Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 3831 (ALL)

Bharat v. State

2015-12-04

PRATYUSH KUMAR, SURENDRA VIKRAM SINGH RATHORE

body2015
JUDGMENT (Per Surendra Vikram Singh Rathore, J.) 1. Heard Shri R.N.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellants, and Shri R.K. Dwivedi, learned AGA for the State. 2. Instant appeal was preferred by eleven appellants. During pendency of this appeal, appellant no.5 Keshan and appellant no.10 Ambar expired. Accordingly, vide order dated 10.07.2014, the appeal with regard to above mentioned two appellants was abated. 3. It is a case of murder of one village Chowkidar named Parmeshwar, who has been brutally murdered and his head was chopped and was taken away by the accused persons. All eleven appellants namely Bharat, Pyarey, Sewak, Deota, Keshan, Maheshwar, Ram Saran, Prakash, Banwari, Ambar and Chhangu were convicted by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Sitapur, vide judgment dated 27.02.1982 and order dated 02.03.1982 in Sessions Trial No.61 of 1979 arising out of Case Crime No.81 of 1978, Police Station Sadarpur, District Sitapur. All the appellants were convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and were further convicted for the offence under Section 201 IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. Appellants Bharat, Keshan, Pyarey, Chhangu, Deota, Maheshwar and Ram Saran were further convicted for the offence under Section 148 IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. Appellants Sewak, Prakash, Banwari and Amber were convicted for the offence under Section 147 IPC and were sentenced to undergo with rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 4. The incident of this case is alleged to have taken place in the abadi area of village Behti, Police Station Sadarpur, District Sitapur. All the accused persons were also the residents of the same village. Appellants Bharat, Sewak, Pyarey and Deota are real brothers and appellant Chhangu happens to be the son of appellant Bharat. Likewise, appellants Keshan (dead), Maheshwar and Ram Saran are also real brothers and they are first cousins of appellants Bharat, Sewak, Pyarey and Deota. All these are Pasis by caste. Appellants Prakash and Banwari were Ahir by caste and were cousins. Appellant Ambar (dead) is also Ahir by case. Appellants Prakash, Banwari and Ambar are alleged to be the associates and friends of the remaining accused persons. 5. All these are Pasis by caste. Appellants Prakash and Banwari were Ahir by caste and were cousins. Appellant Ambar (dead) is also Ahir by case. Appellants Prakash, Banwari and Ambar are alleged to be the associates and friends of the remaining accused persons. 5. In the instant case, the first information report was lodged by Rangi Lal, who happens to be the son of deceased Parmeshwar. It was alleged in the first information report that the deceased Parmeshwar was the Chowkidar of the village. Appellant Bharat was arrested by the police several times in criminal cases registered against him and whenever the police arrested him, the deceased Parmeshwar, being the Chowkidar of the village, used to help the police, which annoyed appellants. It was further alleged in the first information report that about 3-4 days prior to this incident, the police had come to apprehend appellant Bharat and in that connection, the deceased Parmeshwar had helped the police. It was further alleged that there was old enmity for the last 20 years between deceased Parmeshwar on one side and appellant Bharat and others on the other side. Deceased Parmeshwar's wife had lodged a report, one year prior to the murder of Parmeshwar, against appellant Bharat and his wife. About three months' prior to this incident, Gram Samaj had allotted some land to the deceased Parmeshwar, which was reserved by the consolidation authorities for Abadi. Deceased Parmeshwar, after allotment of the land, constructed his house on the said land and lived in it with his family. Prior to the consolidation proceedings, the said land was being used as Khalihan by accused persons also. So, the accused persons wanted to grab that land but they could not do so because it was given to deceased Parmeshwar. It was also a cause of annoyance and animosity of the appellants with the deceased Parmeshwar. Parmeshwar had lodged a report about one month prior to this incident against appellants Prakash, Ambar and Banwari due to which there was severe bitterness between deceased and the appellants. 6. According to the prosecution story, on 04.07.1978 early in the morning Parmeshwar had gone towards the south of his house to ease himself. Parmeshwar had lodged a report about one month prior to this incident against appellants Prakash, Ambar and Banwari due to which there was severe bitterness between deceased and the appellants. 6. According to the prosecution story, on 04.07.1978 early in the morning Parmeshwar had gone towards the south of his house to ease himself. At that time, the complainant Rangi Lal and his family members were busy in the morning work of collecting cow dung in front of their house and his brother Khusi Ram was giving fodder to the cattles and the mother of the complainant was sitting at the door of the house. When Parmeshwar was coming back after easing himself, when he reached near the "Nads" (big pots made of mud to provide fodder to the cattle) adjoining to the Baithka of Ambar, appellants Bharat and Keshan armed with Banka, appellant Chhangu armed with Gandasa, appellant Sewak armed with lathi and appellants Ram Saran and Deota armed with Kanta came out of Baithka of Ambar and the remaining appellants namely Pyarey and Maheshwar were armed with Kanta and appellant Prakash, Banwari, Sewak and Ambar, who were armed with lathis, came out from the Koliya in the south of Baithka of Ambar. All these accusedppellants surrounded Parmeshwar and shoved him on the ground. Appellants Bharat and Keshan exhorted to kill Parmeshwar to settle the dispute for ever. When the complainant and his family members saw this incident from their house, they raised alarm and rushed towards the place of occurrence. Hearing their alarm, some other persons of the village namely Raja, Molhey, Mool Chand, Dularey and Soney Lal also reached there. In the meantime, appellants Bharat, Chhangu and Keshan started assaulting Parmeshwar with their respective weapons. Appellants Ram Saran and Deota stood towards north and appellants Pyarey and Maheshwar stood towards south of Parmeshwar threatening the witnesses not to come close to them and were also challenging that if anybody came close then he shall also be killed. At the time of assault, appellants Ambar, Prakash, Banwari and Sewak were holding hands and legs of Parmeshwar. In the meantime, Kamta also came out of his house and witnessed the incident. Appellant Bharat, Keshan and Chhangu chopped the head of Parmeshwar from his body, put it in a Tasla and all the accused persons went away with the head of the deceased towards south of the village. In the meantime, Kamta also came out of his house and witnessed the incident. Appellant Bharat, Keshan and Chhangu chopped the head of Parmeshwar from his body, put it in a Tasla and all the accused persons went away with the head of the deceased towards south of the village. After fleeing away from the place of occurrence, the complainant and other persons went near the headless dead body of Parmeshwar which was lying in a pool of blood. The complainant thereafter went to the police station Sadarpur on foot which was situated only at a distance of one mile from the place of occurrence. Thereafter, on his dictation the Chik report was scribed by the Head Moharrir and case was registered at Case Crime No.81 of 1978. The police immediately came into action, came to the place of occurrence, taken blood stained and plain earth from the place of occurrence, prepared inquest report and after sealing the dead body and preparing relevant documents, sent the dead body for postmortem, which was conducted on 05.07.1978 at 04.30 PM. According to the postmortem report, following injuries were found on the body of the deceased: - (1) Incised wound 15 cm x 14 cm x the whole thickness of the neck at the level of IV cervical vertebra body cut through and through posteriorly and 3 cm above the sternal notch anteriorly in five strokes. All the five strokes have their cut levels like this: - Ist - Cut level on 7th cervical body partially; IInd - Cut level on 6th cervical body partially; IIIrd - Cut level on 5th cervical body partially; IVth - Cut level on 4/5 cervical inter vertebral disc partially; Vth - Cut level on iv cervical body through and through. (2) Six multiple incised wounds in area of 12 cm x 3 cm on front of left supraclavicular and infra clavicular region. Maximum dimension is 6 cm 2 cm x muscle deep. Minimum dimension 1.5 cm x .5 cm x muscle deep. (3) Multiple incised wounds in area of 10 cm x 8 cm on right supra clavicular and infra clavicular region. Maximum dimension 5 cm x 2 cm x right clavicle medial end. Minimum dimension 3.5 cm x .5 cm x muscle deep. Minimum dimension 1.5 cm x .5 cm x muscle deep. (3) Multiple incised wounds in area of 10 cm x 8 cm on right supra clavicular and infra clavicular region. Maximum dimension 5 cm x 2 cm x right clavicle medial end. Minimum dimension 3.5 cm x .5 cm x muscle deep. (4) Incised wound 15 cm x 4 cm x head of humerus (right) cut half on right axilla extending from posterior axillary fold to under surface of axilla, then anterior axillary fold cut reaching to top of the right shoulder. (5) Incised wound 5 cm x 1.5 cm x metacorpal bone cut partially of left hand middle finger in the metacarpal bone axial direction. On internal examination, the doctor found that the stomach was empty. The upper part of the small intestine was empty and the lower part was full. The upper part of large intestine was full and rectum was empty. Bladder was also empty. He opined that the death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of ante-mortem injuries. 7. Appellant Ambar was arrested by the police on the same day and the Investigating Officer got the information on 06.07.1978 that all the remaining accused persons have surrendered in Court. 8. After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed against all the appellants. 9. The case of the defence was of total denial and of their false implication because of enmity. During trial it was suggested to the witnesses that the deceased used to remain on Gast (part of duty) in the night and during such Gast, he was murdered in the night by some unknown persons. His dead body was recovered near grove of Molhey which was seen by the persons who were going to attend the call of nature and thereafter information was given to the complainant. It was also suggested that the police reached the place of occurrence before lodging the first information report and thereafter, in consultation with the police, this false case was concocted. 10. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined PW-1 Rangi Lal- the complainant, PW-2 Kamta and PW-3 Raja Ram as witnesses of fact and all these witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution. PW-4 is Dr. Om Prakash, who has conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased. 10. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined PW-1 Rangi Lal- the complainant, PW-2 Kamta and PW-3 Raja Ram as witnesses of fact and all these witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution. PW-4 is Dr. Om Prakash, who has conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased. PW-5 Constable Surendra Singh is a formal witness who is the carrier of the dead body. PW-6 is Head Moharrir Shamsher Bahadur Singh, who has prepared Chik Report and GD of this case. PW-7 is SO B.N. Mishra, the Investigating Officer of this case. 11. In defence, DW-1 Radhey Shyam has been examined to prove that Special Report reached in the office of District Magistrate with delay. 12. After appreciating the evidence on record, learned trial court has convicted the appellants, as above, hence, the instant appeal. 13. Submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that in this case first information report was ante-timed. It was not registered at the alleged time and the prosecution witnesses were not wholly reliable. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the role of severing head of the deceased from the body was assigned only to three appellants and remaining appellants have not been assigned any specific role in this offence, therefore, their conviction with the aid of Section 149 IPC was not in accordance with law. Learned trial court has not appreciated this aspect of the matter in accordance with law and has wrongly convicted the appellants. 14. Learned AGA has submitted that it is a broad day light murder which had taken place in village abadi and murder has been committed in a very brutal manner. All the witnesses of fact, who have been examined by the prosecution, are residents of the vicinity where the incident had taken place. Their presence at the place of occurrence was most natural. They have fully supported the case of the prosecution. The manner in which the incident had taken place clearly establishes that all the accused persons have acted in prosecution of their common object, which was to commit murder of Parmeshwar. 15. Now, the first point to be considered is the delay in lodging the first information report. They have fully supported the case of the prosecution. The manner in which the incident had taken place clearly establishes that all the accused persons have acted in prosecution of their common object, which was to commit murder of Parmeshwar. 15. Now, the first point to be considered is the delay in lodging the first information report. The grounds regarding delay in first information report which are being pressed into service before this appellate Court were also raised before learned trial court. We have gone through the impugned judgment and we are fully satisfied with the view taken by learned trial court and the finding that the first information report was not ante-timed. Therefore, to discuss this point again would unnecessarily lengthen the judgment without serving any fruitful purpose. We are satisfied that the first information report of this case was not ante-timed. The incident is alleged to have taken place on 04.07.1978 at 05.30 AM and the first information report of this case was lodged on the same day at 06.55 AM i.e. only after one hour and 25 minutes of the incident. PW-1 Rangi Lal in his cross examination has stated that after the incident he remained at the place of occurrence for about half an hour and thereafter he went to the police station on foot and he consumed half an hour time to reach the police station. The complainant Rangi Lal himself had dictated the first information report to the Head Moharrir in his own rural dialect and it was taken down in his own language. Perusal of the first information report clearly shows that it was a very natural description of the incident and enmity of the deceased with the appellants. Thus, we fully agree with the finding of the learned trial court that the first information report in this case was lodged promptly. 16. A prompt F.I.R. lends credence to the prosecution case because a prompt F.I.R. eliminates all the chances of cooking up of a false story. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 188 while emphasizing the importance of recording a prompt FIR the Supreme Court observed as under: - "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eye witnesses if any. Delay in lodging FIR often result in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On the account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version of exaggerated story." 17. In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393 the Supreme Court observed as under: - "............ first information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused." 18. Similarly in Kishan Singh through LRs v. Gurpal Singh and others reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 : 2010 (71) ACC 153 (SC) the Supreme Court held that "Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with vivid details gives assurance regarding truth of its version. In case there is some delay in recording the FIR the complainant must give an explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained." 19. Law expects a prompt first information report because it eliminates all the chances of coming up of a coloured version. On this point, reliance may be placed on the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Nanhe Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1973 (3) SCC 317 . 20. Keeping in view the aforementioned proposition of law, in the facts of the instant case, the first information report was lodged with utmost promptness and virtually there was no delay in lodging the same. A prompt first information report eliminates the chances of false implication, as stated earlier. 21. The main thrust of argument of learned counsel for the appellants is regarding common object of all the accused persons. A prompt first information report eliminates the chances of false implication, as stated earlier. 21. The main thrust of argument of learned counsel for the appellants is regarding common object of all the accused persons. It is submitted that only three of the appellants have been assigned the role of severing the head of the deceased while no overt act has been assigned to other appellants, therefore, said appellants cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC. 22. Before proceeding further, we would like to quote Sections 141 and 149 IPC: - "141. Unlawful assembly. - An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is - First. - To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, [the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or Second. - To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third. - To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or Fourth. - By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or Fifth. - By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation. - An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly." "149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object. - If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence." 23. Perusal of aforementioned two sections makes it abundantly clear that whenever an offence, in prosecution of the common object in unlawful assembly, is committed by a member of such unlawful assembly and any member of such unlawful assembly knows that such an offence may be committed or is likely to be committed in prosecution of that common object then every member of such unlawful assembly shall be liable for punishment with the aid of Section 149 Cr.P.C. 24. Hon'ble the Apex Court has considered this legal point in several cases. In the case of State of Haryana v. Shakuntla reported in (2012) 5 SCC 171 : 2012 (77) ACC 942 (SC), Hon'ble the Apex Court in paragraphs 34, 35 and 36 has held as under: - "34. In the case of Ramchandran and Ors. v. State of Kerala (2011) 9 SCC 257 , a Bench of this Court dealt, at some length, with the scope and object of Section 149 Indian Penal Code. It was held that Section 149 Indian Penal Code essentially has two ingredients, one, that the offence must be committed by any member of unlawful assembly consisting of five or more members and second, such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object Under Section 149 Indian Penal Code of that assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Clarifying the expression "common object", the Bench further said that it is not necessary that there should be a prior concert in the sense of a meeting of minds of the members of the unlawful assembly. The common object may form on the spur of the moment. It is enough if it is then adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. 35. In the case of Waman (supra) (2011) 7 SCC 295 , the Court also stated that in order to attract Section 149 Indian Penal Code, it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of the unlawful assembly. It must be within the knowledge of other members that the offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, and if such requirement is satisfied, then they would be held liable Under Section 149 Indian Penal Code. 36. It must be within the knowledge of other members that the offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object, and if such requirement is satisfied, then they would be held liable Under Section 149 Indian Penal Code. 36. It is not possible to define the constituents or dimensions of an offence Under Section 149 simplicitor with regard to dictionary meaning of the words 'unlawful assembly' or 'assembly'. An "assembly" is a company of persons assembled together in a place, usually for a common purpose. This Court is concerned with an "unlawful assembly". Wherever five or more persons commit a crime with a common object and intent, then each of them would be liable for commission of such offence, in terms of Sections 141 and 149 Indian Penal Code. The ingredients which need to be satisfied have already been spelt out unambiguously by us." (Underlined by us) 25. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 11 SCC 237 : 2012 (79) ACC 48 (SC), in paragraph 20 has held as under: - "It is now well settled law that the provisions of Section 149 Indian Penal Code will be attracted whenever any offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or when the members of that assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, so that every person, who, at the time of committing of that offence is a member, will be also vicariously held liable and guilty of that offence. Section 149 Indian Penal Code creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be guilty of an offence where that offence is committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly, or such members or assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. [Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437 ; Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 : 1989 (26) ACC 400 (SC), Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 ]". 26. [Lalji v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 437 ; Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 : 1989 (26) ACC 400 (SC), Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 ]". 26. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Charan reported in (2013) 12 SCC 76 : 2013 (82) ACC 987 (SC), in paragraph 19 has held as under: - "The pivotal question of applicability of Section 149 Indian Penal Code has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its application. It contains essentially only two ingredients, namely, (I) offence committed by any member of any unlawful assembly consisting five or more members and; (II) such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common object ( Section 141 Indian Penal Code) of the assembly or members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. It is not necessary that for common object there should be a prior concert as the common object may be formed on spur of the moment. Common object would mean the purpose or design shared by all members of such assembly and it may be formed at any stage. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly, it may yet fall under second part of Section 149 Indian Penal Code if it is established that the offence was such, as the members knew, was likely to be committed. For instance, if a body of persons go armed to take forcible possession of the land, it may be presumed that someone is likely to be killed, and all the members of the unlawful assembly must be aware of that likelihood and, thus, each of them can be held guilty of the offence punishable Under Section 149 Indian Penal Code. The court must keep in mind the distinction between the two parts of Section 149 Indian Penal Code, and, once it is established that unlawful assembly had a common object, it is not necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed some overt act, rather they can be convicted for vicarious liability. The court must keep in mind the distinction between the two parts of Section 149 Indian Penal Code, and, once it is established that unlawful assembly had a common object, it is not necessary that all persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed some overt act, rather they can be convicted for vicarious liability. However, it may be relevant to determine whether the assembly consist of some persons which were merely passive witnesses and had joined the assembly as a matter of ideal curiosity without intending to entertain the common object of the assembly. However, it is only the rule of caution and not the rule of law. Thus, a mere presence or association with other members alone does not per se be sufficient to hold everyone of them criminally liable for the offence committed by the others unless there is sufficient evidence on record to show that each intended to or knew the likelihood of commission of such an offending act, being a member of unlawful assembly as provided for Under Section 142 Indian Penal Code. It may also not be a case of group rivalry or sudden or free fight or an act of the member of unlawful assembly beyond the common object. (Vide: Baladin and Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 1956 SC 181 ; Masalti v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 202 ; Chandra Bihari Gautam and Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 2002 SC 1836 ; Ramesh and Ors. v. State of Haryana AIR 2011 SC 169 ; Ramachandran and Ors. Etc. v. State of Kerala AIR 2011 SC 3581 ; Onkar and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 2 SCC 273 : 2012 (76) ACC 786 (SC); Roy Farnandez v. State of Goa and Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1030 : 2012 (77) ACC 983 (SC); and Krishnappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka AIR 2012 SC 2946 : 2012 (79) ACC 48 (SC))". (Underlined by us) 27. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 2 SCC 273 : 2012 (76) ACC 786 (SC); Roy Farnandez v. State of Goa and Ors. AIR 2012 SC 1030 : 2012 (77) ACC 983 (SC); and Krishnappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka AIR 2012 SC 2946 : 2012 (79) ACC 48 (SC))". (Underlined by us) 27. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in (2013) 4 SCC 228 , in paragraph 49 has held as under: " Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code constructively criminalizes all members of an unlawful assembly if a member of that assembly commits an offence in prosecution of a common object of that assembly or if the members of that assembly knew likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. To bring a case within Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code three features must be present. Firstly, there must be in existence an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. This is a mixed question of fact and law, which was overlooked by the Trial Judge. Secondly, an offence must have been committed by a member of the unlawful assembly. Thirdly, the offence committed must be in prosecution of a common object of the unlawful assembly or must be such as the members of the unlawful assembly knew likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the provisions of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code will come into play and cover every member of the unlawful assembly". (Emphasis added) 28. Now the prosecution evidence has to be evaluated keeping in view the aforementioned observations of Hon'ble the Apex Court and it is to be judged whether all the appellants formed unlawful assembly and acted in prosecution of the common object of such unlawful assembly. It is clear from the aforementioned case laws that no specific overt act is necessary to be committed in the prosecution of the common object of such unlawful assembly to fasten liability with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It is clear from the aforementioned case laws that no specific overt act is necessary to be committed in the prosecution of the common object of such unlawful assembly to fasten liability with the aid of Section 149 IPC. If the existence of unlawful assembly is proved and the common object of its members is also proved then all the members of unlawful assembly shall be liable to be convicted with the aid of Section 149 IPC for any act even if it was likely to be committed. 29. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that admittedly there was long standing enmity of the complainant side with appellants and their family members. So because of such long standing enmity, they have been falsely implicated. It is true that in the first information report, earlier enmity of the deceased with the appellants has been narrated in detail. Even during trial the complainant had furnished the details of the earlier litigation and the facts and circumstances which led to the enmity between two groups that ultimately culminated into this offence. Enmity is a double edged weapon. It cuts both ways. On one hand, it may be a motive to commit the offence and on the other hand it may be a reason to falsely implicate. 30. It is a case based on direct evidence. It is true that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the existence of motive assumes higher importance. But where direct evidence of the commission of offence is available then the motive part loses its significance because the motive is a mental status of an accused which remains embedded in his own heart only. So the complainant side can only guess the same on the basis of the existing circumstances. So where the direct evidence of an offence is available, law does not expect that the specific evidence of motive to commit the offence must be produced by the prosecution. On this point, reference may be made to the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Habib Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2013 (12) SCC 568 , wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has observed that if there is direct and trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to the commission of offence, the motive part loses its significance. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2013 (12) SCC 568 , wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has observed that if there is direct and trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to the commission of offence, the motive part loses its significance. Ocular testimony of witnesses cannot be discarded only due to absence of motive if otherwise evidence is worthy of credence. Similar view has been expressed in the case of Subodh Nath and another Vs. State of Tripura reported in 2013 (4) SCC 122 : 2013 (82) ACC 45 (SC) wherein Hon'ble the Apex Court has observed that motive becomes relevant as an additional circumstance in a case where prosecution seeks to prove the guilt by circumstantial evidence only. But if there is direct evidence against the accused having committed offence motive becomes irrelevant. Similar view has been expressed by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Darbara Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in 2012 (10) SCC 476 : 2012 (79) ACC 656 (SC). 31. The next submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that in this case only three witnesses of fact have been examined while according to the prosecution some other persons of the village had also seen the incident but the prosecution has withheld such witnesses which gives rise to an adverse inference against prosecution. 32. It is true that some other persons were also named in the first information report who had seen the occurrence but the prosecution has examined three eyewitnesses of the incident who have supported the case of the prosecution. Indian law does not expect that a particular number of witnesses are required to prove a particular fact. Even if a single witness is found to be wholly reliable then the law does not require that all the witnesses must be examined. Law is settled on the point that it is only the quality of evidence and not the quantity of evidence that is required to prove a particular fact. In the instant case, three witnesses of fact have fully supported the case of the prosecution. Law is settled on the point that it is only the quality of evidence and not the quantity of evidence that is required to prove a particular fact. In the instant case, three witnesses of fact have fully supported the case of the prosecution. So, in such circumstances only because of the fact that some other persons had seen the incident and they have not been examined by the prosecution would not have any adverse effect on the case of the prosecution if the evidence of any of the three witnesses or all of three witnesses is found to be wholly reliable. Reference on this point may be made to the pronouncement of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of (i) Manga alias Man Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand reported in 2013 (7) SCC 629 , (ii) State of Haryana Vs. Shakuntala and others reported in 2012 (5) SCC 171 : 2012 (77) ACC 942 (SC) and (iii) Prathipal Singh etc. Vs. State of Punjab and another etc. reported in 2012 (1) SCC 10 . We would like to quote paragraph no. 49 of the judgment of Prithvipal Singh's case (supra), which reads as under: - "49. This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number or the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time- honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence, rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras : AIR 1957 SC 614 ; Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras : AIR 1957 SC 614 ; Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 (48) ACC 27 (SC); Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150 : 2007 (58) ACC 414 (SC); and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal AIR 2010 SC 3638 : 2011 (72) ACC 327 (SC))." (Underlined by us) 33. Now, the point to be considered is whether all the accused persons shared common object and acted in prosecution of the said common object or only three accused persons namely Bharat, Keshan and Chhangu can be held guilty for the brutal murder of Parmeshwar. 34. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Ramesh and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana reported in 2011 Cri. L.J. 80 has discussed the legal position as to how the Court will gather the common object of an unlawful assembly. We would like to quote paragraph no. 9 of the said judgment, which reads as under: - "9. We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned Counsel. In our opinion the common object of an unlawful assembly has to be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms possessed by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before the occurrence. It is an inference which has to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case. To attract the mischief of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary that each of the accused must commit some illegal overt act. When the assembly is found to be unlawful and if offence is committed by any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, every member of the unlawful assembly shall be guilty of the offence committed by another member of the assembly. It has to be borne in mind that an assembly which is not unlawful when assembled may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. It has to be borne in mind that an assembly which is not unlawful when assembled may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. In the present case there is overwhelming material to show that the appellants variously armed, including the fire arms assembled at one place and thereafter came to the place of occurrence and started assault together and when protested by the deceased, one of the members of the unlawful assembly shot him dead and some of them caused injury by fire arm, gandasa, lathi, etc. to others. All of them have come and left the place of occurrence together. From what has been found above, there is no escape from the conclusion that appellants were the members of the unlawful assembly and offences have been committed in pursuance of the common object and hence, each of them shall be liable for the offence committed by any other member of the assembly. In our opinion, the trial court correctly held them guilty with the aid of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, which has rightly been affirmed in appeal by the High Court. " The aforementioned case law applies in its full force in the facts of the instant case. 35. In the first information report, which was lodged without any delay, the specific allegation and specific role played by each accused was mentioned. Appellants Bharat, Keshan and Chhangu were alleged to have caused death of Parmeshwar by giving blows with their respective deadly weapons while the appellants who were armed with lathis namely Prakash, Banwari, Sewak and Ambar were holding hands and legs of the deceased after throwing him on the ground and appellants Ram Saran and Deota were standing towards North of Parmeshwar and appellants Maheshwar and Pyarey were standing South to Parmeshwar and were extending threats to other persons not to intervene. All the accused persons came simultaneously at the place of occurrence. Some of them came out from the Baithka of appellant Ambar while others came from through the narrow lane situated in between the house of Ambar and Puttilal. The specific version of the first information report was that all the accused persons surrounded the deceased on the narrow lane which goes from North to South and after shoving him on the ground, four appellants caught hold of the deceased by his hands and legs and three persons gave blows. The specific version of the first information report was that all the accused persons surrounded the deceased on the narrow lane which goes from North to South and after shoving him on the ground, four appellants caught hold of the deceased by his hands and legs and three persons gave blows. Perusal of the site plan shows that the incident had taken place in an inhabited area of the village abadi in front of the house of Appellant Ambar and on the other side of lane, house of Bhagwandeen is situated. House of witness Kamta is situated towards South of the house of appellant Ambar and there is a narrow lane in between two houses. Kamta happens to be the son of Puttilal and as per the site plan, the dead body was found lying on the narrow lane towards East of "Naads" of Ambar. PW-1 Rangi Lal, PW-2 Kamta and PW-3 Raja Ram all these witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution. PW-1 Rangi Lal has seen the incident from the very beginning. He has seen all the appellants coming to the place of occurrence and he has given description of the same while other two witnesses reached the place of occurrence hearing the noise of Parmeshwar and they have fully supported the case of the prosecution. There is absolutely no contradiction in the weapons assigned to the appellants, role assigned to the appellants and the manner in which the incident had taken place. All the three witnesses of fact have categorically stated that appellants Bharat, Keshan and Chhangu cut the throat of Parmeshwar while four appellants who were armed with lathis were catching hold of the deceased at that time while the blows were being given to him and the remaining appellants who were armed with Kanta were standing towards North and South of the deceased. Thus, in the instant case, all the accused persons came together at the place of occurrence. Immediately they started committing offence by pushing the deceased on the ground and holding him and thereafter blows were given to him and at that relevant point of time the other four appellants namely Ram Saran, Deota, Maheshwar and Pyarey were extending threats of dire consequences to the witnesses so that they may not come and intervene in the matter. Immediately they started committing offence by pushing the deceased on the ground and holding him and thereafter blows were given to him and at that relevant point of time the other four appellants namely Ram Saran, Deota, Maheshwar and Pyarey were extending threats of dire consequences to the witnesses so that they may not come and intervene in the matter. Thus, their act provided a protection cover or a shield to the other appellants in the prosecution of their common object. Since this incident had taken place in an inhabited area and the appellants were apprehending that some other persons of the village may also come and intervene, therefore, in order to prosecute their common object, they came in large number armed with weapons and extended threats that in case any of the person comes near them then he shall also face the same result. After going through the evidence of all the three witnesses of fact, we do not find any contradiction at any point in their testimony. Presence of PW-1 Rangi Lal was wholly natural. He was busy in the morning work in front of his house. The presence of PW-2 Kamta was also wholly natural as his house is situated very close to the place of occurrence. The house of PW-3 Raja Ram is situated at a distance of 70 paces towards East of the place of occurrence near the well crossing. He has also stated that hearing the cries, he came to the place of incident and saw the incident. The evidence of all three eyewitnesses stands fully corroborated with the medical evidence. The evidence of PW-1 is very natural that he could see "Tasla" when the accused persons were taking away the head of his father after keeping the same in Tasla. Perusal of evidence of PW-1 shows that it was very natural description of the incident by a rustic villager. The brutal and high handed manner in which the offence has been committed clearly makes out that all the appellants formed an unlawful assembly and this offence was committed in prosecution of the common object of such assembly. Perusal of evidence of PW-1 shows that it was very natural description of the incident by a rustic villager. The brutal and high handed manner in which the offence has been committed clearly makes out that all the appellants formed an unlawful assembly and this offence was committed in prosecution of the common object of such assembly. So the manner in which the incident had taken place leads to the only conclusion that all the accused persons came to the place of occurrence with a common object to commit the murder of Parmeshwar and in prosecution of the said common object the murder of Parmeshwar was committed. All the accused persons not only shared common object but they also played active role in the commission of the offence. Therefore learned trial court has rightly convicted all the appellants with the aid of Section 149 IPC. 36. In view of discussions made above, we are of the view that the judgment of learned trial court suffers with no illegality. Conviction of the appellants was in accordance with law. The appeal sans merits, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The appellants are on bail. Their bail is cancelled. They shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out their sentence. 37. Office is directed to communicate this order forthwith to the court concerned and also to send back the lower court record to ensure compliance.