JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents. 2. Through this writ petition, prayer has been made to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport Authority and order dated 3.8.2015 passed by the State Transport Appeallate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal No. 06 of 2015 (Mohit Kumar Goyal v. U.P. Transport Commissioner, Lucknow) 3. Vide order dated 13.3.2015, the respondent No. 3 has refused to grant permit to the petitioner whereas by the subsequent order dated 3.8.2015, appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 13.3.2015 has been dismissed by the Tribunal as not maintainable. 4. The facts giving rise to this case are that the petitioner is the owner of bus and applied for inter-state permit under sub-section 2 of Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The said permit has been rejected by the State Transport Authority by the following order : egksn;] mi;qZDr fo"k;d Mkd ls izsf"kr vius vkosnu i= fnukad 7&2&2015 dk lanHkZ ysa] ftlds lkFk :0 200@&dk LVkEi ,oa :0&1000@&rFkk :0 &6000@& dk cSad MªkV layXu fd;k x;k gSA bl lEcU/k esa voxr djkuk gS fd lgkjuiqj&fodkluxj ekxZ vUrjkZT;h; ekxZ gS tks mRrj izns'k ,oa mRrjk[k.M jkT; ds e/; vofLFkr gSA mRrj izns'k ,oa mRrjk[k.M jkT; ds e/; vHkh ikjLifjd ifjogu le>kSrk lEiUu ugha gqvk gSA ek0 mPp U;k;ky; ds fofHkUu vkns'kks ,oa v'ouh dqekj ds dsl es ek0 mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vfHker ds vuqlkj vUrjkZT;h; ekxksZ ij fcuk le>kSrk ds ijfeV ugh fn;k tk ldrkA vr% Mkd ls izkIr mDr vkosnu i= ewy :i esa okil fd;k tkrk gSA mRrjk[k.M jkT; ls ikjLifjd ifjogu le>kSrk lEiUu gksus ij ;FkkfLFkfr vki vkosnu i= izLrqr dj ldrs gaSA 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner herein has filed appeal under sub-section 1(g) of Section 89 of the Act. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner herein has filed appeal under sub-section 1(g) of Section 89 of the Act. The said appeal has been dismissed as not maintainable by the following order : vkns'k ;g vihy fn0 18&5&2015 vihykFkhZ }kjk mRrjnkrk foi{kh ds vkns'k la[;k 375@,l0Vh0,0@2015 fn0 13&3&2015 ds fo:);ksftr dh gSA foi{kh us vihykFkhZ dk izkFkZuk i= fn0 7&2&2015 lEcfU/kr lgkjuiqj 'kkdqEcjh nsoh jk;iqj rktsokyk& fodkl uxj vUrjkZT;@vjk"Vªh;d`r ekxZ ij LFkkbZ cl ijfeV gsrq vLohd`r dj fn;k gSA vihykFkhZ dk dFku gS fd izkFkhZ us izkFkZuk i= fnukad 7&2&2015 esa dksbZ =qfV ugh gS og eksVj;ku vf/kfu;e la[;k 59@1988 dh /kkjk 69¼2½ ds rgr iks”k.kh; gS foi{kh dk vLohd`fr vkns'k fn0 13&3&2015 lEcfU/kr fu;e&fuekoyh o lUnfHkZr rF;ks ls lefFkZr ugh gSA lEcfU/kr jkT; dks mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 69¼2½ ds foijhr dksbZ Hkh vkns'k ikfjr djus dk dkbZ vf/kdkj ugh gSA vkns'k fn0 13&3&2015 [kf.Mr dj vihykFkhZ dk izkFkZuk i= fnukad 7&2&2015 Lohdkj gksuk o vkosfnr LFkkbZ cl ijfeV tkjh fd;k tkuk t:jh gSA vihykFkhZ us vius dFkus ds leFkZu esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;ksa ,oa mPpre U;k;ky; Hkkjr dh LFkfir fof/k O;oLFkk Hkh lUnfHkZr gSA foi{kh us vius vkns'k fn0 13&3&2015 ds leFkZu esa dksbZ lk{; izLrqr ugh fd;k gS dsoy bruk gh rdZ fn;k gS fd vkosfnr cl ijfeV tkjh gksus ls vusd tfVyrk,a iSnk gks tk;sxhA ijfeV tkjh fd;k tkuk tufgr esa ugh gSA vihy [kf.Mr dh tkosA vkns'k vihykFkhZ dh vihy iks”k.kh; u gksus ds dkj.k [kf.Mr dh tkrh gS vihykFkhZ l{ke U;k;ky; esa dk;Zokgh esa LorU= gSA g0 v/;{k fnukad&3&8&2015 }kjk& iqVVhyky& eqUlhje 20&8&2015 6. When the case was argued, on the first date i.e. on 3.11.2015 following order was passed : The submission is that the state transport authority has erred in rejecting the application of the petitioner for grant of stage carriage permit on the ground that on inter-state route, permit cannot be granted without there being any agreement in between the States pursuant to the judgment of the Apex Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no such judgment, which prohibits grant of permit without there being any agreement in between the States. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to seek instructions in this matter apprising the Court as to whether on inter state route, permit cannot be granted without there being any agreement in between the States. Put up on 26th November, 2015 as fresh. 7. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to seek instructions in this matter apprising the Court as to whether on inter state route, permit cannot be granted without there being any agreement in between the States. Put up on 26th November, 2015 as fresh. 7. Pursuant thereto, no instruction could be obtained by the learned Standing Counsel. The case was again taken up on 27.11.2015 and the learned Standing Counsel was again granted time to seek instructions but that too is of no avail. 8. From the perusal of the order dated 13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport Authority, it is apparent that the State Transport Authority has refused to grant permit to the petitioner for the reasons that there was no agreement in between the States for grant of permit in view of the various pronouncements of Supreme Court and High Court. So far as the appellate order is concerned, the appellate authority, after noting the submission of learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the appeal as not maintainable without assigning any reason. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of sub-section 1(g) of Section 89 of the Act, the appeal would lie against any order not covered by sub-section 1 (a) to (f) of Section 89 of the Act. The next submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of Second Proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 80 of the Act, in case, the authority refuses to grant permit, for that it has to record the reason after affording an opportunity of hearing to the persons who have applied for permit, therefore impugned orders are unsustainable and deserves to be quashed. 10. In response to that, learned Standing counsel appearing for the State respondents submitted that the provisions contained under Section 80 are relating to the permit to be issued under Section 66 of the Act and it will not be applicable in the cases where the application has been filed under sub-section 2 of Section 69 of the Act. 11. For appreciating the controversy, it would be appropriate to quote the provisions contained under Sections 66, 69 and 80, which are reproduced hereinunder : 66. 11. For appreciating the controversy, it would be appropriate to quote the provisions contained under Sections 66, 69 and 80, which are reproduced hereinunder : 66. Necessity for permits : (1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle Is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used: Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage: Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not: Provided also that goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him. (2) The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of any public or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of any public or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. [ Provided that the holder of a permit of any articulated vehicle may use the prime-mover of that articulated vehicle for any other semi-trailor] (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply— a. To any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise; b. To any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing, road watering or conservancy purposes; c. To any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance purposes; d. To any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the mourners accompanying the corpses; e. To any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle or for removing goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety; f. to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf; g. to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufactures or deals in motor vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis, solely for such purposes and in accordance with such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Offical Gazette, specify in this behalf; (h) omitted by Act 27 of 2000. (i) to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3,000 kilograms; (j) subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehicle purchased in one State and proceeding to a place, situated in that State or in any other State, without carrying any passenger or goods; (k)To any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registered under Section 43 while proceeding empty to any place for the purpose of registration of the vehicle; (l) omitted by Act 39 of 2001. (m) to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake or any other natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseen circumstances is required to be diverted through any other route, whether within or outside the State, with a view to enabling it to reach its destination; (n) to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Central or State Government may, by order, specify; (o) to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement and which owing to the default of the owner has been taken possession of by or on behalf of, the person with whom the owner has entered into such agreement, to enable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or (p) To any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any place for purpose of repair. 4. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), sub-section (1) shall if the State Government by rule made under Section 96 so prescribes, apply to any motor vehicle adapted to carry more than nine persons excluding the driver. 69. General provision as to applications for permits. 1. Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles: Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles: Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. 2. 2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in the case of any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under that sub-section shall be made to the State Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business. 80. Procedure in applying for and granting permits. (i) An application for a permit of any kind may be made at any time. (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act: Provided that the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 74: Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter. (3) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by altering the route or routes or area covered by it, or in the case of a stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit: Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route to increase the frequency of the service so provided without any increase in the number of vehicles: Provided further that,— (i) in the case of variation, the termini shall not be altered and the distance covered by the variation shall not exceed twenty-four kilometres; (ii) in the case of extension, the distance covered by extension shall not exceed twenty-four kilometers from the termini, and any such variation or extension within such limits shall be made only after the transport authority is satisfied that such variation will serve the convenience of the public and that it is not expedient to grant a separate permit in respect of the original route as so varied or extended or any part thereof. 4. A Regional Transport Authority may, before such date as may be specified by it in this behalf, replace any permit granted by it before the said date by a fresh permit conforming to the provisions of Section 72 or Section 74 or Section 76 or Section 79 as the case may be, and the fresh permit shall be valid for the same route or routes or the same area for which the replaced permit was valid: Provided that no condition other than a condition which was already attached to the replaced permit or which could have been attached thereto under the law in force when that permit was granted shall be attached to the fresh permit except with the consent in writing of the holder of the permit. 5. 5. Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 81 a permit issued under the provisions of sub-Section (4) shall be effective without renewal for the remainder of the period during which the replaced permit would have been so effective. 12. From the bare reading of Section 66 of the Act, it would transpire that it talks about the necessity for permit. Sub-section 3 of Section 66 provides the necessity of permit for plying the vehicle on road. Sub-section 3 of Section 66 also carves out exceptions where the permit will not be necessary. Section 69 deals with the general provisions for grant of permit. Sub-section 2 of Section 69 covers the case of the petitioner where the petitioner desires to have inter-State permit. Second Proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 80 provides that the Regional Transport Authroity/State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority referred to sub-section 1 of Section 66 of the Act shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act. The proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 80 of the Act talks about the refusal of the permit stipulating the condition that the reason has to be recorded while refusing to grant permit and for that, an opportunity is required. 13. In view of aforesaid legal position, the submissions of learned standing counsel appears to be misconceived to the extent that the Second Proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 80 would not be attracted as the petitioner has filed application under Section 2 of Section 69. Section 69 enables a person to file application under Section 69 to obtain a permit of any kind and as has been discussed above, the provisions contained under Section 66 talks about the necessity for permits carving out the conditions when the permit would not be required. 14. Otherwise also, assuming the argument of learned Standing Counsel that Second Proviso to Section 2 of Section 80 would not be applicable is taken to be true, the order would suffer from breach of principles of natural justice as refusal to grant permit without assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity would lead to serious prejudice to the petitioner, which involves the livelihood of the petitioner who desires permit for purposes of running his business. 15. 15. Therefore, in my considered opinion, before refusing to grant permit to the petitioner, two conditions were to be fulfilled namely : (i) the refusal order must have contained the reasons. (ii) the same was to be passed only after affording an opportunity of hearing. 16. The Apex Court in the case of D.K.Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., ( 1993 SCC 259 ) has made the following observations: “The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person.” In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621 , a Bench of seven judges of the Apex Court has held that the substantive and procedural laws and action taken under them will have to pass the test under article 14. The test of reasons and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The procedure prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that individual. The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. Even executive authorities which take administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on inherent fundamental rights of citizens, must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirement of natural justice. 17. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirement of natural justice. 17. This view has consistently been followed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in number of cases namely, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , Canara Bank v. V.K.Awasthy, 2005 (6) SCC 321 , Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Ass. v. Central Valuation Broad and others, (2007) 6 SCC 668 and Devdutt v. Union of India and others, 2008(3) ESC 433(SC) as well as this Court in Suresh Singh v. Board of Revenue and others, 2014(5) ADJ 697 . 18. It is also well-settled law that an order which leads to civil consequences must be passed in conformity with the principles of natural justice. 19. Here in this case, since non grant of permit to the petitioner affect the livelihood of the petitioner, therefore it leads to civil consequences. In State of Orissa v. (Misss) Birapani Dei (1967 AIR S.C. 1269) Hon’ble Apex Court has held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice. 20. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1989 SC 620 , Gronsons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 2001 SC 3707 , M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and another, AIR 1975 SC 266 and M/s. Southern Painters v. Fertilisers & Chemical Travancore Ltd. and another, AIR 1994 SC 1277 , as well as Division Bench judgment of this Court in Smt Rajni Chauhan v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (6) AWC 5762 and Society for Education and Welfare Awareness (Sewa) thru it secretary v. Union of India thru Ministry of Human welfare (Manav Sansadhan) New Delhi and others, 2011(6) ADJ 787 . 21. I have seen the impugned orders referred hereinabove. 22. 21. I have seen the impugned orders referred hereinabove. 22. The State Transport Authority has refused to grant permit for the reasons that there are decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court that without there being any agreement, no stage carriage permit can be issued but while observing so the State Transport Authority has not disclosed those cases giving citations where those propositions have been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no such decision of the Apex Court which prohibits the issuance of permit on inter-state route without there being an agreement in between the States. Considering the same, on two occasions, time was granted to the learned Standing Counsel to obtain instructions but no instructions has yet been obtained, therefore the impugned order refusing to grant permit is faulty on this count. Otherwise also, from the perusal of the order, it does not transpire that before refusing to grant permit any opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner whereas the petitioner has taken specific ground that the impugned order dated 13.3.2015 has been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing. 23. So far as appellate order is concerned, the appellate authoirty, taking note of the submissions of both the sides, has dismissed the appeal holding it to be not maintainable. I fail to understand as to how the appeal would not be maintainable ignoring the statutory provisions contained under Section 89 (1) (g) of the Act only because of noting of the contentions of learned counsel for the parties. Here, the appellate authority has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it in view of the provisions contained under sub-section 1(g) of Section 89 of the Act. The factum of which could not be disputed by learned Standing Counsel. Hence, both the orders cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 24. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport Authority and order dated 3.8.2015 passed by the State Transport Appeallate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal No. 06 of 2015 (Mohit Kumar Goyal v. U.P. Transport Commissioner, Lucknow) are hereby quashed. The State Transport Authority is directed to pass a fresh order on the application of the petitioner in accordance with law taking note of the observation made hereinabove. ———————