general order of stay and then contend that the disqualification has ceased to operate.” The court also observed: “When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial when a adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court." 21. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan and Another (supra), the e Supreme Court observed: “5. In the said judgment of K.C. Sareen this court has held that it is only in very exception cases that the court should exercise such power of stay in matters arising out of the Act. The High Court has in the impugned order nowhere pointed out what is the exceptional fact which in, its opinion required f it to stay the conviction. The High Court also failed to note the direction of this court that it has a duty to look at all aspects including ramification of keeping such conviction in abeyance. The High Court, in our opinion, has not taken into consideration any of the above factors while saying the conviction. It should also be noted that the view expressed by this court in K.C. Barren case was subsequently approved followed by the judgment of this court in Union of India v. Atar Singh.” 22. In the case of Union of India v. Atar Singh and Another (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the discretion for suspending the conviction should be exercised in appropriate case having regard to the h facts and circumstances and that no such order should be mechanically passed. 23. In the case of Ravikant S. Patil (supra), the Supreme Court observed that no stay, in respect of the conviction on a corruption charge against a public servant, should be granted during pendency of the appeal. 24. In the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra), the Supreme Court observed that grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending a upon the special facts of the case. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed: “In such cases it is obvious that it would be highly improper to suspend the order of conviction of public servant which would enable him to occupy the same office which he misused. This is not the case here.” As Navjot Singh Sidhu’s case related to disqualification in contesting election in view of his conviction under section 304, Part II, IPC, the Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal and suspending the conviction, the Apex Court observed that the facts and circumstances in the case of State of T.N. v. A. Jaganathan and KC. This is not the case here.” As Navjot Singh Sidhu’s case related to disqualification in contesting election in view of his conviction under section 304, Part II, IPC, the Supreme Court, while allowing the appeal and suspending the conviction, the Apex Court observed that the facts and circumstances in the case of State of T.N. v. A. Jaganathan and KC. Sareen v. CBI were different and that it would be highly improper to suspend the order of conviction of a public servant and that the person convicted is to be kept under disability. 25. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Balakrishna Dattarya Kumbhar (supra), the Supreme Court observed as follows: “15. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that the appellate court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if f the same is not done.” The Supreme Court further observed: “17. The aforesaid order, therefore, certainly not sustainable in law if examined in the light of the aforementioned judgments of this court. Corruption is not only a punishable offence but also undermines human rights, indirectly violating them, and systematic corruption, is a human rights’ violating in itself/as it leads to systematic economic crimes. Thus, in the aforesaid backdrop, the High Court should not have passed the said order of suspension of sentence in a case involving corruption. It was certainly not the case where damage if done, could not be undone as the respondent h employee, if ultimately succeeds, could claim all the consequential benefits. Thus, in the aforesaid backdrop, the High Court should not have passed the said order of suspension of sentence in a case involving corruption. It was certainly not the case where damage if done, could not be undone as the respondent h employee, if ultimately succeeds, could claim all the consequential benefits. The submission made on behalf of the respondent, that this court should not interfere with the impugned order at such a belated stage, has no merit for the reason that this court, vide order dated 9.7.2009 has already stayed the operation of the said impugned order." 26. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Roshal Lal Sain (supra), the Supreme Court, referring to the observation, made in the case of K.C. Sareen (supra), observed: “When a public servant is found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court, The mere fact that an appellate or re visional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servant once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings.” 27. From the above decisions and the principles, laid down by the Apex Court, there is no difficulty in understanding that an appellate court, in exceptional and rare cases can suspend the conviction, except the conviction of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act relating to a public servant, if such conviction is found to stand as a disability during the pendency of the appeal or revision. As held in the case of State of Maharashtra, through CBI, Anti-Corruption Branch (supra) the conviction of an employee can't be suspended only on the ground that the employee may lose his job for want of stay of the conviction. In the case in hand, the petitioner, who is a public servant has been found guilty and convicted by the trial court on the charge of corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, as held in the case of K.C. Sareen (supra), the petitioner is to be treated as corrupt until he is acquitted by a superior court. 28. In view of what has been discussed above, I find no sufficient ground to stay the impugned conviction. This miscellaneous case is devoid of any merit. Therefore, as held in the case of K.C. Sareen (supra), the petitioner is to be treated as corrupt until he is acquitted by a superior court. 28. In view of what has been discussed above, I find no sufficient ground to stay the impugned conviction. This miscellaneous case is devoid of any merit. Accordingly, the miscellaneous case is dismissed.